J  X 


UC-NRLF 


SB    20    ISb 


UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


THIRTY-SEVEN  YEARS  OF 

HOLLAND-AMERICAN  RELATIONS 

1803  TO  1840 


BY 


PETER  HOEKSTRA 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


EERDMANS-SEVENSMA  CO. 

Grand  Rapids,  Michigan         -          Paterson,  New  Jersey 
1916 


EXCHANGE 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

Thirty-Seven  Years  of 

Holland- American  Relations 

1 803  to  1 840 


BY 

PETER  HOEKSTRA 


THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DECREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


EERDMANS-SEVENSMA  CO. 

Grand  Rapid*,  Michigan        -         Paterson,  New  Jersey 

1916 


DEDICATION 


To  Professor  B.  K.  Kuiper  of  Calvin  College,  who 
first  inspired  me  with  a  love  for  the  historical  sciences, 
and  to  that  most  modest  of  historical  scholars,  Pro- 
fessor K  W.  Dow  of  the  University  of  Michigan,  to 
whom  I  owe  a  valuable  training  in  historical  method, 
these  pages  are  affectionately  inscribed.  May  they  con- 
tinue to  inspire  large  numbers  of  their  students  to 
worship  at  the  shrine  of  history. 


Copyrighted  1917,  by  P.  Hoekrtra 


PREFACE. 


The  task  of  collecting  material  for  this  monograph  was 
begun  in  the  summer  of  1913,  partly  at  the  suggestion  of  Dr. 
W.  E.  Lingelbach  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania.  My 
original  plan  was  to  treat  the  subject  of  spoliation  claims 
against  Holland,  but  the  material  proved  to  be  entirely  inade- 
quate. The  reasons  for  enlarging  the  scope  of  the  work,  so 
as  to  make  it  cover  the  years  1803  to  1840,  are  set  forth  in  the 
Introduction. 

A  part  of  the  manuscript  was  read  by  Dr.  Lingelbach  and 
by  Dr.  Frank  E.  Melvin,  then  a  Harrison  research  Fellow  in 
history  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  now  assistant  pro- 
fessor in  history  in  the  Kansas  State  University.  I  owe  much 
to  their  helpful  criticism  and  encouragement,  as  well  as  to 
their  active  assistance.  Dr.  Lingelbach  kindly  consented  to 
collect  for  me  the  documents  from  the  British  Foreign  Office 
which  have  been  utilized  in  Chapter  V.,  while  Dr.  Melvin 
generously  loaned  me  material  from  British  and  French 
archives,  to  which  circumstances  prevented  me  from  pro- 
curing access.  To  the  members  of  Dr.  Lingelbach's  Sem- 
inary on  the  Continental  System  I  am  indebted  for  much 
useful  information,  which  enabled  me  to  give  a  broader 
setting  to  Chapters  II.  and  III.  than  would  otherwise  have 
been  possible.  A  word  of  thanks  is  also  due  to  Dr.  R.  Fruin, 
chief  archivist  of  the  Rijks-Archief  at  The  Hague,  and  to 
his  able  staff  of  assistants. 


3012 


CONTENTS 


Chapter  Pages 

I.     Introduction  1 —  15 

II.     A  Period  of  Prosperity  for  the  American 

Trader  (1803-1807) 6—  59 

III.  A  Period  of  Experimentation  and  Uncer- 

tainty (1808-1809) 60—  92 

IV.  The  Crisis  of  1810  and  its  Results 93—108 

V.     The   Re-opening  of  Diplomatic   Relations 

(1814-1815)  109—119 

VI.     The  Spoliation  Claims  Against  Holland 120—128 

VII.  The  Establishment  of  Trade  Relations 
with  Holland  on  a  Basis  of  Partial 
Reciprocity  129—145 

VIII.     The     Dispute     Regarding     Discriminating 

Duties 146—160 

IX.     The  Conclusion  of  a  Commercial  Treaty 161 — 172 

X.     Conclusion   ..173— 178 

XL     Bibliography  ...  179—184 


CHAPTER  I. 


INTRODUCTION. 


During  the  past  three  centuries  several  lines  of  connec- 
tion, more  or  less  important  according  to  one's  point  of  view, 
have  existed  between  The  Netherlands  and  the  American 
continent.  The  earliest  and  best  known  of  these  Holland- 
American  relations  dates  from  the  year  1609,  when  the  dis- 
coveries of  an  English  sea  captain,  Henry  Hudson,  in  the 
employ  of  a  Dutch  commercial  company,  established  for  the 
Republic  of  Holland  a  claim  to  the  region  which  came  to  be 
known  as  New  Netherland,  lying  between  the  Delaware  and 
Connecticut  rivers.  Discovery  was  followed  by  occupation ; 
trading  stations  were  founded  to  develop  the  new  line  of 
trade  with  the  Indians,  and  colonists  were  sent  in  to  found 
settlements  along  the  Hudson  or  to  find  employment  on  the 
semi-feudal  estates  of  the  patroons.  In  1621  the  Dutch  West 
India  Company  was  organized,  with  supreme  power  of  gov- 
erning the  newly  acquired  region  in  the  name  of  the  Estates 
General. 

Dutch  rule  in  America,  however,  abruptly  came  to  an 
end  in  1664,  when  New  Netherland  was  surrendered  to  the 
English.  For  more  than  a  century  after  this  date  all  direct 
commercial  intercourse  between  Holland  and  her  former 
colony  was  effectually  prevented  by  the  operation  of  the 
British  Navigation  Acts.  During  this  period,  also,  emigra- 
tion from  Holland  practically  ceased.  However,  the  main- 
tenance of  ecclesiastical  relations  still  constituted  a  some- 
what feeble  bond  of  union  between  the  Hollanders  in  the  new 
world  and  those  in  the  old.  In  fact,  the  establishment  of  the 
Reformed  Church  may  be  considered  the  main  permanent 
result  of  this  period,  for  this  religious  organization  exists  and 
thrives  after  the  lapse  of  three  centuries.  Yet,  isolated  as 
they  were  in  other  respects,  the  few  thousand  Hollanders  in 
New  York  and  New  Jersey  influenced  the  life  of  these  col- 
onies for  several  generations.  With  the  conservatism  which 


6       Thirty- Sevttn  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

has  ever  characterized  the  race,  they  retained  their  own  cus- 
toms and  their  language  was  still  spoken  at  the  close  of  the 
American  Revolution.1* 

Of  more  importance  to  our  national  history  than  the  inef- 
fectual attempts  at  colonization  was  the  series  of  relations — 
commercial,  financial  and  political — established  during  the 
Revolutionary  period.  Relations  with  Holland  were  re- 
opened through  the  operation  of  the  same  factor  which  had 
originally  brought  the  Dutch  in  contact  with  the  American 
continent.  Hope  of  gain,  and  the  desire  to  injure  their  trade 
rivals,  the  English,  induced  the  Dutch  to  carry  on  an  illicit 
trade  with  the  American  colonies  during  the  war,  and  this  in 
turn  paved  the  way  for  the  commercial  treaty  of  1782,  under 
which  a  flourishing  trade  soon  sprang  up.  Holland  also 
added  to  our  prestige  abroad  by  her  recognition  of  American 
independence,  and  she  followed  up  this  step  by  sending  an 
accredited  minister  as  early  as  1783 — an  honor  which  the 
United  States  did  not  return  until  1790.  The  loans  which 
the  Dutch  offered  to  the  national  government  at  the  time  of 
our  greatest  financial  distress  were  another  mark  of  esteem 
and  confidence,  which  cemented  the  bonds  of  friendship  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 2)  And  for  more  than  a  century 
our  relations  with  Holland  have  in  the  main  been  character- 
ized by  the  same  friendly  spirit  which  is  noticeable  in  the 
early  years  of  our  national  existence. 

Travel  and  immigration  offered  yet  a  fourth  line  of  con- 
nection. Among  the  most  distinguished  of  the  early  Dutch 
travelers  was  the  later  statesman  Gijsbert  Karel  Van  Hogen- 
dorp,  whose  eager  curiosity  to  obtain  a  first-hand  knowledge 
of  our  institutions  induced  him  to  accompany  the  squadron 
which,  in  1783,  conveyed  the  Dutch  minister  Van  Berckel  to 
the  United  States.  His  name  deserves  mention  not  only  for 
the  interesting  comments  on  men  and  events  which  he  has 


!)  Francis  Adriaan  Van  der  Kemp,  who  reached  New  York  from 
Holland  in  1788,  notes  that  Mrs.  Tap-pan,  Mrs.  Clinton  and  Mrs. 
Hamilton  conversed  with  Mrs.  Van  der  Kemp  in  Dtitch.  "This  was 
unexpected  and  enhanced  yet  farther  the  high  value  of  their  numer- 
ous favors."  Autobiography,  91-2,  Ms.  copy  in  Pa.  Hist.  Society. 

2)  In  so  far  as  these  relations  fall  within  the  Revolutionary 
period  they  have  recently  been  discussed  in  Frederick  Edler's  study, 
The  Dutch  Republic  and  the  American  Revolution,  in  Johns  Hopkins 
Univ.  Studies,  Series  29,  No.  20. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations      7 

left  us,1*  but  also  for  the  part  which  he  played,  in  1814,  in 
re-opening  diplomatic  intercourse  between  the  two  countries. 
The  failure  of  the  so-called  Patriot  uprising,  in  1787,  brought 
to  this  country  the  first  small  band  of  immigrants.  Easily 
foremost  among  them  was  the  former  Mennonite  pastor 
Francis  Adriaan  Van  der  Kemp,  whom  John  Adams,  his  inti- 
mate friend,  characterizes  as  "a  great  man,  a  star  of  first 
magnitude."  2)  "Had  he  been  as  great  a  master  of  our  lan- 
guage as  he  was  of  his  own,"  he  writes  on  another  occasion, 
"he  would  at  this  day  have  been  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
characters  in  the  United  States."  3>  De  Witt  Clinton  was 
equally  impressed  with  his  talents.  "In  a  secluded,  unassum- 
ing village,"  he  wrote  in  1820,  "I  have  discovered  the  most 
learned  man  in  America."  4) 

Van  der  Kemp,  together  with  Adam  G.  Mappa,  Gerrit  C. 
Boon  and  others,  became  connected  with  the  Holland  Land 
Company,  an  association  organized  in  1790  by  a  number  of 
Dutch  financiers,  who  chose  to  invest  a  portion  of  their  capi- 
tal in  American  land.  Among  the  original  founders  of  this 
company — six  in  number — there  are  three  who  deserve  men- 
tion. Rutger  Jan  Schimmelpenninck  was  then  a  rising  young 
lawyer  at  Amsterdam,  and  later  became  Grand  Pensionary 
of  Holland.  His  name  will  receive  frequent  mention  in  the 
following  pages.  Nicholas  Van  Staphorst  and  Willem  Wil- 
linck  were  connected  with  prominent  banking  houses  at  Am- 
sterdam, which  for  many  years  carried  on  the  banking  opera- 
tions which  the  American  government  conducted  with  Hol- 
land.5)  Yet,  although  conditions  in  Holland  were  unusually 


1)  F.  de  B.  Van  Hogendorp,  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften  van 
G.  K.  Van  Hogendorp,  I.,  244  et.  seq. 

2)  John  Adams,  Works,  x.,  22,  Adams  to  S.  B.  Malcolm. 

3)  Ibid.,  x.,  224,  Adams  to  Jefferson,  1816. 

4)  Quoted  in  Helen  Lincklaen  Fairchild,  Fr.  Adriaan  Van  der 
Kemp,  185. 

5)  The  names  of  the  founders  are  attached  to  a  Memorial  to  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Penn- 
sylvania, in  connection  with  one  of  the  numerous  ejectment   suits 
instituted  against  the  company,     (Pamphlet,  Pennsylvania  Hist.  So- 
ciety, no  date.)     In  this  memorial  the  reason  for  the  organization  of 

the  company  is  briefly  given  as  follows:     "Having  acquired 

considerable   estates,  and  perceiving  great  troubles   about  to  cdme 
upon  our  country,  a  natural  sentiment  inclined  us  to  place  a  part,  at 
least,  of  our  property  beyond  the  vicissitudes  of  civil  dissentions  and 
revolutionary  government.     Attached   as  we  were  to  the  cause  of 
liberty  in  Holland,  with  this  view  we  turned  our  thoughts  to  America, 
confidently  believing  that  whatever  was  precious  to  us  in  interest  or 
affection,   would  best  be  secured   among  a  virtuous  people  whose 
government  was  republican " 


8      Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

favorable  for  emigration,  owing  to  the  dissatisfaction  with 
French  influence  and  to  the  growing  economic  distress  which 
followed  upon  the  establishment  of  the  Continental  System, 
only  a  small  number  of  Dutch  Settlers  were  induced  to  oc- 
cupy the  company's  land  in  western  New  York  and  Penn- 
sylvania. 

Toward  the  middle  of  the  century  came  a  more  numerous 
and  more  influential  group  of  immigrants.  Indeed,  the  total 
number  of  Dutch  who  had  come  to  these  shores  between 
1609  and  1846  was  after  all  but  a  Gideon's  band  in  com- 
parison with  these  newcomers.  As  in  other  movements  of  a 
similar  kind  in  the  course  of  American  history,  an  economic 
motive  was  not  entirely  lacking  in  this  case,  but  the  religious 
factor  should  receive  a  far  stronger  emphasis  than  the  eco- 
nomic. The  pioneers  of  this  movement  have,  not  inaptly, 
been  called  the  Pilgrim  Fathers  of  the  West.  They  were 
Seceders  (AFGESCHEIDENEN)  from  the  Established 
Reformed  Church,  who  refused  longer  to  endure  the  petty 
persecutions  to  which  they  were  subjected.  The  religious 
character  of  the  movement  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  whole 
congregations  were  transplanted.  The  vanguard  passed  the 
winter  of  1846- '47  at  New  York,  where  they  still  met  fellow- 
countrymen  with  whom  they  could  converse  in  their  native 
language.  But  their  destination  was  farther  West.  Passing 
along  the  Erie  Canal  in  open  flat-boats,  they  then  wound  < 
their  way  along  the  Great  Lakes,  and  disembarked  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  Lake  Michigan,  near  Black  Lake.  During 
the  same  year  another  party  traveled  westward  from  Balti- 
more, and,  after  a  long  and  tedious  journey  by  land  and 
water,  settled  on  the  prairies  of  Iowa.  In  either  case  immi- 
gration was  conducted  under  the  leadership  of  their  re- 
spective pastors.  In  1849  the  Dutch  colony  in  the  forests  of 
western  Michigan  numbered  some  3,000  souls,  scattered 
about  in  several  communities  which  have  ever  since  retained 
the  typical  Dutch  names  then  conferred  upon  them, — in  Hoi- 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations      9 

land,   Groningen,  Zealand,  Overisel,  Drenthe,   Graafschap 
and  Vriesland.1) 

From  that  day  to  this,  immigration  from  the  Nether- 
lands, generally  speaking,  has  continued  without  interrup- 
tion, though  it  has  long  since  lost  its  religious  character.  It 
is  particularly  during  the  last  six  decades,  then,  that  the 
Dutch  have  contributed  their  share  toward  the  making  of 
the  American  nation,  small  though  that  share  may  be  com- 
pared with  the  contributions  made  by  the  Irish,  the  German, 
the  Latin  and  the  Slav.  A  study  of  this  movement  as  a 
whole  would,  no  doubt,rreveal  the  Dutch  immigrant  at  his 
best ;  through  his  industry  many  a  square  mile  of  our  virgin 
soil  has  been  brought  under  cultivation,  and  in  his  advance 
westward  he  has  ever  carried  with  him  the  church  and  the 
school,  with  all  that  these  institutions  imply.  At  the  present 
day  larger  or  smaller  communities  of  them  are  to  be  found 
in  each  of  the  northern  tier  of  states  from  New  York  to 
Washington,  and  in  at  least  a  dozen  states  to  the  south  of 
this  line.  Outside  of  the  main  areas,  however,  which  roughly 
centre  around  Paterson,  N.  J. ;  Rochester,  N.  Y. ;  Grand 
Rapids,  Mich. ;  Chicago,  111. ;  and  Pella  and  Sioux  Centre, 
Iowa,  their  numbers  are  so  insignificant  as  almost  to  escape 
notice.  It  is  only  in  western  Michigan  and  in  Iowa  that  they 

a)  Two  original  pamphlets  by  leaders  of  this  movement  are  to  be 
found  in  the  Royal  Library  at  The  Hague : 

Brummelkamp,  Rev.  A.,  Holland  in  Amerika — de  Hollandsche 
Kolonizatie  in  den  Staat  Michigan. 

Scholte,  Rev.  H.  P.,  Een  Stem  uit  Pella,  1848.  A  translation  of 
this,  by  Jacob  Van  der  Zee,  appears  in  the  Iowa  Journal  of  History 
and  Politics,  vol.  IX.,  (1911),  pp.  528-574.  In  vol.  X.  of  the  Iowa 
Journal,  pp.  363-381,  Van  der  Zee  gives  a  translation  of  John  Hos- 
per's  Diary  of  a  Journey  from  the  Netherlands  to  Pella,  Iowa,  in  1849. 

Among  the  best  secondary  accounts  are  : 

1.  Versteeg,   D.,   De  Pelgrim   Vaders  van   het   West  en,  Grand 
Rapids,  1886. 

2.  Dosker,   Rev.   Henry  E.,  Levensschets  van  Rev.  A.  C.   Van 
Raalte,  Nykerk,  1893. 

3.  Cole,  Cyrenus,  Pella — A  Bit  of  Holland  in  the  New  World,  in 
Annals  of  Iowa,  vol.  III.,  3rd  Series  (Jan.  1898). 

4.  Gedenkboek  van  het  Vijftigjarig  Jubileum  der  Chr.  Ger.  Kerk, 
Grand    Rapids,    19O7,    contains    two    well-written,    well-ddcumented 
chapters,  dealing  chiefly  with  the  ecclesiastical  side  of  the  question, 
by  Dr.  Henry  Beets. 

5.  Huizenga,  George  Ford,   What  the  Dutch  have  done  in  the 
West,  Philadelphia,  1909,  pp.  52.    Prize  essay  on  this  subject,  awarded 
to  students  of  Hope  College,  Holland,  Mich.,  by  Edward  Bok.     A 
brief,  but  fairly  comprehensive  study  of  the  entire  movement.    Gives 
no  references. 


10     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

are  sufficiently  numerous  to  impress  their  social  character- 
istics, and,  to  a  certain  extent,  even  their  language  upon 
entire  cities  and  countries. 

Thus,  with  some  degree  of  certainty,  the  assertion  may 
be  made  that  since  the  days  of  Stuyvesant  and  Van  Twiller 
the  Dutch  tongue  has  never  ceased  to  be  spoken  on  this  con- 
tinent; and,  with  even  greater  certainty,  that  the  number  of 
those  who  use  either  the  spoken  or  written  language  is  larger 
today  than  at  any  previous  time  in  our  history. 

And,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  this  immigration 
movement  has  tended  to  strengthen  and  multiply  the  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  the  Netherlands. 


During  the  years  1803  to  1840,  the  period  which  has  been 
chosen  for  more  intensive  study,  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  were  very  largely  of  a  commercial  character. 
A  discussion  of  the  Holland  Land  Company  is  here  omitted, 
for,  though  it  overlaps  nearly  the  entire  period,  it  was 
organized  at  least  a  decade  prior  to  1803,  and  several  phases 
of  its  history  do  not  belong  to  a  study  on  Holland- American 
relations.  At  the  opening  of  the  period  the  last  installments 
of  the  Dutch  loans  were  being  repaid,  so  that  this  line  of 
connection  had  practically  been  eliminated.  Although  many 
hundreds  of  emigrants  embarked  for  the  United  States  from 
Dutch  ports,  the  vast  majority  of  these  were  Germans; 
arrivals  from  Holland  were  as  yet  few  and  far  between. 
This  phase  of  the  subject,  therefore,  does  not  call  for  sep- 
arate treatment.  Our  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Nether- 
lands, though  not  entirely  devoid  of  interest,  were  certainly 
of  secondary  importance  in  comparison  with  the  problems 
arising  out  of  trade  and  navigation.  This  was  emphatically 
true  of  the  years  1803  to  1813,  when  diplomatic  relations 
were  suspended  entirely,  and  when  the  tremendous  political 
and  economic  struggle  between  England  and  France  dis- 
turbed the  commerce  of  the  whole  civilized  world  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  history  of  trade  forms  an  important  part  of 
the  history  of  the  period.1* 


a)  For  a  broader  discussion  of  this  statement  see  a  recent  article 
by  Dr.  W.  E.  Lingelbach,  "Historical  Investigation  and  the  Com- 
mercial History  of  the  Napoleonic  Era,"  in  Am.  Hist.  Review,  vol. 
XIX.,  No.  2,  January,  1914. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     11 

The  American  minister  at  The  Hague  had  been  recalled 
in  May  1801, a)  and  no  successor  was  appointed  until  after 
the  downfall  of  Napoleon.  The  reason  for  his  recall,  as 
Secretary  Madison  explained, 2)  was  not  due  to  any 
grievance  or  ill-will  against  Holland,  but  solely  to  the  desire 
of  the  Jefferson  administration  to  economize  on  expendi- 
tures. This  explanation  must  have  been  interpreted  as  a 
polite  diplomatic  subterfuge  by  the  Dutch  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, who  in  his  despatches  makes  pointed  comments  on 
our  abundant  harvests,  on  the  diversified  products  of  the 
soil,  and  on  the  growing  commercial  prosperity  of  the  coun- 
try. And  so  in  reality  it  was ;  for  the  political  status  of  Hol- 
land had  changed  for  the  worse  since  the  first  Dutch  min- 
ister arrived  at  Philadelphia  in  1783.  In  1795  Holland  be- 
came the  ally  of  France,  and  in  succeeding  years  the  nation 
experimented  with  a  series  of  governments,  which  culmin- 
ated, in  1806,  in  the  establishment  of  a  kingdom,  with  Louis 
Bonaparte,  a  brother  of  the  French  Emperor,  as  king.  The 
last  three  of  these  changes  were  expressly  dictated  by  Napo- 
leon, who  aimed  to  bind  Holland  more  closely  to  France,  in 
order  to  insure  the  success  of  his  policy  with  regard  to  Eng- 
land. An  almost  endless  number  of  citations  might  be  made 
from  the  voluminous  correspondence  of  Napoleon,  illustrat- 
ing the  extent  to  which  the  foreign  policy  of  Holland  was 
controlled  by  France  for  many  years  prior  to  July,  1810, 
when  she  actually  became  a  portion  of  French  territory. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  virtually  became  a  needless 
expense  to  the  American  government  to  maintain  a  separate 
mission  in  that  country. 

Meanwhile  the  task  of  safeguarding  the  interests  of  our 
merchants  and  shipowners,  trading  with  Holland,  was  en- 
trusted to  Sylvanus  Bourne,  the  American  consul-general  at 
Amsterdam.  And  to  his  credit  it  must  be  said  that  he  per- 
formed that  difficult  task  quite  as  well  as  any  regularly 
accredited  envoy  could  have  done.  This  is  not  saying,  how- 
ever, that  he  was  entirely  successful,  for  the  spoliation  claims 
later  instituted  against  the  Dutch  government  tell  a  different 


a)  Original  letter  of  recall.  May  30,  1801,  signed  by  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  is  in  the  Rijks-archief  at  The  Hague,  Buitenlandsche  Za- 
ken,  Amerika,  deel  359. 

2)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerika,  359,  Madison  to  Van  Pola- 
nen,  July  30,  1802. 


12     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

story.  But  such  losses  as  were  sustained  by  American  ship- 
ping were  due  to  causes  which  were  entirely  beyond  his  con- 
trol. These  were  years  of  great  uncertainty  for  that  portion 
of  our  seaboard  population  engaged  in  foreign  commerce. 
A  single  voyage  might  bring  rich  returns,  it  might  also  in- 
volve heavy  losses — losses  which  were  not  due  to  a  sharp  de- 
cline in  market  prices,  but  to  the  restraints  of  one  kind  or 
another  which  the  international  diplomacy  of  the  time  im- 
posed even  upon  the  trade  of  neutrals.  Able  and  alert  as 
Bourne  showed  himself  to  be,  he  was  as  powerless  to  prevent 
the  restrictive  legislation  of  the  Dutch  government,  as  he 
was  to  calm  the  violent  storms  of  the  North  Sea  which  an- 
nually wrecked  a  number  of  our  vessels  off  the  coast  of 
Holland. 

The  Napoleonic  regime  collapsed  toward  the  end  of 
1813,  and  with  it  collapsed  also  the  vast  economic  system 
which  had  come  to  bear  his  name.  The  trade  of  the  United 
States, — of  the  entire  world,  in  fact — entered  upon  a  new 
era.  War  prices  no  longer  prevailed  in  Holland,  and  the 
peculiar  risks  and  uncertainties  which  had  lent  such  a 
variety  of  interest  to  the  preceding  years  were  now  a  thing 
of  the  past.  Before  many  years,  the  Dutch  resumed  their 
former  position  as  the  nation's  carriers,  and  the  monopoly 
which  Americans  had  enjoyed  of  this  branch  of  the  trade 
also  became  a  memory  of  the  past.  The  return  of  peace  did 
not,  it  is  true,  put  an  end  to  mutual  complaints  against  trade 
restrictions,  but  these  complaints  were  of  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent nature  than  during  the  decade  preceding  1813.  Then, 
too,  the  fact  that  we  now  had  to  deal  with  an  independent 
nation,  which  was  free  to  shape  its  navigation  policy  as  its 
interests  seemed  to  dictate,  was  another  important  factor 
entering  into  the  changed  situation,  which  put  an  entirely 
different  face  on  our  commercial  relations  with  Holland. 

One  of  the  first  results  of  Dutch  independence  was  the 
restoration  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  United  States,  a 
step  in  which  the  Dutch  government  took  the  initiative.  The 
part  which  England  attempted  to  play  in  this  move  will  be 
told  later.  Yet,  looking  at  this  period  from  1814  to  1840  as  a 
whole,  it  is  again  the  strictly  commercial,  rather  than  the 
diplomatic  phase  of  the  subject,  which  is  of  primary  interest 
and  importance.  Tonnage  duties  and  tariff  schedules,  and 
discussions  relative  to  a  new  commercial  treaty — these  out 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     13 

and  out  commercial  questions  engaged  nearly  the  entire  at- 
tention of  the  diplomats  of  both  countries. 

To  repeat,  therefore,  the  main,  though  not  the  sole,  inter- 
est of  these  37  years  of  Holland-American  relations  centres 
in  questions  growing  out  of  the  commercial  intercourse  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  And  it  is  this  feature  which  gives 
a  large  degree  of  unity  to  the  period. 

The  reason  for  fixing  upon  the  year  1803  as  the  opening 
date  of  this  study,  rather  than  some  earlier  date  such  as 
1783,  or  some  later  date  such  as  1814,  will  possibly  require  a 
word  of  explanation.  The  choice  may  in  part  be  considered 
arbitrary,  although,  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems  justified  from 
the  fact  that  it  marks  the  rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens 
and  the  resumption  of  war  between  England  and  France.  A 
striking  feature  of  this  prolonged  contest  was  the  persistent 
policy  of  France  to  starve  England  into  submission  by  ex- 
cluding her  products  and  manufactures  not  only  from  the 
ports  of  France,  but  also  from  those  of  every  European 
country  which,  through  the  success  of  French  arms  or 
diplomacy,  was  compelled  to  become  her  ally  in  this  cause. 
After  1806  this  economic  phase  of  the  war  came  to  be  known 
as  the  Continental  System  of  Napoleon,  but  so  far  as  Hol- 
land was  concerned,  the  Berlin  decree  of  that  year  merely 
intensified  the  exclusion  laws  which  were  already  being  en- 
forced there  since  1803. 

The  Continental  System  as  such — a  definition  of  which 
need  not  be  attempted  here — is  a  subject  which  properly  be- 
longs to  the  European  history  of  the  period;  but  it  is  here 
approached  very  largely  from  the  American  point  of  view, 
with  the  object  of  determining  its  effects  upon  our  commerce 
with  Holland.  This  plan  has  necessitated  an  examination  of 
the  exclusion  decrees  and  commercial  regulations  of  Hol- 
land, and,  to  some  extent,  of  the  actual  administration  of  the 
system  by  Dutch  and  French  officials.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind,  however,  that  the  primary  object  has  been  to  set  forth 
the  American  rather  than  the  European  aspect  of  the  sub- 
ject. The  two  cannot  be  entirely  separated,  to  be  sure,  for 
it  would  not  be  possible  to  make  a  detailed  study  of  the  Con- 
tinental System  in  Holland  without  devoting  considerable 
space  to  the  peculiar  position  of  the  Americans  as  neutral 
carriers.  It  is  possible,  on  the  other  hand,  to  trace  the  vicis- 
situdes of  our  commerce  during  the  operation  of  the  system, 


14     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

without  entering  into  the  larger  European  aspect  of  the 
problem  any  further  than  is  necessary  for  purposes  of 
explanation. 

A  second  reason  why  the  choice  of  the  year  1803  seems 
justified  is  that  it  furnishes  a  proper  perspective  for  forming 
a  judgment  on  the  effect  of  the  Napoleonic  System  after  it 
came  to  be  applied  to  neutrals.  It  is  only  by  comparing  our 
trade  with  Holland  under  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  with 
that  of  the  preceding  years,  that  an  adequate  idea  can  be 
formed  of  what  these  decrees  actually  meant  to  the  Ameri- 
can shipper  as  well  as  to  the  Dutch  consumer. 

It  may  at  first  thought  appear  that  the  year  1814,  the 
year  when  diplomatic  relations  were  reestablished,  and  when 
trade  was  resumed  on  a  normal,  peace  basis,  would  be  a 
more  suitable  date  for  beginning  a  study  of  this  nature  than 
the  year  1803.  There  are,  however,  a  few  obvious  objec- 
tions to  this  plan.  In  the  first  place,  though  it  is  often  idle 
to  speculate  on  what  might  have  been,  in  this  instance  it  is 
highly  improbable  that  there  should  have  been  a  gap  of 
some  thirteen  years  in  our  diplomatic  relations  with  Hol- 
land, had  the  French  Revolution  not  produced  a  Napoleon, 
who  carried  out  the  ambitions  and  policies  of  his  nation,  as 
well  as  his  own,  when  he  made  Holland  a  dependency,  a 
mere  vassal  state,  of  France.  In  the  second  place,  the  axiom 
that  present-day  conditions  must  be  explained  from  causes 
operative  in  the  past,  is  strikingly  illustrated  when  applied  to 
the  years  following  upon  the  Napoleonic  era.  Thus  the 
entire  subject  of  spoliation  claims,  which  the  United  States 
instituted  against  Holland  and  other  European  countries,  is 
one  of  the  aftermaths  of  this  period,  and  the  subject  can  be 
made  intelligible  only  by  a  study  of  the  restrictive  legislation 
which  gave  rise  to  them.  Again,  it  is  due  to  causes  grow- 
ing out  of  the  grotesque  economic  system  of  Napoleon  that 
at  least  one  explanation  must  be  sought  for  the  difficulty  in 
agreeing  upon  a  satisfactory  basis  for  a  commercial  treaty 
between  the  two  countries.  It  seems  more  logical,  therefore, 
to  carry  the  subject  back  to  1803,  in  order  to  trace  these 
causes  to  their  source. 

The  period  from  1814  to  1840  also  has  an  interest  all  its 
own.  Until  1815  it  had  been  the  policy  of  the  American 
government  to  protect  American  shipping  by  laying  discrim- 
inating tonnage  and  import  duties  on  foreign  vessels.  After 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     15 

1815  this  protective  policy  was  gradually  abandoned  in  favor 
of  reciprocity.  The  first  American  reciprocity  act,  that  of 
March  3,  1815,  was  general  in  its  nature  and  applied  to  all 
foreign  nations  that  were  willing  to  reciprocate.  The  king 
of  The  Netherlands  made  an  immediate,  and  a  favorable, 
response  to  this  act  in  his  proclamation  of  May  27,  1815. 
After  three  years  of  delay,  Congress  made  concessions  to 
Dutch  shipping  similar  to  those  which  Holland  had  made  in 
favor  of  American  shipping.  The  act  of  April  20,  1818, 
established  a  partial  reciprocity  between  the  two  countries. 
Holland  thus  became  the  second  nation  to  obtain  this  favor 
from  the  United  States,  England  having  already  received  it 
in  1815.  After  1818  both  countries  sought  to  obtain  a  more 
perfect  reciprocity,  but  found  it  difficult  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment. The  negotiations  on  this  subject  dragged  along  for 
many  years,  and  it  was  not  till  1839  that  a  reciprocity  con- 
vention between  the  two  countries  was  adopted. 


NOTE:  From  1795  to  June,  1806,  the  official  name  of  the  Dutch 
government  was  the  Batavian  Republic ;  in  1806  it  was  changed  to 
the  Kingdom  of  Holland,  and  in  1814  to  the  Kingdom  of  the  Neth- 
erlands, which  has  since  remained  the  official  designation.  Even  the 
most  careful  writers  have  come  to  use  "The  Netherlands"  and  "Hol- 
land" without  discrimination  when  referring  to  either  the  country 
or  to  the  government,  and  this  well-established,  though  erroneous, 
practice  is  here  adhered  to.  The  practice  arose  from  the  fact  that 
the  provinces  of  North  and  South  Holland  were  the  centres  of 
greatest  wealth  and  political  influence,  and  consequently  played  a 
more  important  part  in  the  history  of  the  nation  than  did  the  rest  of 
the  provinces  combined.  "Holland"  and  "Dutch"  when  used  either  as 
noun  or  adjective,  have  also  become  synonymous. 


CHAPTER  II. 


A  PERIOD  OF  PROSPERITY  FOR  THE  AMERICAN  TRADER. 
(1803—1807.) 

The  return  of  peace,  in  1802,  was  hailed  with  far  greater 
joy  by  the  nations  of  Western  Europe  than  among  the  com- 
mercial population  of  the  United  States.  The  European 
wars,  as  the  Dutch  minister  at  Washington  expressed  it  in 
one  of  his  last  despatches,  had  enriched  the  American  nation 
at  the  expense  of  Holland,  France  and  Spain,  and  had  led 
to  a  mighty  increase  in  American  commerce.  "The  wisdom 
of  the  previous  American  administration,"  he  writes  on  May 
12,  1802,  "in  maintaining  a  position  of  neutrality  among 
the  warring  nations ;  the  complete  predominance  of  England 
on  every  sea,  by  reason  of  which  the  shipping  of  our  nation, 
of  France  and  Spain  has  ceased  entirely,  and  the  trade  with 
the  colonies  of  these  nations  has,  as  a  consequence,  been 
opened  up  to  the  Americans ;  the  spirit  of  revolution  which 
has  swept  over  a  large  part  of  Europe,  and  which  has  caused 
the  transfer  of  huge  capitals  to  the  United  States,  the  only 
place  of  safety;  all  these  misfortunes  under  which  the 
greater  part  of  Europe  has  suffered,  have  combined  to  raise 
American  commerce  to  a  very  high  rank,  and  have  placed 
the  United  States  next  to  England  among  the  commercial 
nations  of  the  world."  Not  only  had  our  carrying  trade 
been  increased,  but,  as  he  relates  further  with  ill-concealed 
jealousy,  that  same  nation  had  also  been  blessed  with  a  suc- 
cession of  favorable  crops,  and  this,  together  with  the  open- 
ing up  of  new  lands,  had  more  than  doubled  the  products  of 
the  soil  in  the  last  eight  years.  During  the  wars  these 
products  had  brought  rich  returns  to  their  owners  when  sold 
in  the  markets  of  Europe  and  the  West  Indies.  It  would, 
doubtless,  be  incorrect  to  assume  that  the  slight  jealousy 
which  he  here  reveals  was  indicative  of  the  state  of  mind  of 
the  entire  Dutch  people;  nevertheless,  as  the  years  go  by 
this  feeling  crops  out  again  and  again. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    17 

In  this  same  despatch  he  gives  expression  to  the  follow- 
ing opinions  on  the  business  methods  employed  by  the 
Yankee  merchant  and  trader,  as  he  had  come  to  know  them 
after  residing  in  this  country  some  six  years.  "As  in  their 
trade,  so  in  their  expenditures — everything  has  been  exagger- 
ated; bad  faith,  downright  cheating  and  the  breaking  of 
contracts  have  become  universal,  yet  these  methods  have 
failed  to  increase  their  capital;  and  by  reason  of  their 
hazardous  speculations  and  their  shameful  business  transac- 
tions, they  have  forfeited  both  their  good  standing  as  mer- 
chants and  the  respect  of  their  fellowmen.  A  contempla- 
tion of  the  present  state  of  things  in  this  country,"  he  con- 
fesses, "has  given  me  a  more  just  appreciation  of  the  sound 
common  sense  and  of  the  old  customs  and  virtues  of  my 
countrymen,  who,  by  honesty  in  trade,  combined  with  a  wise 
frugality,  have  arisen  to  such  a  degree  of  prosperity  that,  in 
the  last  war,  they  were  not  only  enabled  to  prevent  their 
complete  destruction  as  a  nation,  but  even  to  gain  the  re- 
spect and  confidence  of  their  jealous  English  rivals."  Un- 
fortunately, a  year  or  two  later  any  American  might  have 
retorted,  with  perfect  truth,  that  the  entire  commercial  popu- 
lation of  Holland  were  resorting  to  practices  equally  false 
and  dishonest  as  those  which  are  here  charged  up  against 
the  Americans. 

Owing  in  part,  at  least,  to  these  "vicious  practices,"  he 
was  confident  that  the  commercial  nations  of  Europe,  his 
own  included,  "need  entertain  no  fears  that  the  Americans 
....  will  stand  in  their  way,"  now  that  the  return  of  peace 
had  restored  trade  to  its  ordinary  channels.  Dutch  gin,  it  is 
true,  might  find  a  less  favorable  market  in  America,  for  in 
recent  years,  he  writes,  "Americans  have  become  addicted  to 
the  use  of  French  brandies ;  moreover,  their  own  distilleries 
have  increased  in  number,"  and  he  predicted  a  still  further 
increase,  for,  owing  to  the  lack  of  exportation,  the  price  of 
grain  would  be  greatly  reduced.  He  also  expected  a  falling 
off  in  the  exportation  of  broadcloth,  inasmuch  as  the  Ger- 
mans had  learned  to  manufacture  a  higher  grade  of  this 
article  (to  which  they  attached  the  familiar  Leiden  trade- 
mark), and  were  already  exporting  it  to  the  United  States 
by  way  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  Yet,  in  other  lines  of 
trade  he  was  confident  the  Dutch  merchant  would  more  than 


18     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

hold  his  own,  and  that  before  long  a  large  number  of  Ameri- 
can ships  would  be  lying  idle  at  their  wharves.1* 

This  prediction  might,  indeed,  have  come  true,  if  the 
Peace  of  Amiens  had  put  an  end  to  the  European  conflict. 
In  1802  every  branch  of  Dutch  trade  and  industry  was  be- 
ginning to  revive;  during  the  nine  months  following  upon 
the  conclusion  of  peace,  upwards  of  4,000  Dutch  vessels 
were  said  to  have  entered  the  ports  of  Holland. 2)  The  trade 
between  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  the  mother  country,  in 
which  many  an  American  ship  had  been  engaged  during  the 
war,  now  again  became  a  Dutch  monopoly.  Unfortunately 
for  the  Dutch  nation  the  Peace  of  Amiens  proved  to  be 
merely  a  truce;  another  ten  years  of  warfare  was  to  ensue, 
and  during  a  part  of  this  period  the  trade  of  Holland  was 
once  more  carried  on  very  largely  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes. 

As  early  as  July  19,  1803,  some  two  months  after  war 
was  resumed,  we  find  a  mercantile  firm  at  Amsterdam  writ- 
ing to  consul  Bourne  that  the  occasion  had  again  arrived 
"for  a  brisker  intercourse  between  this  country  and  your 
States/'  "The  political  state  of  the  continent,"  they  con- 
tinue, "must  afford  many  facilities  to  American  trade  .... 
England's  intercourse  with  the  greatest  part  of  the  continent 
is  cut  off;  the  importation  of  its  produce,  both  foreign  and 
domestic,  severely  prohibited  both  in  this  and  the  Hanseatic 
Republics  ....  In  this  dilemma  American  vessels  must  be- 
come the  principal  carriers  of  the  different  articles  of  trade, 
and  of  colonial  produce  in  particular.  .  .  .  North  American 
produce  is  considerably  higher."  3)  And  the  testimony  of  a 
Dutch  merchant  at  The  Hague,  about  a  month  later,  would 
indicate  that  this  prediction  was  already  being  fulfilled. 
"Our  merchants,"  he  writes  on  August  30,  "now  hoist  only 
the  American  flag  on  board  their  vessels  to  carry  on  their 
commerce  with  foreign  countries,  as  it  is  the  only  one  which 
the  English  suffer  to  pass  free.  Accordingly,  vessels  be- 
longing to  the  United  States  arrive  daily  in  the  Batavian 


!)  R.  A.,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken  (1795-1813),  Amerika,  deel  358, 
R.  G.  Van  Polanen  to  Van  der  Goes,  May  12,  1802. 

2)  J.  De  Jong,  Geschiedenis  van  het  Vaderland,  2de  druk,  Nij- 
megen,  1895 ;  Deel  III.,  96. 

3)  Louyrex  and  Van  Lennep  to  Bourne,  Bourne  MSS.,  Division 
of  Manuscripts,  Library  of  Congress. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     19 

ports,  the  cargoes  of  which  bring  in  great  profits  to  their 
owners/'  ^ 

As  has  been  stated  before,  one  of  the  outstanding  fea- 
tures of  this  war  was  the  effort  of  France  to  bring  about 
the  commercial  isolation  of  Great  Britain  from  the  con- 
tinent, with  the  object  of  ruining  her  trade  and  industry 
and  thus  compelling  her  to  sue  for  peace.  This  policy  did 
not  originate  with  Napoleon,  nor  was  it  by  any  means  a 
new  one  in  1803,  for  it  had  been  tried  out  more  or  less  con- 
sistently in  France  since  1793.2)  During  the  second  decade 
of  the  continental  wars  (1803-1813)  the  exclusion  system 
was  worked  out  with  far  greater  detail,  and  in  the  end  came 
to  be  applied  throughout  entire  Europe.  In  Holland  it  may 
be  said  to  have  been  inaugurated  by  Napoleon's  order  of 
May  13,  1803,  in  which  he  demanded  that  an  embargo  be 
laid  on  British  shipping  in  the  harbors  of  the  Batavian  Re- 
public and  her  dependencies. 3) 

The  government  of  Holland,  at  this  time  in  the  hands 
of  a  weak  and  vacillating  Directory  or  Executive  Council 
of  twelve  men  (Staatsbewind),  showed  great  reluctance  in 
complying  with  this  demand.  And  they  had  a  two-fold 
motive  in  doing  so.  In  the  first  place,  about  two  months 
before  the  war  broke  out,  the  Dutch  foreign  office  was 
planning  to  shake  off  the  perpetual  alliance  against  Eng- 
land which  had  been  entered  into  in  1795,  and  to  bring 
about  the  neutrality  of  Holland  in  the  coming  struggle. 
On  March  27,  1803,  a  "projet  de  neutralite"  was  forwarded 
to  the  Dutch  ministers  at  Paris  and  London,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  agitating  the  question  in  the  newspaper s4* ;  and  on 
April  12  the  matter  was  formally  brought  to  the  attention 
of  Napoleon.5)  On  May  20,  three  days  after  Napoleon's 
order  for  an  embargo  had  been  communicated  to  the  Dutch 


!)  News  letter  to  The  Aurora,  Oct.  23,  1803;  dated  The  Hague, 
August  30. 

2)  Prof.  J.  H.  Rose,  in  his  chapter  on  The  Continental  System, 
in  the  Cambridge  Modern  History,  (Vol.  IX.,  chap.  XIII),  traces  the 
policy  which  culminated  in  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  back  to  1793. 

3)  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  ler,  VIIL,  314,  No.  6743.     Na- 
poleon to  Semonville,  May  13,  1803. 

*)  This  projet  is  printed  in  Colenbrander,  Gedenkstukken  der 
Algemeene  Geschiedenis  van  Nederland  van  1795  tot  1840,  Staatsbe- 
wind en  Raadspensionaris,  1801-1806;  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  408. 

5)  Ibid.,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  415-416,  Pontoi  to  the  First  Con- 
sul, April  12,  1803. 


20     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

government,  England  expressed  her  willingness  to  sanction 
this  arrangement,  provided  France  would  consent  to  with- 
draw her  troops  from  Dutch  soil,  and  to  release  the  Dutch 
government  from  all  its  engagements  to  furnish  aid  to  her 
ally  during  the  war.1)  To  issue  an  embargo  decree  at  that 
moment  would  therefore  have  been  highly  impolitic,  and 
would  in  fact  be  a  declaration  of  war. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Dutch  government  did  not  un- 
derstand (or  at  least  professed  not  to  understand)  the  exact 
nature  of  the  order  which  had  just  been  received,  and,  as  a 
means  of  delaying  its  execution,  sought  to  obtain  some 
further  explanation  or  modification.  In  replying  to  the 
note  of  Semonville,  the  French  ambassador  at  The  Hague, 
the  Dutch  minister  of  foreign  affairs  argued  that  an  em- 
bargo act  would  result  in  a  great  loss  to  Holland,  and  a 
great  gain  to  England,  and  would  therefore  in  effect  be 
contrary  to  the  real  intentions  of  Napoleon.  He  pointed 
out  that  at  least  forty  vessels  were  at  that  moment  return- 
ing home  from  the  West  Indies,  and  a  much  larger  number 
from  the  East  Indies ;  and  that  at  the  first  sign  of  a  hostile 
act  all  of  these  vessels  with  their  valuable  cargoes  would  be 
confiscated  by  England.  He  concluded  by  stating  that  an 
embargo  "as  general  as  the  one  which  is  proposed,  cannot 
fail  to  estrange  neutral  powers  and  would  give  rise  to  com- 
plaints and  to  demands  for  indemnification."  2) 

Meanwhile  England  had  begun  hostilities  against  Hol- 
land by  laying  an  embargo  on  Dutch  vessels  in  English 
ports  (May  19).  The  Dutch  government,  having  by  this 
time  become  convinced  that  Napoleon  would  listen  to  no 
further  arguments  on  the  subject  of  neutrality,  now  saw 
the  need  of  retaliating  in  kind,  and  on  May  24  resolved  "that 
a  general  embargo  shall  be  laid  on  all  ships  belonging  to 
the  subjects  of  His  Brittanic  Majesty  in  the  ports  of  this 
republic."  3)  Though  Holland  would  ultimately  have  been 
compelled  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  Napoleon,  irrespective 
of  the  course  which  England  pursued,  the  action  which 


!)    Ibid.,   IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  340-341.     Lord  Hawkesbury  to 
Robert  Listen,  May  30,  1803. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Gedenkstukken,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  Van  der 
Goes  to  Semonville,  May  19,  1803. 

3)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewlnd,  Minuteele  Notulen  van  het  Staatsbewind, 
deel  84,  No.  46. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    21 

England  took  had  the  effect  of  hastening  the  adoption  of 
the  embargo  in  Holland.  In  communicating  this  order  to 
the  English  ambassador,  the  hope  was  expressed  that  it 
might  be  considered  "as  a  measure  of  necessity  not  of 
choice,  taken  in  consequence  of  the  urgent  remonstrances 
of  the  French."1) 

This  incident  may  be  taken  as  a  typical  example  of  the 
manner  in  which  government  officials  in  Holland,  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest,  conspired  with  their  subjects,  a 
large  percentage  of  whom  were  in  reality  but  their  fellow- 
merchants  and  traders,  in  the  hopeless  endeavor  to  thwart 
the  application  of  the  exclusion  system  which  Napoleon 
was  determined  to  impose  upon  them.  When  it  was  no 
longer  possible  to  delay  the  application  of  a  particular 
measure,  we  find  them  again  and  again  offering  but  a  half- 
hearted co-operation  in  enforcing  it,  and  conniving  at  the 
open  violations  of  the  law,  which  were  of  daily  occurrence. 
Many  of  Napoleon's  political  dealings  with  Holland  must 
to  a  large  extent  be  explained  in  the  light  of  this  policy  of 
delay  and  evasion. 

The  embargo  act  of  May  24  was  but  the  first  of  a  long 
series  of  decrees  and  regulations  in  regard  to  commercial 
intercourse  with  England,  which  were  to  end  only  with 
the  overthrow  of  Napoleon.  An  act  so  general  in  its  na- 
ture soon  necessitated  a  number  of  supplementary  meas- 
ures, some  of  them  serving  to  explain  the  meaning  of  the 
embargo,  while  others  contained  new  and  additional  feat- 
ures. The  first  of  these  was  the  decree  of  July  5,  1803, 
which  calls  for  more  extensive  discussion.  There  were 
two  outstanding  features  of  this  decree.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  regulated  the  exportation  of  shipbuilding  material,  mate- 
rials of  war,  and  foodstuffs;  on  the  other  hand,  it  forbade 
the  importation  of  enemy  goods,  and  laid  down  conditions 
in  regard  to  the  importation  of  goods  from  neutral  coun- 
tries. Both  phases  of  the  law  were  modified  within  the 
next  half  year,  and  it  was  from  these  modifications  in  par- 
ticular that  the  American  trader  was  to  profit.  It  may  be 
convenient  to  treat  each  phase  of  the  law  separately  and  at 
the  same  time  to  note  its  actual  operation  down  till  the 
middle  of  1805,  when  a  change  of  policy  occurred. 


!)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  341-342,  Robert  Listen  to 
Lord  Hawkesbury,  May  25,  1803. 


22     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

In  the  first  place,  the  exportation  of  all  shipbuilding 
material  and  of  materials  of  war  was  forbidden,  except  by 
the  special  consent  of  the  Directory.1*  This  special  con- 
sent was  not  difficult  to  obtain  where  exportation  to  the 
United  States  was  desired.  Thus,  in  February,  1804,  Van 
Staphorst  &  Company  were  allowed  to  export  500,000 
pounds  of  old  iron  to  the  United  States.2*  On  April  10, 
an  Amsterdam  firm  requested  permission  to  send  50,000 
pounds  of  gun-powder  to  Boston,  which  was  granted  six 
days  later.3*  There  was  also  an  occasional  shipment  of 
sailcloth,4*  but  the  most  common  requests  were  for  the  ex- 
portation of  gunpowder,  and  one  begins  to  wonder  why  there 
should  have  been  such  a  demand  for  this  article  at  Boston 
and  New  York.  The  Directory  may  also  have  had  their 
doubts  as  to  whether  these  shipments  were  really  being  sent 
to  the  United  States,  for  we  find  them  occasionally  granting 
a  request,  but  reducing  the  amount  asked  for  to  one-half  or 
one-third.5* 

The  provision  of  this  law  in  regard  to  the  exportation  of 
foodstuffs  was  largely  due  to  the  vigilance  of  the  French 
ambassador,  Semonville,  who  reported  to  Talleyrand  on 
June  27,  1803,  that  the  most  scandalous  contraband  trade 
was  being  organized,  and  that  shiploads  of  provisions,  evi- 
dently destined  for  the  enemy,  were  being  sent  out  daily.  He 
states  that  he  had  requested  the  Dutch  government  to  forbid 
the  further  exportation  of  foodstuffs  by  sea,  and  that  he  had 
meanwhile  taken  matters  into  his  own  hands  by  ordering  the 
French  agents  at  certain  ports  to  place  under  sequester  every 
vessel  laden  with  foodstuffs.6*  The  decree  of  July  5  was 
by  no  means  to  his  liking,  for  it  merely  forbade  the  exporta- 
tion of  foodstuffs  to  the  enemy,  but  placed  no  restriction  on 
their  sale  to  neutrals.  The  Dutch  government,  half  suspect- 
ing that  Semonville's  activity  in  the  matter  was  due  to  a 


a*  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  Min.  Notulen  van  het  Wetgevend  Lichaam 
der  Bat.  Rep.,  deel  13. 

2*  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  Min.  Notulen  van  het  Staatsbewind,  deel  100, 
Feb.  17,  1804. 

3*  Ibid.,  deel  105;  also  Zeeraad,  II.  April  10,  1804. 

*)  Ibid.,  deel  109,  June  12,  1804  . 

5)  Thus  a  request  for  shipping  35,000  pounds  to  New  York,  was 
reduced  to  12,000  pounds;  Zeeraad,  III.,  March  11,  1805. 

«)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  78;  Semonville  to  Talley- 
rand, June  27,  1803. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    23 

desire  to  line  his  own  purse,  ignored  his  further  protests, 
and  resolved  to  await  the  opinion  of  Napoleon  himself. 

In  the  instructions  to  the  committee  which  was  appointed 
to  confer  with  Napoleon  during  his  visit  to  Brussels,  the 
argument  is  advanced  that  butter  and  cheese  were  the  only 
products  for  which  ready  money  could  'be  obtained  so  as  to 
establish  a  more  favorable  balance  of  trade.  The  English 
used  little  cheese,  it  was  stated,  but  paid  a  high  price  for 
butter,  which  was  used  exclusively  by  the  wealthy  and  not 
for  provisioning  their  ships.  Moreover,  every  cask  of  gin 
smuggled  into  England  would  decrease  the  income  of  the 
English  government,  and  increase  both  the  public  and  pri- 
vate resources  of  the  Dutch  nation. x)  A  later  communica- 
tion to  this  committee  2)  indicated  that  the  government  was 
anxious  to  find  out  whether  it  really  was  Napoleon's  inten- 
tion to  prevent  the  exportation  of  foodstuffs  to  England  in 
neutral  vessels  by  every  possible  means.  Napoleon  listened 
attentively  to  the  arguments  presented  by  the  committee,  but 
to  their  plea  that  it  was  an  absolute  necessity  for  Holland  to 
allow  the  exportation  of  butter,  cheese  and  salted  meat,  his 
only  reply  was,  "Nous  examinerons  cela  encore."  3*  It  is 
significant,  however,  that  he  did  not  forbid  the  practice  en- 
tirely, although  he  was  well  aware  that  neutral  nations  were 
thus  indirectly  granting  assistance  to  England. 

Semonville,  apparently  influenced  by  Napoleon's  atti- 
tude, now  conceded  that  the  arguments  which  had  been  ad- 
vanced to  justify  the  exportation  of  butter  and  salted  meat 
were  sound,  but  that  they  could  not  be  used  to  justify  the 
exportation  of  cheese,  which  was  an  article  of  daily  use  on 
board  of  every  English  man-of-war.  He  therefore  re- 
quested the  passage  of  a  law  prohibiting  the  exportation  of 
cheese  to  all  countries  except  France  and  Spain  until  the  first 
of  April,  1804.4)  Two  days  later,  on  August  25,  a  decree 
embodying  this  request  was  provisionally  put  into  effect,5 ) 


1)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  443;  Besier's  instructions 
to  the  committee,  July  5,  1803. 

2)  Ibid.,  443;  Bosscha  to  Van  der  Goes,  July  21,  1803. 

3)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  449-451;  Van  der  Goes' 
report  of  the  committee's  interview  with  Napoleon,  July  23,  1803. 

4)  Semonville   to   Van   der   Goes,   August  23,   1803 ;   quoted  in 
Vreede,  Inleiding   tot  eene  Geschiedenis  der  Ncderlandsche  Diplo- 
matic, deel  2,  2de  stuk,  bijlage  VI.,  21-23. 

5)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  Min.  Not.  van  het  Wetg.  Lichaam  der 
B.  R.,  deel  13. 


24     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

and  on  October  18  this  provisional  measure  was  renewed  for 
an  indefinite  period. 1) 

This  decree  at  once  raised  a  storm  of  protest  throughout 
Holland.  Before  long  the  American  vice-consul  at  Amster- 
dam began  to  receive  requests  from  Dutch  mercantile  houses 
to  use  his  influence  in  having  the  privilege  of  exporting 
cheese  extended  to  the  United  States.  In  transmitting  a 
number  of  these  memorials  to  the  foreign  office  on  October  5, 
he  writes  that  he  was  daily  pestered  by  Dutch  firms  which 
desired  to  fill  the  orders  they  had  received  from  American 
business  houses. 2)  The  Dutch  government  hesitating  to  act 
on  its  own  responsibility,  referred  these  communications  to 
Schimmelpenninck,  the  Dutch  ambassador  at  Paris,  with  a 
statement  that  the  vessels  were  lying  in  readiness  to  sail  and 
that  the  stormy  season  was  approaching.3) 

Schimmelpenninck  was  easily  the  foremost  statesman 
and  diplomat  whom  the  Dutch  nation  produced  during  this 
period  of  French  domination.  In  fact,  he  deserves  to  be 
ranked  among  the  greatest  Dutch  statesman  of  any  time. 
At  that  moment  he  stood  high  in  the  confidence  and  esteem  of 
Napoleon,  who,  only  two  months  earlier,  had  paid  him  a 
very  flattering  compliment  for  the  part  he  played  in  the  ne- 
gotiations which  led  to  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  Several  years 
earlier  he  had  begun  to  take  an  interest  in  things  American 
by  becoming  a  member  of  the  Holland  Land  Company,  and 
since  then  he  had  shown  his  appreciation  of  American  insti- 
tutions, by  advocating  the  adoption  of  a  Federal  government 
in  Holland,  with  a  President  at  the  head.  In  connection  with 
the  proposed  change  of  government  in  1802,  one  of  his  con- 
temporary admirers  says,  "Schimmelpenninck  has  always 
preached  in  favor  of  the  American  constitution,  and  has 
always  told  me  that  he  found  this  constitution  to  be  the  best 
one",  and  he  asks  whether  Schimmelpenninck  would  not  be- 
come the  Washington  of  Holland  in  case  such  a  constitu- 

1)  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  deel  14. 

2)  R.  A.,  Bmtenl  Zaken,  Amerika,  deel  359;  H.  H.  Daroen  to 
Van  der  Goes,  Oct.  5,  1803.    Here  also  are  found  a  number  of  the  re- 
quests referred  to  in  the  text.     On  Oct.  4,  e.  g.,  the  firm  of  P.  H. 
Eeghen  at  Amsterdam  states  that  they  have  received  an  order  for 
1500  cheeses  from  Streatfield  and  Clarkson,  N.  Y.,  and  ask  whether  it 
is  possible  to  obtain  a  permit  to  export  them. 

3)  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  deel  359;  Van  der  Goes  to  Damen,  October  7, 
1803 ;  also  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  463 ;  Van  der  Goes  to 
Schimmelpenninck,  Oct.  7,  1803. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    25 

tion  should  be  adopted.1*  But  the  readiness  with  which  he 
took  up  the  matter  now  entrusted  to  him  probably  sprang 
from  another  motive  than  his  friendship  for  the  United 
States.  He  was  a  thorough  patriot  at  heart,  and  was  touched 
to  the  quick  by  complaints  on  the  part  of  the  commercial 
population  at  home. 

In  his  first  communication  to  Talleyrand  on  the  subject 
of  non-exportation  of  cheese,  he  skillfully  put  forward  the 
American  rather  than  the  Dutch  side  of  the  case,  by  pointing 
out  that  under  the  treaty  of  1782  Holland  had  agreed  to  treat 
the  United  States  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored  nation. 
On  this  ground,  he  asserted,  the  United  States  was  objecting 
to  the  recent  action  taken  by  the  Dutch  government.2 )  Nor 
was  he  content  with  his  own  efforts,  for  he  also  made  use  of 
the  services  of  Robert  Livingston,  the  American  minister  at 
Paris.  Between  them  it  was  agreed,  according  to  Schimmel- 
penninck's  report,  "that  we  could  most  easily  attain  the 
object  sought  after  by  both  governments,  if  he  [Livingston] 
should  continually  place  himself  in  the  foreground  as  the 
complaining  party. 3*  After  trying  out  the  effect  of  this  policy 
for  nearly  three  months,  Livingston  sent  a  note  to  Schimmel- 
penninck,  which  was  clothed  in  the  form  of  an  official  protest 
to  the  Dutch  government  that  the  law  in  question  had  not  yet 
been  modified  so  far  as  it  affected  American  interests,  and 
which  contained  a  mock  threat  that  the  United  States  could 
no  longer  maintain  silence  on  so  important  a  matter.  "If  the 
state  of  war  renders  any  precautions  necessary  in  effecting 
the  shipments/'  he  adds  by  way  of  compromise,  "the  United 
States  will  object  to  none  that  are  imposed  upon  other 
nations."  4> 

This  note,  according  to  previous  agreement,  was  duly 
transmitted  to  the  French  foreign  office,  with  a  polite,  but 
firm,  request  that  the  French  ambassador  at  The  Hague 
might  be  instructed  to  make  a  speedy  settlement  of  the  mat- 
ter, and  with  a  delicate  hint  that  further  delay  might  embroil 


*)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  381;  Gogel  to  Canneman, 
August  31,  1802. 

2)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Frankrijk,  deel  216 ;  Schimmelpenninck 
to  Van  der  Goes,  October  14,  1803. 

3)  R.  A,,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Frankrijk,  216;  Schimmelpenninck  to 
Van  der  Goes,  November  20,  1803. 

4)  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  218;  Livingston  to  Schimmelpenninck,  Feb.  9, 
enclosed  in  Schimrnelpenninck's  despatch  of  Feb.  26. 


26     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

the  ally  of  France  in  difficulties  with  the  United  States.1* 
The  game  thus  played  by  these  two  diplomats  in  the  end  had 
the  desired  effect  upon  Napoleon,  and  on  March  31,  1804, 
Schimmelpenninck  transmitted  the  intelligence  "that  the 
exportation  of  our  cheese  to  the  United  States  shall  be  per- 
mitted in  the  same  manner  as  now  holds  for  France  and 
Spain."  2>  A  few  days  later  the  Dutch  government  authorized 
the  proper  authorities  to  grant  all  pending  and  all  future 
requests  for  exportation  of  cheese  to  the  United  States.  As 
a  precaution  to  prevent  the  goods  from  reaching  the  enemy, 
the  Dutch  shipper,  not  the  American  carrier  or  the  Ameri- 
can consignee,  was  required  to  deposit  with  the  proper 
officials  a  bond  amounting  to  double  the  value  of  the  cargo, 
which  was  to  be  forfeited  in  case  a  certificate,  showing  that 
the  goods  had  actually  been  landed  at  an  American  port,  was 
not  returned  within  six  months,  with  the  signature  of  the 
French  or  Dutch  consul. 3)  A  merchant  at  Amsterdam  was 
the  first  to  apply  for  the  shipment  of  a  quantity  of  cheese  to 
the  United  States  and  thence  to  Surinam.  He  proved  to  be 
the  same  person  who,  in  his  capacity  of  vice-consul  of  the 
United  States,  (a  position  which  he  no  longer  held)  had 
brought  this  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Dutch 
government.4* 

It  is  a  curious,  and  yet  a  significant  fact,  that  a  similar 
privilege  was  not  granted  to  any  other  neutral  country,  nor, 
so  far  as  is  known,  was  even  applied  for.  The  question  nat- 
urally presents  itself,  why  all  this  ado  about  allowing  the  ex- 
portation of  an  article  of  luxury  to  a  distant  nation  across 
the  sea  ?  Did  the  cheese  merchants  of  Holland  annually  send 


!)  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  218;   Schimmelpenninck  to  Talleyrand,  Feb.  24, 
enclosed  in  Schimmelpenninck's  despatch  of  Feb.  26. 

2)  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  218;  his  original  despatch   (No.  36)   appears  to 
have  been  lost,  but  the  substance  of  it  is  given  in  his  note  to  Living- 
ston, April  3,  1804,  enclosed  in  his  despatch  No.  40,  April  9. 

3)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  Min.  Notulen — Staatsbewind,  105,  Apr.  5, 
38O4. 

*)  Ibid.,  April  6.  The  following  form  of  agreement,  found  among 
the  Bourne  MSS.,  was  probably  in  common  use.  Les  soussign£s  s'  en- 
gagent  de  procurer  dans  1  'espece  de  six  mois  a  son  excellence  1'  am- 
bassadeur  de  1'  Empire  Francais  un  certificat  delivre  par  1'  agent  des 
relations  commercialles  de  France,  qui  prouye  que  les  Dix-sept  cent 
Livres  de  Frommage,  qui  seront  charges  ici  a  bord  du  navire  Am6ri- 
cain  nomm£  Aimable.  . .  .destinS  pour  New  York  . .  .seront  d6charg£s 
dans  le  dit  port,  et  s'  engagent  de  plus  de  payer  le  double  du  valeur  du 
susdit  frommage  en  cas  que  le  dit  certificat  ne  soit  procur& 
March  14,  1805.  (Signed)  Daniel  Crommelin  et  fils. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     27 

over  such  large  quantities  of  their  wares  that  absolute  ruin 
stared  them  in  the  face,  now  that  a  government  regulation 
prevented  them  from  supplying  their  customers?  During 
the  year  ending  September  30,  1803,  the  United  States  re- 
ceived only  41,175  pounds  of  Dutch  cheese,  valued  at 
$10,293. 75. 1)  This  amount  was  sufficient  to  supply  only  a 
few  hundred  households,  while  the  money  value  was  so  in- 
significant that  its  loss  would  hardly  be  felt  when  distributed 
among  a  number  of  Dutch  merchants,  who  annually  disposed 
of  not  merely  thousands,  but  millions  of  pounds  of  cheese  to 
foreign  buyers.  When  it  be  remembered  also  that  cheese  had 
long  been  an  American  export  of  no  inconsiderable  value,  it 
becomes  perfectly  clear  that  this  measure  was  not  as  inno- 
cent as  it  at  first  appears. 

A  few  trade  statistics  may  help  to  explain  the  motives 
which  led  to  its  adoption.  During  the  year  1802,  when  there 
was  no  prohibition  to  export  this  article,  10,683,961  pounds 
were  sent  abroad.  The  following  year,  with  exportation 
restricted  during  the  last  three  months  to  only  two  coun- 
tries, the  figure  rose  to  16,757,812  pounds.  In  1804,  with 
exportation  restricted  to  two  countries  during  the  first  three 
months,  and  to  three  countries  during  the  last  nine  months, 
it  amounted  to  19,019,266  pounds. 2)  One  would  expect  to 
see  a  sharp  decline,  but  curiously  enough,  there  is  a  gain  of 
nearly  three  million  pounds  over  the  preceding  year.  Now 
during  the  same  year  only  70,313  pounds  of  Dutch  cheese 
were  sent  to  the  United  States,3 >  not  quite  double  the  amount 
received  in  1803.  Clearly  these  additional  three  million 
pounds  must  have  been  shipped  to  other  markets,  most  likely 
to  those  neutral  and  belligerent  ports  to  which  exportation 
was  prohibited. 

As  has  been  stated,  one  of  the  first  permits  was  for  a 
shipment  by  way  of  New  York  to  Surinam,  or  Dutch  Guiana, 
which  was  then  a  British  and  not  a  Dutch  colony.  If  this 
case  were  the  only  one  of  its  kind,  there  would  be  no  need  of 
referring  to  it  at  all.  For,  though  it  was  a  fraudulent  opera- 
tion to  export  cheese  to  Surinam — fraudulent  in  the  first 


*)  A.  Seybert,  Statistical  Annals  of  the  United  States,  (Phila- 
delphia, 1818),  235. 

2)  R.  A.,  Collectie  Goldberg,  deel  208,  Staten  van  In-  en  Uit- 
voer. 

3)  Seybert,  235. 


28     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

place  because  the  law  of  Holland  limited  exportation  to 
France,  Spain  and  the  United  States,  and  in  the  second  place 
because  it  required  the  use  of  a  false  certificate — the  trans- 
action might  be  justified  on  the  ground  that  the  cheese  was 
destined  for  Dutch  planters,  who  through  the  fortunes  of 
war  had  become  British  subjects.  Requests  for  exportation 
to  Danzig,  Riga  and  other  northern  ports  were  generally  re- 
fused, although  in  one  instance  at  least  a  direct  shipment  to 
Archangel  was  allowed.1  >  But  there  appears  to  have  been  no 
difficulty  in  obtaining  permits  for  exportation  to  the  East 
and  West  Indies  by  way  of  the  United  States. 2) 

It  was  therefore  not  the  possibilities  which  the  American 
markets  offered  for  the  sale  of  cheese,  but  the  desire  to  make 
a  fraudulent  use  of  the  American  flag  for  disposing  of  what 
was  then,  and  is  today,  one  of  the  most  important  products 
of  Holland,  that  led  to  the  adoption  of  this  measure.  For, 
it  was  comparatively  easy  for  an  American  captain,  home- 
ward bound,  to  store  away  a  considerable  quantity  of  this 
article,  which  occupied  little  space  in  proportion  to  its  value, 
to  induce  a  Dutch  or  French  consul  by  fair  means  or  foul  to 
sign  the  requisite  certificate  showing  that  the  cargo  had  been 
1'anded  at  an  American  port,  or  at  a  pinch  to  forge  his  own 
signature,  and  then  to  forward  the  goods  to  the  port  of  des- 
tination either  in  the  same  vessel  or  in  another.  As  likely  as 
not  this  ultimate  destination  was  a  British  colony  or  a  port 
of  the  British  Isles,  so  that  the  transaction  was  apt  to  involve 
a  second  trip  across  the  Atlantic. 

A  third  element  of  fraud  entered  when  the  vessel,  instead 
of  first  going  to  the  United  States,  would  directly  proceed  to 
some  forbidden  British  or  Continental  port.  For,  such  a  voy- 
age required  not  only  a  false  certificate,  but  also  a  false  cus- 
tom-house declaration  and  a  falsification  of  the  ship's  papers 
in  general.  And  this  practice  probably  became  more  common 
than  the  former  because  it  was  more  profitable.  Suggestive 
as  to  the  extent  of  the  practice  are  the  shipping  lists  in  Amer- 
ican newspapers.  Thus  on  August  27,  1804,  out  of  the  fif- 
teen American  vessels  in  the  port  of  Rotterdam,  nine  were 


!)  May  27,  1805. 

2)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  Min.  Not Staatsbewind,  deel  103.  On 

April  10,  1804,  a  permit  was  granted  for  20,000  pounds ;  April  12,  for 
2,000  pounds,  etc. 


Thirty- Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     29 

destined  to  foreign  ports. x)  At  Amsterdam,  which  drew  a 
larger  percentage  of  American  trade  than  Rotterdam,  there 
»vere  twenty-four  American  vessels  on  March  25,  1805,  of 
which  ten  were  destined  directly  for  the  United  States  and 
fourteen  for  ports  on  the  continent  or  for  the  East  Indies 
and  China.2 >  These  figures,  which  have  been  selected  at 
random,  would  seem  to  indicate  that  about  three-fifths  of  our 
trade  with  Holland  was  carried  on  by  vessels  which  plied 
back  and  forth  between  a  Dutch  port  and  some  foreign  port 
before  returning  to  the  United  States.  And  during  any  one 
of  the  years  1803  to  1807  the  number  of  American  vessels 
reported  in  the  ports  of  Holland  is  from  two  to  four  times 
as  large  as  the  number  of  arrivals  from  Holland  in  American 
ports. 

We  have,  therefore,  in  all  the  circumstances  surrounding 
the  adoption  of  this  bit  of  commercial  legislation,  as  well  as 
in  the  evidence  on  its  actual  operation,  a  recognition,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  the  important  place  which  Americans  had  come 
to  occupy  in  conducting  the  carrying  trade  of  the  Dutch  na- 
tion ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  concrete  example  of  the  way 
in  which  our  carrying  trade  was  increased  by  the  operation 
of  the  exclusion  system  in  Holland. 

There  was  yet  another  feature  of  the  decree  of  July  5, 
1803,  from  which  the  American  trader  was  to  profit.  After 
the  last  day  of  July,  all  goods  imported,  either  directly  or  in- 
directly, from  Great  Britain  or  any  of  her  colonies  were  sub- 
ject to  confiscation.  To  guard  against  the  importation  of 
such  goods  from  neutral  countries,  all  neutrals  were  required 
to  present  a  certificate  signed  by  a  Dutch  consul  or  by  some 
local  official  at  the  place  of  lading,  and  indicating  the  name  of 
the  vessel  and  of  the  shipper,  together  with  a  statement  as  to 
the  origin  and  destination  of  the  goods.  Without  such  a 
certificate  no  vessel  was  allowed  to  enter  or  to  discharge  its 
cargo,  unless  this  should  consist  in  whole  or  in  part  of  goods 
which  were  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  Holland  and 
her  colonies,  and  unless  the  same  vessel  carried  out  from 
Holland  a  certain  amount  of  goods  corresponding  to  the 
value  of  those  which  were  imported. 

On  August  17,  1803,  a  little  over  two  weeks  after  this 
provision  of  the  law  had  gone  into  effect,  Mr.  H.  H.  Damen, 


a)  Amer.  Daily  Advertiser,  Oct.  25,  1804. 
2)  Aurora,  May  21,  1805. 


30     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

who  was  temporarily  looking  after  American  interests  during 
the  absence  of  Consul  Bourne,  requested  the  government  to 
delay  its  application  until  some  more  convenient  date,  as  re- 
gards American  vessels  coming  from  the  United  States  and 
foreign  ports,  on  the  ground  that  no  sufficient  time  had  been 
granted  to  spread  the  news  to  American  vessels  which  were 
on  their  way  to  Holland.1*  The  Directory,  ever  ready  to 
favor  the  American  trader,  upon  whom  the  nation  was  daily 
becoming  more  dependent  for  the  supply  of  foreign  products, 
met  this  request  part  way  by  ordering  that  until  the  first  of 
October  no  certificate  should  be  required  of  ships  coming 
directly  from  American  ports,  provided  the  ship's  papers 
clearly  indicated  that  the  cargo  had  been  taken  on  board  be- 
fore the  decree  had  become  known.  For  American  vessels 
coming  from  any  other  port  of  the  world  the  decree  was  to 
have  immediate  effect. 2) 

Before  long  American  vessels  were  beginning  to  exper- 
ience difficulties,  some  because  they  had  no  certificates,  others 
because  their  certificates  were  suspected  of  being  false. 
Early  in  October  there  were  44  neutral  vessels  at  Amster- 
dam, among  them  a  number  from  America,  which  the  French 
ambassador  suspected  of  being  English.  He  requested  the. 
government  to  make  a  close  inspection,  and  meanwhile  to 
grant  no  permits  to  unload. 3)  Our  commerce  with  Rotter- 
dam, so  Bourne  reported  on  October  22,  was  likewise  "em- 
barrassed." "Several  vessels  loaded  with  cotton  [are]  pre- 
vented from  discharging  their  cargoes  because  they  had  call- 
ed in  England  for  orders,  and  were  not  furnished  with  the 
certificates  required  by  the  decree  of  July  5  last,  proving  the 
property  to  be  American."  He  stated  that  he  would  go  to 
The  Hague  to  seek  relief  from  the  government,  "whose  con- 
duct in  these  cases  I  am  led  to  believe,  is  more  dictated  by  an 
extraneous  influence,  (which  it  has  not  the  power  to  counter- 
act) than  by  its  own  abstract  view  ....  of  the  matter."  4> 


1)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  Min.  Not.  van  het  Staatsbewind,  deel 
90.    His  memorial  is  quoted  in  the  minutes  of  the  Directory  for  Aug. 
19,  1803. 

2)  Ibid.,  deel  90,  Aug.  25,  1803.    A  copy  of  this  decision,  bearing 
the  seal  of  the  Bat.  Republic,  is  found  among  the  Bourne  MSS. 

3)  Ibid.,  Register  van  de  Besluiten  der  Zeeraad,  II.,  contains  two 
letters  on  this  matter. 

*)  Bourne  MSS.,  Bourne  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Oct.  22,  1803. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     31 

Early  in  November,  1803,  the  July  decree  was  somewhat 
modified  owing  to  complaints  from  Denmark,  and  possibly 
also  to  the  efforts  of  Bourne.  Neutral  vessels  which  had 
been  compelled  to  run  into  a  British  port,  were  now  per- 
mitted to  enter  and  unload,  provided  they  had  neither  broken 
cargo  nor  taken  any  additional  goods  on  board.  No  cer- 
tificates were  required  for  vessels  carrying  iron  from  coun- 
tries to  the  north  of  Holland,  and  shipbuilding  material  from 
other  parts  of  the  world.  More  significant  still,  all  ports 
of  the  Republic  were  opened  "without  any  formalities,  to  all 
merchandise  of  such  a  nature  that  the  same  cannot  expressly 
be  considered  as  having  been  brought,  either  directly  or  in- 
directly, from  Great  Britain  or  her  colonies."  ^  It  will  be 
noted  that  this  was  a  relaxation  of  the  earlier  regulation  in 
regard  to  certificates,  and  was  plainly  intended  to  encourage 
the  fradulent  introduction  of  English  goods  by  neutral  car- 
riers. No  attempt  was  made  even  to  specify  what  should  be 
considered  as  non-English  goods ;  this  matter  was  left  to  the 
decision  of  customs  officers,  who  could  be  relied  upon  to  wel- 
come every  vessel  which  entered  without  inquiring  too 
closely  into  the  origin  of  the  cargo. 

During  the  next  twelve  months  the  country  was  flooded 
with  British  goods,  many  of  which  ultimately  found  their 
way  into  Germany,  Switzerland  and  France.  Napoleon, 
through  the  daily  bulletins  which  he  received  from  Fouche2*, 
was  well  aware  of  this  practice,  but  the  proposed  Boulogne 
expedition  for  a  descent  upon  England,  which  demanded  his 
entire  attention,  probably  prevented  him  for  the  time  being 
from  taking  any  action.  In  the  latter  part  of  1804,  however, 
he  gave  orders  that  all  intercourse  between  England  and 
Holland  must  cease,  and  that  English  goods  should  be  con- 
fiscated to  the  profit  of  the  army.3)  Semonville  had  not  only 
forestalled  this  order  completely,  but  had  once  more  called 
upon  the  Dutch  government  to  prohibit  the  exportation  of 
foodstuffs  except  in  so  far  as  the  law  allowed,  and  this  time 


!)  R.  A.,  Staatsbeivind,  Notulen  van  het  Wetgevend  Lichaam  der 
Bat.  Rep.,  deel  15,  Nov.  3,  1803. 

2)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Inleiding,  XXXVI.,  et  seq., 
gives  liberal   selections  from  the  work  of  Ernest  d'  .Hauterive,  La 
Police  Secrete  du  Premier  Empire;   Bulletins  quotidiens  addresses 
par  Fouche  a  1'  Empereur,  1804-1805. 

3)  Corresp.  de  Nap.,  X.,  36,  Nap.  to  Talleyrand,  Oct.  27;  to 
Gen.  Marmont,  Nov.  1;  Ibid.,  40. 


32     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

he  made  the  additional  demand  that  the  certificates  which 
the  law  required  must  be  recorded  and  countersigned  at  the 
French  legation.1)  Had  any  one  but  the  ambassador  of 
France  presented  this  demand,  writes  the  Dutch  Secretary 
of  Finance,  the  indignation  which  it  caused  would  have  been 
less  extreme,  for  Semonville  was  at  that  time  openly  accused 
of  favoring  contraband  trade  by  the  sale  of  permits. 2)  The 
failure  of  the  government  to  comply  with  his  demand  was 
due  in  part  to  the  positive  dislike  they  had  conceived  for 
this  individual. 

Semonville  thereupon  again  took  the  law  into  his  own 
hands,  and  we  soon  find  French  consular  agents  and  soldiers 
acting  as  though  Holland  was  already  a  portion  of  French 
territory.  In  his  despatch  of  November  2,  1804,  Semon- 
ville reported,  with  evident  satisfaction,  that  no  vessel  con- 
taining foodstuffs  was  allowed  to  depart  unless  a  certificate 
had  been  presented  to  one  of  the  French  commissaries  and 
viseed  at  the  legation.  Certificates  bearing  the  signature  of 
a  Dutch  or  French  consul  were  now  also  required  of  all 
incoming  vessels,  and  to  facilitate  the  carrying  out  of  this 
plan  the  French  troops  stationed  along  the  coast  were 
ordered  to  visit  every  vessel  entering  or  leaving.3 >  This  was 
the  first  attempt  at  a  more  rigid  enforcement  of  the  exclusion 
system;  from  this  time  forward  the  use  of  certificates  be- 
came a  recognized  part  of  the  system,  and  American  captains 
had  to  put  up  with  the  practice  along  with  other  petty  incon- 
veniences which  the  war  imposed  upon  our  trade  with 
Europe. 

It  proved,  however,  to  be  merely  an  inconvenience  and 
by  no  means  diminished  the  amount  of  trade  which  Ameri- 
cans carried  on  with  Holland.  It  was  as  easy  to  perpetrate 
fraud  in  introducing  British  goods  as  it  was  to  obtain  a  false 
certificate  showing  that  Dutch  foodstuffs  had  not  been 
landed  at  an  enemy  port.  English  officials  were  only  too 
ready  to  cooperate  with  the  Dutch  officials  in  order  to  dis- 
pose of  English  goods  and  thus  to  defeat  the  intention  of 
Napoleon,  and,  if  the  French  officials  became  too  meddle- 


x)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  528;  Semonville  to  Van 
der  Goes,  Oct.  1,  1804. 

2)  Ibid.,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk,  535 ;  Gogel  to  Gen.  Marmont,  Oct.  5, 
1804. 

3>  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  116-117;  S&n.  to  Talley- 
rand, Nov.  2,  1804. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     33 

some,  the  trade  was  profitable  enough  to  offer  them  a  good 
round  sum  in  hush  money.  In  1804  the  French  commissary 
at  Amsterdam  was  receiving  80,000  florins  a  year,  payable  by 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  and  the  one  at  Rotterdam  per- 
haps made  out  even  better  by  demanding  five  per  cent,  of  the 
value  of  the  cargo  on  each  false  certificate  of  origin  which 
he  sold.1*  Nor  were  Americans  apt  to  suffer  greatly  even 
though  British  goods  were  confiscated  by  such  French 
officials  as  were  not  open  to  corruption.  For,  the  penalty 
attached  to  the  fraudulent  importation  of  English  goods 
did  not  affect  the  vessel  but  merely  the  goods,  and  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten  these  goods  were  probably  not  American 
owned,  but  were  paid  for  by  Dutch  merchants  or  by  some 
ultimate  consignee  in  France  or  Germany.  A  Yankee  cap- 
tain might  sympathize  with  a  good  customer  whose  goods 
had  been  seized  and  confiscated,  but  he  stood  ready  none  the 
less  to  bring  in  another  shipload,  if  so  desired.  The  only  loss 
he  was  apt  to  sustain  was  the  expense  of  paying  his  crew 
during  the  enforced  idleness  of  a  few  days  or  weeks  while 
the  ship's  papers  were  being  examined  by  Dutch  and  French 
officials,  and  possibly,  as  a  result  of  this  delay,  the  loss  of  an 
opportunity  to  obtain  a  suitable  return  cargo  at  some  other, 
more  distant  port. 

But  the  Dutch  merchants  at  once  felt  the  effect  of  this 
more  rigid  enforcement,  and,  in  response  to  their  outcry,  the 
Directory  made  a  last  desperate  effort  to  protect  the  interests 
of  the  commercial  element,  by  forbidding  Dutch  army  officers 
to  obey  any  civil  or  military  authority  of  France. 2)  This  un- 
fortunate order  was  in  part  inspired  by  the  belief  that 
Semonville  was  acting  without  specific  instructions  from 
Napoleon.  They  were  soon  to  realize  their  blunder,  when 
Talleyrand,  on  December  10,  transmitted  Napoleon's  order 
for  a  repeal  of  this  measure  within  forty-eight  hours,  with  a 
threat  that  a  refusal  to  -do  so  would  be  considered  as  a  declar- 
ation of  war.3) 

This  incident  undoubtedly  hastened  the  change  in  govern- 
ment which  Napoleon  had  for  some  time  been  contemplating, 


1)  Ibid.,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Inleiding,  XXXVIII.    These  state- 
ments are  based  on  Fetiche's  report  to  Napoleon  on  Nov.  23,  1804. 

2)  R.  A.,  Staatsbewind,  544,  Nov.  23,  1804. 

3)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Talleyrand  to  S4monville, 
Dec.  10,  1804. 


34     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations 

and  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  the  statement  that 
his  primary,  though  not  his  only,  reason  for  desiring  the 
change,  was  the  laxness  which  the  Directory  had  shown  in 
enforcing  the  exclusion  system.  Without  entering  into  the 
European  phase  of  the  subject,  it  may  suffice  to  say  that 
Napoleon  believed  he  had  found  in  Schimmelpenninck  a  per- 
son who  could  be  trusted  to  enter  more  fully  into  the  spirit 
of  his  intentions.  In  April,  1805,  he  was  installed  as  chief 
executive,  with  the  title  of  Grand  Pensionary,  and  was  in- 
vested with  almost  royal  powers.  He  not  only  possessed  the 
right  to  initiate  legislation,  but  the  measures  which  he  pro- 
posed must  be  accepted  or  rejected  in  toto  without  change. 
We  may  therefore  consider  him  as  the  main  author  of  the 
stringent  law  of  May  31,  1805,  and  may  look  upon  this 
measure  itself  as  a  revelation  of  Napoleon's  real  motive  in 
raising  him  to  this  position. 

This  new  law1),  which  repealed  all  previous  measures, 
became  the  basis  of  all  future  legislation  in  regard  to  ex- 
clusion, and  forestalled  by  nearly  eighteen  months  some  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Berlin  decree.  The  exportation  of 
materials  of  war  and  of  all  shipbuilding  material,  which  hith- 
erto had  been  allowed  by  special  consent  of  the  Directory, 
was  now  forbidden  entirely.2)  Hereafter  the  special  con- 
sent of  the  government  was  needed  for  exporting  to  neutral 
ports  such  foodstuffs  as  butter,  cheese,  pork  and  salted  meat, 
together  with  beans,  peas,  and  grains  of  all  kinds.3)  The 
amount  of  the  bond  was  raised  to  three  times  the  value  of 
the  cargo.  Nothing  was  said  regarding  the  exportation  of 
gin  and  other  manufactures.  Under  this  law  Dutch  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers  obtained  a  wider  market  for  the 
sale  of  their  products,  and  neutral  nations  no  longer  had  the 
slightest  ground  of  complaint.  With  the  exception  of  muni- 
tions of  war  and  shipbuilding  materials,  all  the  important 
products  of  Holland  could  now  be  sent  to  neutral  countries ; 
and  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  high  bond  which  was 
exacted,  was  deposited  by  the  Dutch  shipper,  not  by  the 
neutral  carrier. 


!)  Le  Moniteur  Universel,  June  19,  1805,  (An.  13),  p.  1113. 

2)  This  provision  was  not  rigidly  adhered  to.    On  June  24,  1805, 
permission  was  granted  to  send  2,300  pounds  of  powder  to  the  U.  S. ; 
on  July  22,  125,000  pounds  were  sent;  on  Sept.  25,  1805,  100  guns,  etc. 

3)  A  decree  of  Dec.  2  forbade  the  exportation  of  these  articles 
entirely  to  places  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     35 

This  concession  in  regard  to  exportation  was  offset  by 
the  rigid  provisions  regarding  the  importation  of  English 
goods  and  manufactures.  We  have  here  for  the  first  time  a 
careful,  comprehensive  definition  of  what  should  be  included 
under  the  term  British  goods.  Merchandise  and  manufac- 
tures of  a  similar  nature,  but  not  of  English  origin,  could  be 
imported  upon  the  presentation  of  certificates  of  origin. 
These  certificates,  together  with  all  the  ship's  papers,  were 
to  constitute  the  evidence  for  judging  whether  or  not  the 
cargo  was  of  English  origin.  Before  a  vessel  could  enter, 
these  papers  must  be  sealed  and  sent  to  the  nearest  commis- 
sary of  customs,  while  the  captain  and  pilot  must  take  an 
oath  that  all  papers  had  been  delivered.  A  somewhat  similar 
practice  was  followed  in  regard  to  English  mails,  and  any 
member  of  the  crew  who  attempted  to  conceal  an  English 
letter  or  newspaper  was  punishable  by  a  fine  of  1,000  florins. 

Naturally  enough,  the  former  complaints  as  to  the  delays 
which  such  a  regulation  occasioned  now  became  more  fre- 
quent. An  American  captain  who  returned  on  August  15, 
1805,  reported  that  vessels  bound  for  Amsterdam  were  de- 
tained at  the  Texel  until  all  their  papers  "are  forwarded  by 
land  to  the  commissaries  of  the  customs,  then  to  be  examined 
by  the  commissary  of  the  French  relations  at  his  pleasure. 
The  consequence  is  an  unwarrantable  and  scandalous 
detention  of  from  ten  to  fourteen  days."  ^  Many  another 
American  captain,  no  doubt,  gave  expression  to  similar 
opinions,  but  after  he  had  aired  his  feelings,  he  probably 
remembered  only  the  profits  of  the  last  voyage  and  proceeded 
to  take  on  another  cargo.  With  tobacco  averaging  from  ten 
to  fifteen  cents  a  pound,  sugar  from  thirty-five  to  forty 
cents,  coffee  from  forty  to  forty-six  cents,  cotton  from  thirty 
to  sixty  cents,  and  rice  from  $9.00  to  $10.00  per  cask  accord- 
ing to  quality,2 >  the  profits  of  the  voyage  more  than  offset 
the  losses  resulting  from  the  detention  of  the  vessel,  even 
though  the  vessel  might  be  detained,  as  occasionally  hap- 
pened, from  four  to  six  weeks. 

An  analysis  of  the  further  provisions  of  the  law  of  May 
31  under  the  head  of  exclusion  of  British  goods,  indicates 
that  considerable  attention  had  been  paid  to  the  problem  of 
fraudulent  trade  under  a  neutral  flag.  English  goods  which 


*)  Am.  Daily  Advertiser,  August  15,  1805. 

-)   Based  on  price  lists  in  Am.  Daily  Ad.  for  May  6,  1805,  and 
July  9,  1806. 


36     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

were  smuggled  in  were  to  be  confiscated  as  a  matter  of 
course,  as  were  those  which  were  introduced  by  false  cer- 
tificates. But,  passing  over  a  number  of  minor  regulations, 
the  real  meaning  of  the  law  becomes  apparent  in  article  four, 
which  provided  that  if  a  neutral  vessel  coming  from  a  British 
port,  but  having  a  neutral  destination,  was  compelled  even 
by  stress  of  weather  to  enter  a  Dutch  port,  that  part  of  the 
cargo  which,  according  to  the  ship's  papers,  was  not  neutral 
property,  was  lawful  prize  of  war.  This  provision,  which 
was  to  be  enforced  so  long  as  England  did  not  adopt  the 
rule  that  the  flag  covers  the  goods,  was  clearly  a  step  in  ad- 
vance in  Napoleon's  commercial  warfare  against  England. 
Henceforth,  the  doctrine  was  to  be  enforced  that  every 
article  of  commerce  which  could  be  traced  either  to  British 
origin  or  to  British  ownership  was  subject  to  confiscation 
the  moment  it  entered  within  the  maritime  or  territorial 
jurisdiction  of  Holland.  The  fact  that  it  was  brought  in  by 
a  neutral,  and  was  destined  for  a  port  in  Russia  or  Turkey 
or  the  United  States  no  longer  sheltered  it  from  capture. 

When  the  news  of  this  May  decree  reached  the  United 
States,  the  editor  of  the  American  Daily  Advertiser  com- 
mented that  the  new  Code  of  Commerce  "has  very  naturally 
produced  a  considerable  sensation  among  that  part  of  the 
commercial  world  interested  in  Dutch  trade."  J)  And,  on 
the  face  of  it,  the  law  surely  looked  forbidding  enough,  for 
it  offered  four  possibilities  for  penalizing  an  American  who 
brought  in  English  goods,  where  up  to  this  time  he  had  not 
been  punishable  at  all.  Not  only  were  the  goods  themselves 
to  be  confiscated,  but  those  who  had  any  part  in  introducing 
them  might  now  be  punished  under  one  of  the  following 
counts:  1.  For  smuggling  them  in,  without  making  a  cus- 
tom-house declaration. 

2.  For  fraudulent  importation  in  the  regular  way 
of  trade  by  means  of  a  false  entry  at  the  custom- 
house. 

3.  For   incidentally  touching  at  an   English   port 
and  taking  in  cargo  there,  while  on  the  way  to  a 
Dutch  port. 

4.  For  entering  a  Dutch  port  out  of  course,  while 
on  the  way  from  an  English  port  to  a  neutral 
port. 


Am.  Daily  Advertiser,  July  22,  1805. 


Thirty- Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     37 

These  provisions  will  bear  a  little  further  explanation. 

In  the  first  place,  any  vessel  which  engaged  in  the  prac- 
tice of  smuggling  British  goods  into  Holland,  without  the 
formality  of  passing  through  the  customs,  was  to  'be  con- 
fiscated, while  the  captain  and  all  others  who  knowingly  took 
part  in  the  transaction  were  to  be  fined  1,000  florins 
($400.00).  This  was  the  extreme  penalty  which  could  now 
be  meted  out,  and  it  is  clear  also  from  the  measures  which 
were  prescribed  in  regard  to  smuggling  across  the  land  fron- 
tier, that  one  of  the  primary  objects  of  the  law  was  to  make 
this  practice  unprofitable.  Now,  the  actual  smuggling  of 
English  goods  into  Holland  was  a  branch  of  the  trade  which 
Americans  had  up  to  this  time  probably  found  it  entirely 
unnecessary  to  resort  to.  They  would  now  be  more  content 
than  ever  to  leave  this  practice  to  be  carried  on  by  the  Dutch 
themselves,  who  in  addition  to  their  more  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  the  long  and  broken  coast  line,  and  their  use  of 
smaller  vessels,  also  possessed  greater  facilities  for  hiding 
the  goods  more  rapidly. 

The  American  trader,  along  with  other  neutrals,  was  apt 
to  be  harder  hit  by  any  one  of  the  three  remaining  penalties 
which  the  law  prescribed  for  the  introduction  of  British 
goods.  Instead  of  smuggling  them  in,  he  might  attempt  to 
introduce  them  in  the  regular  way  of  trade,  by  resorting  to 
the  use  of  false  certificates  and  by  making  a  false  declaration 
at  the  custom-house.  If  the  officials  succeeded  in  detecting 
the  fraud,  the  vessel  wrhich  had  carried  the  goods  was  con- 
fiscated. This  was  the  second  penalty,  less  severe  than  the 
first  only  because  it  did  not  require  the  payment  of  a  fine. 

The  third  and  fourth  offenses  were  punishable  by  the 
payment  of  1,000  florins,  which  was  payable  in  each  case  by 
the  captain  of  the  vessel.  It  was  a  common  practice  for 
American  vessels  bound  for  the  continent  to  stop  in  at  a 
British  port  for  purposes  of  trade.  Sometimes  they  were 
compelled  to  enter  through  stress  of  weather  or  through  lack 
of  provisions.  Frequently  they  were  brought  in  by  British 
cruisers  on  one  pretext  or  another,  and  were  detained  in  port 
while  awaiting  trial  before  the  prize  courts.  After  May  31, 
1805,  vessels  which  had  touched  at  an  English  port  were  to 
give  notice  of  this  fact  immediately  upon  their  arrival  in 
Holland.  All  the  goods  which  had  been  taken  on  board  in 
England  were  subject  to  confiscation,  even  though  they  were 


38     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations 

destined  for  a  neutral  port  (though  an  exception  would  pos- 
si'bly  be  made  in  the  case  of  ship's  provisions).  If  the  cap- 
tain attempted  to  conceal  any  part  of  the  cargo  which  was 
of  British  origin  he  was  to  be  fined  1,000  florins,  and,  in 
case  of  his  refusal  or  inability  to  pay,  his  vessel  was  con- 
fiscated. 

In  the  fourth  place,  any  captain,  who  was  on  his  way 
from  an  English  port  to  a  neutral  port,  might  be  fined  for 
running  into  a  Dutch  port,  if  he  could  present  no  adequate 
excuse  for  doing  so.  Suppose  an  American  captain,  while 
on  a  voyage  between  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  should  run 
into  the  port  of  Amsterdam,  possibly  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
posing of  part  of  the  cargo.  Not  only  were  the  British  goods 
on  board  to  be  confiscated,  but  the  captain  was  to  forfeit 
1,000  florins  unless  he  could  furnish  proof  that  absolute 
necessity  had  compelled  him  to  enter. 

Taking  these  various  provisions  as  a  whole,  we  can  read- 
ily understand  why  a  British  journal,  apparently  moved  by 
sympathy  for  the  Dutch  people,  should  consider  this  meas- 
ure as  "one  of  the  first  grand  acts"  of  Schimmelpenninck, 
who  is  referred  to  as  "Bonaparte's  viceroy  in  Holland,"  and 
should  interpret  it  as  an  effort  "to  enforce  restrictions  upon 
the  trade  with  England  by  neutrals,  such  as  must  utterly 
ruin  the  commercial  interests  of  his  country."  But  when 
the  same  journal  adds  that  as  a  result  of  this  measure  the 
Dutch  were  "fleeing  in  multitudes  from  his  government  to 
Louisiana  and  other  wilds  of  America"  1),  we  are  evidently 
dealing  with  a  bit  of  exaggeration  which  must  be  accepted 
with  more  than  one  grain  of  salt,  the  more  so  because  at  the 
time  it  was  written  the  measure  in  question  had  been  in 
operation  less  than  a  month.  No  contemporary  evidence  has 
been  found  to  afford  even  the  slightest  support  for  this 
statement.2) 

Yet,  although  there  is  no  evidence  of  such  wholesale 
emigration,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  exclusion  system 
as  enforced  under  the  Schimmelpenninck  regime  was  be- 
ginning to  cause  distress  among  the  commercial  population 

J)  From  the  Glasgow  Journal,  June  21,  1805,  quoted  in  the  Am. 
Daily  Adv.  for  August  17. 

2>  The  departure  of  about  1,000  German  emigrants  from  Amster- 
dam for  Philadelphia,  in  May  and  June,  may  possibly  account  for  this 
statement.  See  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  July  10,  August  17,  and  September 
21,  1805. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  .  39 

of  Holland.  This  was  probably  due  in  the  first  instance  to 
the  greater  degree  of  vigilance  exercised  in  preventing 
smuggling,  and  in  the  second  place  to  the  decrease  in  the 
amount  of  English  goods  brought  in  by  neutrals.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  a  single  American  vessel  was  confiscated 
under  this  act,  nor  has  a  single  complaint  been  found  arising 
out  of  the  payment  of  fines;  yet  the  shipping  lists  for  1805 
indicate  that  only  198  American  vessels  arrived  as  against 
242  in  1804.1)  The  falling  off  in  the  number  of  arrivals 
probably  also  accounts  for  the  decrease  in  the  amount  of 
goods  imported  from  the  United  States.  American  cotton 
fell  off  from  1,475,979  pounds,  in  1804,  to  881,979  pounds,2) 
while  rice,3)  tobacco**  and  other  articles  also  showed  an  ap- 
preciable decrease.  Coffee,  an  article  for  which  Holland  de- 
pended almost  exclusively  upon  the  American  carrier, 
showed  a  decrease  of  nearly  two  and  a  half  million  pounds, 
although  even  with  this  decrease  the  amount  reexported 
from  the  United  States  to  Holland  was  twice  as  large  as  the 
amount  sent  to  any  other  country,  and  the  amount  imported 
in  Holland  from  the  United  States  was  six  times  as  large  as 
the  total  amount  received  from  all  other  countries. 5)  Sugar 
was  the  only  important  article  of  import  which  showed  an 
increase,  the  amount  imported  from  the  United  States  in 
1805  being  47,544,197  pounds,  a  gain  of  over  20,000,000 
pounds  since  the  preceding  year.6*  Inasmuch  as  there  was 
no  restriction  of  any  sort  on  the  importation  of  neutral 
goods,  the  amount  of  English  goods  introduced  by  Ameri- 
cans in  1805  would  undoubtedly  show  an  even  greater  de- 
crease, but  of  this  branch  of  the  trade  no  statistics  seem  to 
have  been  kept. 

The  exclusion  system  as  enforced  in  1805  was  therefore 
for  the  first  time  beginning  to  have  an  unfavorable  effect 
upon  American  trade.  Americans  were  either  seeking  more 
favorable  markets  where  no  such  restrictions  existed,  or 
were  trying  out  the  temper  of  the  new  government,  and  were 


*)  These  figures  have  been  computed  from  the  shipping  lists  in 
the  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  supplemented  by  those  in  the  Aurora. 

2)  Pitkin's   Statistical   View  of   the   Commerce   of   the    United 
States,  (1835  edition),  135. 

3)  Ibid.,  122. 

*)  Ibid.,  131-133. 

5)  Ibid.,  161-162;  also  R.  A.,  Collectie  Goldberg,  vol.  190. 

«)   Ibid.,  157. 


40     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

meanwhile  taking  no  chances  on  incurring  the  penalties  of 
the  law.  The  latter  interpretation  is  probably  the  more  cor- 
rect, as  will  be  seen  by  comparing  the  trade  statistics  which 
have  just  been  given  with  those  which  are  available  for  1806. 
On  April  30,  1806,  T.  H.  Backer,  the  Amsterdam  agent  for 
the  firm  of  William  Taylor  and  Sons  at  Baltimore,  reported 
that  the  ports  of  Holland  "remain  fully  open  to  all  neutral 
vessels,"  and  that  the  price  of  tobacco,  sugar  and  coffee  was 
very  high,  while  rice  and  cotton  were  in  great  demand.1*  A 
month  later,  just  as  the  new  government  under  King  Louis 
was  being  ushered  in,  to  take  the  place  of  the  Batavian  Re- 
public, he  writes  that  the  price  of  these  articles  has  some- 
what declined,  owing  to  the  large  supply  which  had  arrived 
from  the  United  States.2*  "A  vast  number  of  American 
ships  have  now  arrived  again,"  he  reports  on  June  6,  "yes- 
terday four  arrived  and  today  eleven."  3)  And  on  August  4 
he  half  apologized  for  the  small  returns  on  the  last  ship- 
ments from  Baltimore  by  saying  that  the  numerous  arrivals 
from  the  United  States  had  so  greatly  increased  the  stock 
on  hand  as  to  reduce  prices.4) 

During  the  course  of  the  year  1806,  while  the  law  of  1805 
was  supposedly  in  full  operation,  231  American  vessels  en- 
tered the  port  of  Amsterdam  alone,5 >  without  counting  the 
arrivals  at  Rotterdam  and  other  ports.  Not  only  had  the 
trade  recovered  from  the  temporary  loss  sustained  in  1805, 
but  the  total  arrivals  in  1806  even  exceeded  the  figure 
reached  in  1804.  There  was  a  corresponding  increase  in 
imports  from  the  United  States.  Tobacco  increased  from 
17,948  hogsheads  in  1804,  to  29,953  hogsheads  in  1806,6> 
whole  the  amount  of  rice,  cotton  and  sugar  was  not  only 
greater  than  in  1805,  but  in  each  instance  was  more  than 
double  the  amount  imported  in  1804.7) 

Two  principal  reasons  may  be  assigned  for  this  remark- 
able increase  in  American  trade.  In  the  first  place,  as 
Backer  notes  in  one  of  his  letters,  the  blockade  of  the  Ems, 


J)   Wm.  Taylor  MSS.,  (Library  of  Congress,  Manuscript  Divi- 
sion), Backer  to  Taylor,  June  6,  1806. 
2)  Ibid.,  May  31,  1806. 
3>  Ibid. 
*)  Ibid. 

5>  A  complete  list  is  given  in  the  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  May  8,  1807. 
«)   Pitkin,  Statistical  View,  131-133. 
r)    Ibid.,  123,  135-137,  157-158. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    41 

the  Weser  and  the  Elbe  by  an  English  fleet  had  a  favorable 
effect  on  Dutch  markets,  by  preventing  Americans  for  the 
time  being  from  trading  with  the  ports  of  Embden,  Bremen 
and  Hamburg.1)  Millions  of  pounds  of  American  produce, 
which  would  otherwise  have  been  sent  to  these  ports,  was 
now  disposed  of  in  Holland,  there  to  be  stored  in  ware- 
houses for  speculative  purposes  or  to  be  sent  farther  into 
the  interior.  A  second  important  reason  why  the  American 
flag  was  becoming  such  a  familiar  sight  in  the  ports  of  Hol- 
land was  the  change  in  the  Dutch  government,  which  took 
place  in  June  of  this  year. 

Schimmelpenninck,  who  understood  the  real  temper  of 
Napoleon  and  saw  through  his  plans  as  but  few  of  his  own 
countrymen  or  contemporaries  did,  had  made  a  conscien- 
tious effort  to  enforce  the  Emperor's  policies,  from  a  con- 
viction that  it  was  the  only  means  of  saving  his  country  from 
a  worse  fate.  He  was  well  aware,  however,  that  the  gov- 
ernment, at  the  head  of  which  he  had  been  placed,  was  re- 
garded by  Napoleon  merely  as  an  experiment.  In  the  series 
of  conferences  to  which  Napoleon  had  summoned  him  in 
1804,  in  regard  to  a  new  constitution,  he  had  boldly  argued 
in  favor  of  an  elective  President,  after  the  American  model, 
and  Napoleon  had  yielded  to  this  desire  only  after  Schim- 
melpenninck had  positively  declared  that  he  would  under 
no  circumstances  cooperate  in  making  the  office  of  chief 
executive  hereditary.2)  The  failing  eyesight  of  the  Grand 
Pensionary  now  offered  Napoleon  a  ready  excuse  for  intro- 
ducing another  change  in  the  direction  of  greater  centrali- 
zation and  for  bestowing  the  crown  of  Holland  upon  his 
favorite  brother  Louis.  Early  in  February,  1805,  Talley- 
rand had  officially  informed  Schimmelpenninck  of  the  im- 
pending change,3)  and  from  that  time  until  June  the  atten- 
tion of  the  old  government  was  so  largely  occupied  in  bring- 
ing about  the  transition  and  in  reorganizing  the  finances, 
that  the  enforcement  of  the  exclusion  law  was  temporarily 
relaxed.  The  people  of  Holland,  who  from  mingled  motives 
had  dreaded  the  advent  of  a  foreign  prince,  soon  learned 
that  their  new  sovereign  was  by  no  means  in  accord  with  the 

!)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  April  30,  1806. 

2)  General  Wiipperman,  Holland  Voor  Honderd  Jar  en,  24. 

3)  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,   Iste  stuk  158-159;   Talleyrand  to 
Schimmelpenninck,  Feb.  6,  1806. 


42     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations 

ideas  of  his  Imperial  brother  on  questions  of  commercial 
policy. 

"Never  cease  to  be  a  Frenchman,"  were  the  words 
which  Napoleon  had  used  in  proclaiming  Louis  king  of 
Holland.1*  But  in  replying  to  a  deputation  from  the  Legis- 
lative body,  soon  after  his  arrival  at  The  Hague,  Louis  stated 
that  he  had  become  a  Hollander  the  moment  he  had  set  foot 
on  Dutch  soil.  "No  matter  what  may  happen/'  he  added, 
"I  am  certain  that  I  shall  always  remain  a  Hollander.  .  .  . 
Therefore  be  assured  that  you  can  utter  no  wish  for  the  wel- 
fare of  your  fatherland  in  which  I  shall  not  share,  or  which 
I  shall  not  have  anticipated."  2)  And  these  words  were  not 
mere  rhetoric,  for  he  at  once  set  to  work  to  remove  the  re- 
strictions upon  trade  by  every  means  in  his  power.  With- 
out actually  opening  the  ports  of  his  kingdom  to  English 
vessels,  he  nevertheless  connived  at  the  contraband  trade 
which  now  flourished  anew,  and  he  permitted  vessels  con- 
taining English  goods  to  discharge  their  cargoes  without 
hindrance.3) 

Such  was  the  situation  when  Napoleon,  on  November  21 
of  this  year,  promulgated  the  Berlin  decree,  which  is  often 
erroneously  referred  to  as  the  initial  step  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Continental  Blockade,  but  which,  needless  to 
say,  did  not  mark  the  inception  of  the  exclusion  system  in 
Holland.  In  the  memoirs  of  Louis,  published  in  1820, 
occurs  the  statement  that  the  exclusion  law  already  in 
force  in  Holland,  was  even  more  stringent  than  the  Berlin 
decree,  and  that  every  measure  "humainement  possible" 
had  been  taken  to  exclude  English  goods. 4)  A  comparison 
of  the  Berlin  decree  with  the  law  of  May  31,  1805,  indi- 
cates that  the  earlier  measure  was  far  more  detailed  and 
more  specific.  Evidently  Napoleon  expected,  the  rulers  of 
the  various  countries  where  the  Continental  System  was 
now  in  force  to  adopt  supplementary  regulations  in  order  to 


*)  Louis  Bonaparte,  Documents  Historiques  et  Reflexions  sur  le 
Gouverucment  de  la  Hollande,  II.,  129-130. 

2>  Ibid.,  II.,  155. 

3)  Louis'  own  memoirs  as  well  as  the  writings  of  Dirk  Van 
Hogendorp,  Verhnell,  Falck  and  other  contemporaries  leave  no  doubt 
as  to  the  correctness  of  this  statement.  It  is  so  generally  recognized 
by  Wickers,  Jorissen  and  Wupperman,  the  Dutch  historians  of  this 
period,  as  well  as  by  Rose,  Sorel  and  other  writers  on  the  Cont.  sys- 
tem, that  further  proof  seems  unnecessary. 

*)   Louis  Bonaparte,  Documents  Historiques,  I.,  270-271. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    43 

make  the  decree  effective.  There  are  only  two  provisions  of 
the  Berlin  decree  which  contained  additional  features  on  the 
subject  of  exclusion.1*  In  the  future  no  vessel  was  to  be 
admitted  which  came  directly  from  England  or  from  an 
English  colony,  or  which  had  touched  at  an  English  port 
since  the  publication  of  the  decree.  Article  eight  increased 
the  penalty  for  making  a  false  declaration ;  not  only  was  the 
vessel  itself  to  be  confiscated,  but  the  entire  cargo  suffered 
the  same  fate,  even  though  all  the  goods  were  neutral 
property. 

In  transmitting  this  decree  to  the  French  ambassador  at 
The  Hague,Talleyrand  added  the  significant  statement/'since 
no  power  in  Europe  is  more  directly  interested  than  Holland 
in  the  execution  of  the  measures  decreed  by  His  Imperial 
Majesty,  you  will  no  doubt  find  the  Dutch  government  im- 
pressed with  the  necessity  of  lending  every  assistance  in  its 
power."  2>  Before  publishing  the  decree,  Louis  requested 
the  opinion  of  his  foreign  secretary,  and  received  the  rather 
vague  advice  to  comply  with  Napoleon's  intention  "in  so  far 
as  would  be  possible."  3)  On  the  same  day,  December  1,  he 
ordered  the  Berlin  decree  to  be  executed  to  its  full  extent  in 
East  Friesland,  Oldenbourg  and  other  possessions  formerly 
belonging  to  Prussia,  but  which  were  then  occupied  by  Dutch 
troops.  Within  the  kingdom  itself  the  decree  was  to  be 
executed  only  "in  so  far  as  the  measures  already  adopted 
shall  not  be  sufficient  to  effect  the  general  blockade  of  the 
enemy's  country."  4)  In  other  words,  it  was  his  intention  to 
leave  the  law  of  1805  unchanged  and  to  consider  the  Berlin 
decree  a  dead  letter. 

On  December  3  Napoleon  ordered  Louis  to  issue  the  nec- 
essary instructions  to  the  customs  officers  and  to  lend  them 
the  support  of  the  army  in  the  enforcement  of  the  decree. 
"This  is  the  only  means  of  striking  a  blow  at  England,"  he 
averred,  "and  of  compelling  her  to  sue  for  peace.  Without 
doubt  this  will  cause  some  harm  to  Holland  and  to  France, 
but  a  brief  period  of  suffering  is  necessary  to  insure  an  ad- 


*)  The  decree  may  be  found  in  the  Corresp.  de  Nap.,  XIII.,  555- 
557. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  3-4;  Talleyrand  to  Du- 
pont-Chaumont,  Nov.  23,  1806. 

3)  Ibid.,  268;  Van  der  Goes  to  Louis,  Dec.  1,  1806. 

4)  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Origineele  Koninklijke  Decreten  en 
Besluiten,  deel  89,  No.  23. 


44     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

vantageous  peace."  J)  In  another  letter  on  the  same  day  he 
held  out  the  threat  that  "in  the  general  treaty  for  the  parti- 
tionment  of  continental  states,"  upon  the  establishment  of 
peace,  "I  shall  deal  with  Holland  according  as  she  has 
served  me."  2> 

Louis  now  apparently  became  convinced  that  further  ac- 
tion was  necessary,  and  on  December  15  he  issued  a  supple- 
mentary decree  for  the  entire  kingdom,  which  provided,  in 
the  main,  that  until  further  orders  no  vessel  should  leave 
the  ports  of  Holland  without  a  special  authorization,  signed 
by  the  King  himself,  and  only  after  a  sufficient  guarantee 
had  been  given  that  the  cargo  would  not  be  sent  to  an  enemy 
port.  All  incoming  vessels  were  to  be  seized  at  once,  and 
could  be  released  only  upon  receiving  special  authorization 
from  the  king.  Fishing  vessels  were  not  allowed  to  depart 
unless  the  master  took  an  oath  that  no  voluntary  communi- 
cation would  be  held  with  any  vessel  whatsoever.3) 

On  January  13,  1807,  while  Napoleon  was  in  the  midst 
of  his  campaign  against  Russia,  he  found  time  to  write  to 
Louis  that  all  the  news  from  London  indicated  that  trade 
with  England  was  being  carried  on  as  before  the  decree.*) 
And  on  February  25  he  wrote  in  even  more  positive  lan- 
guage, "I  am  told  that  the  trade  between  England  and  Hol- 
land has  never  been  more  active  than  since  the  decree  of 
blockade,  and  communications  with  England  [never]  more 
rapid  and  numerous."  5)  Louis  replied  by  saying  that  he 
had  put  a  stop  to  all  direct  communication  with  England, 
except  by  means  of  a  single  vessel,  but  that  it  was  impossible 
to  prevent  a  certain  amount  of  intercourse  by  Americans,  or 
by  way  of  neutral  countries.6)  For  nearly  a  half  year  after 
this  reply  was  written,  the  subject  of  enforcement  was 
dropped  entirely  in  the  correspondence  between  Napoleon 
and  Louis.  When  Napoleon  again  recurred  to  the  subject, 
about  a  month  after  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  he  had  practically 
become  master  of  Europe  and  had  compelled  all  but  a  few 
states  to  adopt  the  Continental  System. 

*)    Rocquain,  Napoleon  ler  et  le  Roi  Louis,  79. 

2)  Rocquain,  80. 

3)  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Orig.  Koninklijke  Decreten  en  Be- 
sluiten,  deel  90,  No.  2. 

4)  Rocquain,  91. 

5)  Ibid.,  93-94. 

6)  Ibid.,  94-95. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    45 

Meanwhile  the  decree  of  December  15,  1806,  had  placed 
American  commerce  with  Holland  in  a  rather  doubtful 
situation.  It  now  depended  entirely  upon  the  pleasure  of 
King  Louis  whether  American  vessels  would  be  admitted  in 
Dutch  ports,  while  those  which  were  already  in  port  when 
the  decree  was  issued  could  not  depart  without  the  king's 
special  authorization.  Three  days  after  the  decree  was  is- 
sued, consul  Bourne  felt  called  upon  to  issue  a  protest 
against  the  provision  which  required  from  all  outgoing  ves- 
sels a  guarantee  that  the  cargo  would  not  be  discharged  at  an 
enemy  port.  "My  duty  as  representative  of  the  United 
States  of  America,"  he  writes,  "forbids  me  from  maintain- 
ing silence  in  regard  to  this  article,  which  wounds  the  dig- 
nity of  my  country,  is  contrary  to  its  neutral  rights,  and  con- 
tradicts the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  existing  between  the 
two  countries."  1J  No  reply  appears  to  have  been  received 
to  this  protest,  but  on  January  8  of  the  following  year  a 
firm  at  Rotterdam  requests  a  mercantile  house  at  Boston  to 
have  the  following  letter  published  in  American  newspapers : 

"We  wrote  you  that  several  American  vessels  had  been 
arrested  by  their  having  touched  in  England.  This  had  nat- 
urally created  a  doubt  whether  American  vessels  that  had 
touched  in  British  ports  would  be  admitted  in  our  ports; 
and  therefore  an  explanation  had  been  asked  from  the  king's 
minister  at  The  Hague,  who  had  answered  that  American 
vessels  under  such  circumstances  would  be  admitted  as  here- 
tofore, provided  their  papers  are  in  order  and  they  have  not 
taken  on  board  anything  in  England — and  whatever  letters 
should  be  put  on  board,  must  immediately  on  arrival  be  de- 
livered to  the  commissary  of  marine,  all  the  ship's  papers 
and  documents  must  be  produced  ....  and  none  to  be 
concealed,  or  otherwise  it  might  give  a  suspicion  as  if  the 
voyage  was  illegal."  2) 

A  private  letter  from  Holland,  received  at  New  York  in 
March,  is  equally  clear  as  to  the  policy  which  Louis  intended 
to  pursue  regarding  American  vessels. 

"The  late  royal  non-intercourse  law  with  England  had 
given  rise  to  serious  doubts  whether  or  not  vessels  coming 
from  America,  but  having  touched  at  England,  would  be  ad- 


*)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerika,  deel  359;  Bourne  to  Van  der 
Goes,  Dec.  18,  1806. 

2)  T.  &  A.  Cramer,  in  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  March  24,  1807. 


46     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

mitted  in  our  ports.  Now  we  have  received  the  assurance 
....  that  ships  coming  from  your  country,  and  which 
either  for  orders,  or  on  account  of  stress  of  weather,  or  for 
want  of  water,  have  been  compelled  to  run  into  an  English 
port,  will  be  admitted  as  heretofore,  provided  that  by  their 
papers  it  appears  that  they  have  neither  landed  or  taken,  in 
England,  any  part  of  their  cargo,  and  the  required  certificates 
of  the  Dutch  and  French  consuls  must  not  be  forgot."  *) 

Under  the  Berlin  decree  such  vessels  should  have  been 
refused  admission  to  Dutch  ports,  but  Louis  preferred  to 
incur  the  displeasure  of  Napoleon  rather  than  see  his  sub- 
jects suffer  any  inconvenience. 

Early  in  March  Backer  reported  from  Amsterdam  that 
"all  vessels  which  were  detained  [for]  some  time  under  a 
sort  of  silent  embargo,  by  the  king's  not  granting  his  signa- 
ture for  their  departure,  have  now  received  leave  to  sail," 
and  that  many  of  them  were  hurrying  off  to  other  mar- 
kets.2)  At  the  end  of  the  month  he  writes  that  Dutch  ports 
"remain  fully  open  to  neutral  vessels,  even  those  which 
have  touched  in  England,  and  it  seems  that  our  government 
is  more  and  more  inclined  to  favor  trade  and  commerce."  3) 
The  volumes  containing  the  secret  royal  decrees  indicate 
that  many  vessels,  whose  outward  cargoes  consisted  very 
largely  of  Dutch  foodstuffs,  were  allowed  to  depart  with- 
out furnishing  a  guarantee  of  any  sort,  and  that  Dutch 
shippers  were  not  even  required  to  deposit  the  customary 
bond,  as  a  precaution  that  their  wares  should  not  be  sent  to 
England.  On  March  5  Louis  signed  permits  for  16  vessels, 
ostensibly  destined  for  neutral  ports,4*  and  before  the  end 
of  the  month  more  than  50  vessels  had  received  the  king's 
authorization  to  depart.5* 

By  that  time  the  task  of  signing  permits  was  evidently 
becoming  burdensome  to  Louis,  for  on  March  31  we  find  the 
following  secret  decision  recorded  in  his  own  handwriting: 

"By  way  of  alteration  in  the  first  article  of  our  decree 
of  the  15th  of  December,  1806,  we  authorize  our  minister  of 


!)  Jan.  12,  1807.     Ibid.,  March  14,  1807. 
2)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  March  2,  1807. 
3>  Ibid.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  March  28,  1807. 

*)   R.   A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Secrete  Koninklijke  Besluiten  en 
Stukken,  deel  359,  Letter  "E." 

s)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Ibid,  359,  Letter  "L",  "M",  et  seq. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations     47 

finance  to  sign  with  his  own  hand  the  authorizations  for  the 
discharge  or  departure  of  vessels  entering  or  leaving  the 
kingdom. 

"Our  minister  of  finance  need  render  us  no  report  of 
the  requests  which  come  in  under  the  head  of  the  aforesaid 
article.  He  shall  (always,  however,  in  our  name)  sign  the 
requested  authorizations,  whenever  he  considers  himself 
acting  in  accordance  with  our  will,  which  must  be  known 
to  him  from  the  dispositions  we  have  made  of  the  several 
requests  on  this  subject  which  he  has  submitted  to  us."1* 
The  minister  of  war  and  marine  was  to  instruct  his  sub- 
ordinates to  respect  the  validity  of  these  signatures. 

The  manner  in  which  this  official  discharged  his  duty 
is  shown  in  several  interesting  letters  which  he  sent  to 
Louis  while  the  latter  was  on  a  trip  to  France.  On  July  24, 
1807,  he  writes  that  there  had  thus  far  been  no  occasion  to 
question  any  American  vessel  which  had  entered.  "Ex- 
perience has  given  me  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  signatures 
and  of  the  [official]  seals,"  he  boldly  asserts,  "and  I  have 
always  found  them  en  regie."  Recently,  however,  there 
arrived  from  New  York  four  vessels  laden  with  sugar,  con- 
signed to  two  houses  at  Amsterdam.  He  was  convinced 
that  in  this  case  the  certificates  and  seals  were  counterfeit, 
and  was  now  in  a  quandary  as  to  what  to  do  with  the 
vessels. 

"I  cannot  prove  that  these  vessels  did  not  come  from 
New  York,"  he  writes.  "To  prove  that  the  papers  are 
false,  I  would  have  to  send  them  to  America,  in  order  to 
have  them  presented  to  the  proper  authorities  and  to  de- 
mand the  necessary  certificates;  the  journey  is  long  and 
uncertain,  and  if  the  vessel  to  which  these  papers  are  con- 
fided should  be  captured,  I  would  never  be  able  to  es- 
tablish proof."  To  institute  legal  proceedings  under  such 
circumstances  had  its  difficulties,  although  the  parties  in- 
terested feared  that  this  step  would  be  taken.  "The  houses 
which  are  concerned,"  he  explains,  "have  reputations  to 
lose.  It  is  not  very  laudable  to  resort  to  false  certificates, 
so  that  both  houses  have  protested  that  they  had  no  direct 
interest  in  the  cargo.  M.  Willink  has  even  begged  me  to 
make  no  further  efforts  to  establish  proof,  roundly  avow- 
ing that  these  vessels  came  from  an  enemy  country." 


R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Ibid.,  359,  Letter  "Z." 


48     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

The  two  business  houses  to  whom  the  cargoes  were 
consigned  were  among  the  very  largest  in  Holland,  and 
members  of  these  firms  were  connected  with  important 
banking  establishments  at  Amsterdam  and  London.  Re- 
cently they  had  advanced  large  loans  to  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment, and  by  reason  of  this  fact,  writes  the  secretary  of 
finance,  the  public  had  more  than  once  uttered  the  re- 
proach that  these  houses  had  obtained  a  license  for  the 
sale  of  English  goods.  For  this  reason  alone  the  case  of 
these  four  vessels  was  one  of  great  delicacy.  Something 
would  have  to  be  done  to  satisfy  public  opinion,  lest  the  im- 
pression prevail  that  these  houses  had  been  promised  im- 
munity from  the  penalties  of  the  law.  As  a  means  out  of 
the  difficulty,  he  suggests  that  these  firms  should  be  called 
upon  to  forfeit  100,000  florins,  which  would  roughly  cor- 
respond to  the  value  of  vessels  and  cargoes,  and  he  requests 
the  secret  authorization  of  the  king  for  this  purpose.1)  Louis 
merely  returned  the  letter  with  the  marginal  comment: 
"Ajourner  la  decision  jusqu'  a  mon  retour."  2> 

The  difficulty  of  guarding  against  the  introduction  of 
British  goods,  and  of  establishing  satisfactory  evidence,  is 
brought  out  more  clearly  in  his  letter  of  August  19.  He 
here  makes  an  elaborate  attempt  to  defend  himself  against 
the  indirect  charge  of  neglect  of  duty  which  Napoleon  pre- 
ferred against  him,  when  he  threatened  to  enforce  the  system 
in  Holland  by  means  of  French  troops,  unless  intercourse 
with  England  should  cease. 3) 

"I  have  never  for  a  single  day,"  he  explains,  "entrusted 
to  anyone  but  myself  the  task  of  examining  the  papers  of 
incoming  vessels.  It  has  often  pained  me  to  note  how  neg- 
lectful the  authorities  of  neutral  countries  were  of  their 
duties,  being  morally  persuaded  that  the  affirmations  given 
under  their  signatures  did  not  conform  to  the  truth.  I  have 
tried  to  impress  these  authorities  with  the  risks  they  are 
running  of  ultimately  having  complaints  on  this  matter  pre- 
sented to  their  government,  and  it  appeared  to  me  that  these 
hints  on  my  part  have  not  entirely  been  without  effect.  But 
then  another  evil  practice  arose,  a  horrible  evil,  which  ought 


a)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  306;  Gogel  to  Louis,  July 
24,  1807. 

2)  Ibid.,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Inleiding,  XXXVIII. 

3)  Correspondence  de  Napoleon,  XV.,  No.  13022.     Napoleon  to 
Champagny,  August  12,  1807. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations   49 

not  to  be  tolerated  in  spite  of  all  the  enmity  among  nations ; 
namely,  the  practice  of  manufacturing  false  papers,  in  which 
the  printing,  the  hand-writing,  the  signatures,  the  stamps,  the 
seals  and  what  not,  are  counterfeited  down  to  the  minutest 
detail,  which  tend  to  deceive  even  those  whose  papers  are 
falsified. 

"The  first  cases  of  this  kind  upon  which  my  attention  was 
fixed  were  those  of  the  four  American  vessels,  which  en- 
tered under  papers  from  New  York,  but  in  reality  came  from 
Liverpool.  The  vessels  and  cargoes  are  now  under  arrest. 
Since  that  time  no  false  papers  from  that  country  have  been 
presented  to  me."  As  an  evidence  of  his  good  intentions  he 
encloses  a  list  of  18  vessels  which  were  held  under  sequester, 
some  of  them  since  the  first  of  May,1)  but  he  confesses  that 
all  precautionary  measures  were  useless  so  long  as  no  guar- 
antee existed  against  falsifications. 2> 

When  Napoleon,  a  few  days  later,  repeated  his  accusa- 
tions against  Holland,  and  threatened  to  send  in  30,000  men 
to  close  Dutch  ports,3  >  Gogel  was  led  to  declare  that  he 
knew  of  but  one  additional  means  of  preventing  communica- 
tion with  England ;  "namely,  to  forbid  all  navigation  whatso- 
ever to  and  from  this  kingdom."  "I  repeat,"  he  says,  "if 
you  wish  to  be  sure  that  nothing  can  enter  which  has  ever 
been  in  England,  there  is  no  other  means  but  to  forbid  all 
importation  whatsoever."  "And  this  will  hardly  be  neces- 
sary," he  adds,  "when  there  no  longer  are  any  neutral  na- 
tions, as  to  all  appearances  will  soon  be  the  case."  More- 
over, to  put  a  stop  to  commerce  with  neutrals  would  merely 
be  rendering  a  service  to  England,  and  he  points  out  how  this 
commerce  had  given  a  means  of  existence  to  thousands  of 
the  king's  subjects,  and  had  thus  far  kept  the  Dutch  and 


!)  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Koninklijke  Besluiten,  100.  The  list 
was  enclosed  in  the  packet  containing  the  royal  decree  of  August  28, 
and  was  accompanied  by  the  following  note.  Note  de  batimens  et  ef- 
f&ts  centre  lequel  s'  enstruisent  des  procedures  ou  se  trouvent  sous 
embargo  comme  suspects,  et  dont  les  cargaisons  sont  en  depot  dans 
les  magazins  royaux  pendant  que  1'  on  fait  des  perquisitions  s'  ils 
yiennent  de  1'  Angleterre,  le  tout  depuis  le  premier  de  Mai,  1807, 
jusqtv  a  la  date  de  la  presente. 

La  Haye,  ce  19  Aout,  1807. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  308.    Gogel  to  Louis,  August 
19,  1807. 

3)  Correspondence  de  Napoleon,  XV.,  No.  13051,  Napoleon  to 
Champagny,  August  19,  1807. 


50     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

French  navies  supplied  with  pitch,  tar,  hemp,  iron,  copper, 
timber  and  other  necessaries.1  > 

These  letters,  which  testify  to  the  difficulty  of  adminis- 
tering the  Continental  System,  also  point  to  a  new  activity  on 
the  part  of  Napoleon.  The  last  two  were  called  forth  by 
the  Emperor's  criticism  on  the  laxity  with  which  the  system 
was  enforced  in  Holland.  For  the  space  of  nearly  six 
months  the  correspondence  of  Napoleon  had  been  silent  in 
regard  to  enforcement  in  Holland,  but  immediately  after 
his  return  from  Tilsit  this  subject  again  drew  his  attention. 
The  terrible  battle  of  Friedland,  in  which  Napoleon  over- 
whelmed the  Russians,  was  followed  by  the  treaty  of  Tilsit, 
in  which  the  Czar  agreed  to  enter  into  an  offensive  and  de- 
fensive alliance  with  Napoleon,  against  England.  This 
meant  that  Russian  markets  were  henceforth  to  be  closed 
against  English  goods;  it  also  meant  that  Napoleon  for  the 
time  being  had  no  enemy  on  the  continent,  and  that  he  was 
free  to  devote  his  energies  to  a  more  rigid  enforcement  of 
the  Continental  System  in  France,  in  Holland,  and  in  other 
vassal  states  of  the  empire. 

When  the  news  of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit  reached  Louis  in 
southern  France,  he  was  about  to  set  out  on  his  return  jour- 
ney to  Holland.  Before  he  reached  Paris,  he  was  informed 
by  special  courier  that  Napoleon  had  threatened  to  guard 
Dutch  ports  by  means  of  French  troops.  This  induced  him 
to  seek  an  interview  with  his  Imperial  brother,  which  took 
place  on  August  27.  Roell,  the  Dutch  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  who  was  with  Louis  at  the  time,  reports  that  on  the 
morning  following  this  stormy  interview  the  king  ordered 
him  to  draw  up  a  new  decree,  containing  every  possible 
measure  for  preventing  communication  with  England,  even 
though  no  other  means  remained  than  the  entire  closure  of 
Dutch  ports.  Roell  finally  succeeded  in  convincing  the  king 
that  the  entire  closure  of  the  ports  would  spell  ruin  to  Hol- 
land, and  Champagny  also  assured  Louis  that  so  radical  a 
measure  went  beyond  the  intentions  of  Napoleon.  It  was 
therefore  agreed  to  drop  this  provision.2* 

The  decree  of  August  28,  1S07,3>  provided  that  the  ves- 


J)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  331,  Gogel  to  Louis,  August 
24,  1807. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  646  et  seq. 

3)  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Orig.  Kon.  Decreten  en  Besluiten, 
100,  No.  1. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     51 

sels  which  had  already  been  seized  should  be  judged  before 
the  proper  tribunals  with  the  greatest  severity.  This  applied 
to  some  22  vessels,  including  the  four  which  had  ostensibly 
come  from  New  York.  The  rest  of  the  decree  gives  evidence 
that  it  had  been  drawn  in  haste.  In  the  future  a  double 
bond — presumably  double  the  value  of  the  cargo,  although 
this  was  not  specifically  stated — was  required  of  all  incom- 
ing vessels.  This  bond  was  to  be  forfeited  if  the  vessel  con- 
tained any  English  goods  or  had  touched  at  an  English  port, 
whereupon  the  vessel  itself  must  immediately  leave  port. 

The  minister  of  finance  called  Louis'  attention  to  the  fact 
that  in  one  respect  the  new  decree  was  less  severe  than  the 
law  of  May  31,  1805. 1)  Under  the  new  law  the  vessel  suf- 
fered no  penalty  whatsoever  for  the  fraudulent  introduction 
of  English  goods ;  under  the  former  law  such  vessel  might  be 
confiscated.  The  reply  which  Louis  gave  would  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  he  had  either  not  read  his  late  decree  very 
attentively  or  that  he  was  casting  about  for  means  of  evad- 
ing it.  "The  intention  of  said  decree,"  he  explains,  "is  not 
that  vessels  which  have  touched  at  an  English  port  without 
making  a  declaration  to  that  effect,  or  which  have  declared 
the  contrary,  shall  be  confiscated ;  that  would  be  contrary  to 
the  article  of  the  decree  which  speaks  of  sending  the  cargoes 
of  the  kingdom  when  English  goods  are  found  on  board, 
which  could  not  be  done  without  sending  out  the  vessel." 
The  decree,  however,  states  in  unequivocal  terms  that  such 
English  goods  should  be  confiscated.  But,  he  adds,  "it  is 
entirely  in  conformity  with  the  spirit  of  the  decree  that  a 
double  bond  shall  be  exacted  for  the  value  of  the  vessel  as 
well  as  for  the  value  of  the  cargo."  2) 

In  response  to  the  demand  of  Napoleon,  who  insisted  that 
vessels  which  had  touched  at  an  English  port  should  be  con- 
fiscated,3^ instead  of  being  allowed  to  depart,  Louis  was  con- 
strained to  issue  the  following  explanatory  decree  on  Sep- 
tember 16 : 

"All   vessels,   without   distinction,   entering  the 
ports  of  our  kingdom,  and  whose  cargo  shall  consist 


*)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  333;  Gogel  to  Louis,  Sep- 
tember 4,  1807. 

2)  Ibid.,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  389.  Louis  to  Gogel,  September 
8,  1807. 

3>  Rocqnain,  124,  Napoleon  to  Louis,  September  14,  1807. 


52     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

in  whole  or  in  part  of  English  merchandise,  or  which 
came  from  an  enemy  port,  shall  be  confiscated,  as 
well  as  the  entire  cargo."  *> 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  short  decree  was  more  than  an 
explanation  of  the  previous  measure.  It  contained  two  addi- 
tional penalties :  the  confiscation  of  the  vessel,  and  the  con- 
fiscation of  the  entire  cargo,  neutral  goods  as  well  as  English 
goods.  The  first  penalty  had  already  been  foreshadowed  in 
the  Schimmelpenninck  law  of  1805.  The  second  penalty  had 
been  prescribed  in  the  Berlin  decree,  but  it  now  for  the  first 
time  became  a  municipal  regulation  in  Holland.  Hence- 
forth any  captain  who  merely  touched  at  an  English  port  on 
his  way  to  a  Dutch  port,  was  to  suffer  the  extreme  penalty  of 
losing  not  only  his  ship,  but  also  the  entire  cargo. 

Three  other  measures,  all  having  the  same  object  in  view, 
were  put  in  force  in  October  and  November,  but  inasmuch 
as  they  contained  no  new  features  affecting  neutral  com- 
merce, they  may  be  passed  over  with  this  brief  reference. 
This  series  of  decrees  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  stage  in 
the  enforcement  of  the  Continental  System  in  Holland. 
There  were  still  occasional  attempts  at  evasion,  but  in  the 
main  the  laws  were  more  relentlessly  enforced,  and  they 
were  brought  to  bear  with  increasing  severity  against  neu- 
trals. And  by  this  time  the  term  neutral  had  almost  become 
synonymous  for  American,  for  the  United  States  was  the 
only  important  neutral  country  outside  of  the  Continental 
System.  That  the  system  really  became  effective  is  shown 
by  the  satisfaction  which  Napoleon  expressed  on  November 
25  at  the  method  of  enforcement  in  Holland. 2)  No  expres- 
sion of  this  kind  is  to  be  found  in  all  the  previous  corre- 
spondence of  Napoleon  since  1803. 

The  situation  of  American  commerce  with  Holland  now 
became  very  critical.  Consul  Bourne  became  sufficiently 
alarmed  to  address  a  circular  letter  to  the  captains  of  Ameri- 
can vessels  in  the  ports  of  Holland,  in  which  he  advised  them 
to  return  home  as  soon  as  possible.3 >  In  another  circular  to 
the  business  houses  at  Amsterdam  and  Rotterdam  he  writes, 


*)  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie,  Orig.  Kon.  Decreten,  100,  No.  5. 

2)  Rocquain,  145. 

3)  On  Oct.  16,  1807,  referred  to  in  Le  Moniteur  Universel,  Oct. 
25;  and  in  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  Dec.  18. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    53 

"I  have  to  request  that  you  would  hasten  the  departure  of 
any  American  vessel  which  may  be  to  your  address  with  all 
expedition."  *> 

A  prominent  citizen  of  Holland,  well  acquainted  with 
the  movements  of  trade,  reported  to  Louis  on  November  23 
that  nearly  all  trade  at  the  port  of  Amsterdam  was  at  a 
standstill.  Not  a  single  vessel  was  taking  on  cargo,  and,  ex- 
cept for  a  few  Americans,  not  a  single  vessel  entered.  The 
only  branch  of  trade  which  still  showed  any  signs  of  life  was 
the  trade  in  raw  sugar,  which  he  ascribed  to  the  welcome 
which  was  still  accorded  to  American  vessels. 2* 

There  is  a  difference  also  in  the  tone  of  the  reports 
which  Backer  sent  to  his  American  correspondent  during  the 
last  four  months  of  this  year  as  compared  with  those  of  the 
earlier  months.  During  the  first  eight  months  his  reports 
are  optimistic  in  character,  and  they  indicate  that  American 
trade  continued  to  flourish  in  spite  of  the  Berlin  decree. 
During  September  a  change  is  noticeable ;  all  his  letters  after 
the  middle  of  this  month  dwell  upon  the  trade  restrictions 
and  upon  the  high  prices  of  American  and  colonial  goods. 
On  September  29  he  notes  that  the  price  of  tobacco,  sugar, 
coffee,  cotton  and  rice  had  gone  considerably  higher,  which 
he  ascribed  to  rumors  of  a  war  between  the  United  States 
and  England.3 )  On  November  16  he  urged  Taylor  to  con- 
tinue his  shipments,  and  expressed  the  belief  that  there 
would  soon  be  a  decline  in  the  high  prices  which  then  pre- 
vailed.4 >  On  January  4  of  the  following  year,  he  writes  that 
if  a  shipment  of  American  tobacco  could  be  sent  to  Amster- 
dam in  safety,  "you  would  make  an  enormous  profit  on  the 
cargo,  but,  as  I  mentioned  before,  I  find  the  present  times  too 
critical  to  undertake  any  business  or  to  make  any 
shipments."  5) 

As  a  result  of  these  restrictive  measures  many  an  Ameri- 
can vessel  destined  for  Holland  was  compelled  to  seek  an- 
other market.  By  the  middle  of  November,  if  the  reports 
which  Backer  received  were  correct,  a  number  of  American 
vessels  which  had  begun  loading  for  Amsterdam  were  dis- 


*)  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  Dec.  10. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  347.    Valckenaer  to  Louis, 
Nov.  23,  1807. 

3)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor. 
*)  Ibid. 

«)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  January  4,  1808. 


54     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

charging  their  cargoes. ^  Yet,  in  spite  of  the  trade  depres- 
sion during  the  last  four  months,  the  year  1807  was  another 
prosperous  year  for  the  American  trader.  The  number  of 
arrivals  from  the  United  States  nearly  equalled  the  high 
figure  reached  in  1806,  while  the  amount  of  coffee,  cotton 
and  rice  imported  by  Americans  was  larger  than  in  any  pre- 
vious year  since  1803. 2)  It  was  not  until  the  following  year 
that  American  trade  with  Holland  was  seriously  affected  by 
the  commercial  warfare  which  characterized  this  period. 

Before  setting  forth  the  causes  which  led  to  a  rapid  de- 
cline of  our  trade  during  the  next  six  years,  it  will  be  of 
service  to  assemble  the  rather  fragmentary  statistics  which 
have  thus  far  been  presented,  and  to  make  a  few  generaliza- 
tions in  regard  to  the  position  of  American  trade  with  Hol- 
land during  these  prosperous  years. 

Between  the  first  of  June,  1803,  and  the  last  of  Decem- 
ber, 1807,  1,100  vessels  flying  the  American  flag  entered  the 
ports  of  Holland,  while  during  the  same  period  448,  or  two- 
fifths  of  the  total  number,  returned  to  the  United  States. 
Only  two  out  of  every  five,  or  40%  of  the  total,  were  there- 
fore engaged  in  the  direct  trade  between  the  two  countries, 
while  60%  appear  to  have  been  engaged  in -the  carrying  trade 
of  Holland.  Many  a  vessel  no  doubt  failed  to  return  to  the 
United  States  because  it  had  been  condemned  before  the 
prize  courts  of  one  of  the  belligerents,  while  some  allowance 
must  also  be  made  for  the  incompleteness  of  shipping  lists, 
and  for  the  very  common  practice  of  running  into  one  or 
more  foreign  ports  on  the  way  to  a  home  port.  If  statistics 
were  available  as  to  the  number  of  vessels  sailing  under  the 
American  colors,  but  in  reality  owned  by  Dutch,  French 
or  even  English  subjects,  the  number  of  bona  fide  American 
vessels  engaged  in  the  carrying  trade  of  Holland  might 
dwindle  down  to  50%  or  less. 

In  spite  of  these  allowances  the  important  fact  remains 
that  a  large  percentage  of  the  carrying  trade  of  Holland  was 
conducted  by  Americans.  The  shipping  lists  do  not,  it  is 
true,  indicate  a  progressive  increase  in  the  number  of  ar- 


!)   Ibid.,  Jan.  16,  1808. 

2)  Pitkin,  Statistical  View,  135,  122.  Pitkin's  statistics  show  a 
decline  in  the  amount  of  coffee  exported  from  the  United  States  to 
Holland.  I  have  followed  the  figures  given  by  Goldberg  who  lists 
the  total  amount  imported  by  Americans. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    55 

rivals,  for,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  there  was  a  decline  in 
1805,  and  again  in  1807  the  figures  were  lower  than  for  the 
preceding  year.  Nevertheless,  as  a  general  statement,  it  may 
be  said  that  there  was  a  steady  growth  in  our  trade  with  Hol- 
land during  these  years.  In  1807,  the  year  when  the  Berlin 
decree  was  in  force,  the  number  of  arrivals  was  nearly  twice 
as  large  as  in  1803,  and  the  volume  of  our  trade  with  Hol- 
land was  correspondingly  larger.  The  steady  growth  of  our 
trade  during  these  years  was,  of  course,  due  to  causes  arising 
out  of  the  European  wars.  But,  that  there  existed  a  mer- 
chant marine  which  was  American  built,  American  owned, 
manned  very  largely  by  American  seamen,  and  commanded 
by  shrewd  American  captains  who  knew  how  to  profit  by  the 
unusual  opportunities  which  the  war  offered,  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  most  of  the  states  then  faced  the  ocean,  and  to  the 
encouragement  which  the  government  gave  to  every  form  of 
maritime  pursuit. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  after  the  lapse  of  a  century 
this  trade,  which  once  constituted  a  profitable  source  of  in- 
come to  a  considerable  portion  of  our  seaboard  population,  is 
now  carried  on  almost  exclusively  under  a  foreign  flag.  A 
United  States  treasury  officer  reported  in  1900  that  not  a 
single  American  merchant  vessel  had  been  employed  in  the 
trade  between  this  country  and  the  Netherlands.  "The 
American  flag/'  he  states,  "was  never  before  such  a  rarity  on 
the  North  Atlantic  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe."  J> 

During  the  course  of  the  war,  Holland  managed  for  a 
time  to  retain  the  position  which  she  had  long  held  as  one  of 
the  most  important  distributing  centers  of  the  commercial 
world,  where  the  productions  and  manufactures  of  nearly 
every  country  could  be  bought  or  sold.  These  goods  were  now 
brought  in  almost  entirely  by  neutral  carriers,  and  among 
them  Americans  easily  occupied  the  foremost  position.  A 
committee  for  the  province  of  Holland,  which  had  been  ap- 
pointed by  Louis  for  the  purpose  of  inquiring  into  the  state 
of  commerce  and  manufactures,  reported  in  December,  1806, 
that  Americans  and  a  few  other  neutrals  then  held  the  same 
important  position,  in  regard  to  the  trade  which  passed 
through  the  port  of  Amsterdam,  which  the  vessels  owned  in 


Quoted  in  Bates,  American  Navigation,  (Boston,  1902),  p.  2. 


56    Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

that  city  had  occupied  previous  to  the  war,  in  conducting  the 
trade  of  entire  Europe.  "The  East  India  and  China  trade," 
the  report  states,  "would  be  lost  entirely  if  it  had  to  be  car- 
ried on  by  vessels  of  our  country."  a> 

The  statistics  thus  far  quoted,  in  regard  to -the  amount  of 
goods  imported  into  Holland  by  Americans,  have  been  taken 
in  part  from  Pitkin's  Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  of 
the  United  States,  a  work  which  is  still  of  value  for  the  early 
years  of  American  history,  when  statistics  were  not  as  yet 
well  kept.  This  has  been  supplemented  by  the  manuscript 
collections  of  Goldberg,  who  held  office  under  the  Batavian 
Republic  as  well  as  under  Louis,  and  who,  like  Pitkin,  evi- 
dently made  a  hobby  of  trade  statistics.  Goldberg's  statis- 
tics, which,  in  part,  at  least  appear  to  have  been  compiled  for 
official  purposes,  constitute  a  far  more  valuable  source.  From 
Pitkin  we  obtain  only  the  principal  articles  of  export  from 
the  United  States,  while  Goldberg  apparently  listed  every 
pound  or  every  florin's  worth  of  goods  brought  in  by  Ameri- 
cans, not  only  from  the  United  States,  but  from  all  other 
ports  of  the  world,  even  though  the  amount  were  only  180 
pounds  of  cochenille  or  six  boxes  of  wax  candles.  He  seems 
to  have  been  an  interested  observer  of  the  growth  of  Ameri- 
can carrying  trade,  for  during  the  years  1805  to  1809  he 
took  pains  to  construct  separate  balance  sheets,  showing  in 
one  column  the  amount  of  goods  brought  in  by  Americans, 
and  comparing  this,  in  a  parallel  column,  with  the  amount 
brought  in  by  all  other  vessels,  or  with  the  total  amount 
imported. 

These  statistics  indicate  that  in  1805  fully  97%  of  the 
pepper  and  other  spices  received  in  Holland  was  carried  in 
by  American  ships.  The  next  year  this  high  figure  declined 
to  32%,  and  in  1807  it  rose  slightly  to  42%  of  the  total. 
Cocoa  rose  from  35,290  pounds,  or  8%  of  the  total  in  1805, 
to  50%  and  52%,  respectively,  in  the  next  two  years.  Our 
carrying  trade  was  increased  also  by  reason  of  the  vast 
quantitites  of  coffee  and  sugar  with  which  Americans  sup- 
plied the  Dutch  market.  The  amount  of  coffee  exported 
from  the  United  States  to  Holland  increased  from  2,323,902 
pounds  in  1803,  to  26,082,432  pounds  in  1804,  which  was 
three  times  as  large  as  the  shipments  to  any  other  country. 

!)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  sttik,  606  et  seq.    Dec.  11,  1806. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    57 

In  1805  Americans  were  importing  80%  of  the  total,  and 
83%  in  1806.  The  amount  of  sugar  imported  in  American 
bottoms  averaged  82%  of  the  total  during  the  years  1805  to 
1807.  Indigo,  ivory,  drugs,  teas  and  nankeens  from  China, 
timber  from  Northern  Europe,  and  dyewoods  and  other 
costly  woods  from  tropical  countries  were  among  the  other 
articles  of  commerce  which  Americans  disposed  of  in  Hol- 
land. If  the  amount  of  these  goods  was  relatively  smaller, 
their  great  variety  helped  to  swell  the  volume  of  our  carrying 
trade. 

Dutch  markets  also  offered  unusual  opportunities  during 
these  years  for  the  sale  of  the  domestic  products  of  the 
United  States.  The  cotton  planters  of  the  south,  and  the 
tobacco  and  rice  growers,  found  one  of  their  best  customers 
in  Holland.  Holland  was  surpassed  only  by  England  and 
France  as  a  market  for  American  cotton.  Her  annual  supply 
of  rice  was  obtained  very  largely  from  the  United  States. 
During  the  years  1803  to  1805,  and  again  in  1807,  England 
was  the  only  country  which  annually  received  larger  supplies 
of  American  tobacco  than  were  sent  to  Holland;  in  1806 
Holland  headed  the  list.  So  many  hogsheads  were  sent  over 
in  that  year,  that,  during  the  next  34  years,  the  figure 
reached  in  1806  was  only  once  surpassed,  namely  in  1823. 
During  the  period  from  1808  to  1840,  there  were  only  four 
years  when  the  amount  of  rice  which  had  been  exported  to 
Holland  in  1807  was  exceeded, — and  this  in  spite  of  the  in- 
creased acreage  which  Southern  States  devoted  to  its  pro- 
duction. Besides  these  staple  products  of  the  South,  Hol- 
land annually  received  from  the  United  States  large  quanti- 
ties of  potash,  staves,  whale-oil,  hides,  and  other  more  bulky 
articles  of  commerce. 

It  is  only  natural  that  the  prosperity  which  the  American 
trader  enjoyed  should  occasionally  excite  the  envy  of  the 
Dutch,  the  more  so  when  we  remember  that  the  balance  of 
trade  was  always  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  and  that 
many  a  cargo  brought  in  by  Americans  was  paid  for  in  hard 
cash.  "The  commerce  of  Holland  with  the  United  States," 
says  a  Dutch  writer  in  1806,  "on  which  the  city  of  Amster- 
dam had  built  such  lofty  expectations  at  the  commencement 
of  the  Revolution,  instead  of  being  any  advantage  has  be- 
come a  distinct  source  of  loss,  the  United  States  having 
found  means  of  importing  everything  into  Europe,  and  of 


58     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

exporting  as  little  as  possible  in  the  way  of  articles  of  manu- 
facture and  luxury."  He  estimated  that  the  direct  imports 
from  the  United  States  amounted  to  2,000,000  florins  a  year, 
while  the  exports  to  the  Nnited  States  were  scarcely 
1,000,000  florins.1) 

A  silk  manufacturer  at  Haarlem,  in  an  elaborate  memo- 
rial on  the  manufactures  of  Holland,  dated  August  23,  1807, 
made  the  statement  that  during  the  American  Revolution 
this  country  had  "used  only  the  manufactures  and  produc- 
tions of  France  and  Holland,  thus  raising  the  hope  that  in 
time  these  two  countries  would  be  compensated  for  the  con- 
siderable efforts  and  real  sacrifices  they  had  made"  in  aiding 
the  establishment  of  American  indenpendence.  But  as  soon 
as  peace  had  been  established,  he  asserts,  the  United  States 
showed  la  plus  noire  ingratitude,  by  discarding  Dutch  and 
French  manufactures,  "and  by  making  use  almost  exclu- 
sively of  those  of  Great  Britain,  while,  through  the  ever- 
increasing  prosperity  of  the  United  States,  they  have  become 
an  infinitely  larger  and  richer  market  for  English  goods  than 
they  ever  were  during  the  entire  colonial  period."  Yet,  he 
admits  that  the  silk  and  thread  manufactures  of  Holland  still 
found  a  profitable  market  in  this  country,  and  he  suggests 
that  this  market  might  be  extended  by  adopting  the  same 
method  which  England  had  found  useful  in  extending  her 
sales,  that  is,  of  having  the  Dutch  consuls  at  Boston,  New 
York,  Philadelphia,  and  other  ports  report  once  or  twice  a 
year  on  the  state  of  the  markets. 2) 

The  list  of  exports  from  Holland  in  1807  indicates  that 
silk  and  cotton  manufactures  of  various  kinds,  as  well  as 
linen,  were  among  the  most  important  and  most  valuable 
articles  sent  to  the  United  States.  During  the  same  year  the 
United  States  received  only  one  per  cent,  of  the  total  amount 
of  white-lead  exported  from  Holland,  about  two  per  cent,  of 
the  total  amount  of  flax,  and  ten  per  cent,  of  the  iron  goods, 
mostly  in  the  form  of  nails.  The  list  also  included  a  great 
variety  of  other  articles,  but  in  each  case  the  amount  or  the 
money  value  was  very  small. 3) 

J)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  246  ff.,  (quotation  found 
on  page  261)  in  a  document  on  "Du  Commerce  des  Hollandais," 
Sept.  22,  ISO*},  writer  unknown. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  311  et  seq. 

:{)  R.  A.,  Collectie  Goldberg,  190. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    59 

The  cargo  which  the  Lovely  Nan  obtained  at  Amster- 
dam, in  July,  1806,  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  nature  and 
variety  of  the  goods  which  Americans  obtained  in  Holland. 
The  liquid  part  of  the  cargo  consisted  of  10  pipes  of  gin,  50 
pipes  of  beer,  34  boxes  of  claret  and  some  mineral  water.  In 
the  same  vessel  were  stowed  a  box  of  books,  10  hogs- 
heads of  madder,  25  boxes  of  tobacco  pipes,  25  pairs  of 
millstones,  7  boxes  of  German  peddlar's  ware,  1,158  bars  of 
iron,  a  quantity  of  hardware,  mirrors,  silk  handkerchiefs, 
coffee  mills  and  a  few  other  miscellanies.  The  millstones 
were  obtained  from  Cologne,  the  peddlar's  ware  was  indi- 
cated as  German,  while  the  iron,  the  hardware,  the  looking 
glasses  and  coffee  mills,  as  well  as  the  claret  and  mineral 
waters  were  in  all  probability  first  imported  into  Holland 
from  some  adjacent  European  country,  before  being  re- 
exported  to  the  United  States. 1)  The  fact  that  the  outward 
cargoes  of  American  vessels  was  apt  to  consist  in  part  of 
goods  which  were  not  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  Hol- 
land, may  account  for  the  large  balance  of  trade  in  favor 
of  the  United  States,  and  will  help  to  explain  the  jealousy 
which  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the  American  nation 
aroused  in  Holland. 


From  a  copy  of  the  ship's  manifest  among  the  Bourne  papers. 


60    Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 


CHAPTER  III. 


A  PERIOD  OF  EXPERIMENTATION  AND  UNCERTAINTY. 
(1808—1809.) 


The  last  two  months  of  the  year  1807  saw  the  adaption 
of  three  measures  of  far-reaching  importance,  all  three 
growing  out  of  the  commercial  and  economic  warfare  which 
characterized  this  period.  So  far  as  legislation  could  effect 
the  desired  object,  these  measures  practically  brought  the 
contest  to  a  climax.  Only  one  of  them  became  embodied  in 
the  municipal  regulations  of  Holland,  but  all  three  had  a 
pronounced  effect  on  our  commercial  relations  with  that 
country.  The  first  of  these  measures,  the  British  Orders  in 
Council  of  November  11,  led  directly  to  the  adoption  of  the 
second  and  third. 

The  Orders  of  November  11  may  be  taken  as  the  cul- 
mination of  the  navigation  policy  which  Great  Britain  had 
steadfastly  adhered  to  since  the  adoption  of  the  famous  rule 
of  the  war  of  1756.  As  the  contest  with  France  lengthened, 
British  Orders  had  multiplied  to  keep  pace  with  French  de- 
crees, and  the  rule  of  1756  had  been  given  an  ever  wider 
interpretation.  The  immediate  occasion  for  these  last  orders 
was  the  more  rigid  enforcement  of  the  Berlin  Decree  after 
the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  together  with  the  design  of  Napoleon  to 
impose  the  Continental  System  on  Portugal  and  Denmark. 
Of  all  the  Orders  in  Council  which  Great  Britain  had 
adopted  in  regard  to  trade  with  her  enemies,  these  were  the 
most  severe  and  the  most  unfair. 

Every  neutral  vessel  was  declared  to  be  a  lawful  prize,  if 
the  captain  or  owner  had  shown  his  acquiescence  in  the  Ber- 
lin Decree  by  accepting  from  a  French  consul  a  certificate 
of  origin,  or  a  declaration  of  any  kind,  stating  that  the  goods 
on  board  were  not  English  property  or  of  English  origin. 
All  trade  with  the  ports  of  France  and  her  allies,  or  of  any 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    61 

country  at  war  with  England,  was  forbidden,  "as  if  the  same 
were  actually  blockaded  by  his  majesty's  naval  forces,  in 
the  most  strict  and  vigorous  manner."  A  concession  was, 
however,  made  in  favor  of  neutrals,  for,  as  the  Orders 
state,  his  majesty  was  "desirous  not  to  subject  neutrals  to 
any  greater  inconvenience  than  is  absolutely  inseparable 
from  the  carrying  into  effect"  of  this  policy.  Trade  with 
enemy  ports  was,  therefore,  to  be  permitted  to  neutrals,  "un- 
der such  regulations  as  his  majesty  may  think  fit  to  pre- 
scribe." The  substance  of  these  regulations  was  that  all 
neutral  commerce  with  the  enemies  of  England  must  pass 
through  a  British  port,  and  that  the  voyage  from  such  British 
port  to  an  enemy  port  could  be  undertaken  only  after  the 
neutral  had  purchased  a  British  license  and  had  paid  cer- 
tain import  duties  to  the  British  government.1) 

Retaliation  for  the  enforcement  of  the  Berlin  Decree 
was  the  alleged  motive  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  these 
Orders.  However,  this  particular  form  of  retaliation  was 
fully  as  injurious  to  neutrals  as  to  the  enemy.  And  the 
framers  of  the  Orders  were  well  aware  of  this  fact;  they 
knew  that  under  the  Berlin  Decree  every  vessel  which 
touched  at  an  English  port  would  be  confiscated.  Retalia- 
tion was,  therefore,  not  the  sole  aim  of  these  Orders;  per- 
haps an  equally  strong  motive  for  their  adaption  was  the 
desire  to  increase  the  trade  of  England  and  to  decrease  the 
trade  of  neutrals.  And  although  the  Orders  were  general 
in  form  and  applied  to  all  neutrals,  it  was  no  secret  at  the 
time  that  they  were  intended  in  particular  to  throttle  the 
colonial  trade  with  the  continent  which  was  carried  on  in 
American  ships. 

Scarcely  had  the  news  reached  American  shipping  circles 
that  the  Berlin  Decree  was  to  be  enforced,  when  rumors  be- 
gan to  arrive  that  England  was  planning  new  indignities 
against  American  trade.  On  December  17,  President  Jef- 
ferson called  his  cabinet  together  in  special  session  to  con- 
sider the  situation.  Though  no  official  notice  of  the  adoption 
of  the  Orders  had  yet  reached  him,  he  was  in  possession  of 
London  newspapers  of  the  12th  of  November,  which  pre- 
dicted their  immediate  publication.  Basing  his  action  on  this 
information,  as  well  as  on  the  definite  knowledge  that  the 
Berlin  Decree  would  no  longer  be  considered  a  dead  letter 


Annual  Register,  1807,  p.  746. 


62     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

as  regards  American  vessels,  Jefferson  now  proposed  that  an 
embargo  be  laid  on  all  shipping  in  American  harbors.  All 
the  cabinet  members  concurred  in  this  view,  and  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  an  embargo  message  was  sent  to  Congress. a) 
Four  days  later,  on  December  22,  Jefferson  signed  the  em- 
bargo act  which  forbade  all  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations.2* 

On  the  same  day  on  which  Jefferson  proposed  to  lay  an 
embargo,  Napoleon  had  promulgated  the  Milan  decree,  as 
a  retaliation  against  the  British  Orders  in  Council.  This  de- 
cree declared,  in  substance,  that  every  vessel  which  stopped 
at  an  English  port,  or  which  submitted  to  visitation  or  search 
by  an  English  man-of-war,  thereby  became  denationalized 
and  should  be  treated  as  English  property.  All  such  vessels 
were  to  be  regarded  as  good  prize  in  the  ports  of  France 
and  her  allies,  or  wherever  they  might  be  captured  by  the 
privateers  or  war  vessels  of  these  countries. 3) 

The  publication  of  the  Milan  decree  in  Holland,  on  Janu- 
ary 8,  by  no  means  satisfied  Napoleon  that  his  royal  brother 
also  intended  to  carry  this  measure  into  effect.  On  the 
contrary,  he  declared  to  Brantsen,  who  was  about  to  leave 
his  post  as  Dutch  ambassador  at  Paris,  that  his  late  decree 
against  England  was  neglected  in  Holland,  and  that  trade 
with  England  was  again  reviving  under  the  so-called  neutral 
flags.  He  is  quoted  as  saying  that  Holland  was  betraying 
France,  and  that  to  all  appearances  a  brother  of  the  English 
king  was  ruling  there.4 >  The  new  Dutch  ambassador,  Ver- 
huell,  received  orders  from  Napoleon  to  send  a  special 
courier,  to  inform  Louis  of  the  Emperor's  discontent.  In  a 
private  letter  to  the  Dutch  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Ver- 
huell  explained  that  the  matter  was  of  the  most  delicate  na- 
ture. "God  grant,"  he  writes,  "that  our  worthy  king  may  real- 
ize that  all  this  corruption  and  this  bungling  with  our  trade 
must  cease  ....  And  let  us,  high  officials  of  the  realm,  beg 
the  king,  if  need  be  upon  our  knees,  to  conform  to  the  Em- 
peror's intentions.  The  Emperor  demands,  with  justice,  that 
we  should  follow  no  other  system  than  that  of  France."  5) 


!)  Henry  Adams,  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  IV.,  166  et  seq. 

2)  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  II.,  451. 

3)  Corresp.  de  Nap.,  XVI.,  192. 

4)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  391.     Brantsen  to  Louis, 
Jan.  17,  1808. 

5>  Ibid.,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  666;  Verhuell  to  Roell,  Jan.  17,  1808. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    63 

In  reply  to  these  new  protests  Louis  complained  bitterly 
against  what  he  termed  his  slanderers  and  calumniators,  and 
demanded  that  the  Emperor  do  him  full  justice.  "What 
are  your  Majesty's  orders,"  he  asks,  "what  would  you  have 
me  do?  To  close  the  ports?  I  shall  close  them;  but  is  it 
just  to  crush  this  unfortunate  country?  Must  I  leave  it?  I 
willingly  consent  to  this,  provided  I  do  not  leave  behind  me 
the  reproach  of  being  a  traitor."  x)  Two  days  later,  on 
January  23,  1808,  appeared  Louis'  order  for  closing  the  ports 
of  his  Kingdom  entirely  to  all  vessels,  whatever  might  be 
their  nationality,  the  only  exception  being  that  armed  ves- 
sels of  allied  nations  could  enter  and  depart  as  usual  with 
their  prizes. 2)  On  January  26,  Napoleon,  for  the  second 
time  since  1803,  expressed  his  satisfaction,  and  compli- 
mented Louis  on  his  good  intentions. 3) 

By  this  ord'er  of  January  23,  1808,  American  commerce 
with  Holland  was  placed  under  a  double  embargo.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  act  of  December  22,  1807,  which  instituted  the 
long  embargo  in  the  United  States,  forbade  any  clearances 
for  a  foreign  port.  On  the  other  hand,  should  any  vessels 
succeed  in  escaping  from  an  American  port  and  in  crossing 
the  Atlantic  in  safety,  they  were  confronted  with  a  munici- 
pal regulation  of  Holland,  which  forbade  their  admission 
into  Dutch  ports.  This  regulation  applied  also  to  the  hun- 
dreds of  American  vessels  which  were  in  the  various  ports  of 
Europe  or  in  the  far-away  East  Indies  and  China  at  the 
time  the  Dutch  embargo  was  declared.  All  trade  with  Hol- 
land was  placed  under  an  interdict.  Not  only  were  Ameri- 
can vessels  forbidden  to  enter  Dutch  ports,  but,  what  was 
worse,  those  which  were  in  port  on  January  23  were  re- 
fused permission  to  depart.  And  it  was  upon  these  vessels 
and  their  crews  that  the  embargo  in  Holland  had  an  imme- 
diate effect. 

Two  days  after  Louis'  order,  the  American  consul  at 
Rotterdam  requested  the  advice  of  Bourne  as  to  what  should 
be  done  with  the  crews  of  the  ten  American  vessels  which 
were  then  in  port.4)  Bourne  at  once  busied  himself  in  at- 
tempting to  find  a  practical  solution  of  this  question,  and  the 


1)  Rocquain,  15O,  Jan.  21,  1808. 

2)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Orig.  Konink.  Decreten,  deel  115. 

3)  Rocquain,  152. 

*)  Bourne  MSS.;  George  Curtis  to  Bourne,  Jan.  25,  1808. 


64     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

success  of  his  efforts  is  shown  in  his  despatch  to  the  Secre- 
tary, of  State  on  February  22.  A  short  time  before,  he 
writes,  the  Dutch  government  had  allowed  him  to  send  a 
vessel  to  the  United  States  containing  "a  great  number  of 
destitute  American  seamen."  But  he  adds  that  he  was  soon 
"surrounded  with  about  100  more,  collected  from  different 
quarters  of  Europe  ....  and  it  cost  the  public  about  $40.00 
per  day  for  their  support.  I  thought  it  to  be  my  duty  to 
petition  the  king  for  permission  to  send  a  ship  off  with  them 
....  and  was  happy  in  obtaining  this  permission."  1) 

Dutch  merchants  generously  lent  their  support  in  reliev- 
ing the  seamen  of  a  nation  upon  whom,  in  former  years, 
they  had  largely  depended  for  their  supply  of  foreign  goods. 
On  March  10,  the  American  consul  at  Rotterdam  informed 
Bourne  that  he  would  follow  the  example  set  by  the  mer- 
chants at  Amsterdam  in  drawing  up  a  petition  to  the  Dutch 
Secretary  of  State.  This  petition,  he  states,  would  be  signed 
by  the  masters  of  American  vessels  as  well  as  by  the  mer- 
chants who  were  the  consignees  of  the  cargoes. 2)  Three 
weeks  later  Bourne  reported  that,  upon  the  request  of  sev- 
eral merchants  at  Amsterdam,  the  government  had  allowed 
the  departure  of  another  vessel,  "to  take  home  about  50  more 
seamen,  and  as  the  masters  of  the  vessels  from  which  they 
are  discharged  furnish  the  provisions  for  these  50,  the  United 
States  will  be  at  no  charges  on  their  accounts."  3)  This  re- 
lief work  was  not  completed  until  the  departure  of  the  Shep- 
herdess from  Amsterdam,  about  the  middle  of  August. 

The  embargo  act  of  January  23  may  be  regarded  as  the 
beginning  of  a  period  of  experimentation  to  do  away  with 
all  neutral  trade.  As  the  weeks  and  months  passed  by,  it 
became  apparent  that  this  experiment  was  a  difficult  one  to 
carry  out,  and  a  costly  one  to  the  country  at  large.  Hence 
we  find  the  king  and  his  officials  enforcing  the  embargo  in 
an  arbitrary  manner,  and  resorting  to  various  concessions 
and  evasions.  For  a  week  or  two  all  vessels  which  attempted 
to  enter  were  warned  to  depart.  Thus  a  vessel  from  Phila- 
delphia, which  tried  to  enter  the  port  of  Hellevoetsluys  late 
in  January,  was  ordered  by  the  naval  commander  there  to 


*)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  MSS.,  Dept.  of  State. 
2)   Bourne  MSS.,  Curtis  to  Bourne. 

3>  Consular  Despatches,  Amst.,  II.,  Dept.  of  State,  Bourne  to 
Sec.  of  State,  March  29. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations    65 

put  to  sea  again. J>  The  next  week  a  number  of  vessels  with 
salted  fish  were  refused  permission  to  run  into  Amsterdam. 
They  then  proceeded  to  Antwerp  where  they  discharged 
their  cargoes  without  hindrance. 2)  But  this  policy  was  dim- 
cult  to  adhere  to.  Within  a  few  weeks  the  embargo  caused 
a  rise  in  the  price  of  colbnial  goods  and  in  the  price  of  abso- 
lute necessaries  of  life,  such  as  salt,  quinine,  etc.  Public 
sentiment  and  private  interest  combined  to  clamor  for  the 
admission  of  vessels  which  hovered  off  the  coasts,  and  Louis 
was  constrained  to  yield,  though  he  well  knew  that  such  a 
course  ran  counter  to  the  will  of  his  Imperial  brother. 

On  February  9,  the  French  ambassador  reported  that  a 
few  American  vessels,  which  in  all  probability  contained 
colonial  goods  belonging  to  Dutch  merchants,  had  received 
permission  to  enter. 3>  The  ship  Lexington  from  New  York 
not  only  entered  without  hindrance,  but  was  also  allowed  to 
depart.  This  vessel  left  the  port  of  New  York  just  before 
the  long  embargo  was  declared,  with  a  cargo  consisting  of 
sugar,  pimento  and  dyewoods.  Her  logbook  indicates  that 
she  entered  the  port  of  Amsterdam  on  February  16  and  be- 
gan to  discharge  her  cargo  on  February  29.  She  then  took 
in  ballast  and  set  sail  for  Baltimore  on  March  31.4) 

"From  time  to  time  ships  have  arrived  from  your  conti- 
nent," Backer  writes  on  February  22,  "and  they  are  per- 
mitted to  remain  in  port,  and  some  of  them  have  even  re- 
ceived liberty  to  discharge  their  cargoes."  5)  On  the  same 
day  Bourne  wrote  that  the  Dutch  government  was  showing 
every  effort  to  alleviate  "the  effects  to  which  our  com- 
merce had  been  unavoidably  subjected  by  the  measures 
which  France  and  this  government  have  found  it  necessary 
to  adopt  for  bringing  England  to  peace  ....  Indeed,  I 
think  I  can  be  justified  in  saying  that  this  government  will 
not  be  disposed  to  do  anything  unfriendly  towards  our  coun- 
try which  it  is  not  compelled  to  do  by  extraneous  influences. 
It  appears  to  have  a  due  estimation  of  the  reciprocal  inter- 


*)  Bourne  MSS.,  F.  Van  der  Schoor  to  Bourne,  Feb.  4. 

2)  Colenbrander,    Vde    deel,    Iste    stuk ;    Dupont-Chaumont    to 
Champagny,  Feb.  8. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  27;  Dupont-Chaumont  to 
Champagny. 

4)  Logbook  of  the  Merchant  Ship  Lexington,  Timothy  Gardner, 
Master,  MS.,  in  Library  of  Cong.,  Division  of  MSS. 

5>   Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor. 


66     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

ests  of  the  two  countries,  and  to  be  anxious  to  preserve  the 
relations  of  frienship  and  harmony  .  .  .  .  ,  and  in  proof 
thereof  it  has  of  late,  at  my  express  request,  modified  some 
of  its  decrees  so  as  to  afford  a  material  relief  to  our  ves- 
sels and  cargoes  coming  here."  1) 

It  was  not  long  before  "extraneous  influences,"  to  use 
Bourne's  phrase,  were  being  brought  to  bear  to  insure  a 
more  effective  enforcement  in  Holland.  "I  am  informed," 
Napoleon  wrote  to  Gaudin,  his  minister  of  finance,  "that  the 
English  make  use  of  the  following  method  for  introducing 
their  merchandise  in  Holland  and  France :  they  load  Ameri- 
can vessels  with  English  goods,  and  escort  them  to  the  coasts 
of  Holland;  the  vessels  enter,  declaring  they  came  in  a 
straight  line  from  America,  and  have  not  met  an  English 
privateer  at  sea.  By  this  means  the  privateers  cannot  seize 
them,  and  the  local  authorities  receive  them."  Gaudin  re- 
ceived instructions  to  call  upon  the  French  consuls  in  Hol- 
land for  reports  as  to  whether  this  information  was  true.2* 

On  March  31,  Champagny,  the  French  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  addressed  a  communication  on  this  subject 
to  the  French  minister  at  The  Hague.  The  Emperor  had 
been  informed,  he  states,  that  two  American  vessels  had 
arrived  at  Amsterdam  from  London,  with  colonial  goods, 
and  that  150  other  American  vessels  were  taking  in  colonial 
goods  at  London,  in  the  hope  of  carrying  them  to  Holland. 
He  instructs  La  Rouchefoucauld  to  act  on  the  principle  that 
every  American  vessel  with  colonial  goods  was  suspected, 
since  the  general  embargo  in  the  United  States  prevented  a 
single  vessel  from  leaving  port.3) 

These  instructions  to  La  Rouchefoucauld  clearly  fore- 
shadow the  more  determined  stand  which- the  Emperor  took 
two  weeks  later  in  regard  to  American  vessels.  In  an  ad- 
ministrative order  to  Gaudin,  on  April  17,  Napoleon  argued 
that  since  the  United  States  had  placed  an  embargo  on  their 
vessels  and  had  resolved  to  carry  on  no  more  trade  during 
the  war,  it  must  be  evident  "that  all  the  vessels  which  state 
that  they  come  from  America,  come  from  England,  and  that 
their  papers  are  false."  He  gave  orders  that  those  which  ar- 


*)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Dept.  of  State. 

2)  Corresp.  de  Nap.,  XVI.,  453 ;  Nap.  to  Gaudin,  March  29,  1808. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  .'50;  Champ,  to  La  Roche- 
foucauld. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     67 

rived  at  the  ports  of  France,  Holland,  Italy  and  the  Hanse 
towns  should  be  not  merely  suspected,  but  actually  placed 
under  sequester. l)  This  order,  although  couched  in  the  form 
of  an  ordinary  letter,  has  come  to  be  known  as  the  Bayonne 
decree.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  it  was  called  forth  by  the 
arrival,  early  in  April,  of  a  vessel  from  the  French  colony 
of  Guadeloupe,  which  vessel,  according  to  a  despatch  from 
the  American  minister  at  Paris,  announced  that  "the  most 
terrible  apprehensions"  existed  "among  the  French  colonists 
of  the  West  Indies,  in  consequence  of  our  embargo."  2) 

In  this  same  letter  of  April  17  Napoleon  also  called  for 
information  as  to  the  number  of  American  vessels  which 
had  arrived  in  France  and  Holland  since  the  first  of  Janu- 
ary. In  reply  to  this  question,  La  Rouchefoucauld  re- 
ported on  May  1  that,  according  to  information  furnished  by 
the  French  consuls,  not  a  single  vessel  had  entered  Dutch 
ports  during  the  last  six  weeks.  He  immediately  qualified 
this  statement  by  saying  that  on  April  20  an  American  ves- 
sel arrived  from  Baltimore,  and  on  April  22  another  from 
New  York.  But,  although  their  papers  were  declared  to  be 
in  good  order,  these  vessels  were  immediately  ordered  to  de- 
part without  obtaining  leave  to  break  cargo. 3)  Backer  states 
that  this  action  of  the  government  "has  made  much  impres- 
sion oil  our  market  prices,  as  it  is  now  considered  a  certainty 
that  no  supplies  can  arrive  here."  4)  The  Moniteur  adds  that 
these  vessels  hovered  off  the  coast  for  two  weeks,  and  com- 
ments that  the  refusal  to  admit  them  was  all  the  more  singu- 
lar because  it  was  known  to  the  authorities  that  one  of  them 
had  on  board  196  cases  of  quinine. 5) 

At  about  the  same  time  an  American  vessel  arrived  from 
Lisbon  with  a  cargo  of  salt,  which  was  admitted  because  of 
the  great  scarcity  of  this  article.6)  In  fact,  as  early  as  Febru- 
ary 1 1 ,  Louis  had  ordered  that  vessels  laden  with  salt  should 
be  exempted  from  the  general  embargo. 7)  Upon  the  arrival 


!)  Corresp.  de  Nap.,  XVII.,  16. 

2)  State  Dept.,  Despatches,  France  Vol.  XI ;  Armstrong  to  Madi- 
son, April  15. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  34;  La  R.  to  Champagny. 

4)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  May  13. 
5>  Moniteur  Universe  I,  May  30,  1808. 

6)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  34.    La  Rouchefoucauld  to 
Champagny,  May  1,  1808. 

7)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Konink.  Besluiten,  118. 


68     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

of  this  vessel  from  Lisbon,  the  Dutch  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  pointed  out  to  La  Rochefoucauld  the  necessity  of  ad- 
mitting two  or  three  additional  vessels,  until  a  sufficient 
supply  could  be  received  by  land.1)  This  proved  to  be 
merely  a  ruse,  however,  for  obtaining  other  articles  besides 
salt.  When  four  other  vessels  with  salt  arrived  about  the 
middle  of  May,  La  Rochefoucauld  ordered  a  close  inspec- 
tion of  the  cargoes.  This  inspection  showed  that  the  colo- 
nial goods  on  board  had  merely  been  covered  with  a  layer  of 
salt.2)  These  four  vessels  were,  therefore,  ordered  to  leave, 
and  on  May  18  Louis  was  constrained  to  rescind  the  permit 
granted  in  February,  and  to  order  that  the  ports  be  closed 
to  all  vessels  whatsoever. 3) 

This  order  was  violated  on  the  very  day  it  was  issued,  in 
favor  of  an  American  vessel  from  China,  with  a  cargo  of 
tea  consigned  to  the  house  of  Willinck  and  Company  at 
Amsterdam.  In  justification  of  Louis,  it  should  be  said 
that  he  had  specially  authorized  certain  mercantile  houses, 
early  in  1807,  to  make  use  of  American  vessels  in  importing 
tea  from  China,  and  now  probably  felt  bound  to  carry  out 
his  promise,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  circumstances  had 
greatly  changed  since  the  authorization  was  granted.4*  On 
July  13  Louis  again  admitted  an  American  vessel  with  tea 
and  in  this  case  he  ordered  that  the  goods  should  be  landed 
in  the  royal  warehouses  but  that  the  proceeds  should  be 
turned  over  to  the  consignees. 5>  Before  this  order  could 
be  executed,  another  American  vessel  had  arrived  from 
China,  and  this  apparently  induced  Louis  to  change  his  mind. 
On  July  15  he  informed  his  minister  of  finance  that  cir- 
cumstances compelled  him  to  revoke  his  previous  authoriza- 
tions to  American  vessels,  and  that  he  had  decided  to  allow 
no  further  importations  under  any  pretext  whatsoever. 6) 
From  a  communication  which  Louis  addressed  to  Napoleon 
on  this  subject,  it  appears  that  both  these  vessels  were  or- 
dered to  leave  port — which  can  hardly  be  considered  a  pen- 

*)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  34;  La  R.  to  Champ.,  May  1. 
-)  Ibid.,  La  R.  to  Champ.,  May  19. 
3)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Komnklijke  Besluiten,  131. 

*)  See  his  letter  to  Gogel,  May  18,  1808;  Duboscq,  Louis  Na- 
poleon en  Hollande,  232. 

5)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  424;  Louis  to  Gogel. 

6)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stak.  424. 


Thirty- Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations    69 

alty — and  that  the  cargoes  were  confiscated  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public  treasury.1) 

Upon  receiving  this  second  order,  of  July  15,  the  min- 
ister of  finance  not  only  intimated  his  disapproval,  but  hinted 
also  at  the  desirability  of  making  an  exception  in  favor  of 
certain  vessels  from  Gothembourg  (Goteborg),  on  the 
ground  that  their  cargoes  consisted  in  part  of  salt.  This 
article,  he  pointed  out,  was  now  three  times  its  ordinary 
price,  "and  can  scarcely  be  purchased  by  the  poorer  class  of 
Your  Majesty's  Subjects."  2)  This  information  alone  was 
sufficient  to  soften  Louis'  heart,  and  when  the  owners  of 
the  cargoes  came  to  him  in  person  and  pleaded  for  the  ad- 
mission of  these  vessels,  Louis  was  in  a  mood  to  yield  to 
their  request.  On  July  28  he  permitted  the  minister  of 
finance  to  admit  the  vessels  from  Gothembourg,  provided  it 
could  be  done  without  creating  a  stir,  and  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  French  consuls.  If  this  could  not  be  done,  the 
vessels  were  to  be  placed  under  sequester,  but  in  that  case  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  cargoes,  which  ordinarily 
would  go  to  the  public  treasury,  were  to  be  handed  over  to 
the  commercial  houses  concerned. 3) 

This  decision  indicated  a  return  to  the  policy  pursued 
earlier  in  the  year.  On  August  1,  in  fact,  Louis  again  per- 
mitted the  introduction  of  salt,4*  while  in  September  a  few 
vessels  from  China  were  allowed  to  enter.5*  Finally  in  a 
decree  of  November  27,  which  was  intended  as  a  more  rigid 
reapplication  of  the  embargo,  an  exception  was  again  made 
in  favor  of  vessels  with  tea  and  other  Chinese  products,  and 
also  of  those  whose  cargo  consisted  of  salt  only.  The  Chi- 
nese goods,  however,  were  to  be  placed  in  the  royal  ware- 
houses, and  could  be  sold  only  by  special  permission  from 
the  King.6) 

By  that  time  the  entire  country  was  suffering  from  the 
effects  of  the  embargo.  All  industry  was  paralyzed  for  lack 

x)   Rocquain,  185;  Louis  to  Nap.,  Sept.  25. 

2>  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  425;  Gogel  to  Louis,  July  20. 

3)  Ibid.,  427;  Louis  to  Gogel,  July  28.     In  all  probability  these 
were   American   vessels,   for   the   ports   of  Holland   were   closed  to 
Swedish  vessels  by  royal  decree  of  January  18,  1808. 

4)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Secrete  Besluiten,  360. 

5)  See   Louis  to   Napoleon,   Sept.  25,   Rocquain,   185;   Louis  to 
Roell,  Sept.  18,  Duboscq,  262-263. 

G)  Moniteur  Universcl,  Dec.  31,  1808. 


70    Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

of  raw  material  or  for  lack  of  export  facilities.  At  Zaan- 
dam,  so  the  Prussian  ambassador  reported,  all  mills  were 
closed,  the  saw-mills  for  lack  of  wood,  the  paper  mills  for 
lack  of  rags.  The  laborers  and  their  children  were  clad  in 
rags,  and  their  entire  appearance  bespoke  dire  poverty.  This 
was  early  in  May.  Late  in  June  he  writes  that  the  women 
and  children  of  Amsterdam  fairly  staggered  and  seemed 
ready  at  every  step  to  drop  from  sheer  exhaustion,  as  they 
dragged  their  boats  along  the  canals — "a  sight  which  one 
sees  here  only  too  often,"  he  adds,  "and  which  is  an  unmis- 
takable proof  of  great  poverty  of  the  people.^  Agriculture 
still  continued,  but  the  wages  of  farm  laborers  declined  ow- 
ing to  the  competition  which  arose  with  the  influx  of  the  half- 
starved  city  populations. 

The  universal  distress  was  due  in  large  measure  to  the 
decrease  in  the  supply  of  commodities  which  Holland  in  for- 
mer years  had  received  from  abroad.  As  a  necessary  con- 
sequence the  price  of  these  commodities  rose  immediately 
after  the  embargo  went  into  effect.  On  January  4  of  this 
year  the  best  quality  of  Georgia  cotton  could  be  obtained  at 
$22.00  per  bale.  On  February  22,  a  month  after  the  Dutch 
embargo,  it  sold  at  $28.00.  Four  months  later  this  figure 
had  been  doubled,  and  by  August  6  the  price  had  soared  to 
$68.00  per  bale.  Thus  in  the  space  of  seven  months  this 
article  had  increased  to  more  than  three  times  its  former 
price.  Carolina  rice  showed  an  even  greater  increase.  This 
article,  which  usually  sold  at  from  $7.00  to  $8.00  per  cask, 
was  selling  at  $12.00  per  cask  on  June  20,  and  at  $41.60 
early  in  August — an  increase  of  nearly  500%  since  Janu- 
ary 4,  when  it  sold  at  $9.00.  Coffee,  sugar  and  tobacco  also 
showed  a  marked  increase. 2) 

The  striking  prediction  which  Schimmelpenninck  had 
made  at  the  very  inception  of  the  exclusion  system  in  Hol- 
land was  now  being  fulfilled.  In  July,  1803,  shortly  after 
Schimmelpenninck  returned  from  London,  he  was  sum- 
moned to  an  interview  with  Napoleon,  in  the  course  of  which 


T)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Inleiding,  2*1 ;  from  Nie- 
buhr's  Circular  Brief e  aus  Holland,  1808. 

2)  These  figures  have  been  obtained  from  the  price  lists  which 
Backer  regularly  sent  to  Taylor — Taylor  MSS.  The  last  of  these  is 
dated  August  6.  After  that  date  it  became  almost  impossible  to  get  a 
letter  through  to  the  United  States. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    71 

he  informed  Napoleon  that  the  prevailing  belief  in  England 
was,  that  France  could  do  no  real  harm  by  closing  her  ports 
and  those  of  her  allies  to  English  goods,  and  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  France  to  attack  the  two  great  resources 
which  England  possessed  for  carrying  on  the  war,  that  is, 
her  finance  and  her  commerce.  When  pressed  for  a  further 
explanation  Schimmelpenninck  had  replied : 

"The  application  of  the  system  comes  down  to  this,  that 
if  you  cannot  deprive  the  40  million  Frenchmen,  whom  you 
govern,  of  the  desire  (for  example)  to  drink  coffee,  to  eat 
sugar,  to  use  spices,  commerce  will  always  find  means  of 
procuring  that  quantity  of  coffee,  sugar  and  spices  which  40 
million  men  need;  and  since  commerce  finds  them  only  in 
British  warehouses,  it  is  necessary  to  seek  for  them  at  Lon- 
don, and  to  pay  the  dealers  for  them.  Now  your  measures 
will  hinder  the  means  and  facilities  for  importation,  but,  for 
all  that,  people  will  not  drink  a  dror>  of  coffee  less  nor  eat  a 
grain  of  sugar  less  ....  they  will  import  in  a  roundabout 
way  what  they  used  to  import  directly. 

"The  difference  is  that  importation  will  be  carried  on  by 
certain  privileged  houses,  which  know  how  to  evade  the  laws 
and  prohibitive  measures,  while,  in  the  case  of  a  free  com- 
merce, a  greater  number  of  houses  would  participate  in  it." 
The  need  of  resorting  to  roundabout  ways  would  neces- 
sarily occasion  greater  expenses,  and  would  increase  the  cost 
of  the  merchandise  imported.  "But  it  is  the  consumers,  and 
not  the  English,  who  pay  the  expenses/'  Napoleon  agreed 
at  the  time  that  there  was  some  truth  in  this  view  of  the 
matter.1) 

Schimmelpenninck  did  not  foresee  the  possibility  of  a 
complete  closure  of  Dutch  ports,  and  therefore  based  his 
prediction  on  the  assumption  that  British  goods  alone  were 
to  be  excluded.  With  this  difference,  his  statement  fits  the 
situation  which  arose  after  the  embargo  act  of  1808,  with 
remarkable  accuracy.  There  was  an  immediate  rise  in 
prices,  not  only  of  coffee,  sugar,  spices  and  other  colonial 


*)  Ah!  c' est  la  leur  calcul !  II  y  a  du  vrais  dans  ce  developpe- 
ment,  are  the  words  which  Sch.  attributes  to  him.  See  his  report  of 
the  interview,  July  24,  1803,  in  Colenbrander,  IVde  deel,  2de  stuk, 
453-454. 


72     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

goods,  but  of  all  other  commodities  as  well,  including  those 
furnished  by  neutral  countries.  And  though  this  advance 
in  prices  was  due  in  the  first  instance  to  the  cutting  off  of 
the  usual  supply,  it  was  due  in  the  second  place  to  the  very 
cause  which  Schimmelpenninck  assigned.  For,  the  signifi- 
cant fact  remains  that  in  spite  of  the  embargo  a  considerable 
amount  of  goods  continued  to  be  imported  throughout  the 
year  1808. 

In  addition  to  the  evidence  which  has  already  been  cited 
in  proof  of  this  assertion,  it  may  be  noted  that,  between  the 
first  of  December,  1807,  and  the  last  of  August,  1808,  at 
least  54  British  licenses  were  granted  to  neutrals  to  export 
goods  to  Holland.1*  Furthermore,  a  report  of  Gogel,  the 
Dutch  minister  of  finance,  indicates  that  about  3*/2  million 
pounds  of  sugar  and  more  than  9  million  pounds  of  coffee 
were  imported.  In  both  cases  about  one-half  came  from  the 
United  States,  the  rest  from  Europe. 2)  The  statistics  kept  by 
Goldberg  show  that  considerable  quantities  of  rice  (4,819,- 
906  pounds),  cotton  (1,093,908  pounds),  cocoa,  drugs,  dye- 
woods,  indigo  and  spices  were  imported,  partly  in  American 
vessels.3  > 

These  figures,  moreover,  in  all  probability  do  not  include 
the  goods  carried  in  by  smugglers.  Smuggling  was  particu- 
larly active  in  the  newly  acquired  region  of  East  Friesland, 
where  the  regular  customs  organization  was  not  introduced 
until  October ;  but  it  was  prevalent  also  in  all  other  parts  of 
the  kingdom.  Some  idea  as  to  the  amount  of  goods  smug- 
gled in  may  be  gained  from  the  testimony  of  a  merchant  at 
Rotterdam.  He  writes  to  the  minister  of  Marine,  on  Decem- 
ber 18,  that  Zeeland  had  become  the  centre  of  the  smuggling 
trade  for  southern  Holland.  From  there  the  goods  were 
sent  to  Rotterdam,  were  stored  in  warehouses  for  some 
time,  and  were  then  repacked  and  sent  to  Amsterdam  and 
elsewhere.  At  one  town  in  Zeeland  (Zierikzee)  the  ware- 
houses were  so  completely  filled  with  colonial  goods  that  the 
smugglers  no  longer  knew  where  to  place  them.  He  states 


!)  Privy  Council  Registers,  Vols.  68-70.  This  figure  is  suggestive 
rather  than  exhaustive,  for  the  Registers  are  not  complete. 

2>  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  1428;  Gogel  to  Montalivet, 
Aug.  7,  1810.  His  figures  tally  exactly  with  those  of  Goldberg. 

3)  R.  A.,  Collectie  Goldberg,  190,  Lijsten  van  In-,  Uit-  en  Door- 
gaande  Goederen. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     73 

that  the  arrival  of  colonial  goods  at  Rotterdam  was  a  matter 
of  daily  occurence.  The  market  for  these  goods  had  been 
transferred  from  London  to  the  British  vessels  lying  off  the 
coasts  of  Holland.  The  Dutch  vessels  which  went  out  to 
meet  the  British  vessels  hoisted  a  special  flag  for  purposes 
of  identification,  and  usually  returned  under  cover  of  dark- 
ness. These  facts,  he  states,  needed  no  proof;  they  were 
knov.-n  to  every  merchant  at  the  Bourse,  and  even  to  the  king 
himself.  In  this  way  the  government  was  being  deprived  of 
its  import  duties,  the  honest  merchants,  and,  in  fact,  the 
entire  nation  were  being  ruined,  while  the  smugglers  and 
speculators  derived  all  the  profits. ^ 

In  another  letter  he  noted  that  just  before  the  frost  set 
in,  500  bags  of  Jamaica  sugar  arrived  at  Rotterdam,  and  that 
one  warehouse  (he  mentions  the  street)  had  received  400 
bags  of  coffee,  while  another  had  been  filled  entirely.  On  a 
single  day  35  wagons  arrived  from  Papendrecht,  each  of 
which  carried  in  at  least  2,000  pounds  of  coffee. 2) 

From  all  this  evidence  in  regard  to  the  importation  of 
foreign  goods,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  increase  in  price 
was  not  due  solely  to  the  cutting  off  of  the  supply.  A  second 
reason  was  that  the  market  was  largely  controlled  by  a  few 
speculators  who  knew  how  to  evade  the  laws,  and  who  were 
willing  to  incur  the  expense  and  to  assume  the  tremendous 
risks  which  commercial  operations  involved. 

Turning  now  to  the  subject  of  exportation  from  Hol- 
land, we  find  that,  between  the  first  of  February  and  the 
last  of  August  of  this  year,  at  least  176  British  licenses  were 
granted  to  import  goods  from  Holland. 3)  Most  of  these 
Dutch  goods  were  probably  obtained  through  smugglers,  in 
much  the  same  manner  in  which  the  Dutch  received  their 
British  and  colonial  goods. 4)  Moreover,  on  three  separate 
occasions  during  the  year,  Louis  relaxed  the  embargo  by 
permitting  the  exportation  of  Dutch  goods. 

On  March  31  he  authorized  the  ministers  of  marine  and 


1)   Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  685-686;   Cremer  to  Van 
der  Heim,  Dec.  17,  1808. 

2>  Ibid.,  688;  Cremer  to  Van  der  Heim,  Jan.  7,  1809. 

3)  Privy  Council  Registers,  Vols.  67  to  70.    See  also  note  6,  p.  72. 

4)  Cremer,  in  his  letter  of  Dec.   17,  quoted  above,  specifically 
states  that  boat  loads  of  Dutch  goods  were  carried  to  British  vessels. 


74    Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

finance  not  only  to  connive  at  smuggling,  but  also  to  direct  it 
and  to  give  it  actual  encouragement.  They  were  instructed, 
however,  to  use  the  utmost  caution,  to  send  out  only  a  few 
vessels  at  first  and  to  increase  the  number  very  gradually, 
in  order  that  the  French  officials  might  not  become  aware  of 
the  practice.1* 

On  May  26  Louis  permitted  the  exportation  of  the  three 
principal  products  of  Holland — butter,  cheese  and  gin —  to 
friendly  or  neutral  countries.  The  customary  bond  was  to 
be  exacted  and  the  vessels  were  to  receive  positive  orders  to 
return  in  ballast  only.2)  La  Rochefoucauld  reported,  on 
June  9,  that  this  order  might  be  regarded  as  null  and  void, 
because  the  merchants  hesitated  to  deposit  a  bond  which 
they  feared  would  be  forfeited.3) 

This  is  partly  confirmed  by  Bourne,  who  writes  on  June 
16  that  the  embargo  on  American  vessels  "is  still  con- 
tinued, except  under  certain  circumstances,  when  they  have 
liberty  to  depart  if  they  take  out  cargoes  of  gin,  butter  and 
cheese,  but  as  this  will  expose  them  to  the  British  Blockade 
Act  of  November  11,  few  of  the  masters  are  inclined  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  permission  under  these  terms.  The 
embargo  in  the  United  States  tends  to  render  those  in  Eu- 
rope less  irksome  to  the  parties,  as  the  vessels  could  not  be 
employed  at  home."  He  adds  a  suggestion  which  was  later 
repeated  by  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  and  which  was 
to  be  reechoed  in  the  halls  of  Congress.  "If  our  govern- 
ment should  permit  the  merchants  of  the  United  States  to 
arm  their  vessels,  and  fight  their  way  through  the  Blockades 
and  other  impediments  to  their  course  in  the  seas,  many 
would  succeed  to  get  through,  and  the  present  prices  of  mer- 
chandise would  richly  reimburse  the  risk  and  charges,  even 
if  they  were  at  the  expense  of  fitting  out  twenty-gun  ships 
in  due  order,  to  convey  it  here."  4) 

Backer  also  wrote  from  Amsterdam  on  July  14,  "As  yet 
no  vessel  dare  sail  from  here  with  cargo,  and  in  ballast 
our  government  will  not  permit  them  to  go.  From  Rotter- 


!)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Secrete  Konink.  Besluiten,  326. 

2)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Konink.  Besluiten,  132,  No.  2. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  40;  La  R.  to  Champagny. 
4)    Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Dept.  of  State.    Bour 

to  Sec.  of  State. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    75 

dam  some  ships  have  sailed  with  cargoes  of  gin."  x)  In  real- 
ity, all  the  American  vessels  at  Rotterdam  took  advantage  of 
this  opportunity  to  escape  from  the  embargo.  On  April  29 
there  were  ten  American  vessels  at  that  port.2*  One  of 
these,  the  Amiable,  arrived  at  New  York  on  August  3,  and 
her  captain  reported  that  no  American  vessels  remained  in 
port  when  he  set  sail  on  June  26.3)  A  few  American  ves- 
sels also  left  the  port  of  Amsterdam.  Of  the  eighteen  which 
were  in  port  on  April  13, 4*  eleven  remained  on  May  26,  the 
day  on  which  Louis'  order  appeared. 5)  Six  of  these  were 
still  under  embargo  on  August  18;  the  other  five  had  de- 
parted.6* One  of  these  was  the  bearer  of  despatches,  and  it 
is  not  unlikely  that  one  or  more  of  the  others  carried  home 
American  seamen. 

On  August  22  appeared  another  of  those  characteristic 
secret  orders  of  Louis,  this  particular  one  being  labelled  un- 
usually secret  (buitengewoon  secreet).  It  allowed  the  ex- 
portation of  a  large  variety  of  articles  which  were  either  of 
Dutch  growth  or  manufacture  or  of  foreign  origin.  These 
could  be  sent  only  to  friendly  or  neutral  countries,  and  a 
special  request  must  be  made  to  the  minister  of  finance  for 
each  expedition.7*  Whether  any  of  these  exports  reached 
the  United  States  is  extremely  doubtful,  nor  is  there  the 
slightest  evidence  to  indicate  that  this  measure  afforded  any 
relief  to  the  few  American  vessels  still  embargoed  in 
Holland. 

In  fact,  the  pressure  which  Napoleon  brought  to  bear 
induced  Louis,  on  October  13,  to  forbid  all  further  exporta- 
tion and  to  take  new  steps  in  enforcing  the  embargo.8*  The 
adoption  of  the  decree  of  November  279)  completed  the  com- 
mercial legislation  of  this  year.  This  measure,  like  that  of 
October  13,  was  intended  to  make  the  embargo  more 
effective,  although,  as  has  already  been  noted,  an  exception 
was  made  in  regard  to  the  admission  of  salt  and  Chinese 
goods.  Smuggling  still  continued,  but  so  far  as  the  official 


!)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor. 

2)  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  June  16. 

3)  Ibid.,  August  5. 

4)  Ibid.,  June  16. 

5)  Ibid.,  August  1. 
«)  Ibid.,  October  3. 

7)  R   A.,  S.  S.,  Secrete  Besluiten,  360. 

8)  R.  A.,  S.  S.,  Konink.  Besluiten,  157. 
»)    Ibid. 


76     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

attitude  of  the  government  was  concerned  no  further  experi- 
ments were  tried  during  the  rest  of  the  year  and  during  the 
first  three  months  of  1809. 


The  various  experiments  which  Louis  had  tried  out  in 
1808  were  merely  a  reflexion  of  what  was  going  on  in  France 
during  the  same  period.  He  might  have  justified  the  impor- 
tation of  salt,  tea  and  other  products  by  pointing  to  the  fact 
that  France  was  following  a  similar  course.  His  orders 
allowing  the  exportation  of  Dutch  goods  followed  closely 
upon  the  agitations  in  France  for  the  exportation  of  French 
goods.  And  the  same  was  true  of  the  first  measure  adopted 
in  1809.  A  year's  experimentation  with  the  embargo  had 
convinced  Napoleon  that  France  was  not  a  self-supporting 
country.  One  after  another  the  relief  measures  which  had 
been  tried  out  had  resulted  in  failure.  Napoleon  was  now 
ready  to  resort  to  a  more  radical  experiment,  which  was 
nothing  less  than  the  adoption  of  the  British  license  system 
in  a  somewhat  modified  form.  By  the  15th  of  March  a  suit- 
able form  of  license  had  been  agreed  upon  and  before  the 
end  of  the  month  a  limited  number  of  applicants  had  been 
supplied  with  these  trade  permits.1* 

The  action  taken  by  the  Emperor  emboldened  Louis  to 
relax  the  embargo  in  Holland.  All  his  subjects,  he  informed 
Napoleon,  were  clamoring  for  the  re-opening  of  trade;  he 
was  therefore  desirous  of  applying  the  same  laws  and  regu- 
lations as  were  in  force  in  France.  On  this  matter  he  would 
impatiently  await  the  Emperor's  response. 2)  When  Na- 
poleon failed  to  reply,  Louis  construed  this  silence  as  an  ap- 
probation, and  on  March  31  he  issued  the  order  which  once 
more  opened  the  ports  of  Holland  to  a  limited  amount  of 
trade. 

The  decree  of  that  date  allowed  the  exportation  of  some 
forty  agricultural  or  manufactured  products,  as  well  as  the 
importation  of  a  large  variety  of  foreign  goods,  including 
tea  and  salt.  Vessels  with  tea  were,  however,  required  to 
furnish  proof  that  they  had  received  previous  authorization 


*)  I  owe  this  information  to  Dr.  Frank  E.  Melvin,  who  has  made 
a  special  study  of  the  License  System  of  Napoleon. 

2)  Rocquain,  195^196,  Louis  to  Nap.,  March  16,  1809. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     77 

from  the  King.  All  other  imported  goods  must  be  accom- 
panied by  a  certificate  of  origin  signed  by  a  French  consul, 
together  with  all  papers  which  were  necessary  to  prove  that 
such  a  certificate  was  not  false.  The  importation  of  any 
article  not  enumerated  in  this  decree  was  forbidden,  under 
penalty  of  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo.  All  previous 
laws  in  regard  to  non-intercourse  with  England  remained  in 
full  force,  except  in  so  far  as  they  were  modified  by  this  de- 
cree.a)  This  measure  was,  therefore,  in  no  sense,  a  repeal  of 
either  the  Berlin  or  the  Milan  decree. 

The  few  American  vessels  which  were  still  embargoed  in 
Holland  now  received  leave  to  depart,  either  in  ballast  or 
with  specified  cargoes.  In  a  communication  to  President 
Madison,  April  10,  Bourne  claimed  all  the  credit  for  having 
secured  their  release.  He  also  reported  the  substance  of  a 
conversation  held  with  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 
Roell  asked  me,  he  writes,  "if  I  thought  the  measure  would 
have  a  favorable  impression  on  our  government.  I  replied 
....  that  as  the  government  of  the  United  States  had  in  all 
its  conduct  evinced  a  strong  desire  to  preserve  harmony  and 
friendship  with  the  powers  of  Europe,  it  had  witnessed  with 
much  regret  the  steps  which  some  of  them  had  lately  pur- 
sued, as  being  evidently  intended  to  impair  those  relations; 
and  that  it  would  consequently  be  disposed  duly  to  appre- 
ciate every  symptom  of  a  return  ....  to  those  principles 
which  constituted  the  basis  of  our  former  intercourse  with 
them,  and  comported  with  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  ....  a  state  of  things  which  I  conceived  the 
interest  of  this  country  preeminently  dictated,  as  it  involved 
some  of  its  most  important  interests."  2) 

Our  relations  with  Holland  were  still  further  modified 
by  the  repeal  of  the  embargo  in  the  United  States.  On 
March  1  Congress  passed  the  non-intercourse  act,  which  for- 
bade all  trade  with  England  and  France  after  March  15,  but 
which  re-opened  commercial  relations  with  the  rest  of 
Europe,  including  Holland.3 >  Furthermore,  as  a  result  of 
the  Erskine  agreement,  England  signified  her  willingness  to 
make  a  concession  to  the  United  States,  pending  the  negotia- 
tions for  a  new  treaty  between  the  two  countries.  An  Order 

x)  Louis  Bonaparte,  Document  Historiques,  III.,  55-60. 

2)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. 

3)  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  II.,  528-533. 


78     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

in  Council  of  May  24  declared  that  after  June  10  the  Orders 
of  January  and  November,  1807,  were  to  be  withdrawn  as 
respects  American  vessels.  At  the  same  time  England  re- 
laxed her  paper  blockade  of  Holland  in  favor  of  American 
vessels.  All  vessels  which  left  the  United  States  between 
April  19  and  July  20,  1809,  were  free  to  enter  and  leave 
Dutch  ports  and  were  not  to  be  molested  by  English  war 
vessels  or  privateers. 1) 

When  Bourne  heard  of  the  repeal  of  the  American  em- 
bargo, about  the  middle  of  May,  he  became  highly  indignant 
and  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  "lead  to  much  em- 
barrassment and  confusion/'  Any  arrangement  between  the 
United  States  and  England,  he  believed,  "will  only  tend  to 
commit  us  with  France,  and  I  believe  that  France  will  cap- 
ture and  confiscate  all  property  of  our  country  navigating 
under  permission  from  Great  Britain  and  violently  set  her- 
self against  any  species  of  trade  construed  by  her  to  be  al- 
lowed by  Great  Britain  ....  The  United  States,  by  giv- 
ing up  the  embargo,  has  thrown  us  into  a  wide  ocean,  with- 
out compass  or  guide  to  direct  our  true  course."  2) 

The  Dutch  decree  of  March  31  allowed  the  importation 
of  only  four  articles  which  might  be  considered  as  American 
products — tobacco,  potash,  hides  and  whale  oil.  The  main 
difficulty  which  Bourne  foresaw  was  that  American  vessels 
then  on  their  way  to  Holland  would  contain  many  additional 
articles,  and  that,  in  attempting  to  import  these  forbidden 
goods,  they  would  be  subject  to  the  penalty  which  the  law 
prescribed,  that  is,  the  confiscation  of  vessel  and  goods.  He 
therefore  sought  to  obtain  a  further  concession  from  Hol- 
land in  favor  of  American  commerce.  In  a  conversation 
with  Roell,  late  in  May,  he  requested  that  the  ports  of  Hol- 
land be  opened  not  only  to  all  American  products,  but  also 
to  the  produce  of  the  East  and  West  Indies,  of  which  we 
were  important  carriers.  He  supported  this  request  by  say- 
ing that  in  proportion  as  the  powers  on  the  continent  con- 
ciliated American  commerce,  our  interest  would  stimulate 
the  American  government  to  oppose  "the  unjust  and  arbi- 
trary pretensions  of  England  in  regard  to  the  passage  over 

*)  See  Madison's  Message  authorizing  trade  with  Great  Britain, 
Richardson's  Messages,  etc.,  I.,  457 ;  also  Annual  Register,  1809,  763 
et  seq. 

2)   Bourne  MSS.,  Bourne  to  Taylor,  May  15,  1809. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    79 

the  seas,  and  the  blockade  of  the  world  by  a  stroke  of  the 
pen.1* 

A  day  or  two  later  Bourne  received  definite  knowledge 
of  the  tentative  agreement  between  the  United  States  and 
England.  This  induced  him  to  address  two  additional  com- 
munications to  Roell,  in  which  he  called  for  an  immediate 
decision  of  the  question.2)  Roell  replied  that  for  the  present 
no  further  encouragement  could  be  given  to  American  com- 
merce. The  admission  of  colonial  produce,  he  argued, 
would  be  directly  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  Dutch  laws,  inas- 
much as  the  colonial  possessions  of  Holland  and  France 
were  then  in  the  hands  of  England.  Bourne  answered  this 
argument  by  saying  that  large  quantities  of  colonial  pro- 
duce, which  had  remained  in  the  United  States  because  of 
the  long  embargo,  had  been  imported  from  places  which  at 
that  time  still  belonged  to  Holland  or  France.  These  could 
be  brought  to  Holland  without  violating  Dutch  .laws,  the 
more  so  because  Great  Britain  was  tenaciously  adhering  to 
her  navigation  laws,  which  forbade  Americans  from  obtain- 
ing sugar,  coffee,  cotton  or  other  articles  from  British  col- 
onies, or  from  enemy  colonies  then  in  her  possession.  He 
added  that  it  would  be  a  great  benefit  to  American  commerce 
if  the  admission  of  South  Carolina  rice  and  Georgia  cotton 
were  allowed,  in  addition  to  the  articles  enumerated  in  the 
March  decree.3) 

Meanwhile  a  few  American  vessels  were  beginning  to 
arrive  with  forbidden  cargoes  of  rice,  cotton  and  colonial 
goods.  Under  the  March  law,  such  vessels  and  goods  were 
to  be  confiscated,  but  Louis  was  not  prepared  to  go  to  this 
extreme.  The  practice  actually  followed  in  such  cases  was 
to  place  the  vessel  under  sequester,  and  to  store  the  goods  in 
the  royal  warehouses,  with  the  intention  of  keeping  them 
there  until  the  return  of  peace.4)  When  La  Rochefoucauld 
remonstrated  against  this  practice,  Louis  instructed  Roell  to 

1)  Bourne  MSS.,  Bourne  to  Sec.  of  State,  May  29,  1809. 

2)  R.  A.,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken,  Bourne  to  Roell,  June  1  and  2; 
the  letter  of  June  2  is  also  found  in  Consular  Despatches,  Amster- 
dam, II. 

3)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerika,  359,  Bourne  to  Bosscha,  June 
6;  also  Bourne  to  Sec.  of  State,  June  6,  Consular  Despatches,  Am- 
sterdam, II. 

*)  See  Backer  to  Taylor,  June  29,  Taylor  MSS.;  Bourne  to  Tay- 
lor, June  30,  Bourne  MSS.;  Bourne  to  Sec.  of  State,  June  30,  Con- 
sular Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. 


80     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

reply  that  he  had  no  need  of  the  French  ambassador's  per- 
mission to  regulate  his  own  affairs.  "You  might  answer 
him/'  he  continued,  "that  sequestration  is  exactly  what  I 
have  ordered,  and  that,  if  American  vessels  are  sent  away,  I 
would  ruin  Holland  totally,  which  I  shall  never  do.  That 
Holland  has  as  much  need  of  the  United  States  as  the 
United  States  has  of  Holland,  and  that  far  from  destroying 
the  relations  and  understanding  (convenances)  which  exist 
between  the  two  nations,  I  would  like  to  find  ten  occasions  a 
day  to  strengthen  and  multiply  them."  a> 

La  Rochefoucauld  feared  that  the  practice  of  sequestra- 
tion, instead  of  confiscation,  would  result  in  the  admission  of 
a  swarm  of  American  vessels  under  false  papers,  with  car- 
goes of  British  colonial  produce.  Moreover,  in  his  belief, 
there  was  daily  proof  that  such  cargoes  as  were  stored  in  the 
royal  warehouses  were  later  restored  to  the  owners.  "So 
true  is  this,"  he  writes,  "that  there  is  not  a  single  person  at 
Amsterdam  who  does  not  regard  these  vessels  as  saved,  after 
they  are  admitted;  and  what  lends  support  to  this  assertion 
is  the  desire  manifested  by  the  owners  that  their  merchandise 
should  be  sequestered  until  peace,  rather  than  be  sent  out 
of  the  Kingdom."  Since  it  was  a  very  uncertain  matter 
when  peace  would  be  restored,  he  argued  that  the  owners 
would  not  submit  to  sequestration  unless  they  had  some  as- 
surance that  their  goods  would  soon  be  returned  to  them.2) 

Although  La  Rochefoucauld  was  probably  justified  in  his 
suspicions  of  Louis'  intentions,  his  opinion  was  by  no  means 
shared  by  Bourne.  On  June  4,  Bourne  wrote  to  the  captain 
of  an  American  vessel  which  had  just  arrived  with  colonial 
produce,  "I  exceedingly  wonder  why  my  countrymen  come 
here  in  direct  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  country,  of  which 
they  cannot  plead  ignorance."  3)  On  June  21,  he  requested 
the  American  consul-general  at  London  to  give  official  notice 
that  for  the  present  no  American  vessels  should  proceed  to 
Holland,  since  those  which  had  already  arrived  were  "under 
peculiarly  unpleasant  circumstances."  4)  And  on  June  30,  in 
writing  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  he  gave  the  advice  that  our 


!)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  501-502,  Louis  to  Roell, 
June  14,  1809. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk;  La  R.  to  Champ.,  June  19, 
1809. 

*)  Bourne  MSS.,  Bourne  to  Smith. 

*)  Ibid.,  Bourne  to  General  Lyman. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    81 

government  "ought  not  to  allow  our  vessels  to  clear  for 
Dutch  ports  with  colonial  produce,  till  a  change  for  the  bet- 
ter occurs."  *> 

Moreover,  Bourne  sought  to  prevent  the  sequestration  of 
such  American  and  colonial  goods  as  were  being  brought 
into  Dutch  ports.  On  June  22,  he  requested  of  Roell  that  per- 
mission be  granted  for  the  sale  of  American  goods,  owned  by 
American  citizens.  Should  this  request  be  refused,  he 
begged  that  the  vessels  which  had  entered  be  allowed  to  de- 
part with  their  full  cargoes. 2)  The  testimony  of  Backer 
indicates  that  the  owners  and  consignees  were  by  no  means 
as  willing  to  have  their  goods  sequestered  as  La  Rochefou- 
cauld believed.  The  cargoes  of  the  five  vessels  which  arrived 
at  Amsterdam,  he  writes  to  William  Taylor,  "will  have  to  be 
landed  in  the  government  stores,  there  to  remain  till  peace. 
Of  course,  the  consignees  and  captains  are  little  disposed  to 
land  their  cargoes  in  this  manner,  and  they  have  presented  a 
second  petition  by  which  they  demand  permission  to  leave 
port  again  with  those  articles  which  they  are  not  allowed  to 
land;  whether,  however,  this  will  be  allowed  to  them  is  a 
great  question  yet.  You  will,  therefore,  observe  how  dan- 
gerous it  is  for  your  ships  ....  unless  they  have  nothing 
but  tobacco  on  board."  3) 

The  persistent  efforts  of  Bourne  during  the  month  of 
June  to  obtain  relief  for  American  vessels  were  not  in  vain, 
for  on  June  30  appeared  a  royal  decree  which  embodied  the 
very  concessions  which  he  had  sought  to  obtain.  The  pur- 
pose of  this  decree,  as  the  preamble  stated,  was  to  adopt 
measures  more  in  harmony  with  those  in  France,  and  to 
maintain  so  far  as  possible,  the  relations  between  the  mother 
country  and  such  colonies  as  had  not  been  seized  by  the 
enemy.  The  list  of  imports  allowed  by  the  decree  of  March 
31  was  provisionally  increased  by  the  following  articles: 
rice,  staves,  Peruvian  bark  (quinquina),  and  other  medical 
drugs,  cotton  from  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  and  coffee 
and  sugar  from  Java.  Besides  requiring  the  usual  certifi- 
cates of  origin,  a  commission  of  exports  was  to  be  appointed 
in  order  to  decide  whether  these  goods  really  came  from 
America  or  from  a  Dutch  colony.  To  facilitate  their  work, 

*)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  State  Dept. 

2)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerika,  359. 

3)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  June  29. 


82     Thirty- Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

the  goods  must  be  landed  at  the  royal  entrepots.  After  the 
decree  had  been  in  force  for  a  month  the  director  of  customs 
was  to  report  on  the  advisability  of  renewing  it.1* 

A  second  decree  of  the  same  day  was  intended  as  Hol- 
land's reply  to  the  raising  of  the  American  embargo.  Ameri- 
can vessels  entering  within  three  months  from  the  date  of 
the  decree  were  not  to  be  subject  to  the  existing  laws  on  the 
blockade,  provided  they  had  neither  touched  at  an  English 
port  nor  submitted  to  visitation  by  the  enemy.  The  captain 
must  make  a  declaration  to  that  effect,  and  if  this  proved 
false  the  vessel  and  cargo  were  to  be  confiscated.  The  de- 
cree was  also  made  retroactive  in  favor  of  American  vessels 
which  entered  previous  to  June  30,  and  whose  cargoes  had 
been  sequestered.2* 

As  an  additonal  concession,  Louis  seems  at  this  time  to 
have  resolved  on  granting  licenses  to  American  vessels  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  them  from  capture  by  privateers. 
The  decrees  of  June  30  make  no  mention  of  licenses,  but  a 
letter  which  Bourne  addressed  to  a  London  correspondent  is 
conclusive  proof.  He  informs  his  correspondent  that  the 
Dutch  government  "has  resolved  to  grant  licenses  for  the 
free  entry  of  all  vessels  of  the  United  States,  coming  direct 
therefrom,  and  laden  with  goods  permitted  by  the  King's  last 
decrees  of  March  31  and  June  30  ....  Should  any  vessels 
under  these  circumstances  arrive  off  the  coast  to  your  direc- 
tion, and  you  should  wish  to  send  them  here,  and  will  trans- 
mit me  the  names  and  description  of  the  vessel,  name  of  the 
master,  where  from  in  the  United  States,  and  the  general 
contents  of  the  cargo,  I  will  send  you  over  the  necessary  li- 
censes, or  procure  them  to  be  sent  on  board  off  the  Texel."  3) 
There  is  proof  that  such  licenses  were  actually  granted,  but 
in  view  of  later  developments  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  af- 
forded any  protection  against  capture  by  French  privateers. 

These  measures,  provided  they  were  strictly  executed, 
contained  nothing  which  violated  the  principles  of  the  Milan 
decree,  and  they  might  have  been  tolerated  by  Napoleon  if 
the  United  States  had  not  committed  the  great  blunder  of 
allowing  our  vessels  to  depart  for  Holland  while  forbidding 


!)  The  decree  is  found  in  Rocquain,  202,  in  footnote. 

2)  Ibid.,  203. 

3)  Bourne  MSS.,  July  24.     Correspondent  not  named,  but  pos- 
sibly Gen.  Lyman. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    83 

them  to  sail  for  France.  The  American  government  failed 
to  recognize  the  patent  fact  that  the  fortunes  of  Holland 
were  intimately  linked  with  those  of  France,  and  that  any 
privileges  accorded  to  the  one  must  be  accorded  to  the  other 
as  well.  Louis,  on  his  part,  made  the  mistake  of  not  inform- 
ing Napoleon  of  this  relaxation  until  the  measures  were 
already  in  force.  On  July  1,  he  transmitted  the  June  30  de- 
crees to  Napoleon,  with  the  brief  statement  that  since  the 
Americans  were  in  sight  of  the  coast,  and  since  his  subjects 
loudly  demanded  their  admission,  he  had  taken  these  "dis- 
positions" for  a  month  only.  If  he  received  no  reply,  he 
would  regard  the  Emperor's  silence  as  an  approbation  of 
his  course/1  > 

Louis'  letter  must  have  reached  Napoleon  about  the  time 
that  the  decisive  battle  of  Wagram  was  being  fought,  which 
for  the  third  time  brought  Austria  at  his  feet.  Napoleon 
found  time  to  reply  on  July  17,  in  a  letter  written  from 
Schoenbrun.  "I  demand  that  you  retract  your  decree  imme- 
diately .  .  .  .  "  was  his  curt  reply.  "If  the  Americans  raise 
the  embargo  for  French  vessels,  well  and  good :  France  and 
Holland  must  follow  the  same  system.  Do  not  compel  me  to 
occupy  your  ports  by  my  customs  officers."  2)  On  the  same 
day  he  dictated  to  Champagny  the  instructions  which  were 
to  be  sent  to  La  Rochefoucauld.  "Write  to  M.  de  la  Roche- 
foucauld that  he  demand  the  immediate  revocation  of  this 
decree,  and  that  he  make  it  understood  that  Holland  must 
follow  the  fate  of  France,  its  good  or  its  evil  fortune ;  that  if 
she  separates  herself  from  the  continental  cause,  I  shall 
abandon  her."  3> 

On  July  29,  Louis  repealed  the  first  of  the  June  decrees, 
and  declared  that  "American  trade  with  Holland  should  be 
placed  on  the  same  footing  as  before  the  promulgation  of 
said  decree,  so  that  no  other  vessels  than  those  conforming 
strictly  with  all  the  restrictions  in  our  former  decrees  shall 
be  admitted.  Those  which  do  not  so  conform  shall  be 
warned  off."  The  director  general  of  customs  was  in- 
structed to  give  notice  of  this  repeal  to  the  captains  of  all 
American  vessels  which  arrived,  and  also  to  call  their  atten- 


*)  Rocquain,  201-203. 

2>  Rocquain,  304. 

3)  Correspondence  de  Nap.,  XIX.,  No.  15547. 


84     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

tion  to  the  decree  of  March  31,  which  still  allowed  a  limited 
importation.  ^ 

La  Rochefoucauld  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  mere  re- 
peal of  the  June  decree  did  not  satisfy  the  intentions  of 
Napoleon,  and  pointed  out  that  no  mention  was  made  as  to 
what  should  be  done  with  the  cargoes  which  had  already 
been  landed,  or  with  vessels  which  had  not  yet  discharged 
their  cargoes.  The  practice  followed  was  to  permit  vessels 
which  entered  prior  to  July  31  to  unload,  on  condition  that 
they  depart  in  ballast  only.  After  that  date  American  ves- 
sels with  forbidden  cargoes  were  warned  not  to  enter.2) 

When  the  decrees  of  June  30  became  known  in  the 
United  States,3*  there  resulted  a  rush  of  American  vessels  to 
Dutch  ports.  "A  great  number  of  vessels  have  sailed  for 
Holland,"  writes  William  Taylor  from  Baltimore  on  August 
18,4)  and  the  same  was  true  at  Philadelphia,  New  York  and 
Boston.  Millions  of  pounds  of  sugar,  coffee,  and  other  colo- 
nial produce,  which  had  been  brought  in  before  the  embargo, 
were  still  lying  in  the  warehouses  waiting  for  a  market.  At 
Baltimore  alone  it  was  estimated,  in  August,  that  there  were 
10,000,000  pounds  of  Java  coffee. 5)  American  merchants 
now  eagerly  seized  the  opportunity  to  dispose  of  this 
merchandise. 

Yet,  even  before  American  vessels  began  taking  in  car- 
goes permitted  by  the  June  decree,  that  decree  had  been  re- 
voked, and  when  they  arrived  before  Dutch  ports  later  in  the 
year,  the  majority  of  them  were  warned  not  to  enter.  The 
question  then  was,  whither  should  they  go  ?  To  run  into  an 
English  port  would  have  subjected  them  to  immediate  con- 
fiscation, for  the  President's  proclamation  of  August  9  had 
officially  informed  them  that  England  had  repudiated  the 
Erskine  agreement  and  had  again  made  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil applicable  to  American  vessels. 6)  The  only  port  in  West- 


!)   The  Aurora,  Oct.  9,  1809. 

2)  Taylor  MSS.,  Backer  to  Taylor,  August  25 ;  Am.  Daily  Adv., 
November  3,  letter  of  a  mercantile  firm  at  Amsterdam  to  a  Baltimore 
firm,  dated  Sept.  12. 

3)  About  the  middle  of  August.    See  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  Aug.  26. 

4)  Bourne  MSS.,  Taylor  to  Bourne. 

5)  This   is  the  estimate  made  by  Van   Polanen,   former  Dutch 
minister  at  Wash.,  in  a  letter  to  Daendels,  Gov.-general  of  the  East 
Indies,  August  20.     R.  A.,  East  India  Collection. 

6)  Richardson,  Messages,  I.,  458. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations     85 

ern  Europe  which  was  still  open  was  Tonningen,  and,  as 
early  as  August  7,  General  Armstrong,  the  American  min- 
ister at  Paris,  had  requested  Bourne  to  direct  American  ves- 
sels to  this  port.1*  Tonningen  not  only  possessed  a  good 
harbor,  but  also  had  this  additional  advantage  that  the  goods 
could  be  sent  from  there  to  Altona,  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and 
thence  farther  overland  into  Holland.  During  the  closing 
months  of  the  year  1809  this  port  became  the  rendezvous  for 
American  vessels  which  were  originally  destined  for 
Holland. 

Although  the  majority  of  American  vessels  were  thus 
turned  away  from  Dutch  ports,  a  limited  number  were  still 
permitted  to  enter  during  the  last  months  of  the  year.  As 
has  already  been  stated,  the  decree  of  March  31  was  still  in 
force,  and  this  decree  permitted  the  importation  of  some 
thirty  articles,  among  them  being  tobacco,  potash,  hides  and 
whale-oil.  In  August  drugs  and  medicines  were  again  added 
to  the  list  of  imports.2)  Vessels  whose  cargoes  consisted 
only  of  these  five  articles  were  still  at  liberty  to  enter.  But 
it  appears  that  colonial  goods  were  not  entirely  barred.  "The 
colonial  produce  brought  in  our  vessels,"  writes  Bourne  on 
August  24,  "is  locked  up  in  the  public  stores,  for  how  long  a 
time  we  know  not,  to  meet  what  results  we  cannot  fore- 
see." 3)  And  La  Rochefoucauld  writes,  on  September  6,  that 
Holland  was  filled  with  merchandise  brought  in  by  Ameri- 
cans, a  part  of  which  was  admitted  since  the  intentions  of 
the  Emperor  had  become  known.4)  A  few  days  later  he  held 
a  conversation  on  this  subject  with  Roell,  who  tried  to  allay 
further  suspicion  by  saying  that  the  American  vessels  which 
had  entered  since  the  last  decree  contained  no  colonial  goods, 
and  that  the  cargoes  had  not  been  handed  over  to  the  con- 
signees. When  La  Rochefoucauld  questioned  him  more  close- 
ly and  asked  whether  he  were  willing  to  make  a  categorical 
statement  to  that  effect,  which  could  be  transmitted  to  the 
Emperor,  Roell  dodged  the  question  by  saying  that  it  would 
be  necessary  for  him  to  obtain  further  information.5) 


!)  Dept.  of  State,  Despatches,  France,  Vol.  XI. 

2)  Taylor   MSS.}   Backer   to   Taylor,    Aug.    25;    also   Consular 
Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Bourne  to  Sec.  Smith,  Nov.  7. 

3)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. 

4)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  96,  La  R.  to  Champagny. 
6)   Ibid.,  98  et  seq.,  La  R.  to  Champagny,  Sept.  9. 


86     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Although  the  exact  number  of  American  vessels  which 
were  thus  admitted  cannot  be  given,  the  shipping  lists  are  at 
least  suggestive,  if  not  exhaustive.  On  September  10  there 
were  24  American  vessels  at  Amsterdam.  During  the  next 
month  15  of  these  departed,  most  of  them  going  to  Tonnin- 
gen  and  St.  Petersburg.  On  October  5  there  were  still  11 
American  vessels  in  port.1)  These  figures  suggest  that  the 
number  of  arrivals  must  have  been  nearly  sufficient  to  supply 
the  Dutch  markets  for  the  time  being  with  American  and 
colonial  goods.  As  will  be  shown  presently,  however,  a 
considerable  portion  of  these  goods  was  placed  under 
sequester. 

There  was  yet  another  feature  of  the  decree  of  March  31 
which  offered  a  possibility  for  the  admission  of  American 
vessels.  It  will  be  recalled  that  this  decree  renewed  the 
orders  of  the  previous  year  for  the  admission  of  salt  and 
tea.  In  respect  to  tea  and  other  Chinese  goods  this  decree 
was  somewhat  modified  by  an  order  of  June  2,  by  which  the 
director  of  customs  was  instructed  to  store  such  goods  in 
royal  warehouses,  and  to  prevent  the  owners  from  disposing 
of  them  until  the  return  of  peace.2)  Although  no  instance  of 
the  admission  of  such  vessels  has  been  found,  it  is  significant 
that,  during  the  course  of  the  year,  fourteen  American  ves- 
sels received  royal  licenses  to  sail  for  China.3 > 

Aside  from  this  more  or  less  regular  and  legitimate 
trade,  the  supply  of  American  and  colonial  goods  was  fur- 
ther increased  by  the  two  irregular  channels  of  privateering 
and  smuggling.  In  1808  Americans  had  been  comparatively 
safe  from  capture  by  French  privateers,  but  in  1809  numer- 
ous captures  were  made.  The  question  of  the  disposition  of 
such  prizes  as  were  brought  into  Dutch  ports  was  a  very 
complicated  one,  by  reason  of  the  numerous  and  often  con- 
flicting decrees  of  1808  and  1809.  Furthermore,  French 
privateers  openly  insulted  the  sovereignty  of  the  Dutch  na- 
tion by  seizing  American  vessels  within  Dutch  bays  and 
harbors — a  practice  which  at  once  raised  a  delicate  question 
of  International  Law  and  served  still  further  to  embitter  the 
already  strained  relations  between  Louis  and  Napoleon. 


*)  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  November  27  and  December  13;  and  The 
Aurora,  October  31. 

2)  Duboscq,  300,  Louis  to  Van  Meeuwen,  June  2. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vide  deel,  Iste  stuk,  193  ff . ;  report  of  Mon- 
talivet  to  Napoleon,  October  11,  1811. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    87 

There  are  instances  where  the  Dutch  resented  these  insults 
by  force  of  arms  and  compelled  the  captors  to  restore  the 
prizes  to  their  owners. a)  The  situation  finally  became  so 
serious  as  to  attract  the  attention  of  General  Armstrong  at 
Paris..  "The  account  brought  to  me  through  various  chan- 
nels of  the  embarrassed  state  of  our  commerce  in  Holland," 
he  writes  on  July  26,  "and  the  belief  expressed  by  several  re- 
spectable houses  of  commerce  there  that  my  personal  appli- 
cation to  the  King  might  be  attended  by  useful  effects,  have 
decided  me  on  fitting  up  the  few  weeks  which  may  yet  re- 
main of  the  Emperor's  absence  from  Paris  by  a  trip  to 
Amsterdam."  2> 

This  intention  was  not  carried  out  until  the  following 
month.  On  August  15  he  arrived  at  Rotterdam  and  on  the 
18th  he  held  an  interview  with  Roell  in  which  he  remon- 
strated in  particular  against  the  seizure  of  American  vessels 
within  Dutch  waters.  While  he  was  dining  en  famille  with 
Roell  on  the  following  day,  the  King's  chamberlain  invited 
him  to  a  conference  with  Louis  at  seven  o'clock  that  even- 
ing. At  this  conference  the  whole  subject  of  American  com- 
mercial relations  with  Holland  was  carefully  threshed  over. 
Louis  pledged  himself :  "That  in  any  event,  even  in  that  of 
war,  both  the  persons  and  the  property  of  your  citizens 
within  the  limits  of  my  kingdom  shall  be  safe.  My  political 
connections  are  not  unknown  to  you,  but  they  can  never  in- 
duce me  to  forget  the  protection  I  owe  to  a  regular  and  fair 
commerce  .  .  .  .  "  When  Armstrong  required  new  proofs 
of  this  good  intention  and  pointed  to  the  recent  seizures  in 
Dutch  waters,  Louis  replied  that  these  vessels  had  been  re- 
taken by  the  Dutch  and  restored  to  the  owners,  as  a  result  of 
which  he  had  had  "a  very  serious  quarrel  with  the 
Emperor."  3> 

In  October  Louis  gave  another  evidence  of  his  good  in- 
tentions by  erecting  a  special  prize  court  for  the  trial  of 
American  vessels  brought  in  by  French  privateers.  Bourne 


*)  La  Rochefoucauld  reports  several  such  instances  on  July  3 
and  24 ;  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  85,  88.  Also  Bourne  to 
Sec.  Smith,  September  30;  Cons.  Desp.,  Amst.,  II.  Two  of  the  ves- 
sels which  sailed  for  St.  Petersburg  on  October  8  {Friendship  and 
Harmony)  had  been  brought  in  by  French  privateers  and  released  by 
the  Dutch  government.  See  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  Dec.  13. 

2)  State  Dept.,  Despatches,  France,  Vol.  XI,  Armstrong  to  Smith. 

3)  State  Dept.,  Despatches,  France,  Vol.  XI,  Armstrong  to  Smith, 
August  20. 


88     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

reports  that  this  court  was  erected  "on  the  predetermina- 
tion of  causing  those  to  be  restored  which  may  have  been 
taken  within  his  territorial  jurisdiction."  He  adds  that  the 
government  of  Holland  was  better  disposed  toward  the 
United  States  than  any  other  government  in  Europe,  but  that 
it  was  powerless  to  carry  its  good  intentions  into  effect.1) 
There  is  no  evidence  that  this  prize  court  ever  rendered  any 
decisions.  On  the  contrary,  La  Rochefoucauld,  who  for 
several  months  had  been  writing  home  for  instructions  in 
regard  to  the  disposition  of  American  prizes,  informed 
Louis,  in  the  latter  part  of  October,  that  French  tribunals 
must  be  given  sole  jurisdiction  in  such  cases. 2)  This  course 
appears  to  have  been  followed  after  the  first  of  November, 
while,  pending  the  decision  of  the  French  tribunals,  the  car- 
goes were  stored  in  the  royal  warehouses. 

On  October  13  Bourne  estimated  that  the  American 
property  which  had  been  placed  under  sequester  was  worth 
between  one  and  two  million  guilders.3)  On  November  20 
he  placed  the  original  cost  at  $500,000;  if  the  goods  were  al- 
lowed to  be  sold,  at  the  prices  which  then  prevailed,  the  profit 
would  amount  to  $700,000,  which  would  bring  their  total 
value  to  $1,200,000.  About  two-thirds  of  the  total,  he  states, 
had  been  sequestered  under  decrees  of  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment ;  the  remainder  was  comprised  of  the  cargoes  of  vessels 
brought  in  by  French  privateers,  the  ultimate  disposition  of 
which  depended  upon  the  decisions  of  the  prize  courts  at 
Paris.4) 

Although  Bourne  was  well  aware  that  sequestration  of 
American  property  in  Holland  was  due  entirely  to  French  in- 
fluence, and  that  the  same  cause  operated  to  prevent  its  sale, 
he  acted  on  the  assumption  that  this  property  would  not  be 
restored,  and  therefore  sought  to  find  a  means  of  indemni- 
fying the  owners.  On  October  13  he  wrote  to  Secretary 
Smith,  "I  believe  this  government  would  be  gratified  by 
having  a  good  reason  or  apology  for  releasing  it  [American 
property],  on  terms  which  would  release  the  government  of 
its  responsibility  to  France."  He  proposed  that  the  Treas- 

1)  Consular    Despatches,    Amsterdam,    II.,    Bourne    to    Smith, 
October  25. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  103  ff.;  La  R.  to  Cham- 
pagny,  October  28. 

3)  Consular  Despatches,  Amst.,  II.,  Bourne  to  Sec.  Smith. 
*)   Ibid.,  to  Sec.  Smith,  Nov.  20. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    89 

ury  Department  should  obtain  information  as  to  the  num- 
ber of  American  merchants  whose  property  had  been  se- 
questered, and  to  make  arrangements  with  them  for  selling 
this  property  to  the  government.  The  government  should 
then  represent  itself  as  the  purchaser  of  these  goods  and 
present  a  claim  against  the  Dutch  government  for  reimburse- 
ment. This  plan,  he  adds  confidentially,  was  approved  by 
the  director  of  customs,  "who  thought  it  a  good  way  for  dis- 
charging the  property  without  offending  any  one  or  violating 
any  pledges  or  systems."  1) 

Although  Bourne  recurred  to  the  subject  in  several  of 
his  later  despatches,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  American 
government  approved  of  the  plan  at  the  time,  nor  that  the 
Dutch  government  made  any  attempt  to  carry  it  out.  By  the 
middle  of  November  the  matter  seems  to  have  been  dropped, 
and  the  subject  of  claims  against  Holland  was  not  again 
taken  up  until  1815.  Meanwhile,  during  the  course  of  the 
next  few  months,  as  will  be  indicated  later,  a  portion  of  these 
sequestered  goods  was  either  sold  by  the  Dutch  government 
for  the  benefit  of  the  owners  or  was  directly  handed  over 
to  the  owners  or  consignees.  But  of  this  secret  arrange- 
ment Bourne  appears  to  have  been  unaware. 

Yet,  even  though  the  cargoes  of  all  the  prizes  brought 
in  by  French  privateers,  and  those  which  were  sequestered 
by  the  Dutch  government,  be  added  to  the  list  of  goods  regu- 
larly imported  by  Americans  in  spite  of  the  restrictions  and 
uncertainties  to  which  trade  was  subjected  during  this  year, 
the  total  amount  of  goods  thus  introduced  was  small  in  com- 
parison with  the  vast  amounts  which  were  smuggled  in.  Ac- 
cording to  Bourne,  the  amount  brought  in  by  smugglers  in  a 
single  week  was  equal  to  all  the  American  property  locked 
up  in  the  royal  warehouses.2) 

Smuggling  was  unusually  active  during  the  latter  months 
of  the  year,  due  to  the  attack  which  the  English  made  on  the 
port  of  Flushing  late  in  July,  and  to  their  occupation  of  the 
island  of  Walcheren  during  the  rest  of  the  year.  The  Eng- 
lish made  use  of  this  opportunity  to  flood  that  part  of  the 
country  with  the  merchandise  with  which  their  own  ware- 
houses were  overflowing.  In  November  coffee  could  be  ob- 
tained in  Walcheren  for  eleven  cents  a  pound  and  sugar  at 


*)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. 

2)   Consular  Despatches,  Amst.,  II.,  Bourne  to  Smith,  Nov.  30. 


90     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

sixteen  cents. a)  And  in  spite  of  new  decrees  and  regulations 
on  the  part  of  the  Dutch  government,  these  goods  found  their 
way  into  other  parts  of  the  Kingdom  as  well.  Moreover,  in 
order  to  meet  this  attack,  all  the  available  troops  which  had 
been  stationed  along  the  coasts,  partly  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  smuggling,  were  now  rushed  southward,  with  the 
result  that  contraband  trade  revived  along  the  entire  coast, 
but  particularly  in  East  Friesland. 

A  correspondent  at  Rotterdam,  writing  to  a  merchant  at 
Philadelphia  on  September  18,  makes  the  statement  that,  in 
spite  of  the  triple  line  of  customs  officers,  the  great  quan- 
tities of  coffee  and  other  articles  introduced  by  fraud  had 
prevented  an  increase  in  prices.  "Within  the  space  of  a 
fortnight  there  have  been  imported  into  East  Friesland  alone 
upwards  of  7,000  bags  of  coffee." 2)  The  government 
officials  were  well  aware  of  this  practice  but  apparently  did 
little  or  nothing  to  prevent  it.  Some  interesting  statistics  on 
this  fraudulent  trade  are  furnished  by  no  less  an  authority 
than  the  Secretary  of  finance.  Between  October  22  and  No- 
vember 11,  one  house  at  Groningen  received  30,500  pounds 
of  coffee  and  21,900  pounds  of  sugar.  One  of  its  competitors 
at  the  same  place  laid  in  the  following  supply :  coffee,  18,- 
045;  indigo,  4,756;  sugar,  15,650;  cotton,  12,400;  campeachy 
wood,  11,250.3> 

Others  received  similar  or  even  larger  amounts.  Be- 
tween October  15  and  the  30th  of  November,  173  vessels  dis- 
charged cargoes  of  contraband  goods  at  the  various  docks 
of  Amsterdam,  which  had  been  carried  by  various  internal 
waterways  from  the  region  of  the  north.  Millions  of  pounds 
of  coffee,  sugar,  pepper,  indigo,  cocoa,  cotton  and  dyewoods, 
besides  smaller  quantities  of  tobacco,  nutmeg,  quinine  and 
other  articles  were  thus  brought  to  Amsterdam  alone  in  the 
space  of  a  few  weeks. 4)  Many  of  these  commodities  must 
have  been  introduced  from  the  great  British  entrepot  at 
Heligoland,  but  beyond  any  doubt  large  quantities  were  first 
brought  to  Tonningen,  or  some  other  northern  port,  in 
American  vessels,  so  that  this  contraband  trade  still  fur- 
nished Americans  with  an  indirect  means  of  supplying  Dutch 
markets. 


*)  Moniteur,  November  22,  1809,  p.  1291. 

2)  Am.  Daily  Adv.,  November  14. 

3)  The  amounts  are  in  pounds. 

«)    Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  Inleiding,  XXXIX. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    91 

The  events  of  the  year  1809  had  done  much  to  intensify 
the  quarrel  between  Louis  and  Napoleon.  In  the  fall  of  this 
year  the  Emperor's  demands  became  more  insisting,  while 
his  complaints  multiplied ;  more  and  more  savage  became  his 
rebukes  and  denunciations,  more  violent  his  threats.  And, 
as  ever,  the  most  frequently  recurring  complaint  was  di- 
rected against  the  non-enforcement  of  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem. In  spite  of  Napoleon's  peremptory  order  of  July  17, 
Louis  had  continued  to  encourage  the  admission  of  Ameri- 
can vessels.  And  although  Louis  might  plead  that  their 
number  was  insignificantly  small  and  that  their  cargoes  were 
securely  locked  up  in  the  royal  warehouses,  these  facts  did 
not  mitigate  Napoleon's  anger.  The  nature  of  the  offense 
lay  not  in  the  number  of  American  vessels  which  were  ad- 
mitted, but  in  the  violation  of  a  policy  which  Napoleon 
deemed  it  of  importance  to  adhere  to  in  his  political  deal- 
ing with  the  United  States — the  policy,  namely,  of  pro- 
hibiting all  American  trade  with  Holland  and  other  allied 
states  of  the  Empire,  until  such  time  as  the  American  gov- 
ernment, by  repealing  the  non-intercourse  act  of  March  1, 
1809,  should  again  permit  free  commercial  intercourse  with 
France  itself.  An  even  more  serious  offense  in  the  eyes  of 
Napoleon  was  the  vast  amount  of  smuggling  which  con- 
tinued to  be  carried  on,  with  or  without  the  connivance  of 
Louis  and  his  officials,  along  the  land  frontier  as  well  as 
along  the  entire  seaboard.  Napoleon  realized  full  well  that 
a  continuance  of  this  practice  "meant  nothing  less  than  the 
breakdown  of  the  Continental  System  in  Holland. 

In  a  note  of  October  11,  1809,  dictated  to  Champagny 
but  intended  to  be  forwarded  to  La  Rochefoucauld,  Na- 
poleon threatened  to  send  in  French  troops  for  the  purpose 
of  closing  Dutch  ports  and  of  seizing  contraband  goods,  if 
need  be  in  Amsterdam  itself.  La  Rochefoucauld  was  to 
impress  upon  Louis  "que  ceci  n'est  pas  une  plaisanterie" ; 
that  Holland  was  betraying  the  common  cause ;  that  it  were 
better  for  her  to  act  openly  as  the  ally  of  England  than  to 
carry  on  war  in  disguise  against  France ;  and  that  in  the  end 
the  double  dealing  on  the  part  of  the  King's  ministry  must 
result  in  the  loss  of  Dutch  independence.^ 

This  note,  which  was  presented  to  Louis  at  the  time  when 


Rocquain,  217-218. 


92     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

his  quarrel  with  Napoleon  over  the  disposal  of  American 
prizes  brought  in  by  French  privateers  was  at  its  height, 
utterly  discouraged  the  weak  and  vascillating  king  of  Hol- 
land. On  the  19th  of  November  he  begged  Napoleon  for 
an  interview,  preferably  outside  of  Paris,  saying  that  the 
disfavor  in  which  he  found  himself  could  no  longer  be  en- 
dured.1)  But,  upon  the  unanimous  advice  of  his  ministers, 
he  yielded  to  the  wishes  of  Napoleon,  who  desired  his 
brother's  presence  at  Paris.  On  the  morning  of  Novem- 
ber 27  he  began  the  journey  which  was  to  have  momentous 
consequences  for  the  future  of  Holland,  and  on  December  1 
he  reached  Paris,  where  he  remained,  virtually  a  prisoner  of 
state  in  the  hands  of  Napoleon,  for  fully  four  months.2) 


!)   Rocquain,  226-227. 

2)   Wiipperman,  Nederland  Voor  Honderd  Jaren,  319-322. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    93 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  CRISES  OF  1810  AND  ITS  RESULTS. 


The  result  of  the  first  interview  between  the  royal 
brothers  was  such  as  to  convince  Louis  that  it  would  be 
a  well-nigh  hopeless  task  to  satisfy  Napoleon's  grievances 
against  Holland.  It  was  apparent  from  the  outset  that  the 
government  of  King  Louis  had  been  weighed  in  Napoleon's 
balances  and  been  found  wanting — wanting  more  decidedly 
than  that  of  the  Grand  Pensionary  Schimmelpenninck.  Re- 
ferring to  the  relations  between  Holland  and  France,  in  his 
address  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  on  December  3,  Napoleon 
stated,  "Changes  will  become  necessary.  The  surety  of  my 
frontiers  and  the  well  known  interest  of  both  countries  im- 
peratively demand  it."  1)  But  for  many  weeks  Louis  was  to 
be  kept  in  painful  uncertainty  as  to  the  nature  of  the  changes 
which  Napoleon  should  ultimately  decide  on  introducing. 

The  closing  month  of  the  year  1809  was  largely  devoted 
to  fruitless  discussions  between  Emperor  and  King  and  to 
endless  negotiations  between  their  respective  ministers  of 
foreign  affairs,  Roell  and  Champagny.  In  this  manner  the 
month  of  January  also  passed  away,  and  yet  the  fate  of  Hol- 
land remained  undecided. 2) 

A  Moniteur  article  of  the  31st  of  January,  written  in 
reply  to  King  George's  address  to  the  British  Parliament,  af- 
fords an  insight  into  Napoleon's  plans  at  that  time.  Hol- 
land, it  was  boldly  asserted,  "has  betrayed  the  common 
cause;  she  has  received  your  [England's]  commerce  under 


a)  Rocquain,  Introduction,  XCVI. 

2)  The  best  source  for  the  negotiations  at  Paris,  a  discussion 
of  which  must  here  be  omitted,  is  the  report  of  Roell,  Verslag  van 
Hetgccn  tc  Parijs  is  I  'oorgevallen,  etc.  Other  source  material  may 
be  found  in  Colenbrander,  in  the  Correspondence  of  Napoleon,  and 
in  the  appendices  (150  pages)  of  Wichers'  De  Regeering  van  Ko- 
ning  Lodezinjk  Napoleon.  The  most  elaborate  secondary  account  is 
given  by  Wiipperman,  Ncderland  Voor  Honderd  Jaren. 


94     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

an  American  flag,  disavowed  by  the  United  States  itself  .  .  . 
.  .  .  ;  but  she  shall  no  longer  receive  it.  Your  Orders  in 
Council  of  1807  call  for  the  occupation  of  the  coasts  and 
ports  of  Holland  by  customs  officers  and  troops  upon  which 
we  can  rely;  and  that  will  take  place.  And  as  one  of  the 
results  of  the  first  and  of  the  second  coalition  was  to  ex- 
tend the  coasts  of  the  Empire  up  to  the  Scheldt,  the  result 
of  your  Orders  in  Council  of  1807  will  be  to  extend  the 
coasts  of  France  up  to  the  Elbe."  a) 

As  a  result  of  this  open  threat  of  annexation,  King  Louis, 
on  February  1,  issued,  the  last  of  his  decrees  on  commercial 
matters.  Since  the  31st  of  July,  1809,  the  ports  of  Holland 
had  remained  open  to  American  vessels  with  cargoes  of  to- 
bacco, potash,  hides  and  whale-oil.  After  February  1,  1810, 
even  this  meagre  concession  was  revoked ;  Dutch  ports  were 
to  be  closed  to  "every  American  vessel  whatsoever",  while, 
except  for  the  prizes,  those  already  in  port  were  to  be  given 
orders  to  depart  without  breaking  cargo. 2)  There  is  every 
evidence  to  believe  that  this  decree  was  enforced  to  the  letter 
during  the  remainder  of  Louis'  reign  ;3>  henceforth  an 
American  vessel  could  enter  only  as  the  prize  of  a  French 
privateer. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  this  decree  appeared,  Louis 
also  instructed  his  ministers  to  reply  to  the  grievous  accusa- 
tions of  the  Moniteur  that  Holland  had  destroyed  the  com- 
mon cause,  and  had  received  English  vessels  under  an  Ameri- 
can flag.4)  The  ministry  complied  with  these  instructions 
by  issuing  a  manly  protest,  which  appeared  in  the  Konink- 
lijke  Courant  of  February  5,  and  which  was  written  in  a 
spirit  worthy  of  the  Dutch  Republic  in  its  most  palmy  days. 

"What  Hollander,"  they  ask,  "can  have  read  without 
emotion  [the  accusation]  that  we  have  betrayed  the  common 
cause  ....  We,  the  descendants  of  the  Batavians,  of  the 


a)  Moniteur,  January  31,  1810,  p.  117. 

2)  The  decree  is  mentioned  in  Bourne's  despatch  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Feb.  4,   1810.     Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. 

3)  Late  in  March  The  Spy  from  Baltimore  sought  to  enter  the 
Texel  but  was  warned  off;   on  April  10,  the  Superb  met  with  the 
same  treatment.     On  the  same  day  the  Whampoa  and  Perseverance 
from  New  York  were  brought  to  Amsterdam  as  prizes.     See  Am. 
Daily  Adv.,  May  3  and  28. 

*)  His  instructions  are  to  be  found  in  Roell,  Verslag,  bijlage  48; 
also  in  Kraaijenhoff,  Bijdragcn  tot  de  Nederlandsche  Geschiedenis, 
327-333. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations    95 

most  faithful  allies  of  the  Romans,  do  not  break  our  treaties 
....  We  declare  before  God  and  before  the  whole  of 
Europe  that  we  do  not  deserve  this  cruel  accusation.  But 
let  the  facts  speak  for  themselves."  After  an  enumeration 
of  the  sacrifices  which  Holland  had  made  in  the  interest  of 
France  since  1795,  they  point  out,  that  since  the  issuance  of 
the  Milan  Decree,  the  king  of  Holland  had  voluntarily  closed 
his  ports  for  over  fourteen  months ;  that  the  very  limited  re- 
laxation of  the  embargo,  in  March,  1809,  had  been  impera- 
tively necessary  and  had  been  resorted  to  with  the  intention 
of  bringing  Dutch  regulations  regarding  neutrals  more  in 
conformity  with  those  of  France ;  and  that  the  further  con- 
cession made  in  June  of  that  year,  in  favor  of  American  ves- 
sels, had  been  revoked  within  four  weeks. 

During  these  four  weeks,  they  maintained,  only  23  Amer- 
ican vessels  had  been  admitted,  all  of  them  provided  with 
the  requisite  certificates  of  origin,  while  ten  of  these  certi- 
ficates even  bore  the  signatures  of  French  consuls  in  Amer- 
ica. Furthermore,  all  the  papers  relating  to  these  23  vessels 
had  been  forwarded  to  the  American  consul-general,  and 
had  been  acknowledged  by  him  as  bona  fide.  How,  then,could 
the  Moniteur  state  that  they  had  been  "disavowed  by  the 
United  States  itself"?  In  the  very  next  sentence,  however, 
they  acknowledge  that  the  papers  of  a  few  vessels  were 
found  to  be  false  and  were  repudiated  by  the  American  gov- 
ernment,— whether  any  of  the  23  mentioned  are  here  re- 
ferred to  cannot  be  definitely  determined  from  the  context — 
but  they  claim  that  the  Dutch  customs  officers  were  the  first 
to  detect  the  fraud  and  to  send  the  papers  back  to  the  United 
States.  Bourne's  comment  on  this  assertion  is  that  he  was 
not  aware  that  the  papers  "of  any  of  the  23  vessels  men- 
tioned" had  "ultimately  proved  to  be  false,"  and  was  ignor- 
ant of  the  fact  that  the  American  government  had  denied 
"that  the  vessels  and  cargoes  were  of  the  United  States."  1J 

As  a  further  evidence  of  Louis'  good  intentions,  they 
point  to  the  fact  that  since  the  first  of  April,  1809,  141  ves- 
sels had  been  confiscated,  while  all  cargoes  of  doubtful 
origin  had  been  stored  in  royal  warehouses  for  safekeeping, 


1)  Consular  Despatches,   Amsterdam,   II.     Bourne   to    Sec.   of 
State,  February  10. 


96     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

and  in  conclusion  they  cite  the  recent  order  of  Louis  for  the 
total  exclusion  of  American  vessels. 1) 

Neither  the  new  decree  of  Louis  nor  the  elaborate  de- 
fense of  his  ministers  appear  to  have  had  the  slightest  effect 
upon  Napoleon.  The  fate  of  Holland,  in  fact,  depended  no 
longer  upon  what  Louis  did  or  left  undone,  but  very  largely 
upon  the  attitude  of  England.  Napoleon  was  bent  on  secur- 
ing peace  with  England,  or,  failing  in  this,  to  obtain  a  revo- 
cation or  modification  of  her  Orders  in  Council,  and  Holland 
was  to  be  used  as  a  pawn  in  the  game. 

About  a  week  before  the  threat  of  annexation  appeared 
in  the  Moniteur  of  January  31,  (which,  of  course,  was  in- 
tended to  influence  the  British  ministry),  Napoleon  informed 
Louis  that  the  independence  of  Holland  might  yet  be  saved 
if  an  agent  were  sent  to  England  for  the  purpose  of  negoti- 
ating peace  or  securing  a  modification  of  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil. The  Dutch  ministry,  acting  on  instructions  from 
Louis,2)  secretly  appointed  for  this  mission  Labouchere,  head 
of  the  banking  house  of  Hope  and  Company  at  Amsterdam, 
and  son-in-law  of  Baring,  the  influential  London  banker. 
But  Labouchere's  mission  soon  proved  to  be  an  utter  failure. 
On  February  12,  he  received  the  final  reply  of  the  British 
ministry,  to  the  effect  that  England  could  not  sacrifice  her 
own  interests  for  the  sake  of  preventing  the  annexation  of 
Holland,  and  could  not  relax  her  orders  until  Napoleon 
showed  a  disposition  to  revoke  the  French  decrees. 3) 

The  failure  of  these  negotiations  left  Napoleon  free  to 
deal  with  Holland  as  he  saw  fit.  Accordingly,  on  February 
17,  he  ordered  Champagny  to  draw  up  the  bases  of  a  treaty 
between  Holland  and  France,4)  and  on  March  13,  Cham- 
pagny was  ordered  to  sign  the  treaty  without  delay.5  >  By 
this  treaty,  which  bore  the  date  of  March  16,  the  Dutch 
provinces  South  of  the  Rhine  were  ceded  to  France.  All 
trade  between  England  and  Holland  was  once  more  pro- 
hibited until  England  should  revoke  her  Orders  in  Council, 


a)  The  article  is  reprinted  in  Vreede,  Diplomatic,  2B,  364-367; 
in  Roell,  V erslag,  bijlage  48C ;  and  in  Wichers,  307-309. 

2)  Wichers,  300.  Louis  to  Van  der  Heim  and  Appelius,  Janu- 
ary 25. 

3>  On  Labouchere's  mission  see  an  article  by  G.  Labouchere, 
"Un  Financier  Diplomate  au  Dernier  Siecle — Pierre  Cdsar  La- 
bouchere," in  Le  Revue  de  I'  Histoire  Diplomatique,  July  13,  1913. 

*)  Correspondence  de  Napoleon,  XX.,  229. 

5>    Ibid.,  265. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    97 

and,  in  case  trade  licenses  should  be  granted,  only  those 
authorized  by  the  Emperor  were  to  be  valid.  To  insure  the 
execution  of  this  provision,  French  customs  officers  were  to 
be  stationed  in  Holland  and  the  coasts  and  harbors  were  to  be 
guarded  by  18,000  soldiers,  one-third  of  these  being  French. 
Difficulties  arising  from  the  seizure  of  prizes  off  the  coasts 
of  Holland  could  be  settled  by  the  Emperor  alone,  and,  by 
article  two  of  a  secret  protocol  attached  to  the  treaty,  vessels 
with  contraband  goods  could  be  seized  even  in  the  ports  of 
Holland.  More  significant  for  our  purpose,  however,  was 
article  ten  of  the  treaty,  which  stipulates :  "All  merchandise 
brought  in  by  American  ships  which  entered  the  ports  of 
Holland  since  the  first  of  January,  1809,  shall  be  seized  and 
shall  belong  to  France,  to  be  disposed  of  according  to  cir- 
cumstances and  according  to  the  political  relations  with  the 
United  States."  *> 

This  stipulation  of  the  treaty,  which  was  to  have  impor- 
tant consequences  for  the  future  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Holland,  appears  to  have  been  brought 
forward  for  the  first  time  on  February  22,  and  the  signi- 
ficance which  Napoleon  attached  to  the  matter  is  shown  by 
his  statement  to  Champagny,  that  he  would  give  his  atten- 
tion to  the  definitive  treaty  only  after  an  agreement  had  been 
reached  with  Louis  in  regard  to  "the  colonial  goods  brought 
in  by  American  vessels  or  otherwise."  2)  Two  days  later 
Louis  received  from  Champagny  the  project  of  a  treaty  as 
Napoleon  desired  to  have  it  signed.3 >  It  appears  that  Louis 
hesitated  to  sign  the  treaty  in  this  form,  and  remonstrated  in 
particular  against  the  article  calling  for  the  confiscation  of 
American  vessels ;  and  well  might  he  hestitate,  for  a  ratifica- 
tion of  this  article  of  the  treaty  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
solemn  pledge  given  to  General  Armstrong  in  August  of  the 
preceding  year, — the  pledge  that  even  in  case  of  war  with 
France,  the  persons  and  property  of  American  citizens  within 
the  limits  of  Holland  would  not  be  molested.4*  Roell  also 
found  this  clause  objectionable  and  preferred  to  have  the 
merchandise  brought  in  by  American  vessels  remain  in  the 

*)  The  treaty  and  protocol  may  be  found,  among  other  places, 
in  Rocquain,  261. 

2)  Correspondence    of   Napoleon,    XX.,    235.      Nap.    to    Cham- 
pagny, Feb.  22. 

3)  Roell,  Verslag,  359-362,  bijlage  69. 

4)  See  page  87  above. 


98     Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

custody  of  the  Dutch  government,  "in  order/'  as  he  writes, 
"that  your  Majesty  might  restitute,  if  not  the  whole,  at  least 
a  part  of  the  consignees."  But  he  advised  the  king,  if  the 
fate  of  Holland  depended  solely  on  this  matter,  to  yield  to 
the  wishes  of  the  Emperor.  ^ 

What  motives  induced  Napoleon  to  insert  an  article  of 
this  character  in  a  treaty  between  Holland  and  France? 
Was  it  intended  merely  as  a  means  of  punishing  the  Dutch 
nation  for  the  lax  enforcement  of  the  Continental  System, 
and  in  particular  for  the  non-fulfillment  of  the  Milan  De- 
cree? This  inference  seems  warranted  from  the  fact  that 
this  article  was  retroactive  as  well  as  from  all  the  circum- 
stances leading  to  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty.  But  if  this 
was  Napoleon's  only  motive,  why  did  he  not  demand  the 
confiscation  of  all  merchandise  which  entered  since  the 
promulgation  of  the  Milan  Decree?  Why  did  the  treaty 
call  for  the  confiscation  of  such  goods  only  as  were  brought 
in  since  the  beginning  of  1809?  That  Napoleon  was  ac- 
tuated by  a  more  important,  or,  at  least,  a  more  specific  mo- 
tive than  the  punishment  of  Holland  for  past  negligence  is 
evident  also  when  we  note,  in  the  first  place,  that,  whereas 
the  penalty  for  violations  of  the  Milan  Decree  fell  upon  the 
vessel  as  well  as  upon  the  cargo,  the  treaty  does  not  call  for 
the  confiscation  of  the  vessels  but  only  of  their  cargoes; 
secondly,  that  this  stipulation  bound  Holland  to  deliver  to 
France  such  merchandise  only  as  was  brought  in  by  Ameri- 
can vessels,  which  are  thus  intentionally  placed  in  a  class  by 
themselves,  but  that  she  was  free  to  dispose  of  the  mer- 
chandise brought  in  by  all  other  vessels  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  and  regulations  at  the  time  in  effect;  and  thirdly, 
when  we  note  that  not  only  the  goods  of  British  origin  or 
manufacture,  but  that  all  goods  discharged  by  American 
vessels  since  January  1,  1809,  were  to  become  the  property 
of  France.  What,  then,  was  this  additional,  this  more  spe- 
cific motive  ? 

The  treaty  itself  suggests  an  answer  to  this  question,  for 
France  was  to  dispose  of  the  goods  according  to  her  political 
relations  with  the  United  States.  It  is  obvious  that  this 
article  of  the  treaty  was  directed  against  the  United  States 
more  particularly  than  against  Holland,  and  that  we  must 


Roell,  Verslag,  362-368,  bijlage  70. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations    99 

consider  it  as  a  means  of  retaliation  employed  by  the  French 
government  for  some  hostile  act  of  the  American 
government. 

At  the  time  the  treaty  was  concluded,  the  only  Ameri- 
can measure  which  France  could  consider  detrimental  to  her 
interests  was  the  Non-Intercourse  Act  of  March  1,  1809, 
which  had  been  substituted  for  the  embargo  of  1807.  This 
act  forbade  all  commercial  intercourse  with  France  and 
England,  and  prohibited  French  and  English  vessels  from 
entering  American  ports,  on  penalty  of  confiscation.  Ac- 
cording to  Armstrong,  it  "was  first  communicated  to  His 
Majesty  in  June  or  July  last,"  x)  and  Napoleon's  communica- 
tion to  Louis,  on  July  17,  1809,2)  is  sufficient  proof  of  the 
fact  that  he  was  on  that  date,  at  least  in  a  general  way,  ac- 
quainted with  the  contents  of  the  act.  The  act  did  not  at 
the  time  cause  any  appreciable  change  in  our  relations  with 
France,  nor  did  it  incite  Napoleon  to  deeds  of  reprisal  until 
the  following  year.  Indeed,  Armstrong  was  convinced  "that 
from  the  first  promulgation  of  the  act  to  the  25th  of  Janu- 
ary (1810),  nothing  in  the  nature  of  reprisal  was  contem- 
plated by  His  Majesty."  3)  On  the  morning  of  January  25 
an  interview  took  place  between  Armstrong  and  Champagny, 
but  even  in  the  course  of  this  "long  conversation,"  as  Arm- 
strong later  reminded  Champagny,  "no  idea  of  reprisal  was 
maintained  by  you,  nor  suspected  by  me;  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, in  speaking  of  the  seizure  of  American  property  in 
Spain,  you  expressly  declared  that  it  was  not  a 
confiscation."  4> 

On  this  very  morning,  however,  Napoleon,  after  hearing 
Champagny's  report  of  the  interview,  dictated  a  note,  in- 
tended to  be  forwarded  to  Armstrong,  which  clearly  states, 
"If  American  vessels  have  been  sequestered  in  France, 
France  has  merely  followed  the  example  that  has  been  set  by 
the  American  government."  After  calling  Armstrong's  at- 
tention to  the  objectionable  features  of  the  Non-Intercourse 
Act,  Napoleon  then  continues,  "It  is  in  reprisal  for  this  last 
regulation,  that  American  vessels  have  been  seized  in  Spain 


*)  American    State    Papers,    Foreign    Relations,    III.,    381-382. 
Armstrong  to  Champagny,  March  10,  1810. 

2)  See  page  83  above. 

3)  American   State  Papers,  Foreign   Relations,   III.,   381. 
*>   Ibid.,  III.,  381. 


100  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

and  at  Naples."  ^  In  returning  this  note  for  Napoleon's  ap- 
proval later  in  the  day,  Champagny  enclosed  a  copy  of  article 
three  of  the  Non-Intercourse  Act,  on  which  he  comments, 
'This  is  the  measure  which  is  most  hostile  to  France  .  .  ."  2) 

This  note,  dictated  on  the  25th,  was  somewhat  altered  in 
the  course  of  the  next  few  days,  and  was  not  submitted  to 
Armstrong  until  February  14.  But  the  essential  idea  re- 
mained the  same.  In  the  note  of  February  14,  which  con- 
tains the  first  official  notice  to  Armstrong  of  Napoleon's 
determination  to  retaliate,  we  read  that  the  United  States, 
through  "having  no  ground  of  complaint  against  France, 
comprised  her  in  their  acts  of  exclusion,"  and  since  the 
first  of  May,  1809,  had  forbidden  French  vessels  to  enter 
American  ports,  "under  penalty  of  confiscation.  As  soon 
as  His  Majesty  was  informed  of  this  measure,  he  consid- 
ered himself  bound  to  order  reprisals  on  American  vessels 

"  "In  the  ports  of  Holland,  Spain,  Italy  and  Naples 

American  vessels  have  been  seized  because  the  Americans 
have  seized  French  vessels."  3)  When  Armstrong  expressed 
his  surprise  at  this  rather  sudden  determination  of  Napoleon 
to  retaliate,  at  so  late  a  date  after  the  promulgation  of  the 
act,  Napoleon  instructed  Champagny  to  explain  that  the  act 
had  been  known  to  him  only  a  short  time,  "and  that  it  was 
not  until  I  was  informed  of  it  that  I  prescribed  the  same 
measure."  4)  And  as  late  as  August  5,  Champagny  speaks 
of  the  Non-Intercourse  Act  as  one  "of  which  the  Emperor 
knew  nothing  until  very  lately."  5) 

Assuming  that  Napoleon  was  sincere  in  saying  that  the 
act  had  been  known  to  him  only  a  short  time,  the  only  ex- 
planation which  can  be  offered  is  that  he  must  have  read  it 
for  the  first  time,  or  must  have  reread  it  more  attentively, 
just  before  dictating  the  note  of  January  25,  and  that  his 
attention  was  directed  in  particular  to  the  penalty  attached 
for  violations  of  the  act.  On  January  10  he  had  ordered 
Champagny  to  draw  up  a  report  on  the  state  of  relations 
between  France  and  the  United  States,  and  to  submit  with 
this  report  copies  of  all  the  despatches  and  other  documents, 


1)  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  XX.,  No.  16169. 

2)  Ibid.,  No.  16169. 

3)  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.,  380. 

*)   Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  XX.,  273,  March  20,  1810. 
5)  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.,  387.     Cham- 
pagny to  Armstrong. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Hvlland-Arqe.vitan.  Rtkitwqs  101 

translated  into  French. 1)  On  January  24  he  reminded 
Champagny  that  the  report  was  due.2)  It  is  not  at  all  unlikely, 
therefore,  that  this  report,  which  would  at  all  events  have 
included  a  discussion  of  the  Non-Intercourse  Act,  reached 
him  late  on  the  24th,  or  early  on  the  25th  of  January.  It  is 
certain  at  any  rate,  that  he  had  read  the  act  before  he  dic- 
tated the  note  of  January  25. 

This  interpretation  of  Napoleon's  conduct  helps  to  ex- 
plain why  in  the  first  draft  of  the  note  to  Armstrong  (of 
January  25)  reference  is  made  to  the  seizure  of  American 
vessels  in  Spain  and  at  Naples,  but  not  in  Holland,  and  why 
in  the  final  note  of  February  14  Napoleon  could  also  refer, 
with  some  exaggeration  of  the  truth,  to  seizures  in  Holland. 
For,  in  the  meantime  he  had  compelled  Louis  to  issue  the  de- 
cree of  February  1,  which  has  been  discussed  above,  and 
though  this  decree  did  not  specifically  call  for  the  confisca- 
tion of  American  vessels,  but  merely  required  their  total  ex- 
clusion from  Dutch  ports,  it  was  clearly  in  line  with  Napo- 
leon's newly  adopted  policy  of  retaliation.  And  this  policy 
of  retaliation  appears  to  have  been  pursued  merely  a  step 
farther,  when  he  ordered  Champagny,  on  February  22,3>  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  Louis  in  regard  to  the  colonial 
goods  which  had  been  brought  to  Holland  in  American  ves- 
sels. The  line  of  connection  seems  all  the  more  clear  when 
we  note,  in  the  same  communication  to  Armstrong  of  Feb- 
ruary 14,  in  which  the  determination  to  retaliate  was  first 
announced,  that  Napoleon  had  also  extended  an  olive-branch 
to  the  American  government,  by  offering  to  enter  into  a  con- 
vention favoring  American  trade,  if  the  United  States  would 
agree  that  its  vessels  would  no  longer  submit  to  the  British 
Orders  in  Council  of  1807 ;  that  Armstrong  had  hastened  to 
submit  a  proposal  of  this  nature  for  Napoleon's  considera- 
tion, but  that  Napoleon  indignantly  rejected  this  proposal  on 
February  22,4>  for  the  -alleged  reason  that  it  had  no  other 
purpose  than  to  favor  contraband  trade  in  American  vessels. 
The  same  day  on  which  Armstrong's  proposal  was  rejected 
appeared  Napoleon's  order  to  Champagny,  which  became  the 
basis  of  article  ten  of  the  treaty  with  Holland. 


x)  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  XX.,  109. 

2)  Mary  Lloyd,  New  Letters  of  Napoleon    I.,  169. 

3)  See  page  97. 

*)  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  XX.,  No.  16280. 


102  Tkiriv-Sr'i'tn  Yeurs  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Four  days  after  the  treaty  was  signed  Napoleon  began  a 
second  attempt  to  obtain  peace  with  England.  Labouchere, 
who  again  acted  as  agent,  was  instructed  to  impress  upon 
the  British  ministry  that  the  French  customs  officers  and 
troops  would  be  withdrawn  from  Holland  the  moment  Eng- 
land revoked  her  Orders  in  Council,  and  that,  by  entering 
into  some  arrangement  for  continuing  the  war  in  a  less  bitter 
manner,  England  would  save  the  independence  of  Holland 
and:  would  be  able  to  settle  her  differences  with  the  United 
States.  But  the  British  ministry  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  these 
proposals,1*  and  their  indifference  seems  to  have  revived 
Napoleon's  original  plan  of  annexing  the  whole  of  the  Dutch 
Kingdom. 

This  plan  was  strengthened  by  the  failure  of  the  Dutch 
government  to  execute  several  important  provisions  of  the 
treaty.  The  terms  of  the  treaty  were  very  severe,  and  La 
Rochefoucauld  was  no  doubt  correct  when  he  reported,  on 
April  16,  "Everyone  realizes  the  impossibility  of  its  execu- 
tion." 2)  Moreover,  Louis  was  very  bitterly  disposed  to- 
ward Napoleon  because  of  the  humiliation  he  had  endured 
at  Paris,  and  showed  no  desire  or  intention  of  carrying  out 
the  treaty  in  full.  Indeed,  he  acknowledged  on  July  1,  that 
he  had  "ratified  the  treaty,  dictated  by  France,  conditionally, 
with  the  conviction  that  the  provisions  most  disagreeable  to 
the  nation  and  to  myself  would  not  be  carried  out/' 3)  He 
not  only  sought  to  delay  the  execution  of  the  treaty,  but,  in 
direct  contravention  of  article  one,  he  even  issued  licenses 
to  trade  with  England.4) 

The  extent  of  Napoleon's  dissatisfaction  with  the  con- 
duct of  Louis  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  a  mere  incident, 
which  occurred  during  May  and  for  which  Louis  was  in  no 
wise  responsible,  caused  a  complete  severance  of  the  per- 
sonal relations  between  the  two  brothers.  A  coachnian  of 
La  Rochefoucauld  had  been  insulted  and  maltreated  by  a 
number  of  persons  at  Amsterdam,  and  because  of  this 
trifling  affair  Napoleon  feigned  such  extreme  anger  that  he 


a)  For  Napoleon's  instructions,  March  20,  and  Louis'  report  of 
the  negotiations,  April  17,  see  Rocquain,  263-264  and  266-267. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,   Iste   stuk,   128.     La   Rochefoucauld 
to  Champagny. 

3)  Rocquain,  322-323.     Message  to  Corps  Legislatif. 

*)   Mary  Lloyd,  New  Letters  of  Napoleon   I.,  186.     Napoleon  to 
Champagny,  June  24. 


Thirty- Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  103 

wrote  Louis  a  scathing  letter,  on  the  23rd  of  May,  which 
closed  with  these  words,  "This  is  the  last  letter  I  write  you 
as  long  as  I  live."  1)  Matters  now  rapidly  went  from  bad  to 
worse,  and  the  inevitable  crisis  came  when  Napoleon  or- 
dered French  troops  to  occupy  Amsterdam.  This  order  led 
to  the  abdication  of  Louis,  on  the  first  of  July,  and  on  July  9 
Napoleon  decreed  the  annexation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Hol- 
land to  France.2)  LeBrun,  the  duke  of  Plaisance,  was  made 
Lieutenant-  General . 


It  now  remains  to  examine  more  fully  the  manner  in 
which  the  tenth  article  of  the  treaty  was  carried  out. 

About  the  middle  of  May,  before  the  Dutch  government 
had  taken  any  steps  to  execute  this  provision,  four  French 
commissioners  were  sent  to  Amsterdam,  to  take  possession 
of  the  American  cargoes  which  had  entered  during  the  four- 
teen and  a  half  months  preceding  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty,  and  to  supervise  their  transportation  to  France.3) 
This  necessitated  an  inquiry  into  the  amount  and  value  of 
the  goods.  On  May  14  La  Rochefoucauld  demanded  that 
the  full  amount  of  the  cargoes  be  handed  over  to  the  Im- 
perial director  of  customs,  who  had  been  named  to  receive 
them.4)  Louis  replied  to  this  demand,  (which  was  exactly 
what  the  treaty  called  for),  by  reminding  Napoleon  that  a 
portion  of  the  goods  was  owned  in  Holland,  and  by  request- 
ing that  this  portion  be  exempted  from  confiscation.5)  On  the 
same  day  he  also  informed  him  that  the  goods  were  valued 
at  between  four  and  five  million  guilders.6)  Napoleon  not 
only  ignored  Louis'  request,  but  his  reply  of  May  22  shows 
that  his  own  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  goods  was  eleven 

*)   Rocquain,  276. 

2)  The    circumstances    leading   to    annexation    are    detailed    by 
Wiipperman,  348-363. 

3)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Bourne  to  Secretary 
of  State,  May  20;  also  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations, 
III.,  384,  Armstrong  to  Smith,  May  24. 

4)  Colenbrander,   Vde   deel,    Iste   stuk,   136.     La   R.   to   Cham- 
pagny,  May  16. 

5)  Ibid.,    137.     Demandes   soumises  a   Sa   Majest£  L'Empereur 
par  le  Roi  Louis,  May  16. 

6)  Rocquain,  273,  Louis  to  Napoleon,  May  16. 


104  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

million  guilders,1*  which  was  more  than  twice  as  high  as 
the  figure  named  by  Louis. 

The  low  estimate  furnished  by  Louis  is  evidence  of  an 
intention  on  his  part  to  evade  the  treaty.  La  Rochefoucauld 
reported  in  his  despatch  of  May  25,  that  he  had  received 
from  Roell  a  list  of  the  merchandise  brought  in  by  Ameri- 
can vessels,  and  explained  that  this  list  included  only  such 
goods  as  were  still  to  be  found  in  the  royal  warehouses,  but 
did  not  include  that  portion  of  the  cargoes  which  had  been 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  owners  or  consignees. 2)  The 
greatest  difficulty  in  the  execution  of  article  ten  arose  from 
this  last  class  of  goods.  Some  of  these  had  been  sold  by  the 
original  owners,  had  passed  from  hand  to  hand,  and  could 
now  be  located  only  after  a  prolonged  search.  Moreover, 
certain  quantities  of  coffee,  sugar,  rice  and  other  commodi- 
ties had  actually  ben  consumed,  thus  making  a  literal  com- 
pliance with  the  treaty  an  impossibility.  Add  to  this  that 
the  owners  were  loath  to  part  with  their  property,  and  the 
reason  why  Louis'  estimate  included  only  about  one-half  of 
the  goods  can  readily  be  understood.  Champagny,  however, 
insisted  that  if  the  goods  themselves  could  not  be  delivered, 
the  Dutch  government  should  pay  a  money  equivalent.3* 

Not  only  did  Louis  resort  to  evasion,  but  for  about  a 
month  he  and  his  officials  contrived  to  prevent  the  French 
commissioners  from  obtaining  possession  of  the  goods.  It 
was  the  15th  of  June  before  Serurier,  La  Rochefoucauld's 
successor,  was  able  to  report  that  final  arrangements  had 
been  completed,  and  that  the  first  consignment  would  prob- 
ably be  sent  to  France  in  a  day  or  two.4)  Less  than  two 
weeks  later  Louis  was  no  longer  King  of  Holland,  and  the 
day  on  which  he  abdicated  the  greater  portion  of  the  car- 
goes still  remained  to  be  delivered.  Champagny  even  ac- 
cused the  Dutch  government  of  having  evaded  the  treaty 
entirely,  and  of  having  limited  itself  to  "offering  the  car- 
goes of  the  American  vessels  which  had  been  seized  by 
French  privateers."  Roell  sought  to  explain  that  this  accu- 
sation must  be  based  on  a  misunderstanding,  and  that  the 


*)  Rocquain,  276,  Napoleon  to  Louis,  May  22. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vde  deel,  Iste  stuk,  138,  La  R.  to  Champagny. 

3)  Colenbrander,    Vde    deel,    2de    stuk,    538.      Roell    to    Louis, 
July  1. 

4)  Ibid.,    Vde    deel,    Iste    stuk,    154.      Serurier    to    Champagny, 
June  15. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  105 

French  agents  had  received  not  only  the  cargoes  of  the 
prizes,  "but  all  the  other  American  merchandise  which  was 
found  in  the  government  storehouses;"  *>  yet  his  explana- 
tion apparently  did  not  convince  Champagny,  for  the  accusa- 
tion was  not  withdrawn. 

On  July  25  Napoleon  gave  final  directions  regarding  the 
disposition  of  the  goods  "which  the  King  should  have  sent 
to  France."  He  wrote  to  Le  Brun,  who  had  already  assumed 
the  office  of  Lieu  tenant- General,  "My  intention  is  that  the 
goods  should  be  sent  to  Antwerp,  there  to  be  sold.  Under 
no  pretext  whatsoever  do  I  desire  the  sale  of  them  at  Am- 
sterdam. Therefore  take  measures  to  hasten  their  depar- 
ture without  the  least  delay."  He  also  asked  for  a  report  on 
the  goods  which  had  been  handed  over  to  the  Dutch  mer- 
chants, "in  order  that  I  may  likewise  have  them  sent  to 
Antwerp."  2> 

A  part  of  the  property  of  which  France  thus  arbitrarily 
obtained  possession  was  originally  owned  by  American  ship- 
pers or  by  the  American  captains  in  whose  vessels  the  goods 
were  brought  to  Holland.  On  May  20,  Bourne  estimated 
that,  at  the  prices  then  prevailing,  "the  American  property 
which  has  been  for  about  a  year,  deposited  in  the  public 
stores,"  was  worth  "about  3,000,000  guilders,  according  to 
the  best  calculations  which  can  be  made."  3)  All  of  these 
goods  were  seized  by  Napoleon,  and  Bourne  states  that  the 
proceeds  from  their  sale  were  to  be  deposited  in  the  so-called 
bank  of  amortization.^  In  what  manner  Napoleon  utilized 
this  sum  cannot  be  stated,^  but  it  is  certain  that  during  his 
lifetime  the  original  owners  were  not  compensated  for  their 
losses. 

The  confiscation  of  over  a  million  dollars'  worth  of 
merchandise  was  not  the  only  loss  which  Americans  sus- 
tained as  a  result  of  Napoleon's  political  dealings  with  that 
country,  for  he  also  seized  a  number  of  the  American  vessels 
which  had  entered  Dutch  ports  prior  to  the  abdication  of 
Louis.  On  May  12  instructions  were  given  for  La  Roche- 
foucauld to  demand  that  "the  21  American  vessels  and  their 

!)   Ibid.,  Vde  deel,  2de  stuk,  538.    Roell  to  Louis,  July  1. 

2)  Colenbrander,  Vide  deel,  Iste  stuk,  16;  Napoleon  to  be  Le- 
Brun,  July  25. 

3)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II. ;  Bourne  to  Secretary 
of  State,  May  20. 

4)  Bourne  MSS.;  Bourne  to  James  De  Wolf,  May  20. 


106  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations 

cargoes  be  delivered  to  me  in  execution  of  the  treaty,"  1)  and 
the  same  demand  appears  in  Napoleon's  letter  to  Louis  on 
the  same  day.2)  Although  Napoleon  based  this  demand  on 
the  treaty,  there  is  no  provision  in  the  treaty  itself  nor  in 
the  secret  protocol  attached  to  it  that  bound  Holland  to 
deliver  21  American  vessels  with  their  cargoes.  Article  ten 
of  the  treaty,  as  we  have  seen,  merely  called  for  the  delivery 
of  the  cargoes  of  American  vessels,  not  of  the  vessels  them- 
selves. And  by  article  two  of  the  protocol  Louis  bound  him- 
self to  have  all  vessels  with  contraband  goods,  which  should 
enter  Dutch  waters,  declared  good  prize.  It  is  true  that  this 
article,  unlike  that  of  the  treaty,  looked  to  the  future,  but  it 
is  highly  improbable  that  as  many  as  21  American  vessels 
should  have  entered  between  March  16  and  May  12;  the 
decree  of  February  1  had  driven  them  to  seek  other  markets. 
Which  vessels  are  here  referred  to  cannot,  therefore,  be 
stated;  nor  is  it  clear  why  Napoleon  should  have  demanded 
the  delivery  of  21,  no  more,  no  less.  This  much,  however,  is 
certain  that  the  demand  was  an  arbitrary  one,  not  justified 
by  any  provision  of  the  treaty,  that  it  was  not  complied  with 
by  Louis,  and  that  the  total  number  of  American  vessels 
seized  by  Napoleon  after  the  annexation  of  Holland  did 
not  reach  21. 


Holland  remained  an  administrative  province  of  France 
until  the  end  of  1813,  and  during  these  three  and  a  half  years 
the  American  flag  was  very  rarely  seen  in  Dutch  ports. 
The  enforcement  of  Napoleon's  commercial  policy  was  now 
entrusted,  for  the  most  part,  to  French  officials,  who,  unlike 
many  of  the  Dutch  officials  under  Louis,  were  not  connected 
with  commercial  houses.  The  chances  of  carrying  on  illicit 
intercourse  with  England  through  official  connivance  were 
thus  largely  eliminated,  and  the  favoritism  which  had  for- 
merly been  shown  to  Americans  became  a  thing  of  the  past. 
Such  trade  as  was  still  permissible  could  be  carried  on  only 
by  licensed  vessels,  for  Napoleon  decreed  that  after  the  first 
of  August,  1810,  "No  vessel  destined  for  a  foreign  port  shall 
leave  our  ports,  unless  it  be  provided  with  a  license  signed 

*)  Rocquain,  270,  Note  1 ;  Napoleon  to  the  duke  de  Bassano. 
2)  Ibid.,  270. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  107 

by  our  hand."  When  Le  Brun  asked  to  be  informed  whether 
this  applied  to  foreign  vessels  as  well  as  to  French  vessels,1* 
Napoleon  explained  that  it  included  every  kind  of  vessel 
whatsoever,  "with  this  exception,  that  I  shall  grant  licenses 
only  to  French  vessels,  and  in  fact  there  is  none  which  really 
is  neutral.  They  are  all  vessels  which  violate  the  blockade 
and  pay  ransom  to  the  English  ....  Therefore,  foreign 
vessels  cannot  trade  with  our  ports  nor  depart  from  them, 
because  there  are  no  neutrals."  2)  And  in  March  of  the 
following  year  Napoleon  declared,  with  specific  reference 
to  Americans,  "Their  vessels  will  not  be  admitted  in  my  ports 
until  they  have  declared  war  against  the  English.  Thanks 
to  the  progress  of  agriculture  and  chemistry,  I  shall  soon  be 
able  to  forbid  the  importation  of  the  various  products  of  the 
Indies."  3> 

This  determination  to  exclude  Americans  appears  to  have 
been  departed  from  in  only  one  instance,  as  a  result  of  the 
scarcity  of  tea  in  Holland.  On  October  11,  1811,  Monta- 
livet  presented  Napoleon  with  a  report  on  the  tea  trade,  from 
which  it  appears  that  the  public  storehouses  were  empty  and 
that  the  private  warehouses  contained  only  one-half  the 
amount  annually  consumed  in  Holland.  Everyone  recog- 
nized, he  states,  that  the  Americans  were  the  only  intermedi- 
aries to  whom  recourse  could  be  had  in  supplying  this  com- 
modity. His  advice  was  that  Americans  should  be  allowed 
to  import  tea  from  the  Dutch  factory  at  Canton,  upon  the 
payment  of  certain  duties.4)  Napoleon  adopted  this  advice, 
and  on  October  19  he  announced  that  special  permits  would 
be  granted  to  Dutch  or  American  vessels.  These  vessels 
must  be  laden  with  tea  only,  and  would  be  bound  to  reexport 
in  silks  of  French  manufacture  a  value  equal  to  the  teas 
which  they  should  import.5 )  How  many  such  permits  were 
issued  to  American  vessels  cannot  be  stated,  but  the  number 
of  tea  ships  which  succeeded  in  making  a  safe  return  from 
their  distant  voyage  before  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  must 


*)  Colenbrander,  Vide  deel,  Iste  stuk,  55;  Le  Brun  to  Napoleon, 
August  12. 

2)  Ibid.,  60;  Nap.  to  Le  Brun,  August  20,  1810. 

3)  Colenbrander,  Vide  deel,  Iste  stuk,  131;  Report  by  an  un- 
known writer  of  Napoleon's  speech  at  Paris  to  the  Presidents  of  the 
Chambers  of  Commerce  and  Agriculture,  March  24,  1811. 

*)  Ibid.,  Vide  deel,  Iste  stuk,  195-196;  Montalivet  to  Napoleon, 
October  11. 

«)   Ibid.,  207. 


108  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

have  been  insignificant,  for  as  late  as  January  31,  1813, 
Bourne  reported,  "We  have  had  but  one  satisfactory  arrival 
since  nearly  two  years,  and  no  prospect  of  a  favorable 
change."  *> 

9  The  main  interest  of  these  last  three  and  a  half  years  of 
French  domination  therefore  lies  herein  that  Americans 
were  practically  excluded  from  all  commercial  intercourse 
with  Dutch  ports.  And,  needless  to  say,  the  Dutch  them- 
selves found  it  even  more  impossible  than  in  former  years 
to  carry  on  a  direct  trade  of  their  own  with  American  ports. 
Not  only  was  the  direct  trade  at  a  standstill,  thus  depriving 
the  Dutch  of  the  tobacco,  rice,  cotton  and  other  productions 
of  the  United  States,  but  the  Yankee  captains  lost  one  of 
their  most  profitable  sources  of  income  when  they  were  for- 
bidden to  act  as  carriers  in  supplying  the  Dutch  with  the 
products  of  the  Indies  and  of  other  climes.  Meanwhile 
Americans  were  compelled  to  forego  the  use  of  such  lux- 
uries as  Dutch  cheese  and  gin,  and  to  seek  elsewhere  for  the 
sailcloth,  the  silks,  linens,  cottons  and  other  wares  and  manu- 
factures with  which  Holland  had  been  wont  to  supply  them. 


Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Bourne  to  Sec.  of  State. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  109 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  RE-OPENING  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS.   • 
(1814—1815.) 

It  was  the  defeat  of  Napoleon  at  the  battle  of  Leipsic, 
in  October,  1813,  that  enabled  the  Dutch  people  to  take  the 
first  practical  steps  toward  the  fulfillment  of  the  long-cher- 
ished ideal  of  reestablishing  their  independence  and  of  re- 
suming their  place  among  the  family  of  nations.  The  news 
of  this  defeat  occasioned  a  general  uprising,  which  forced 
thousands  of  the  much-hated  French  customs  officers,  sol- 
diers and  administrative  officials  to  flee  for  safety.  In  order 
to  put  an  end  to  the  disorder  and  confusion  which  naturally 
resulted  wherever  the  Imperial  authority  was  overthrown,  a 
number  of  influential  men,  among  whom  Count  Van  Hogen- 
dorp  took  a  leading  part,  met  at  The  Hague,  and  on  Novem- 
ber 20,  1813,  proclaimed  the  establishment  of  a  provisional 
government.  On  the  following  day  a  delegation,  which  had 
been  appointed  to  request  the  Prince  of  Orange  to  return  to 
his  ancestral  domains  and  to  place  himself  at  the  service  of 
his  fatherland,  arrived  at  London,  where  they  were  enthu- 
siastically welcomed  by  the  British  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs, Lord  Castlereagh,  and  later  by  the  Prince  himself. 
On  November  30,  the  Prince  landed  at  Scheveningen,  and 
a  few  days  later  was  proclaimed  at  Amsterdam  as  William  I, 
sovereign  ruler  of  the  Netherlands. 

One  of  the  first  questions  which  the  new  Dutch  govern- 
ment was  called  upon  to  consider  was  that  of  securing  recog- 
nition abroad,  so  as  to  strengthen  her  position  over  against 
France,  whose  fortunes,  though  they  seemed  on  a  decline 
after  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  might  at  any  moment  be  revived 
by  a  successful  military  engagement.  England,  the  principal 
enemy  of  France,  saw  fit  to  grant  the  Prince  immediate  rec- 
ognition. In  fact,  even  before  the  Prince's  return,  Earl 


110  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Clancarty  had  been  appointed  as  British  minister  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Netherlands.  The  Dutch  statesman  Jacob 
Fagel  was  commissioned  to  represent  the  interests  of  the 
Prince  of  Orange  at  London.  With  the  United  States  Hol- 
land had  maintained  no  diplomatic  relations  since  1801 ;  but 
as  early  as  December,  1813,  about  nine  months  before  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  met  to  consider  the  political  reconstruc- 
tion of  Europe,  and  when  the  very  political  existence  of  Hol- 
land still  hung  in  the  balance,  plans  were  under  way  of  send- 
ing a  Dutch  minister  to  Washington.  The  re-opening  of 
diplomatic  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Holland 
was  characterized  by  a  curious  interplay  of  interests,  due 
largely  to  the  close  understanding  between  the  Dutch  gov- 
ernment and  that  of  England. 

It  was  no  doubt  as  a  result  of  this  close  understanding 
with  England  that  the  Dutch  government  saw  fit  to  exclude 
the  American  consul  from  the  ceremonies  held  at  Amster- 
dam in  honor  of  the  Prince's  return.  Van  Hogendorp,  the 
acting  minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  when  pressed  for  an 
explanation,  merely  replied  that  he  had  deemed  it  his  duty, 
under  the  circumstances,  to  act  thus.  Bourne  thereupon,  in 
a  formal  note,  requested  to  be  informed  whether  the  exist- 
ing government  still  considered  the  treaty  of  October  8, 
1782,  between  Holland  and  the  United  States,  to  be  in  full 
force,  and  whether  American  merchants  were  free  to  trade 
with  Holland  in  conformity  with  the  conditions  made  in  that 
treaty.1) 

Bourne's  request  placed  the  Dutch  government  in  a 
rather  difficult  situation,  for  the  treaty  of  1782  was  based 
on  the  fact  that  Holland  was  then  at  enmity  with  England 
and  was  acting  in  cooperation  with  France.  Now  the  polit- 
ical situation  was  in  so  far  reversed  that  England  was  the 
friend  of  Holland  and  her  protector  against  France.  More- 
over, in  1813,  as  well  as  in  1782,  England  was  at  war  with 
the  United  States,  and  this  fact  was  certain  to  influence  the 
future  commercial  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Holland.  It  appears  from  Castlereagh's  despatch  to  Clan- 
carty, on  December  21,  that  Van  Hogendorp,  before  ventur- 
ing a  reply  to  Bourne's  questions,  consulted  the  wishes  of  the 
British  government. 


!)  Consular   Despatches,   Amsterdam,   II.     Bourne   to    Sec.   of 
State,  December  10,  1813. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  111 

In  this  despatch  Castlereagh  writes  that  Fagel,  "in  an 
interview  which  I  had  with  him  yesterday  morning,  stated  to 
me  that  he  had  received  instructions  from  his  government  to 
ascertain  the  sentiments  of  the  Prince  Regent's  government 
with  respect  to  the  degree  in  which  our  hostilities  with  the 
United  States  of  America  should  influence  the  relations  be- 
tween that  country  and  the  United  Provinces."  Castle- 
reagh assured  Fagel  that  the  British  government  did  not 
wish  to  influence  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  this  matter,  and 
"that  we  thought  it  of  the  highest  importance  for  the  success 
of  the  great  cause,  which  the  Dutch  people  have  asserted, 
that  they  should  be  at  liberty  to  direct  all  their  energies 
against  the  common  enemy  on  the  continent." 

"The  other  point/'  continues  Castlereagh,  "on  which  M. 
de  Fagel  was  instructed  to  learn  our  opinion  was  the  question 
of  acknowledging  the  present  American  agent,  and  the  exis- 
tence of  the  treaty  of  1782."  On  this  point  Castlereagh  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  both  the  treaty  and  the  commission 
of  the  American  consul  "have  fallen  to  the  ground  by  the 
dissolution  of  the  late  government  of  Holland  and  the  res- 
toration of  the  Prince  of  Orange  ....  A  new  treaty  must 
be  made  with  the  United  States  and  new  agents  re-accredited 
on  both  sides  before  the  relations  of  amity,  though  not  inter- 
rupted in  practice,  can  be  restored  in  form."  Holland  should 
therefore  not  delay  in  adopting  a  policy  which  would  insure 
the  speedy  recognition  of  the  Prince's  sovereignty  by  the 
United  States.1) 

Clancarty  lost  no  time  in  communicating  these  views  to 
Van  Hogendorp,  who  agreed  that  the  treaty  no  longer  ex- 
isted, but  who  nevertheless  wished  to  know,  so  Clancarty 
reported  on  December  29,2)  "whether  it  would  be  objec- 
tionable to  recognize  the  American  agent  as  consul,  with  a 
view  at  once  to  renew  commercial  intercourse  with  that  coun- 
try; ....  and  to  establish  a  permanent  good  disposition 
between  the  two  nations."  Clancarty  replied  that  it  was  by 
no  means  the  wish  of  the  British  government  that  the  Dutch 
should  be  prevented  from  a  free  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  unblockaded  ports  of  the  United  States,  and  that  the 
provisional  recognition  of  the  American  consul  would  not, 
in  his  opinion,  be  objected  to;  but  that  "it  did  appear  to  me 


a)  London,  Foreign  Office, 
2>  Ibid.,  H 


112  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

essential  in  the  very  first  instance,  that  no  time  should  be 
lost  in  despatching  a  person,  properly  accredited,  to  the 
American  government,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  .  .  . 
whether  that  state  was  immediately  prepared  to  recognize 
His  Royal  Highness  the  Prince  of  Orange  .  .  .  ."  In  the 
meanwhile  anything  more  than  a  provisional  recognition  of 
the  American  consul  would  compromise  the  dignity  of  the 
Prince. 

Van  Hogendorp,  acting  on  this  advice,  wrote  to  Bourne 
that  the  king  would  solemnly  announce  his  advent  to  the 
throne  to  the  American  government,  and  would  meanwhile 
recognize  him  as  the  American  consul,  on  the  same  footing 
as  all  other  consuls,  which,  he  says,  "for  the  moment  re- 
establishes our  commercial  relations.  As  for  the  political 
connections  between  the  two  countries,  you  see  that  this  will 
depend  upon  yours,  and  that  we  shall  await  its  official  re- 
sponse to  our  communication."  He  then  informed  Bourne 
that  the  Dutch  government  could  no  longer  recognize  the 
treaty  of  1782,  of  which  he  nevertheless  requested  an  authen- 
tic copy,  in  order  to  determine  whether  it  might  form  the 
basis  of  a  new  treaty,  and  closed  with  an  expression  of  his 
esteem  for  the  nation  which  he  had  visited  in  his  youth. *) 
Upon  reading  the  treaty,  Van  Hogendorp  appears  to  have 
adopted  the  opinion  of  Castlereagh  as  his  own,  for  he  wrote 
to  King  William  on  January  1,  "I.  am  engaged  in  reading  the 
treaty  of  1782,  and  find  the  same  unsuited  for  these  times."  2) 

From  the  facts  given  above  it  is  clear  that  Castlereagh  not 
only  deemed  it  to  England's  advantage  that  Holland  should 
no  longer  consider  herself  bound  by  the  treaty  of  1782,  but 
that  he  was  also  anxious  to  have  the  Dutch  government 
represented  at  Washington  by  an  accredited  minister  as 
soon  as  possible.  In  this  last  matter,  as  well  as  in  regard  to 
the  validity  of  the  treaty,  the  Dutch  government  allowed  its 
policy  to  be  shaped  by  England.  But  this  difference  should 
be  noted:  in  the  one  case  the  Dutch  government  expressly 
sought  the  advice  of  England ;  in  the  other  case  the  British 
ministry  took  the  initiative  and  gave  its  advice  unsought.  It 
is  doubtful  whether  the  Dutch  government  of  its  own 


!)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Van  Hogendorp  to 
Bourne,  December  26,  1813. 

2)  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften  van  Gijsbcrt  Karel  Van  Hogen- 
dorp, V.,  216. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  113 

accord,  and  uninfluenced  by  England,  would  have  made  any 
haste  in  appointing  a  minister  to  the  United  States.  But 
when  Van  Hogendorp  learned  from  Clancarty  that  England 
deemed  it  "essential  in  the  very  first  instance  that  no  time 
be  lost,"  he  at  once  set  about  finding  a  suitable  person  for 
this  mission.  On  January  4,  1814,  Bourne  was  able  to 
report,  "I  am  now  duly  authorized  to  inform  you  that  it  is 
the  intention  of  this  government  to  send  out  shortly  a  min- 
ister to  the  United  States,  on  whose  arrival  our  government 
will  be  fully  advised  to  the  several  views  and  plans  that  may 
be  comprised  in  the  object  of  his  mission,  and  to  decide  on 
that  reciprocity  of  measures  which  it  may  be  proper  to  adopt 
in  regard  to  our  connections  with  this  country,  political  and 
commercial."  ^ 

That  England,  in  urging  Holland  to  adopt  this  course 
of  action,  was  prompted  purely  by  motives  of  disinterested 
friendship,  is  entirely  improbable.  What  England's  ulterior 
motives  may  have  been  is  doubtful,  but  it  can  easily  be  seen 
that  by  securing  for  her  protege  the  recognition  of  the 
American  government  she  would  strengthen  her  own  posi- 
tion against  France,  by  effectually  preventing  a  possible 
understanding  or  alliance  between  both  of  her  enemies, 
Napoleon  and  the  United  States.  Van  Hogendorp  in  after 
years  confided  to  his  memoirs,  "I  thought  that  England  by 
our  means  desired  to  make  peace ;  but  Earl  Clancarty  denied 
every  intention  of  this  nature.  Neither  the  Prince  nor  my- 
self could  guess  the  motives  for  the  haste  which  the  English 
made  of  this  work.  I  could  not  but  think  that  they  set  great 
store  upon  our  becoming  generally  recognized,  and  that  they 
foresaw  that  this  would  be  no  easy  matter  with  the 
Americans."  2> 

A  proposal  which  Bourne  submitted  to  Van  Hogendorp 
in  January,  1814,  without  the  sanction  or  knowledge  of  his 
own  government,  appears  likewise  to  have  been  based  on  the 
belief  that  England  desired  to  make  use  of  the  good  offices 
of  the  Dutch  government  in  bringing  about  peace  with  the 
United  States.  Clancarty,  whose  report  to  Castlereagh  is, 
unfortunately,  the  only  source  of  information  as  to  the 


*)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,  Bourne  to  Sec.  Smith. 

2)  Van  Hogendorp,  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften,  V.,  76-77,  ge- 
heime  aanteekeningen.  This  part  of  his  Memoirs  was  written  at 
sometime  between  March,  1817  and  October,  1820. 


114  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

nature  of  the  proposal,1  >  tells  how  Van  Hogendorp  solic- 
ited an  interview  with  him  on  the  afternoon  of  January  16, 
and  acquainted  him  with  the  contents  of  two  confidential 
letters  from  Bourne,  dated  January  14  and  15.  "The  sub- 
stance of  the  letters/'  says  Clancarty,  "which  are  expressly 
stated  by  the  writer  to  be  unofficial,  is  a  professed  desire  on 
his  part  to  see  the  early  establishment  of  peace  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States."  Bourne  then  pointed  out 
the  advantages  which  the  Dutch  government  would  acquire 
from  the  establishment  of  peace,  and  sought  to  make  clear 
that  it  would  be  to  its  own  interest  to  act  as  mediator.  The 
Hague,  in  his  estimation,  would  be  the  best  place  for  negotia- 
tions, and  he  announced  that  the  commissioners  appointed  by 
the  American  government  might  soon  be  expected  to  arrive 
at  that  place  on  their  way  from  Russia. 

Van  Hogendorp  then  requested  Clancarty's  opinion  on 
this  proposal  and  was  advised  that  "no  action  save  a  cautious 
acknowledgment  could  be  taken  towards  a  note  so  mani- 
festly unofficial,  from  a  minor  commercial  agent  only  pro- 
visionally recognized  as  the  agent  of  a  government  which 
had  not  even  recognized  the  present  Dutch  government." 
Furthermore,  Clancarty  maintained  that  the  issue  between 
the  two  belligerents  "was  not  one  for  mediation,"  because 
the  United  States  "had  thought  proper  to  call  in  question 
our  right  to  the  allegiance  of  our  own  subjects,  and  upon 
this  point  to  wage  war  upon  us."  Should  the  persons 
designating  themselves  American  Commissioners  arrive, 
"they  could  not  only  be  received  as  simple  individuals,  the 
subjects  of  a  state  with  which  this  government  was  desirous 
of  maintaining  relations  of  amity,  but  in  no  respect  in  any 
public  capacity."  "With  these  views,"  Clancarty  concluded, 
"Van  Hogendorp  quite  agreed,  showing  throughout  a  mani- 
fest desire  to  respect  and  even  please  the  wishes"  of  England. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Clancarty  gave  no  encourage- 
ment to  Bourne's  proposal,  the  idea  of  acting  as  mediator 
between  the  two  belligerents  seems  to  have  appealed  to  the 
Dutch  government.  It  is  referred  to  in  a  memorandum 
drafted  by  Baron  de  Nijevelt,  an  official  connected  with  the 


1)  London,  Foreign  Office,  ff  Clancarty  to  Castlereagh, 
January  16,  1814.  The  letters  of  Bourne  referred  to  by  Clancarty 
have  not  been  found  in  the  Dutch  archives  and  no  copies  exist 
among  the  Bourne  Papers,  or  the  Consular  Despatches. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  115 

foreign  office,  which  sets  forth  certain  considerations  by 
which  this  government  should  be  guided  in  its  relations  with 
the  United  States.  In  this  memorandum,1)  which  reads 
much  like  a  proposed  set  of  instructions  for  some  person 
about  to  be  sent  on  a  mission  to  Washington,  the  writer  says 
that  it  would  be  prudent  for  his  government  to  decide  what 
purpose  the  minister  to  the  United  States  ought  to  keep  in 
view,  and  in  case  the  United  States  should  remain  at  war 
with  England,  to  stipulate  whether  he  should  favor  the 
British  or  the  Anti-British  party  in  America,  and  whether 
his  status  as  the  minister  of  a  neutral  power  might  authorize 
him  "a  se  mettre  entre  les  deux  etats  dissidents,  pour  tacher 
de  les  ramener  a  1'union  et  a  le  paix."  The  rest  of  the  mem- 
orandum discusses  the  course  of  action  which  the  Dutch 
minister  ought  to  pursue,  if  upon  his  arrival  peace  had 
already  been  declared.  In  that  case  the  writer  believes  he 
should  be  authorized  to  attach  himself  to  the  "English  party," 
unless  by  doing  so  he  should  fail  entirely  in  the  main  object 
of  his  mission — that  of  concluding  a  new  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce. 

The  person  chosen  for  the  mission  was  F.  D.  Changuion, 
who  is  characterized  by  Bourne  as  "an  intelligent,  amiable 
man,  plain  in  his  manners,  without  pretentions  and  in  general 
esteem  here."  2)  Though  he  had  been  appointed  before  the 
middle  of  January,3*  he  was  unable  to  make  his  departure, 
on  account  of  the  ice,  until  the  end  of  May.  About  the  first 
of  August  he  arrived  at  Boston,  where  a  "brilliant  reception" 
was  accorded  him  by  a  citizens'  committee,  which  had  been 
appointed  for  this  purpose.  There  were  addresses  of  wel- 
come by  this  committee  and  universal  rejoicings  on  the  part 
of  the  townsfolk.4*  In  order  to  put  an  end  to  the  rumors 
which  were  current,  he  deemed  it  prudent,  before  leaving 
Boston,  to  insert  an  article  in  the  newspapers,  which  was  in- 
tended to  inform  the  American  public  that  he  had  not  come 
to  this  country  in  the  character  of  mediator  between  the 
United  States  and  England.5  > 

x)  Rijks-Archief,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken,  Amerikaansche  Lega- 
tie,  Registre  3,  No.  2-A-4.  The  memorandum  bears  no  date. 

2)  Consular   Despatches,   Amst.,    II.,    Bourne    to    Seer.    Smith, 
Feb.  28,  1814. 

3)  Clancarty  mentions  his  appointment  in  his  despatch  of  Jan.  16. 
*)   Rijks-Archief,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken,  Amerikaansche  Legatie, 

Registre  2.     Changuion  to  Nagell,  despatch  No.  1,  Boston,  August  4. 
5)    Enclosed  in  his  despatch  of  August  4.     No.  2-A-6. 


116  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

The  notables  of  the  various  cities  and  villages  through 
which  he  passed,  on  his  journey  overland  from  Boston,  hon- 
ored him  with  speeches  and  receptions.  He  entered  Spring- 
field amid  the  booming  of  cannon  and  shouts  of  Oranje  bo- 
ven  on  the  part  of  the  multitude  which  turned  out  to  greet 
him,  while  a  guard  of  honor,  consisting  of  twenty  youths  on 
horseback,  was  appointed  to  escort  him  to  the  government 
arsenal.1*  Before  his  arrival  at  New  York,  be  became  con- 
vinced that  public  sentiment  in  this  country  was  more  strong- 
ly in  favor  of  Holland  than  he  had  been  led  to  suppose;  he 
was  pleased  to  learn  that  in  the  series  of  public  dinners  and 
celebrations  which  had  been  held  to  commemorate  the  eman- 
cipation of  Europe  from  the  tyranny  of  Napoleon,  many  a 
toast  had  been  offered  to  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands. 2) 
At  New  York,  where  he  arrived  late  in  August,  his  reception 
was  not  as  enthusiastic  as  elsewhere,  which  he  ascribed  to  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy,  and  to  the  fact  that  many  of  the  not- 
ables were  absent  from  the  city,  while  the  citizens  themselves 
were  busied  with  the  problem  of  defense.  Owing  to  the  oper- 
ations of  the  British  in  the  vicinity  of  Washington,  he  deemed 
it  advisable  to  remain  at  New  York  for  several  weeks. 3* 

From  there  he  proceeded  overland  to  Washington,  and 
on  September  24  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  being  received 
by  President  Madison  as  the  representative  of  a  sovereign 
and  independent  nation.  On  the  following  day  he  held  his 
first  interview  with  Secretary  Monroe,  whom  he  informed 
of  the  King's  desire  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty  on  the  basis  of 
perfect  reciprocity.4*  During  the  course  of  the  next  six 
months  a  few  notes  were  exchanged  between  Changuion 
and  Monroe  on  the  subject  of  treaty  renewal,  but  on  April  12, 
1815  the  American  government  put  an  end  to  the  discussions, 
for  the  reason  that  Changuion  had  not  been  clothed  with  full 


*)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerik.  Legatie,  Registre  2.     Chan- 
guion to  Nagell,  despatch  No.  2,  New  York,  August  28. 

2)  At  a  dinner  held  at  Philadelphia,  July  3,  1814,  this  toast  was 
offered :  "The  United  Netherlands,  early  and  faithful  friend  of  the 
United    States — may  their   power   by   sea   and   land   be   established 
upon  its  ancient  foundation."    Amer.  Daily  Advertiser,  July  4,  1814. 
Changuion,  in  his  despatches  of  August  4  and  28,  refers  to  the  cele- 
brations at  Boston  and  New  York.     See  also  McMaster,  History 
of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  IV.,  225. 

3)  Rijks-Archief,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerik.  Legatie,  Registre  2. 
Changuion  to  Nagell,  August  28. 

4>  R.  A.,  Ibid.,  Registre  2,  despatch  No.  5,  New  York,  Oct.  18. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  117 

powers  to  conclude  a  treaty.1*  The  Dutch  government  later 
in  the  year  explained  that  Changuion's  proposal,  though  not 
contrary  to  the  tenor  of  his  instructions,  perhaps  arose  "from 
a  personal  wish  ....  to  be  concerned  in  the  conclusion  of 
such  a  treaty."  2> 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  principal  object  of  Chan- 
guion's mission  was  to  secure  official  recognition  for  his  gov- 
ernment, and  not  to  negotiate  a  new  commercial  treaty.  This 
view  is  strengthened  by  the  early  recall  of  Changuion  and  by 
the  explanations  which  the  Dutch  government  gave  for  this 
action.  He  was  recalled  before  the  end  of  December,  1814,3) 
which  was  about  two  months  before  the  date  of  his  first  note 
to  Monroe,  but  sufficiently  early,  nevertheless,  to  have  en- 
abled the  Dutch  government  to  receive  his  despatch  of  Octo- 
ber 18,  in  which  he  makes  mention  of  his  favorable  reception 
at  Washington.  In  August,  1815,  the  Dutch  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Baron  Nagell,  stated  that  he  had  been  re- 
called to  fill  the  post  of  ambassador  to  Constantinople.4 > 
This  was  a  higher  diplomatic  office  than  the  one  he  had 
held  at  Washington,  where  he  ranked  as  minister-plenipo- 
tentiary. On  the  first  of  May,  1816,  however,  Changuion 
was  still  in  the  Netherlands,  and  on  that  date  Nagell  inti- 
mated that  his  recall  had  been  due  to  the  financial  embarrass- 
ments of  the  Dutch  government  and  to  the  desire  of  the  min- 
istry to  keep  the  budget  as  low  as  possible.  He  had  been 
granted  a  stipend  of  £1500,  but  had  requested  an  additional 
£5,000.  Rather  than  grant  this  request,  says  Nagell,  the 
king  had  replaced  him  by  a  charge  d'affairs.5) 

Meanwhile  the  President  had  nominated  as  minister  to 
the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  William  Eustis,  a  physician 
of  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  who  had  served  several  terms 
in  the  State  Legislature  and  in  Congress.  His  nomination 
was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  in  December,  1814.  Early  in 
June,  Eustis  set  sail  from  Boston,  and  he  disembarked  at 


*)  Notes   from   the   Secretary   of  State   to   Foreign   Legations, 
Vol.  II.,  117,   (Washington,  State  Department). 

2)  .Despatches,  Netherlands,  vol.  V.     (State  Department)  Eustis 
to  Monroe,  August  11,  1815.     The  original  instructions  to  Changuion 
have  not  been  found. 

3)  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  II.,   Bourne  to  Secretary 
Smith,  December  22,  1814. 

4)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  vol.  V.     Eustis  to  Monroe,  Aug.  11. 

5)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  vol.  V.,  Eustis  to  Monroe,  May  1, 
1816. 


118  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Flushing  on  July  12.  Neither  here  nor  at  the  commercial 
city  of  Rotterdam,  whither  he  was  conveyed  in  the  Admiral's 
yacht,  was  there  any  show  of  popular  enthusiasm.  Eustis 
merely  notes  "the  polite  attention  of  the  admirals  and  other 
naval  officers  at  Flushing  to  the  American  flag  and  to  the 
American  minister."  1)  He  arrived  at  The  Hague  on  the 
15th  of  July,  almost  a  year  after  Changuion  had  landed  at 
Boston. 

In  his  instructions,2)  written  at  a  time  when  the  whole  of 
Europe  was  once  more  in  turmoil  as  a  result  of  Napoleon's 
sudden  return  to  power,  Eustis  was  told  that  one  of  his 
most  important  duties  would  be  "the  protection  of  our  com- 
merce, by  securing  to  it  its  rights,  under  the  law  of  nations 
and  the  laws  of  the  United  Netherlands."  Should  a  general 
European  war  break  out,  he  was  to  guard  against  the  abuse 
of  our  flag  and  of  our  national  character  "by  the  subjects  of 
other  powers  who  may  assume  it  for  fraudulent  purposes." 
It  is  evident,  from  this  part  of  his  instructions,  that  what  the 
American  government  most  feared  from  Napoleon's  return 
was  a  renewal  of  the  French  Decrees  and  British  Orders, 
with  all  the  injuries  which  these  had  entailed  on  American 
commerce.  That  danger  was,  happily,  averted  by  the  final 
overthrow  of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  about  a  month  before 
Eustis  arrived  at  The  Hague.  The  duty  of  securing  to  our 
commerce  its  rights  under  International  Law  did  not,  there- 
fore, prove  to  be  an  onerous  one. 

Another  duty  assigned  to  him,  as  well  as  to  his  succes- 
sors, and  one  which  materially  increased  the  volume  of  their 
despatches,  was  that  of  keeping  the  State  Department  in- 
formed of  such  occurrences  in  Europe  as  were  likely  to 
affect  American  interests.  He  was  also  instructed  to  make 
known  the  sincere  desire  of  the  President  to  promote  an 
active  commerce  with  the  Netherlands,  and,  finally,  he  was 
to  make  it  clear  that  the  United  States  expected  its  citizens 
to  be  compensated  for  the  great  injury  they  had  suffered  in 
Holland  in  recent  years,  "by  the  unwarrantable  seizure,  de- 
struction and  even  confiscation"  of  their  property.  "For 
these  acts,"  says  Monroe,  "there  were  in  many  instances 


!)   Ibid.,  vol.  V.,  Eustis  to  Monroe,  July  16,  1815. 
2)   Instructions   to  Ministers   of  the    United  States  in  Europe, 
vol.  VII.,  May  9,  1815,  (State  Department,  Washington.) 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  119 

not  the  slightest  pretext,  and  in  many,  if  not  in  all,  no  justi- 
fiable cause." 

This  last  matter,  that  of  spoliation  claims,  must  be  the 
first  to  demand  our  attention,  because  it  is  one  which  logic- 
ally grew  out  of  our  relations  with  Holland  in  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  re-opening  of  a  regular  diplo- 
matic intercourse. 


120  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  SPOLIATION  CLAIMS  AGAINST  HOLLAND. 


The  essential  facts  which  gave  rise  to  the  spoliation 
claims  against  Holland  have  already  been  discussed  in 
Chapters  III.  and  IV.  It  will  here  suffice  to  state  that  the 
American  government  sought  to  obtain  an  indemnity  for 
the  losses  sustained  by  American  citizens  in  Holland, 
through  the  confiscation  of  their  merchandise  or  of  their 
vessels.  In  reality  there  were  therefore  two  kinds  or  classes 
of  claims,  both  of  them  arising  out  of  the  operation  of  the 
Continental  System.  But  is  is  only  those  of  the  first  class, — 
for  the  merchandise — which  figure  prominently  in  the  cor- 
respondence, while  those  for  the  vessels  are  scarcely  men- 
tioned. This  was  possibly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  govern- 
ment was  in  possession  of  more  accurate  data  relating  to 
the  merchandise.  As  early  as  August,  1809,  Bourne  had  be- 
gun the  practice  of  sending  our  circular  letters  to  "merchants 
in  the  American  line  of  trade,"  and  by  this  means  his  office 
had  obtained  "correct  notes  of  the  merchandise  thus  con- 
fiscated, containing  invoice  value,  and  the  names  and  place 
of  residence  of  the  proprietors. a)  No  such  accurate  data  ap- 
pears to  have  been  kept  in  regard  to  the  vessels,2*  and  the 


*)  A  copy  of  such  a  circular,  dated  August  15,  1809,  is  found 
among  the  Bourne  Mms. 

2)  The  only  information  I  found  is  a  report  which  the  Sec.  of 
State  submitted  as  late  as  Jan.  30,  1827,  in  response  to  a  resolution 
of  the  House,  May  19,  1826,  (Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  384 
and  498-500'.)  It  is  doubtful  whether  this  report  is  accurate  or  com- 
plete, for  by  that  time  some  of  the  original  claimants  had  died.  It 
contains  a  list  of  11  vessels,  some  of  which  were  captured  by  French 
Privateers ;  two  others  are  mentioned  in  the  diplomatic  correspon- 
dence. Four  of  those  given  in  the  list  were  later  released  by  the 
Dutch  government;  of  the  remaining  seven,  only  one,  the  St. 
Michael,  is  specifically  mentioned  as  having  t>een  sold  by  France. 
But  even  this  is  questionable. ..  .See  note  1,  page  121. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  121 

number  which  were  confiscated  is  not  given  in  the  corre- 
spondence on  the  subject. 

An  idea  prevailed  among  American  merchants,  and  was 
shared  by  the  government,  that  a  part  of  this  confiscated 
property  had  remained  in  Holland  since  1810,  without  being 
disposed  of  by  Napoleon.  But  Eustis  informed  Monroe  that 
it  had  all  been  sold  and  the  proceeds  deposited  in  the  French 
treasury.  1> 

In  his  first  note  to  Nagell  dealing  with  the  subject  of 
claims,  Eustis  contented  himself  with  a  brief,  but  accurate, 
statement  of  the  facts,  and  with  a  reference  to  the  legal 
principles  on  which  the  claims  were  justified,  which  he 
summed  up  in  these  few  words :  "that  nations  are  respon- 
sible for  the  acts  of  their  rulers,  and  that  changes  in  gov- 
ernment cannot  diminish  the  force  of  obligations  and  con- 
tracts." 2>  Nagell's  reply  indicated  that  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment not  only  wished  to  wash  its  hands  of  the  matter,  but 
also  absolved  the  government  of  King  Louis  of  all 
responsibility.  The  king,  replied  Nagell,  was  of  the  opinion 
that  the  principle  on  which  indemnity  was  claimed  was  "in- 
admissible in  general,"  and  that  it  was  certainly  inapplicable 
to  this  particular  case,  for,  in  committing  these  acts,  Louis 
had  yielded  to  overwhelming  force  on  the  part  of  France. 
If  the  principle  held  good  at  all,  the  claims  should  be  prose- 
cuted against  the  government  of  France. 3) 

Eustis,  in  his  note  of  October  29,4)  explained  that  the 
ground  on  which  the  claims  were  presented  was  misunder- 
stood. They  were  not  presented  on  the  ground  that  "the 
measures  which  decided  the  fate  of  the  cargoes  in  question 

!)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  vol.  V.,  Eustis  to  Monroe,  Sept.  9, 
1815.  There  was  at  least  one  exception  to  this  statement,  as  ap- 
pears from  Backer's  letter  to  Bourne,  December  20,  1814,  (Bourne 
Mms.)  "The  brig  St.  Michael",  he  writes,  "has  never  been  con- 
demned by  any  court  whatever.  She  was  taken  possession  of  under 
the  reign  of  Louis  Napoleon,  and  remained  undecided  till  Holland 
got  liberated  from  France.  I  applied  to  the  present  government  to 
have  her  returned  and  they  gave  her  up." 

2)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.,   Eustis  to   Nagell,   August  22, 
1815.     Copies  or  translations  of  the  notes  exchanged  with  the  Gov. 
of  the  Netherlands  on  this  subject  were  sent  home  with  the  des- 
patches  of   our   ministers    at   The    Hague.       Because    of    the    dis- 
organized condition  of  the  Dutch   archives  covering  this  period,   I 
have  found  it  more  convenient  to  refer  to  the  material  found  in  the 
State  Dept.  at  Washington. 

3)  Ibid.,  V.,  Nagell  to  Eustis,  October  17,  1815. 
*)  Ibid.,  V. 


122  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- Am  eric  an  Relations 

were  an  act  of  violence,  extorted  by  France  from  the  gov- 
ernment of  Holland,"  but  because  "the  seizure  and  confisca- 
tion were  the  act  and  deed  of  the  government  of  Holland. 
Whether  the  proceeds  were  converted  to  the  immediate  use 
of  the  government,  or  transferred  for  any  consideration 
whatsoever  to  another  power,  it  was  not  for  the  claimants  to 
inquire.  The  government  of  Holland  had  taken  their  prop- 
erty, and  to  the  government  of  Holland  they  looked  for 
redress."  After  thus  proving,  to  his  own  satisfaction  at 
least,  that  the  government  of  Holland,  not  that  of  France, 
was  responsible  for  the  confiscation  of  American  property, 
and  that  this  government  would  have  been  under  obliga- 
tion to  make  compensation,  had  its  existence  been  prolonged, 
Eustis  then  states  that  the  only  question  now  remaining 
was  whether  the  present  government  of  King  William  I. 
had  succeeded  to  this  obligation.  And  he  answers  this 
question  by  saying  that  this  principle  was  too  long  estab- 
lished to  admit  of  doubt,  and  that  acts  of  violence  such  as 
these  in  question  could  not  be  regarded  as  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule. 

But  the  Dutch  government  was  not  to  be  convinced  by 
this  line  of  reasoning.  Nagell,  in  his  reply,  again  attacked 
the  validity  of  the  general  principle  that  "every  government 
which  succeeds  another  succeeds  also  to  the  obligations  of 
the  preceding  government."  This  principle,  he  argued,  was 
not  universally  applicable,  but  was  subject  to  qualification. 
With  a  continuous  succession  of  legitimate  governments  it 
might  be  beyond  dispute :  but  when  as  actually  happened  in 
this  case,  "a  legitimate  government  is  dispossessed  by  an 
illegal  government,  established  by  violence,"  and  when  other 
powers  continued  their  relations  with  this  illegal  govern- 
ment, and  allowed  their  citizens  to  be  exposed  to  injustice, 
the  principle  could  no  longer  be  applied.  The  United  States 
should  have  sought  redress  at  the  time  from  the  French 
government  and  could  not  rightly  present  its  claims  to  the 
reestablished  legitimate  government  of  King  William  I.1) 

After  this  preliminary  exchange  of  views  the  matter  was 
allowed  to  rest  for  some  eight  months ;  Eustis  did  not  renew 
the  demand  until  he  had  received  Monroe's  instructions  to 
that  effect  of  May  20,  1816.2>  Monroe  informed  him  that 


!)  Ibid.,  V.,  Nagell  to  Eustis,  Nov.  8,  1815. 
2)  Instructions,  Europe,  vol.  VIII.,  p.  60. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  123 

Adams  was  charged  with  a  special  mission  to  Naples  to  ob- 
tain indemnity  for  the  seizure  of  vessels  there  in  1809,  that 
Gallatin  was  charged  to  make  a  similar  demand  upon  France, 
and  Russell  upon  Sweden.  "From  these  measures  taken 
with  other  powers/'  he  says,  "you  will  see  the  propriety  of 
renewing  your  application  ....  for  a  similar  indemnity." 
Monroe  insisted  that  the  claims  were  founded  on  "principles 
universally  recognized,  and  which  have  existed  through  all 
ages."  He  then  instructs  Eustis  to  say  that  the  government 
of  Holland,  which  made  the  seizures,  "was  in  full  possession 
of  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation  and  exercised  all  the  rights 
appertaining  to  it ;  it  was  acknowledged  by  other  powers,  to 
many  of  whom  it  sent  ministers,  and  received  others  in  re- 
turn. The  government  de  facto  of  any  country  is  the  com- 
petent government  for  all  public  purposes." 

Eustis,  who  was  not  gifted  with  a  high  degree  of  orig- 
inality, was  content  to  give  an  almost  verbatim  repetition  of 
Monroe's  language,  and  then  expressed  the  hope  that,  in  view 
of  the  justice  of  the  claims  and  the  indisputable  authority  of 
the  principle,  the  discussion  would  this  time  be  more  satis- 
factory.x)  He  did,  it  is  true,  cite  two  specific  instances  as 
examples  of  the  nature  of  the  acts  for  which  the  American 
government  sought  redress,2)  but  this  evidence  neither 
served  to  reenforce  his  argument  nor  to  throw7  any  new  light 
on  the  principles  involved.  The  immediate  point  in  dispute 
was  now  whether  or  not  the  government  of  King  Louis  was, 
at  the  time  the  seizures  were  made  the  de  facto  government 
of  Holland.  The  Dutch  government,  for  obvious  reasons, 
maintained  that  the  Emperor  of  France,  and  not  his  brother 
Louis,  had  been  the  actual  sovereign  at  the  time.3) 

Eustis  was  at  length  compelled  to  descend  from  the  gen- 
eral to  the  particular  and  to  submit  some  of  the  historical 
facts  on  which  the  American  contention  rested.  In  his  last 
note  on  this  subject,4^  he  pointed  out  that  Louis  had  main- 
tained diplomatic  relations  with  other  countries  like  any 
other  sovereign,  independent  ruler,  and  that  the  treaty  of 


!)  Despatches  Netherlands,  V.,  Eustis  to  Nagell,  July  4,  1816. 

2)  The  case  of  the  Bacchus  and  the  Baltimore.     These  are  not 
given  in  Secretary  Clay's  report  referred  to  on  page  120,  note  2. 

3)  Despatches,   Netherlands,  V.,    Nagell   to    Eustis,   August    14, 
1816. 

4)  Ibid.,  V.,  Eustis  to  Nagell,  September  25,  1816. 


124  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

March,  1810,  was  an  act  of  sovereignty  and  bore  no  evi- 
dence of  having  been  extorted  by  force.  The  occupation  of 
Amsterdam  by  French  troops,  the  abdication  of  Louis  and 
the  annexation  of  Holland  to  France  had  all  taken  place  in 
July,  1810;  "whereas  the  order  for  depositing  the  property 
in  the  public  stores  was  issued  by  the  then  King  of  Holland 
in  the  spring  of  1809;  the  cargoes  were  generally  so  depos- 
ited in  the  course  of  that  year,  two  of  them  in  the  winter 
and  spring  of  1810,  and  the  whole  of  them  ....  were 
transferred  to  France  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  March, 
1810." 

The  Dutch  government  made  no  reply  to  this  note  and  it 
was  almost  a  year  and  a  half  later  before  the  discussion  was 
renewed.  Meanwhile  in  the  United  States,  a  new  adminis- 
tration had  been  inaugurated ;  Monroe  had  become  President 
and  John  Quincy  Adams  had  succeeded  him  as  Secretary  of 
State.  Eustis  meanwhile  had  also  been  recalled,  not  because 
of  his  lack  of  success  in  the  matter  of  claims,  but  because  of 
the  failure  of  the  Dutch  government  to  appoint  a  represen- 
tative at  Washington  who  was  his  equal  in  rank.  His  suc- 
cessor was  Alexander  H.  Everett,  who,  besides  having  read 
law  in  the  office  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  had  been  a  member 
of  Adam's  diplomatic  household  on  the  latter's  mission  to  St. 
Petersburg  in  1809.  In  1816  he  had  served  for  a  short  time 
as  attache  to  the  American  legation  at  The  Hague ;  he  was 
now  raised  to  the  rank  of  charge. 

Everett  began  his  mission  by  pressing  the  claims  with 
much  less  moderation  than  Eustis  had  shown.  The  language 
which  he  used  in  his  first  note1)  was  not  only  firm,  but  in 
places  almost  insulting.  He  accused  the  Dutch  government 
of  having  "violated  the  duties  of  hospitality  and  justice/' 
and  of  having  "exhibited  a  total  want  of  those  sentiments 
of  self-respect  and  common  humanity  that  may  often  be 
found  among  the  most  barbarous  nations."  In  proof  of  this 
accusation  he  stated  the  facts  relating  to  the  cargoes  of  the 
Bacchus  and  the  Baltimore,  much  as  Eustis  had  already 
given  them,  and,  as  stronger  evidence  still,  he  cited  the  case 
of  the  St.  Michael,  whose  cargo  had  been  sequestered  after 
the  vessel  had  entered  Amsterdam  in  distress.  "Thus  at 


Ibid.,  VI.,  Everett  to  Nagell,  February  22,  1819. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  125 

present/'  he  continued,  "and  on  the  territory  of  one  of  the 
first  maritime  nations  of  Europe,  the  wrecks  of  friendly  ves- 
sels were  plundered  under  the  public  authority  of  the  coun- 
try : — a  description  of  violence  not  unknown,  perhaps,  to  the 
piratical  inhabitants  of  the  Northern  waste  of  Europe  in  the 
dark  ages,  but  altogether  unheard  of  as  the  acts  of  a  civilized 
community."  These  acts  were  "breaches  of  a  solemn  and 
positive  contract,  as  well  as  outrages  upon  justice,  hospitality 
and  common  humanity,  and  the  present  government  inher- 
ited, together  with  the  obligation  to  observe  the  treaty  which 
descended  to  it  ....  also  the  obligation  to  repair  it  where 
it  has  been  broken."  He  cited  precedents  and  quoted  exten- 
sively from  the  writings  of  Grotius  and  Puffendorf,  to  sup- 
port the  general  principles  of  International  Law  on  which 
the  American  government  had  based  the  claims  since  the 
beginning  of  the  controversy.  In  conclusion  he  states,  "that 
the  claims  though  pursued  with  moderation  and  forbear- 
ance, can  never  be  abandoned  or  relinquished." 

The  Dutch  government  had  not  expected  that  the  con- 
troversy would  be  re-opened.  The  King  had  hoped,  Nagell 
replied  on  June  14,  1819,1'  "that  the  government  of  the 
United  States  would  be  satisfied  with  the  answers  given  to 
the  applications  of  Mr.  Eustis;"  and  since  Everett's  note 
was  merely  an  elaboration  of  the  same  principles  and  argu- 
ments which  Eustis  had  advanced,  the  government  of  the 
Netherlands  might  have  limited  itself  to  a  simple  repeti- 
tion of  its  former  replies;  but  the  king  desired  to  give  a 
new  evidence  of  his  esteem,  and  had  therefore  ordered  him 
to  restate  the  facts  with  great  clarity  and  to  analyze  Everett's 
arguments  in  detail. 

In  this  note  of  June  14,  and  the  one  of  November  4,  we 
have  the  ablest  refutation  of  the  arguments  of  the  Ameri- 
can government,  and  the  clearest  discussion  of  the  merits 
of  the  controversy.  The  fundamental  question  at  issue  was 
still  whether  the  government  of  Holland  or  of  France  should 
be  held  responsible  for  the  confiscation  of  American  prop- 
erty. The  Dutch  government  could,  of  course,  not  deny 
that  the  decrees  of  March  31,  of  June  30  and  July  29,  1809, 
were  issued  in  Louis'  name,  that  the  cargoes  of  American 
vessels  were  sequestered,  that  is,  stored  for  safekeeping  in 


Ibid.,  VI. 


126  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

the  royal  warehouses,  by  the  king's  officers  acting  in  his 
name,  and  that  the  treaty  of  March,  1810,  had  been  con- 
cluded while  Louis  was  still  king  of  Holland ;  but  it  refused 
for  a  moment  to  concede  that  Louis  should  be  held  respon- 
sible for  these  acts.  Nagell  maintained,  and  rightly  so,  that 
if  Louis  had  taken  measures  hostile  to  the  United  States,  he 
had  not  done  so  with  malice  aforethought,  but  that  he  had 
merely  been  the  unwilling  instrument  of  Napoleon's 
tyranny,  and  that  the  treaty  itself  had  been  forced  upon  him 
at  a  time  when  he  was  a  prisoner  in  the  hands  of  the 
Emperor.1) 

Needless  to  say,  these  statements  made  in  palliation 
of  Louis'  conduct  were  not  mere  diplomatic  subterfuges; 
they  can  be  substantiated  by  an  abundance  of  historical 
proof.  It  was  a  matter  of  common  notoriety,  also  in  the 
United  States  and  among  the  merchants  who  still  ventured 
to  trade  with  Holland  at  the  time,  that  Louis  was  king  in 
name  only,  and  that  Napoleon  dealt  with  his  kingdom  much 
as  though  it  were  one  of  the  Departments  of  France.  The 
American  government  realized  full  well  that  the  treaty  had 
been  a  mere  form  and  that  it  was  in  substance  equivalent  to 
an  Imperial  decree,  but  it  stubbornly  maintained  that  none 
of  these  facts  detracted  from  the  justice  of  the  claims.  It 
refused  to  look  into  the  motives  for  Louis'  acts,  and  stood 
its  ground  in  defense  of  the  more  or  less  abstract  principle 
that  a  nation  is  answerable  for  the  acts  of  its  government. 
Adams,  in  his  instructions  to  Everett,  had  gone  so  far  as  to 
say:  "However  frequent  the  instances  of  departure  from 
this  principle  may  be  in  point  of  fact,  it  cannot  with  any 
color  of  reason  be  contested  in  right."  2> 

It  was  also  well  known  to  the  American  government  that 
Holland  had  not  derived  the  least  benefit,  financial  or  other- 
wise, from  the  confiscation  of  American  property,  and  that 
the  treaty  had  not  availed  to  prolong  Louis'  reign,  but  had 
rather  served  to  hasten  the  annexation  of  Holland  to  France. 
Nevertheless  Everett,  when  confronted  with  these  well- 


x)  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V.,  615-620, 
Nagell  to  Everett,  Nov.  4,  1819.  The  material  for  the  period  be- 
tween August  20,  1819  and  Sept.  1,  1822,  is  missing  from  the  files 
of  the  State  Department. 

2)  Instructions,  Europe,  vol.  VIII.,  p.  241-242,  August  10,  1818. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  127 

established  facts,  was  not  in  the  least  disconcerted;  on  the 
contrary,  he  sought  to  prove  that  Holland  had  benefited  from 
the  10th  article  of  the  treaty.  "More  probably,"  he  argued, 
"a  regard  for  what  he  thought  the  public  good  induced  king 
Louis  to  agree  to  this  measure,  as  a  less  evil  rather  than 
expose  himself  to  a  greater.  He  appropriated  to  the  public 
service  a  certain  amount  of  property  belonging  to  individuals, 
to  avoid  some  important  mischief  with  which  the  body  poli- 
tic was  threatened  in  the  event  of  his  refusal.  Perhaps  the 
existence  of  the  nation  could  only  have  been  preserved  on 
this  condition.  This,  then,  was  private  property  taken  for 
the  public  service ;  and  this  is  one  of  the  cases  in  which  the 
obligation  of  indemnity  is  most  strongly  insisted  on  by  the 
writers  on  public  law."  1) 

Equally  true,  though  perhaps  not  so  well  known  to  the 
American  government,  were  the  facts  which  Nagell  sub- 
mitted to  prove  that  "properly  speaking,  it  was  not  the  treaty 
of  1810,"  but  the  annexation  of  Holland  to  France  which  had 
placed  the  American  cargoes  in  the  power  of  the  French. 
"Numerous  proofs  exist,"  he  writes,  "that  Louis,  up  to  the 
moment  of  his  abdication,  was  engaged  in  devising  means  of 
securing  the  American  cargoes  to  their  owners."  The  king 
had  even  consulted  with  respectable  mercantile  houses  on 
this  subject,  and  these  were  forced  to  confess  "that  all  things 
considered,  in  the  given  circumstances  sequestration  was  the 
best  precaution."  "The  archives  for  the  years  1809-'10  are 
filled  with  complaints  and  threats  of  the  French  ambassador 
on  the  manner  in  which  Louis  evaded  the  wishes  of  Bona- 
parte, and  favored  American  vessels."  "Finally,  a  circum- 
stance of  the  highest  importance  has  been  established  by 
authentic  documents;  namely,  that  as  a  result  of  the  pre- 
cautions of  king  Louis,  nearly  all  the  cargoes  were  found  in 
the  warehouses  still  untouched  (encore  en  entier)  after  the 
king's  abdication."  And  not  only  had  the  annexation  of  Hol- 
land abrogated  the  treaty,  but  the  government  of  Holland  had 
actually  ceased  to  exist  even  in  name  when  the  confiscation 
of  American  property  was  effected."  2) 


*)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  VI.,  Everett  to  Nagell,  July  15,  1819. 
2)  American    State    Papers,    Foreign,    V.,    615-620,     Nagell    to 
Everett,  November  4,  1819. 


128  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Everett  was  evidently  impressed  by  this  array  of  facts. 
He  now  sought  to  elicit  from  Nagell  an  acknowledgment  that 
at  least  a  part  of  the  cargoes  had  been  delivered  to  France  be- 
fore the  union,  and  by  virtue  of  the  treaty.1)  But  Nagell 
refused  to  make  a  categorical  statement  to  that  effect. 2) 

In  fact,  the  Dutch  government  was  tiring  of  the  contro- 
versy, and  early  in  1820  it  requested  that  the  discussion  be 
discontinued.  The  American  government  complied  with  this 
request,  and  the  last  word  on  the  subject  of  spoliation  claims, 
in  so  far  as  this  subject  had  any  bearing  on  our  relations  with 
the  Netherlands,  is  to  be  found  in  the  instructions  to  Everett, 
on  May  26,  1820,  where  John  Quincy  Adams  writes :  "On 
taking  leave,  Viscount  de  Quabeck,  under  instructions  from 
his  government,  intimated  verbally  to  me  their  wish  that  the 
discussion  should  not  be  further  pressed,  and  although  he 
was  distinctly  informed  that  the  rights  of  our  citizens  to 
indemnity  for  injuries  so  unjustifiable  and  flagrant  could 
not  be  abandoned,  the  President  believes  that  it  may  be 
expedient  to  forbear  renewing  the  applications  in  their  behalf 
for  the  present/'  3> 


The  government  of  the  Netherlands  later  enjoyed  the  sat- 
isfaction of  learning  that  the  United  States  complied  with 
the  suggestion  which  Nagell  had  made  in  his  first  reply  to 
Eustis.  Shortly  after  the  claims  were  abandoned,  as  de- 
mands against  the  Netherlands,  they  were  merged  into  those 
which  were  then  pending  against  France.  Under  the  Con- 
vention of  July  4,  1831,  France  agreed  to  indemnify  Ameri- 
can citizens  for  losses  incurred  by  the  acts  of  Napoleon.  To 
carry  this  Convention  into  effect,  President  Jackson  ap- 
pointed three  Commissioners,  who  sat  at  Washington  and 
examined  all  the  papers  relating  to  the  claims.  In  the  award 
of  this  commission  the  cargoes  confiscated  by  France,  under 
the  treaty  with  Holland,  were  valued  at  $536,907.01. 4> 


*)   Ibid.,  V.,  621.     Everett  to  Nagell,  November  10. 
2)  Ibid.,  V.,  622.     Nagell  to  Everett,  December  9. 
3i    American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V.,  629. 
4)  The  report  of  the  commission  is  given  in  House  Exec.  Docu- 
ments, 24th  Congress,  1st  session,  No.  117. 

See  also  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  I.,  252-54, 
and  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  V.,  445-8  et.  seq. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  129 


CHAPTER  VII. 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  TRADE  RELATIONS  ON  A  BASIS  OF 
PARTIAL  RECIPROCITY. 


A  second  important  question,  and  one  which  called  for 
a  more  immediate  decision  on  the  part  of  the  respective 
governments,  was  that  of  deciding  on  the  policy  which  each 
should  pursue  in  regulating  the  commercial  intercourse  be- 
tween their  subjects. 

In  the  years  when  her  colonial  and  commercial  policy 
were  dictated  by  France,  Holland  had  seen  her  colonial  pos- 
sessions taken  over,  one  after  another,  by  England,  and  had 
seen  her  mercantile  marine  dwindle  away  under  the  restric- 
tions which  Napoleon  had  imposed  on  her  maritime  trade. 
After  the  return  of  peace,  however,  the  greater  part  of  her 
former  colonial  empire  was  restored  to  her.  England  re- 
tained only  a  fragment,  and  for  the  loss  of  this  fragment 
Holland  was  partially  compensated  by  the  acquisition  of  Bel- 
gium. Her  coast-line  in  Europe  was  thus  extended  so  as  to 
include  the  important  port  of  Antwerp.  For  the  first  time 
in  many  years  the  Dutch  were  now  permitted  to  trade  with 
their  own  colonies  and  with  other  countries,  and  were  at  lib- 
erty to  open  their  own  ports  on  conditions  which  they  them- 
selves should  determine.  And  this  sudden  liberation  of  trade 
necessitated  the  adoption  of  a  new  general  policy  of  trade 
and  navigation. 

The  United  States  was  in  somewhat  the  same  situation, 
for  the  European  wars  and  our  own  war  against  England 
had  affected  our  trade  relations  in  a  number  of  ways.  The 
problem  before  the  American  government  was  well  expressed 
by  Monroe,  in  a  communication  to  Changuion.  "The 
treaties  between  the  United  States  and  some  of  the  powers 
of  Europe  having  been  annulled  by  causes  proceeding  from 
the  state  of  Europe  for  some  time  past,  and  other  treaties 
having  expired,  the  United  States  have  now  to  form  their 
system  of  commercial  intercourse  with  every  power,  as  it 


130  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

were,  at  the  same  time."  *>  It  took  some  three  years  before 
both  countries  reached  even  a  tentative  agreement  on  this 
matter. 

Although  Holland  had  proclaimed  its  independence  in 
November,  1813,  it  was- about  a  year  and  a  half  later  before 
trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  Netherlands  showed 
any  signs  of  revival.  In  1814  American  vessels  were  forced 
to  remain  at  home,  for  throughout  the  year  the  British  fleet 
continued  to  harry  our  Eastern  coast,  and  in  1815,  after  the 
treaty  of  Ghent  had  put  an  end  to  our  hostilities  with  Eng- 
land, our  first  trade  operations  were  necessarily  somewhat 
experimental  in  character.  Some  of  the  old  and  well-known 
firms  in  this  country,  which  had  done  a  thriving  business 
with  Holland  in  the  prosperous  years  before  1807,  had  either 
been  ruined  entirely  or  had  suffered  such  severe  losses  that 
they  were  unable  to  set  up  anew  in  foreign  trade;  others, 
which  had  survived,  had  been  forced  to  break  off  their  for- 
mer relations  with  Holland  and  had  meanwhile  sought  new 
customers  elsewhere.  In  1815,  therefore,  ne\v  trade  con- 
nections had  to  be  sought  on  both  sides.  American  shippers 
had  to  find  new  agents  and  consignees  in  Holland  to  dispose 
of  their  goods,  while  Dutch  merchants  had  to  solicit  con- 
signments from  American  business  houses  with  which  they 
had  had  no  previous  dealings.  It  required  time  to  renew 
business  acquaintances. 2)  Toward  the  end  of  April,  1815, 

*)  State  Department,  Notes  to  Foreign  Legations,  vol.  II.,  p.  117. 
April  12,  1815. 

2)  The  firm  of  Wm.  Taylor  of  Baltimore  was  one  of  those  which 
suffered  from  the  war.  In  August,  1815,  Taylor  wrote  to  Bourne: 
"The  embargo  and  war  have  placed  me  so  much  in  the  back  ground, 
that  I  am  not  able  to  resume  my  standing  again  in  the  commercial 
world."  (Taylor  Mms.)  Their  former  agent  at  Amsterdam,  T.  H. 
Backer,  now  entered  into  the  employ  of  Ellis  and  Allen,  of  Rich- 
mond, Virginia,  a  firm  which  before  1815  appears  to  have  had  no 
dealings  with  Holland.  Early  in  1813  Bourne  had  pointed  out  the 
difficulty  of  re-establishing  trade  connections.  In  1815,  with  the 
object  of  forming  new  business  acquaintances  for  himself  and  sev- 
eral Dutch  firms,  he  made  preparations  for  spending  a  summer  in 
the  Northern  and  Middle  States  and  a  winter  in  the  South,  (Bourne 
Urns.  B.  to  Higgenbottom,  Jan.  1,  1813;  to  Taylor,  Oct.  1815).  Ill- 
ness prevented  him  from  making  his  journey,  but  his  purpose  was 
accomplished  equally  well,  perhaps,  by  the  circulars  sent  out  by 
Dutch  firms,  informing  Americans  of  the  state  of  the  market  and 
soliciting  shipments.  Among  the  Ellis  and  Allen  Papers  are  a  num- 
ber of  circulars,  some  in  printed  form,  from  houses  at  Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam  and  Antwerp. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  131 

Bourne  wrote  that  "not  a  single  vessel  of  any  kind  has  yet 
arrived  which  left  America  after  the  ratification  of  peace 
by  our  government/'  ^  And  as  late  as  August  our  consul 
at  Rotterdam  complained  that  "the  American  business  to 
this  country  is  not  very  brilliant  at  this  moment."  2) 

The  Dutch  at  first  had  few  vessels  to  spare  for  the  Amer- 
ican trade.  It  took  years  to  build  up  a  mercantile  marine, 
and  it  was  but  natural  that  they  should  first  seek  to  renew 
trade  with  their  colonies.  But  they  encouraged  Americans 
to  obtain  their  return  cargoes  at  a  Dutch  port,  and  to  make 
this  possible,  they  strove  to  make  their  country  once  more  a 
centre  of  distribution  for  the  productions  and  manufactures 
of  Northern  and  Middle  Europe  and  of  the  Mediterranean. 
This  was  all  the  more  necessary,  because  a  number  of  Dutch 
commodities  no  longer  found  a  favorable  market  in  the 
United  States.  The  Dutch  charge  at  Washington  pointed 
out,  in  1815,3>  that  as  a  result  of  the  difficulty  of  ob- 
taining liquors  from  Europe  during  the  wars,  and  of  regu- 
larly exporting  our  wheat  and  corn,  the  number  of  whiskey 
distilleries  had  so  increased  that  the  American  people  had 
lost  the  taste  of  gin  and  brandy.  The  process  of  cheese 
making  in  this  country  had  been  perfected,  and  the  manu- 
facture of  drabs  had  been  pushed  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
make  importation  from  Holland  useless.  Wool  growing 
and  manufacturing  had  also  increased  and  linens  could  be 
obtained  more  cheaply  from  Ireland  than  from  Holland.  As 
a  result  of  this  state  of  things  the  balance  of  trade  remained 
for  a  considerable  period  in  our  favor,4)  and  this  fact  in  turn 
gave  rise  to  a  feeling  of  jealousy,  and  even  of  antipathy, 
among  the  Dutch  which  lasted  almost  a  generation. 

Even  before  the  re-opening  of  diplomatic  relations  the 
Dutch  foresaw  that  for  many  years  to  come  they  would  not 


!)   Wm.  Taylor  Mms.    Bourne  to  Taylor,  April  22,  1815. 

2)  Bourne  Mms.    G.  R.  Curtis  to  Bourne,  August  13,  1815. 

3)  R.    A.,    Buitenl.   Zaken,   Amerik.   Legatie.     Dossier    B.,    26. 
Ten  Gate  to  Monroe — no  date,  but  before  Aug.  1st,  1815. 

4)  In  1814  no  less  than  500'  Dutch  vessels  passed  through  the 
Sound,  but  in  1815  only  10  sailed  for  the  U.  S.  (according  to  an  of- 
ficial report  of  Director  General  of  Customs,  July  25,  1816.     R.  A. 
Dossier  B.,  26).     In  1815  there  were  82  American  vessels  at  Am- 
sterdam alone   (R.  A.  Collectie  Goldberg,  vol.  208).     For  the  year 
ending  Sept.  1,  1816,  150  entered  the  ports  of  Amsterdam,  Rotter- 
dam and  Antwerp.     {Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.,  Eustis  to  Mon- 
roe, October  18,  1816.) 


132  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

be  in  a  position  to  compete  with  Americans  in  the  direct 
trade  between  the  two  countries.  But  to  make  the  trade  as 
profitable  as  possible  under  existing  circumstances,  they 
greatly  desired  to  have  the  American  government  abolish  or 
lower  its  import  duties  on  Dutch  merchandise.  This  would 
assure  them  a  somewhat  more  favorable  market  in  the 
United  States,  whether  their  goods  were  imported  in  Dutch 
or  in  American  vessels.  And  Changuion  was  urged,  by 
various  commercial  and  manufacturing  cities  with  which  he 
consulted  before  setting  out  on  his  mission,  to  secure  a  con- 
cession of  this  kind  from  the  American  government.1* 

It  has  been  noted  that  the  Dutch  government,  in  1814, 
took  the  view  that  the  treaty  of  1782  could  no  longer  be 
considered  as  valid.  Changuion,  after  his  arrival  at  Wash- 
ington, proposed  to  Monroe  that  this  treaty  should  be  taken 
as  the  basis  of  a  new  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  except 
for  such  changes  and  additions  as  altered  political  circum- 
stances necessitated.  The  principal  change  he  suggested  was 
based  on  the  advice  which  he  had  received  just  before  sailing; 
namely,  that  goods  of  the  growth  or  manufacture  of  the 
Netherlands  or  her  colonies  should  pay  no  higher  duties 
when  imported  in  Dutch  vessels  than  when  imported  in 
American  vessels.  In  return  for  this  he  promised  a  similar 
concession  in  favor  of  American  goods  imported  into  the 
Netherlands.2) 

Before  Monroe  could  reply,  Congress  had  passed  the 
act  of  March  3,  1815.3>  By  this  act  the  United  States  of- 
fered to  abolish  all  discriminating  tonnage  duties  on  foreign 
vessels,  and  all  discriminating  duties  on  their  cargoes,  when 
these  consisted  of  the  produce  or  manufacture  of  the  country 
to  which  the  vessel  belonged,  on  condition  that  foreign  coun- 
tries should  grant  reciprocal  privileges  to  American  vessels 
and  goods.  Monroe  sent  a  copy  of  this  act  to  Changuion, 
and  expressed  the  belief  that  he  would  find  in  it  "a  satisfac- 
tory proof  that  the  United  States  concur  with  your  gov- 
ernment in  its  policy."  But  he  also  informed  him  that  our 
government  thought  it  "improper  to  enter  into  any  special 
engagement  respecting  it,  until  the  sense  of  other  powers  is 


!)  R.  A.  B.  Zaken,  Am.  Leg.,  Registre  3,  No.  2-A-8,  9  and  10. 
Memorials  from  Schiedam,  Leiden,  Rotterdam,  etc. 

2)  Notes  from  Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  I.    Feb.  24,  1815. 

3)  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  224. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  133 

in  a  certain  extent  ascertained."  x)  In  a  later  communica- 
tion he  explained  that  the  first  treaty  might  in  some  degree 
form  the  basis  of  our  commercial  system.  "It  is  proper, 
therefore,  to  be  attentive  to  its  conditions  to  avoid  engage- 
ments with  one  power  which  might  embarrass  them  with 
others."  "Had  you  the  requisite  powers,  I  should  be  auth- 
orized to  treat  with  you  immediately."  In  the  meantime,  "an 
obvious  inconvenience  might  result  to  both  countries,  from 
agreeing  to  any  condition  which  could  not  possibly  take  ef- 
fect till  some  distant  day,  and  which  from  the  difficulty  of 
arranging  other  points,  might  never  take  effect."  2*  Beyond 
this  point  the  negotiations  did  not  progress,  and  Changuion 
could  justly  complain  to  his  government  of  the  coldness  with 
which  his  proposals  had  been  received.3) 

In  Monroe's  instructions  to  Eustis  we  find  the  idea  ex- 
pressed that  the  American  government  should  "reserve  this 
principle  of  reciprocation,"  as  a  means  of  breaking  down 
the  colonial  system  of  Holland,  France,  and  Great  Britain. 
"There  could  be  no  motive  to  adopt  such  a  regulation"  with 
Holland,  unless  it  could  be  made  part  of  a  general  system 
with  the  powers  of  Europe.  Moreover,  "Holland  could  give 
no  equivalent,  the  articles  imported  thence  into  this  country 
bearing  no  comparison,  in  point  of  bulk,  with  the  vast  pro- 
ductions of  the  United  States."  4> 

The  subject  of  a  new  commercial  treaty  now  came  up 
for  discussion  between  Eustis  and  Nagell.  Nagell  was  a 
member  of  the  Dutch  aristocracy,  and  if  we  may  believe 
what  Van  Hogendorp  says,  he  was  "an  enemy  of  trade," 
and  "a  hater  of  Americans."  5)  Nagell  informed  Eustis 
during  the  course  of  their  first  interview,  that  the  Dutch 
government  "were  not  particularly  anxious  that  there  should 
be  a  treaty."  But  in  view  of  "the  present  state  of  the  com- 
merce of  this  country,"  he  considered  it  "a  matter  of  in- 
difference" whether  the  treaty  should  contain  any  stipula- 
tions regarding  reciprocal  duties,  such  as  Changuion  had 


!)  Notes  to  Foreign  Legations,  II.,  75.    March  23,  1815. 

2)  Ibid.,  II.,  117,  April  12. 

3>  R.  A.,  B.  Z.,  Am.  Legatie,  Registre  2.  Despatch  No.  13, 
April  8,  1815. 

*)  Instructions,  Europe,  VII.,  397.     May  19  1815. 

5)  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften  van  G.  K.  Van  Hogendorp,  V.,  70, 
76.  Van  Hogendorp  was  a  free  trader.  On  his  economic  ideas, 
which  were  far  in  advance  of  those  of  his  time,  see  an  excellent  work 
by  Otto  H.  Van  Rees,  Van  Hogendorp  als  Staathuishoudkundige. 


134  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

urged.  They  agreed,  however,  that  the  former  treaty  would 
serve  as  the  basis  of  a  new  one,  and  that  Eustis  should 
write  home  for  full  powers  to  begin  negotiations. *> 

Meanwhile  king  William,  who  was  keenly  interested  in 
commercial  and  industrial  matters,  had  made  known,  by  his 
decree  of  May  27,  1815,  that  in  the  future  all  goods  and 
merchandise  from  North  and  South  America  were  to  be 
subject  to  no  higher  import,  export  or  transit  duties  in  the 
Netherlands  than  were  levied  on  European  goods,  and  that 
the  tonnage  duties  on  vessels  carrying  such  goods  were  to 
be  the  same  as  for  vessels  trading  to  and  from  a  European 
port.  This  decree  was  officially  made  known  to  our  govern- 
ment on  August  31,  with  an  intimation  that  the  king  would 
be  pleased  to  have  the  United  States  adopt  similar  regula- 
tions in  favor  of  Dutch  vessels. 2)  But  Monroe  pointed  out, 
on  January  17,  1816,  that  this  regulation  "does  not  afford  a 
ground  on  which  the  President  is  authorized  to  put  in  force 
the  law  of  the  last  session  of  Congress,"  for  it  placed  "the 
ships  and  produce  of  the  United  States  on  a  footing  with 
these  of  the  powers  of  Europe  only.  It  does  not  appear  that 
they  are  placed  by  it  on  a  footing,  in  the  ports  of  the  Neth- 
erlands, with  the  vessels  and  goods  of  native  subjects,  which 
our  law  requires."  Furthermore,  our  law  contemplated  "a 
free  commerce,  on  just  and  equal  conditions,  with  all  the 
dominions  of  the  power  to  whom  it  is  extended,"  whereas 
this  regulation  was  limited  to  the  European  dominions  of  the 
Netherlands.3) 

Ten  Gate,  the  Dutch  charge,  acting  on  instructions  from 
his  government,  then  explained4)  that  all  duties  in  the  Neth- 
erlands were  regulated  by  a  law  of  1725,  which  had  again 
been  put  in  operation  in  December,  1813.  By  this  law  Euro- 
pean vessels  were  placed  on  an  equality  with  national  vessels 
as  regards  import  duties.  The  decree,  of  May,  1815,  by 
placing  Americans  on  an  equal  footing  with  Europeans,  had 
therefore  in  reality  placed  them  on  an  equal  footing  with 


*)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.    Eustis  to  Monroe,  Aug.  11,  1815. 

2)  Notes    from    Legation    of    the     Netherlands,     I.,     Lechleiter 
(charge   ad   interim)    to   Monroe.     A   translation   was   also   sent  by 
Bourne  to  the  Seer,  of  the  Treasury  in  June  (Consular  Despatches, 
Amsterdam,  II.) 

3)  Notes  to  Foreign  Legations,  II.,  120.     Monroe  to  Lechleiter. 
*)  Notes  from  Legation   of  the  Netherlands,  I.     Ten  Gate  to 

Monroe,  September  16,  1816. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  135 

vessels  of  the  Netherlands.  The  only  exceptions  to  this 
general  rule  were  an  additional  duty  on  salt,  imported  by 
foreigners,  and  on  the  products  of  the  whale  fishery.  But 
neither  of  these  exceptions  operated  against  the  United 
States;  for  salt  was  an  article  which  Americans  never  im- 
ported into  Holland,  and  the  additional  duty  on  the  products 
of  the  whale  fishery  must  be  paid  not  only  by  foreign  ves- 
sels, but  by  Dutch  vessels  as  well,  when  these  could  not  be 
classed  as  fishing  vessels.  In  respect  to  import  duties,  there- 
fore, the  reciprocity  contemplated  by  the  American  law  "has 
already  been  in  operation  for  more  than  a  year  in  the  Neth- 
erlands." More  important  still,  in  the  colonies  also  the  King 
had  made  arrangements  decidedly  favorable  to  every  branch 
of  our  trade.  In  the  East  Indies  foreign  vessels  and  goods 
were  admitted  entirely  free,  and  vessels  returning  from  a 
colonial  port  to  a  port  of  the  Netherlands,  were  exempt  from 
paying  an  entry  duty,  just  as  national  vessels  were.  In 
Curasao,  St.  Eustatius,  St.  Martin,  and  on  the  coasts  of  New 
Guinea,  Americans  even  enjoyed  special  privileges  not 
granted  to  any  other  foreign  nation. 

In  regard  to  tonnage  duties,  he  admitted  that  by  a  law  of 
September,  1814,  an  inequality  existed  between  those  paid 
by  foreign  and  by  national  vessels.  But  this  law  was  limited 
in  its  operation  to  the  Belgian  provinces  and  in  reality  Ant- 
werp was  the  only  Belgian  port  at  which  Americans  traded. ^ 
And  the  additional  tonnage  duty  on  American  vessels  at 
Antwerp  would  be  removed  as  soon  as  the  United  States  saw 
fit  to  remove  the  discriminating  tonnage  duties  levied  on 
Dutch  vessels  in  American  ports. 

Ten  Gate  was  one  of  these  who  believed  that  the  good  in- 
tentions of  the  government  of  the  Netherlands,  as  evinced 
by  the  decree  of  May  27,  deserved  some  recognition  from 
the  United  States,  and  that  our  failure  to  reciprocate  in  any 
manner  gave  the  Dutch  a  real  cause  for  grievance.  In  a 
despatch  of  August  30,  1816,2)  he  expressed  his  doubts  as  to 
whether  the  American  government  was  sincere  in  its  pro- 
fessed desire  to  apply  the  principles  of  reciprocity.  In  com- 
menting on  the  long  delays  which  he  experienced  in  receiving 


x)  Our  consul  at  Ostend  reported  the  arrival  of  only  two  Amer- 
ican vessels-  in  1816  and  1817.  In  1818  our  consulate  at  that  port 
was  abandoned — Consular  Letters,  Rotterdam  I.,  E.  Wambersie  to 
Seer.  Adams,  May  5,  1818. 

2)  R.  A.,  B.  Z.,  Amer.  Legatie,  I.,  Despatch  No.  8. 


136  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

replies  to  his  various  notes,  he  voiced  the  belief  that  this 
slow  despatch  of  business  by  our  State  Department  was  in- 
tentional, and  that  the  sole  object  of  our  government  was  to 
continue  the  present  scale  of  duties  as  long  as  possible.  At 
length,  when  Monroe  made  no  reply  to  the  explanations  con- 
tained in  his  last  note,  he  advised  his  government  to  retaliate, 
by  raising  its  tonnage  and  import  duties  on  American  vessels. 
Reciprocity  of  this  kind,  he  thought,  would  do  more  good  in 
bringing  the  American  government  to  terms  than  all  the  con- 
cessions which  the  king  had  thus  far  made.1) 

But  the  Dutch  government  was  not  prepared  to  go  to  this 
extreme.  The  king  had  hoped  that  reciprocal  commercial 
relations  might  be  established  by  legislation,  without  the 
adoption  of  a  new  treaty,  but  this  hope  had  been  disappointed 
by  Monroe's  note  of  January,  1816.  He  had  then  expressed 
a  wish  to  see  the  treaty  of  1782  continued  in  force,2*  but  to 
this  Monroe  had  replied,  that  the  former  treaty  could  not  be 
revived  "without  being  again  ratified  and  exchanged  in  the 
form  that  is  usual  in  such  cases,  and  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  our  constitution.  Since  the  declaration  made  by 
M.  Changuion,  the  United  States  have  made  new  regulations 
of  their  commerce,  in  one  instance  by  treaty,  which  must 
necessarily  be  considered  whether  the  old  treaty  be  revived 
or  a  new  one  formed.  This  circumstance  shows  that  the 
business  cannot  be  arranged  with  advantage  without  entering 
into  a  new  negotiation,  either  in  this  city  or  at  The 
Hague."  3)  Rather  than  resort  to  retaliation,  the  king  now 
consented  to  open  negotiations  for  a  new  treaty,  and  pro- 
posed that  these  should  take  place  at  The  Hague.4)  This 
proposal  was  accepted  by  the  American  government  on  Feb- 
ruary 5,  1817.5> 

Meanwhile  the  Dutch  government  had  made  a  second 
concession  to  the  United  States,  by  declaring  that  after 


!)  R.  A.,  B.  Z.,  Am  Legatie,  Dossier  B  26,  No.  4990.  Ten  Gate 
to  Nagelt,  Oct.  12,  1816.  The  idea  of  retaliation  was  suggested  to 
Ten  Gate  by  the  Dutch  consul  at  New  York  in  February  (Ibid., 
Registre  3,  No.  4-A). 

2)  Notes  from  Legation   of  the  Netherlands,  I.    Ten   Gate  to 
Monroe,  April  4,  1816. 

3)  Notes  to  Leg.  of  Netherlands,  II.,  169-170.     Monroe  to  Ten 
Gate,  August  17,  1816. 

4)  R.  A.,  B.  Z.,  Am.  Legatie  Dossier  B  26,  No.  3887.     Decision 
of  king  dated  Oct.  8. 

5)  Notes  to  Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  II.,  202. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  137 

January  1,  1817,  American  vessels  should  be  exempt  from 
paying  the  extra  tonnage  duty  hitherto  demanded.  Eustis 
reported  that  this  was  done  in  anticipation  of  a  similar  ar- 
rangement on  our  part,  and  he  advised  our  government  to 
give  instructions  to  that  effect  to  the  collectors  of  customs.1* 
But  his  advice  was  not  heeded. 


The  treaty  commissioners  appointed  by  the  Netherlands 
were  J.  C.  Van  der  Kemp  and  T.  Goldberg,  the  director-gen- 
eral of  commerce  and  colonies.  The  American  commission- 
ers were  William  Eustis  and  Albert  Gallatin,  our  minister  at 
Paris.  On  September  22,  1817,  they  reported  to  the  American 
government  that  after  four  weeks  of  negotiation  they  were 
unable  to  agree  on  any  of  the  points  mentioned  in  their 
instructions. 

The  discussions  were  confined  to  the  three  propositions 
which  Eustis  and  Gallatin  submitted  at  the  second  sitting, 
on  August  30.2)  The  first  of  these  was  that  the  treaty  of 
1782  should  be  renewed  and  should  be  made  applicable  to 
Louisiana  and  Belgium,  which  had  been  acquired  by  the  re- 
spective countries  since  the  former  treaty  had  been  con- 
cluded. This  was  immediately  agreed  to,3)  for  the  Dutch 
commissioners  had  already  been  authorized,  by  the  king's 
instructions,  to  concede  this  point. 4) 

Their  second  proposition  related  to  discriminating  duties, 
and  in  accordance  with  their  instructions,5^  they  proposed  to 
establish  perfect  equality,  by  the  abolition  of  all  discrim- 
inating duties,  however  light.  The  Dutch  commissioners 
readily  agreed  that  discriminating  tonnage  duties  should  be 
abolished,  for  this  was  a  concession  which  the  Dutch  gov- 
ernment had  thus  far  sought  in  vain  to  secure.  They  also 
consented  to  the  abolition  of  discriminating  import  duties  on 


*)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.    Eustis  to  Monroe,  Feb.  21,  1817. 

2)  Most  of  the  material  on  the  treaty  negotiations,  consisting  of 
a  lengthy  report  by  Eustis  and  Gallatin,  September  22,  and  copies  of 
all  the  protocols  which  were  exchanged,  is  to  be  found  in  the  State 
Dept.  Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.  The  following  references  on  this 
subject  are  to  this  material,  unless  otherwise  indicated. 

8)   Protocol  of  August  20. 

4)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerik.  Legatie,  Dossier  B  26,  Nc.  46. 
August  18. 

5)  Instructions,  Europe,  VIII.,    139.    Richard   Rush   to   Eustis 
and  Gallatin,  April  22. 


138  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

goods  carried  directly  from  country  to  country.  But  they 
refused  to  extend  the  principle  of  reciprocity  to  the  indirect 
trade,  that  is,  to  goods  carried  into  either  country  from  or  to 
a  foreign  country.  This  branch  of  the  trade,  they  main- 
tained, should  receive  no  greater  privileges  than  those  which 
were  accorded  to  most  favored  nations.1)  The  motive  for 
their  refusal  is  made  clear  in  their  report  to  the  king,  where 
they  point  out  that  the  Dutch  were  already  greatly  handi- 
capped by  the  competition  of  Americans,  whose  mercantile 
marine  had  so  increased  of  late  that  they  were  in  a  position 
to  take  part  in  the  carrying  trade,  in  the  most  extensive 
meaning  of  that  word.2) 

The  second  proposition  was  closely  connected  with  the 
third,  which  dealt  with  the  colonial  trade.  For,  the  Ameri- 
can proposal  of  a  general  and  unqualified  repeal  of  discrim- 
inating duties,  "without  distinction  of  place  or  merchan- 
dise," was  intended  primarily  as  a  means  of  opening  up  the 
Dutch  colonies  to  American  vessels  on  more  favorable  terms. 
The  main  difficulty  arose  in  connection  with  this  third  pro- 
position. The  king  would  admit  American  vessels  to  the 
East  and  West  Indies  only  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored 
nations,,. but  in  return  for  this  he  demanded  some  additional 
concession  from  the  United  States.  And  since  the  United 
States  had  no  colonies  which  it  could  open  up  to  the  trade  of 
the  Netherlands,  he  expected  the  concession  to  be  made  in 
some  other  form.3)  Unofficially,  in  private  conversation,  the 
Dutch  plenipotentiaries  intimated  that  they  desired  a  reduc- 
tion of  our  high  tariff  on  gin,  cheese,  and  other  articles  of 
Dutch  growth  or  manufacture.  They  would  also  be  satisfied 
with  a  promise  on  our  part  to  grant  Dutch  subjects  a  share 
in  the  trade  of  such  colonies  as  we  might  acquire  in  the 
near  future. 4) 

The  American  commissioners  explained  that  they  were 
not  authorized  to  grant  any  other  equivalent,  as  the  price  of 
admission  into  Dutch  colonies,  "than  is  to  be  found  in  the 
general  advantage  derived  from  a  free  admission  of  the  ves- 
sels of  the  Netherlands  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States." 


*)  Protocol  of  September  3. 

2)  R.  A.  B.  Z.,  Amerik.  Legatie,  Dossier  B,  26.    October  27. 

3)  Third  sitting.     Protocol  of  September  3.    This  idea  was  laid 
down  in  the  king's  instructions  to  the  commissioners,  on  August  18 
(R.  A.,  B.  Z.,  Dossier  B,  26.) 

4)  Report  of  Eustis  and  Gallatin,  Sept.  22. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  139 

And  this  advantage  they  regarded  as  a  fair  equivalent  for  a 
participation  in  the  trade  of  any  European  power.  They 
argued  that  if  the  United  States  had  no  colonies,  it  was  be- 
cause we  regarded  no  part  of  our  territory  as  a  colonial  pos- 
session. Nevertheless  the  productions  of  Louisiana  belonged 
strictly  to  the  class  known  as  colonial  goods,  and  Louisiana 
had  been  a  colony  prior  to  its  acquisition  by  the  United 
States.  Since  then  it  had  been  opened  to  the  vessels  of  the 
Netherlands  on  the  same  footing  as  to  our  own.  Our  claim 
to  admission  into  the  colonies  of  other  nations  was  therefore 
founded  on  the  principles  of  reciprocity.1* 

The  reply  to  this  argument2 >  indicates  that  Holland  was 
at  this  time  still  a  firm  believer  in  the  Mercantile  system. 
That  Louisiana  might  be  classed  as  a  colonial  possession 
merely  because  it  produced  sugar  and  cotton  was  denied, 
for  on  this  ground  South  Carolina  and  other  states  of  the 
Union  should  also  be  considered  as  colonies.  The  determin- 
ing factor  was  the  political  relation  of  such  a  possession  to 
the  mother  country.  The  United  States  had  always  treated 
Louisiana  as  an  integral  part  of  its  territory,  but  among 
colonial  powers  it  was  generally  held  that  colonies  required 
a  different  form  of  government  from  the  mother  country. 
And  though  some  other  nation  might  wish  to  depart  from 
this  practice,  Holland  would  continue  to  treat  her  colonies  as 
dependent  possessions.  By  the  constitution  of  the  Nether- 
lands the  king  alone  was  empowered  to  determine  the 
colonial  regime.  Colonies,  it  was  stated,  were  a  means  of 
fostering  the  trade  and  navigation  of  a  nation,  and  to  accom- 
plish this  object  "they  should  be  accessible  only  to  national 
vessels;  consequently,  the  admission  of  any  foreign  vessels 
is  an  infraction  of  the  colonial  system."  The  United  States 
should  look  upon  the  trade  with  the  Dutch  colonies  "as  a 
favor  which  is  granted,  and  not  as  a  right  which  they  can 
claim/'  The  utmost  the  king  could  do  was  to  admit  Ameri- 
cans on  the  same  rights  as  were  granted  to  such  nations  as 
possessed  colonies,  but  this  concession  called  for  a  just 
equivalent. 

Seeing  that  the  Netherlands  was  unwilling  to  extend  the 
principle  of  reciprocity  to  its  colonies,  the  American  com- 
missioners now  withdrew  their  second  proposition,  and  re- 


!)  Fourth  sitting.     Protocol  of  September  8. 
2)  Fifth  sitting.     Protocol  of  September  12. 


140  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

submitted  it  in  a  modified  form.  They  now  proposed  that 
the  provision  abolishing  discriminating  duties  on  imports 
should  be  limited  to  goods  which  were  of  the  production  or 
manufacture  of  either  country.  This  restriction  of  the  orig- 
inal proposition  was  objected  to,  on  the  ground  that  the 
geographical  position  of  Holland  made  it  the  natural  outlet 
for  the  merchandise  of  Germany  and  Switzerland.  Such  a 
restriction  as  to  the  origin  of  merchandise  was  not  only 
unfair,  but  would  inevitably  lead  to  fraud.1  > 

The  first  proposition  was  therefore  the  only  one  on  which 
an  agreement  could  be  reached,  but  as  the  American  com- 
missioners had  received  no  specific  instructions  to  conclude 
a  new  treaty  which  merely  extended  the  old  one  to  Louisiana 
and  Belgium,  it  was  agreed,  on  September  20,  that  the  nego- 
tiations should  be  terminated,  and  that  the  subject  should  be 
referred  back  to  the  respective  governments  for  further 
consideration. 

In  their  report  to  the  American  government,  Eustis  and 
Gallatin  state  that  they  had  listened  to  frequent  complaints 
of  our  unfairness,  for  the  Netherlands  had  been  the  first  to 
make  various  concessions  without  obtaining  like  treatment. 
They  suggested  that  it  would  be  to  our  advantage  to  equalize 
the  tonnage  duties  on  the  vessels  of  both  countries. 2)  Eustis, 
in  a  separate  report,  expressed  the  belief  that  the  reluctance 
of  the  Dutch  to  admit  us  by  treaty  to  the  East  Indies,  was 
due  in  large  part  to  the  jealousy  of  the  merchants  of  Amster- 
dam, but  that  the  real  cause  for  the  failure  of  the  negotia- 
tions must  be  sought  in  our  high  tonnage  duties.3) 

The  report  which  the  Dutch  commissioners  submitted  to 
the  king  closed  with  the  advice  that  the  government  should 
lay  an  additional  tonnage  duty  on  American  vessels.  This 
course  of  action,  they  state,  was  "emphatically  desired  by  the 
commercial  element  of  the  entire  kingdom."  4>  The  govern- 
ment now  adopted  this  advice,  and  a  royal  decree  of  Novem- 
ber 24  declared  that  after  February  28,  1818,  the  tonnage 
and  port  duties  on  American  vessels  would  be  raised.5) 


!)  Protocols  and  Notes  of  September  12  and  18. 

2)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  V.,  Sept.  22,  1817. 

3)  Ibid.,  Eustis  to  Monroe,  Sept.  27. 

4)  R.  A.,  Buitenl  Zaken,  Am.  Leg.,  Dossier  B,  26.     Goldberg 
and  Van  der  Kemp  to  the  king,  October  27. 

5>   Ibid.,  No.  81. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  141 

On  February  13  Ten  Gate  sent  a  copy  of  this  decree  to 
Secretary  Adams,  and  on  March  19  President  Monroe  sub- 
mitted a  special  message  to  Congress  in  which  he  mentioned 
the  failure  of  the  treaty  negotiations  and  suggested  that  the 
difficulties  between  the  two  countries  might  be  settled 
amicably  by  legislation.  Since  these  difficulties,  said  Mon- 
roe, "appear  to  be  of  a  nature  which  may,  perhaps,  for  the 
present  be  more  easily  removed  by  reciprocal  legislative  regu- 
lations, formed  in  the  spirit  of  amity  and  conciliation,  than 
by  conventional  stipulations,  Congress  may  think  it  advisable 
to  leave  the  subsisting  treaty  in  its  present  state,  and  to  meet 
the  liberal  exemption  from  discriminating  tonnage  duties 
which  has  been  conceded  in  the  Netherlands  to  the  vessels  of 
the  United  States  by  a  similar  exemption  to  the  vessels  of 
the  Netherlands  which  have  arrived,  or  may  hereafter  arrive, 
in  our  ports,  commencing  from  the  time  when  the  exemption 
was  granted  to  the  vessels  of  the  United  States."  1J 

On  April  13  a  bill  embodying  this  suggestion  was  intro- 
duced in  the  Senate,  by  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  and  on  the  same  day  it  passed  its  second 
reading.2)  At  this  point  Ten  Cate  resorted  to  a  bit  of  lobby- 
ing which  greatly  changed  the  character  of  the  bill.  He  held 
several  interviews  with  Senator  Barbour,  who  had  introduced 
the  bill,  and  persuaded  him  to  introduce  a  provision  for  low- 
ering the  duty  on  imports  as  well  as  on  tonnage,  and  to  have 
the  bill  apply  to  the  Netherlands  alone,  instead  of  extending 
it  also  to  Russia,  Hamburg  and  Bremen  as  the  President 
had  suggested.  In  this  form  the  bill  passed  the  Senate  on 
the  15th.3> 

In  the  House,  so  Ten  Cate  reports4)  "a  pronounced  oppo- 
sition" arose,  not  only  against  the  Senate  amendments  but 
against  the  entire  bill.  The  two  leading  opponents  were 
Lowndes  and  Pitkin,  who  declared  that  Congress  had  no 
power  to  pass  a  special  law  of  this  kind  and  that  the  subject 
was  one  which  should  be  regulated  by  treaty.  A  motion  to 
table  the  bill  was  carried  by  a  great  majority.  This  was  on 
the  17th,  and  Congress  would  adjourn  on  the  20th.  There 


a)  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents.     (1911 
edition),  I.,  599. 

2)  Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Session,  Vol.  I.,  362. 

3)  Ibid.,  L,  369. 

*)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Am.  Legatie,  Dossier  B,  26,  Ten  Cate 
to  Nagell,  April  20. 


142  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

was  no  time  to  lose,  therefore,  if  the  bill  was  to  pass  at  that 
session.  Ten  Gate  now  consulted  with  Mr.  Smith,  one  of  the 
few  Representatives  favoring  the  bill,  and  together  they 
arranged  a  plan  of  action.  Ten  Gate  relates  how  he  spent  the 
night  in  drawing  up  an  expose  of  the  commercial  relations 
between  the  two  countries  and  how  early  on  the  following 
morning  he  managed  to  engage  the  opposing  members  in 
conversation  and  to  induce  them  to  read  his  expose.  After 
having  read  it  attentively,  they  both  appeared  much  better 
disposed  toward  the  law.  While  these  three  were  yet  en- 
gaged in  conversation,  Mr.  Smith  casually  joined  the  group 
and  proceeded  to  enlighten  Lowndes  and  Pitkin  on  the  need 
of  taking  action  before  adjournment.  Both  at  length  agreed 
to  withdraw  their  opposition,  and  an  hour  later,  when  Smith 
moved  to  re-consider  the  motion  of  the  previous  day,  the  bill 
was  immediately  passed  without  opposition.  It  was  signed 
by  Monroe  on  April  20. 

This  act  of  April  20,  1818,a)  made  two  concessions  to  the 
Netherlands,  which  put  an  end  to  further  complaints  of  our 
unfairness.  It  provided  for  the  abolition  of  all  discrimi- 
nating tonnage  duties  on  "vessels  truly  and  wholly  belonging 
to  subjects  of  the  king  of  the  Netherlands."  This  conces- 
sion was  general  and  unqualified.  The  only  test  our  customs 
officers  need  apply  was  that  of  ownership.  If  a  vessel  flew 
the  Dutch  flag  and  was  owned  in  Holland,  it  was  to  pay  no 
higher  tonnage  duty  upon  entering  any  of  our  ports  than  an 
American  vessel,  irrespective  of  whether  it  had  sailed  from 
the  Netherlands,  from  a  Dutch  colony  or  from  some  other 
part  of  the  world. 

The  second  provision  of  the  act  abolished  discriminating 
import  duties  on  certain  kinds  of  merchandise,  when  im- 
ported in  Dutch  vessels.  This  concession  was  more  limited, 
for  here  the  origin  of  the  goods  was  the  determining  factor. 
The  only  merchandise  on  which  the  duty  was  reduced  was 
that  which  consisted  of  the  produce  or  manufactures  of  the 
King's  territories  in  Europe ;  or  such  produce  and  manufac- 
tures "as  can  only  be,  or  most  usually  are,  first  shipped" 
from  a  port  of  the  Netherlands.  These  were  to  pay  the  same 
duties  when  imported  in  Dutch  vessels  as  when  imported  in 
American  vessels.  All  other  goods,  including  the  produc- 


U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  464. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  143 

tions  of  the  Dutch  colonies,  were  to  pay  the  additional  duties 
which  our  tariff  laws  required. 

This  arrangement,  even  though  it  did  not  apply  to  the 
Dutch  colonies,  removed  all  the  objections  of  the  Nether- 
lands against  our  commercial  policy.  It  was  all  the  more 
satisfactory  because  of  the  provision  that  the  repeal  of  both 
classes  of  duties  was  to  take  effect  from  the  time  the  Neth- 
erlands had  abolished  its  additional  duties  on  American  ves- 
sels and  goods.  This  feature  of  the  act  entitled  the  Dutch  to 
a  restitution  of  the  excess  duties  they  had  paid  during  the 
preceding  sixteen  months.  On  June  19,  King  William  in 
turn  ordered  a  repayment  of  the  additional  duties  levied  on 
American  vessels  and  goods  since  February  28,  1818. a* 

This  act  successfully  disposed  of  only  one  of  the  points 
which  had  been  discussed  by  the  treaty  commissioners.  The 
other  two  questions — the  trade  with  the  Dutch  colonies,  and 
the  existence  of  the  treaty  of  1782 — still  remained  undecided. 

On  the  subject  of  the  colonial  policy  of  the  Netherlands, 
Secretary  Adams  unburdened  himself  of  the  following  re- 
marks, in  his  instructions  to  Everett  in  August,  1818.2)  "The 
admission  of  our  vessels  into  the  Dutch  colonies  may  re- 
main upon  its  present  footing  as  long  as  the  government  of 
the  Netherlands  find  their  interest  in  giving  it  no  further  ex- 
tension. They  are  now,  in  fact  admitted  upon  the  footing  of 
the  most  favored  nation ;  but  the  Dutch  government  declined 
stipulating  for  the  continuance  of  this  advantage,  without 
the  promise  of  an  equivalent  on  our  part;  adhering  to  the 
decayed  and  rotten  principles  of  the  exclusive  European 
colonial  system,  as  if  they  had  forgotten,  or  wilfully  over- 
looked, the  40  last  years  of  the  history  of  the  world."  "The 
whole  of  this  colonial  system  ....  is  an  outrage  upon  the 
first  principles  of  civilized  society."  "All  the  remnants  of  the 
absurd  and  iniquitous  system"  must  soon  be  demolished,  he 
thought,  by  the  Revolutions  in  North  and  South  America 
and  in  Portugal,  "together  with  the  progress  of  the  human 
mind  towards  emancipation."  "The  United  States  may, 
without  material  inconvenience,  wait  for  the  consummation 
of  this  event,  and  leave  the  government  of  the  Netherlands  to 
the  necessity  of  accommodating  themselves  to  it." 


!)  R.  A.,  Buitenl  Zaken,  Am,  Leg.,  Dossier  B,  26,  No.  201. 
2)  Instructions,  Europe,  VIII.,  237  and  ff.     August  10. 


144  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

The  principle  established  by  European  colonial  powers, 
"of  granting  access  to  the  colonies  of  each  other  as  a  mutual 
barter  or  monopoly,  is  nothing  less  than  a  conspiracy  against 
the  United  States,  the  only  nation  whom  it  materially  in- 
jures, and  the  only  nation  extensively  commercial  and  mari- 
time which  possesses  no  colonies."  He  believed  our  gov- 
ernment could  not  "too  cautiously  avoid  acquiescing"  in  this 
principle.  Since  the  prospect  of  an  agreement  on  this  sub- 
ject was  unfavorable,  "it  is  hoped  no  further  wish  will  be 
intimated  to  you  for  a  renewal  of  the  negotiation :  in  which 
case  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  you  to  introduce  the  subject, 
or  to  present  the  ideas  here  unfolded."  The  question  of  colo- 
nial trade  did  not  again  become  a  subject  of  discussion  be- 
tween the  two  governments  until  several  years  later. 

On  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  treaty  of  1782 
should  still  be  considered  as  binding,  the  attitude  of  both 
governments  had  thus  far  been  inconsistent.  The  Dutch 
government,  influenced,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  advice  of 
the  British  cabinet,  had  first  taken  the  stand  that  the  treaty 
was  no  longer  applicable,  but  in  1816,  when  the  Netherlands 
was  less  in  need  of  England's  friendship,  the  king  had  de- 
clared his  intention  of  continuing  to  adhere  to  the  treaty. 
And  Monroe,  as  Secretary  of  State,  had  officially  declared 
that  the  old  treaty  could  not  be  revived  without  being  rati- 
fied and  exchanged  in  the  usual  form,  but,  as  President,  he 
had  suggested  to  Congress  the  advisability  of  leaving  "the 
subsisting  treaty  in  its  present  state,"  thereby  declaring  his 
belief  that  the  treaty  was  still  binding. 

Secretary  Adams  informed  Everett  that  the  President 
was  averse  to  opening  new  negotiations  on  this  subject,  be- 
cause "experience  has  shown  that  their  result  is  not  only  to 
prevent  the  mutual  agreement  of  the  parties,  but  to  alienate 
them  from  each  other,  and  to  raise  asperities  between  them 
which  would  not  otherwise  exist."  Should  Nagell  intimate  a 
wish  to  renew  the  negotiations,  Everett  was  to  mention  "the 
natural  tendency  of  discussion,  unless  it  terminates  in  agree- 
ment, to  generate  mutual  coolness  and  opposition,"  and,  not 
as  a  complaint,  but  as  a  fact,  he  was  to  point  out  that  this 
was  exemplified  by  the  late  conferences. x)  And  in  referring 
to  the  spoliation  claims,  in  this  same  set  of  instructions, 


Ibid.,  August  10,  1818. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  145 

Adams  explicitly  states  that  the  two  countries  still  consider 
themselves  bound  by  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1782. 

The  treaty  was  never  formally  abrogated  and  never 
formally  renewed,  but  both  governments  silently  agreed  to 
consider  it  still  in  force. 


146  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  DISPUTE  REGARDING  DISCRIMINATING  DUTIES. 


At  the  beginning  of  1819  the  only  point  in  dispute  be- 
tween the. two  countries  was  that  of  spoliation  claims.  These 
were  abandoned  early  in  1820,  and  during  the  next  two  and 
a  half  years  no  new  question  arose.  But  a  tariff  law  en- 
acted by  the  Dutch  government  on  August  26,  1822,  gave 
rise  to  a  new  discussion  regarding  discriminating  duties, 
which  lasted  during  the  remainder  of  Monroe's  administra- 
tion and  was  continued  under  Presidents  Adams  and  Jack- 
son. In  this  dispute  the  United  States  appeared  as  the  com- 
plaining party.  Our  relations  with  the  Netherlands  from 
1822  to  1839  were  largely  determined  by  this  single  question. 

The  10th  article  of  this  tariff  law1*  provided  for  a  resti- 
tution or  drawback  of  10%  of  the  duties  on  goods  imported 
or  exported  in  Dutch  vessels.  Everett,  without  waiting  for 
instructions, 'pointed  out  that  a  drawback,  granted  to  Dutch 
vessels  alone,  was  equivalent  to  a  discriminating  duty  on 
American  vessels.  He  believed  that  "the  immediate  and  nec- 
essary consequence"  of  this  policy  would  be  a  repeal  of  our 
law  of  1818,  which  had  been  passed  on  the  understanding 
that  there  were  no  discriminating  duties  in  force  in  the 
Netherlands.2) 

Nagell  replied  that  the  duties  remained  the  same  for 
foreign  and  for  national  ships,  and  that  the  10%  drawback 
was  merely  equivalent  to  a  premium  granted  to  every  vessel 
built  in  the  Netherlands.  If  the  American  government  had 
seen  fit  to  grant  a  similar  premium  to  American  vessels, 
the  king  said,  he  would  have  made  no  objection.3)  But  he 
apparently  placed  little  reliance  on  this  explanation,  for  he 
sought  further  to  justify  the  policy  of  his  government  by 


1)  Staatsblad  van  het  Koninkrijk  der  Nederlanden,  No.  9. 

2)  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V.,  591,  Everett  to 
Nagell,  March  7,  1823. 

3)  Amer.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V.,  592.    May  27,  1823. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  147 

pointing  to  an  act  passed  by  Congress  on  March  3,  1819,1) 
which  stipulated  that  our  reciprocity  acts  should  expire  on 
January  1,  1824.  This  applied  to  our  first  reciprocity  act 
of  March,  1815,  which  was  general  in  its  nature;  to  the  act 
of  April,  1818,  which  referred  to  the  Netherlands  alone; 
and  to  the  one  of  March  3,  1819,  which  extended  reciprocity 
to  Prussia,  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  Nagell  professed  to  see 
in  this  act  a  proof  that  the  United  States  intended  soon  to 
deprive  Dutch  vessels  of  the  privileges  assured  them  by  the 
act  of  1818,  and  stated  that  this  "alone  serves  as  a  sufficient 
cause  for  preventing  the  government  of  the  Netherlands 
from  establishing  any  exception  in  the  new  tariff  in  favor 
of  the  American  flag."  2) 

This  argument  was  a  mere  sham,  but  Everett  patiently 
explained3 >  that  the  sole  object  of  the  act  of  1819  was  "to 
fix  a  time  when  the  subject  should  be  taken  up  again  in  Con- 
gress," and  that  a  limitation  of  this  sort  was  a  common  legis- 
lative practice  among  us.  The  limitation  of  our  reciprocity 
acts  to  the  1st  of  January,  1824,  therefore,  furnished  "no 
proof  of  an  intention  to  change  the  system" ;  on  the  contrary, 
there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  "that  the  result  of  a  reconsid- 
eration of  the  subject  will  be  to  reenact  the  law,  with  such 
alterations  as  may  appear  expedient.  Among  these  altera- 
tions will  probably  be  the  repeal  of  the  privileges  granted  by 
the  act  to  any  powers  which  may  have  subsequently  with- 
drawn the  corresponding  privileges  formerly  allowed  by 
them  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

Moreover,  the  argument  that  a  government  may  grant  a 
drawback  to  its  own  citizens,  without  subjecting  itself  to  the 
charge  of  impartiality  was  false,  for,  "if  the  foreigner 
actually  pays  in  any  way  10%  more  than  the  citizen,  it  would 
be  rather  difficult  to  prove  that  they  are  placed  on  the  same 
footing,  or,  in  other  words,  that  they  pay  the  same."  A  pre- 
mium might  be  a  justifiable  means  of  encouraging  national 
shipbuilding,  but  this  was  no  proof  "that  a  discrimination  in 
favor  of  citizens  is  consistent  with  perfect  impartiality  be- 
tween citizens  and  foreigners.  The  American  government 
had  in  view  the  same  object,  viz. :  encouragement  of  the  navi- 
gation of  their  country,  in  establishing  a  discriminating  ton- 

*)   U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  510. 

2)  Amer.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V.,  592. 

3)  Ibid.,  V.,  593.     May  31,  1823. 


148  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

nage  duty  in  favor  of  our  vessels;  but  they  certainly  never 
thought  of  maintaining  that  foreigners,  against  whom  this 
discrimination  operates,  are  as  favorably  treated  in  our  ports 
as  the  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

In  conclusion  Everett  stated  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  were  "too  well  satisfied  with  the  goodly  heritage  which 
the  bounty  of  Providence  has  allotted  to  them,  and  too  abun- 
dantly supplied  from  their  own  territories  with  the  best  pro- 
ducts of  almost  all  climates,  to  solicit  very  anxiously  of  any 
foreign  power  the  concession  of  favors,  commercial  or  polit- 
ical." If  the  king  did  not  deem  it  expedient  to  accept  our 
offer  of  reciprocity,  the  American  government,  "without 
complaining  of  his  refusal,  and  without  suffering  much  from 
it,  will  doubtless  regret  that  the  views  of  so  enlightened  a 
monarch  upon  a  great  question  in  political  economy  should 
be  different  from  their  own." 

Secretary  Adams  entirely  approved  of  these  views,  and 
instructed  Everett1)  to  make  it  clear  that  a  drawback  was  "as 
much  within  the  principle  of  discriminating  duties  as  a  direct 
tonnage  duty."  "The  object  of  all  discriminating  duties," 
he  said,  "is  to  favor  the  national  shipping  and  ship-build- 
ing interest ;  and  whether  in  the  shape  of  additional  import, 
of  tonnage,  of  drawback,  or  of  bounty,  they  are  alike  felt  in 
the  competition  of  navigation,  and  alike  incompatible  with 
the  principle  of  equal  privilege  and  burden."  He  also  be- 
lieved Congress  would  continue  the  system  of  reciprocity, 
unless  the  Netherlands  should  persist  in  its  recent  policy. 
He  therefore  requested  Everett  to  obtain  from  the  Dutch 
government  a  declaration  that  their  tariff  act  would  not  be 
applied  against  American  vessels,  so  long  as  their  vessels  en- 
joyed equal  privileges  with  ours  in  American  ports,  and  to 
forward  this  declaration  before  Congress  should  re-convene. 

But  when  Congress  met  no  such  declaration  had  yet  been 
received.  The  result  of  their  deliberations  was  the  passage 
of  the  act  of  January  7,  1824,2>  which  renewed  the  former 

*)  Instructions,  Europe,  X.,  95.    August  9,  1823. 

2>  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  IV.,  2.  The  bill  was  passed  unani- 
mously. It  was  sponsored  in  the  Senate  by  Samuel  Smith  of  Mary- 
land, who  said  "he  had  been  informed  by  their  charg<§  [i.e.  of  the 
Netherlands]  that  the  revival  of  this  act  on  our  part  would  produce 
the  repeal  of  their  late  law."  Senators  Lloyd  and  Hayne  also  made 
a  few  remarks.  Annals  of  Congress,  18th  Cong.,  1st  Session,  Vol.  I., 
53-60. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  149 

acts  applying  to  the  Netherlands,  Prussia,  Hamburg  and 
Bremen,  and  which  for  the  first  time  extended  reciprocity  to 
Liibeck,  Oldenburg,  Norway,  Sardinia,  and  Russia,  on  con- 
dition that  in  the  ports  of  these  countries  our  vessels  "be 
exempt  from  all  and  every  discriminating  duty  of  import  or 
tonnage,  direct  or  indirect,  whatsoever."  A  provision  was 
also  inserted  for  suspending  the  act  against  any  country 
which  did  not  fully  reciprocate.  This  last  provision  was 
applicable  to  the  Netherlands,  so  long  as  it  did  not  either 
withhold  the  drawback  from  its  own  vessels  or  extend  this 
privilege  to  ours. 

Late  in  February  the  Dutch  Secretary  of  foreign  affairs 
received  a  copy  of  this  act,  but  before  he  could  frame  a  reply, 
Everett  had  returned  home.  His  successor,  Christopher 
Hughes,  did  not  assume  his  duties  until  the  middle  of  1826. 
Further  discussion  was  delayed  also  by  the  change  of  admin- 
istrations in  the  United  States,  and  by  the  resignation  of 
Nagell.  Baron  Verstolk  de  Soelen  was  now  placed  in  charge 
of  the  Foreign  Office. 

In  December,  1825,  the  question  was  re-opened  at  Wash- 
ington by  Henry  Clay,  the  new  Secretary  of  State.  Clay  re- 
ferred to  the  arguments  advanced  by  Everett,  and  repeated 
that  if  "vessels  of  the  United  States  pay,  in  export  or  import 
duties,  ten  per  cent,  more  than  Dutch  vessels,  or  Dutch  ves- 
sels pay  10  per  cent,  less  than  those  of  the  United  States, 
there  does  not  exist  an  equality  between  them.  This  propo- 
sition is  too  clear  to  be  considered  as  open  to  argument.  If  the 
Government  of  the  Netherlands  thinks  proper  to  originate 
such  a  difference,  or  having  created  it  thinks  proper  to  con- 
tinue it,  we  shall  not  controvert  its  right  to  do  so.  But  we  are 
entitled  to  know  its  dispositions  in  this  respect."  He,  there- 
fore, requested  to  know  whether  the  law  in  question  had  been 
modified  or  repealed.1*  The  Dutch  minister,  the  Chevalier 
Huygens,  replied  that  he  had  received  no  instructions  on  this 
matter,  and  was  unable  to  give  a  definite  answer.2)  Clay 
expressed  his  surprise  that  no  instructions  should  have  been 
given  on  a  matter  which  had  been  pending  for  two  years,  but 
stated  that  the  President  would  refrain  from  exercising  the 
power  granted  him  under  the  last  act  of  Congress,  until  Huy- 
gens could  get  in  touch  with  his  government. 3> 

a)  Amer.  State  Papers,  VI.,  374-375.    December  10,  1825. 
2>  Ibid.,  VI.,  375.    Dec.  12. 
3>   Ibid.,  375-376.     Dec.  24. 


150  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

On  September  15,  1826,  Huygens  transmitted  to  Clay  the 
substance  of  the  instructions  which  were  forwarded  to  him 
on  June  2.1*  The  Dutch  had  confidently  expected,  so  Huy- 
gens explained  in  this  note,2)  that  their  trade  with  the  United 
States  would  be  greatly  benefited  by  our  law  of  1818,  but 
experience  had  shown  the  contrary.  During  the  six  years 
following  its  adoption,  "not  a  single  vessel  under  the  national 
flag"  had  sailed  from  Rotterdam,  and  the  number  which  had 
come  to  American  ports  from  Amsterdam  and  Antwerp  was 
so  small  as  to  be  scarcely  worth  mentioning.  On  the  other 
hand,  Dutch  ports  had  been  visited  by  a  large  number  of 
American  ships.  The  Dutch  government  maintained  that  our 
second  law,  that  of  1824,  was  even  less  liberal  than  the  first, 
and  had  afforded  no  relief  to  Dutch  shipping,  but  that  Ameri- 
cans alone  had  profited  by  it.  To  support  this  statement,  he 
submitted  a  'few  trade  statistics  for  the  period  between  Janu- 
ary 1,  1823,  and  June  30,  1825.  During  these  two  and  a  half 
years  only  24  vessels  flying  the  Dutch  flag  had  visited  Ameri- 
can ports,  while  the  number  of  American  vessels  which  had 
cleared  from  Dutch  ports  for  the  United  States  was  228. 
During  the  same  period  only  12  Dutch  vessels  had  sailed  for 
Holland  from  an  American  port,  as  compared  with  287 
American  vessels. 

The  reason  why  so  few  Dutch  vessels  came  to  the  United 
States  must  be  sought,  said  Huygens,  in  our  high  tariff. 
"And  how,"  he  asks,  "could  the  ships  of  the  Netherlands 
transport  their  merchandise  to  the  United  States,  when  they 
find  there  the  principal  productions  of  the  kingdom,  as,  for 
example,  Geneva  [gin],  sail-cloth,  cheese,  and  many  other 
articles,  charged  so  high  as  to  pay,  calculated  from  the  orig- 
inal prices,  from  50  to  100  per  cent,  of  the  value?"  The 
Dutch  tariff,  on  the  contrary,  was  extremely  low,  so  that 
Americans  could  sell  their  merchandise  at  a  profit,  even 
though  some  articles  were  subject  to  a  higher  duty  when  im- 
ported in  foreign  vessels,  and  even  though  Americans  did  not 
receive  a  drawback. 

With  this  explanation  Clay  could  not  agree.  That  a  much 
larger  number  of  American  than  Dutch  vessels  participated 
in  the  direct  trade  between  the  two  countries  could  not  be  de- 
nied, but  the  cause  for  this  phenomenon  should  be  sought, 

*)   R.  A.,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken,  Am.  Legatie,  Registre  9-G. 
2)  Am.  State  Papers,  VI.,  376-378. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  151 

said  Clay,1*  in  the  fact  that  the  mercantile  marine  of  the 
Netherlands  had  almost  been  wiped  out  during  the  Napo- 
leonic wars.  The  ten  years  which  had  since  elapsed,  "were 
not  sufficient  to  restore  it  to  its  ancient  flourishing  condition. 
The  first  object  of  the  government,  and  of  the  enterprise  of 
the  Dutch  merchants,  was  probably  to  revive  the  intercourse 
with  their  distant  colonies,  and  in  that  their  marine  was  prin- 
cipally employed."  The  cause  should,  therefore,  not  be 
sought  in  our  high  tariff,  for,  under  the  law  of  1824,  Dutch 
merchandise  was  subject  to  no  higher  duty  when  imported 
in  Dutch  vessels  than  when  imported  in  American  vessels. 
It  was  the  policy  of  the  American  government  to  enforce  the 
same  rate  of  duties  against  all  nations,  and  from  this  well- 
established  policy  we  were  not  prepared  to  depart.  It  was 
unfortunate  that  gin,  sail-cloth  and  cheese  happened  to  be 
articles  similar  to  those  which  our  own  country  produced; 
our  tariff,  however,  "was  not  arranged  with  any  reference 
to  its  particular  operations  on  Dutch  produce,  but  with  the 
general  purpose  of  protecting  American  industry."  On  the 
other  hand,  such  articles  as  cotton,  sugar,  and  tobacco,  "not 
being  products  of  the  Netherlands,  may  be  admitted  at  a  low 
rate  of  duty,  not  only  without  injury,  but  as  respects  the 
first  especially,  with  great  encouragement  to  the  industry  of 
the  Netherlands." 

Then  coming  back  to  the  original  point  in  dispute,  Clay 
continued,  "There  is  a  manifest  distinction,  however,  be- 
tween the  standard  of  duties  which  is  applied  to  the  articles 
of  a  commerce  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  principle 
of  equality  in  the  transportation  of  those  articles  by  the  ves- 
sels of  the  same  countries.  Leaving  each  free  to  impose  such 
duties  as  the  state  of  its  revenue,  of  its  institutions  and  of  its 
domestic  industry  may  seem  to  require,  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  the  operation  of  a  rule  of  fair  competition  between 
the  vessels  of  the  two  countries,  by  each  being  allowed  to 
export  or  import  at  the  same  rates  of  duty  for  vessel  and 
cargo." 

Clay  was  no  doubt  correct  in  pointing  to  the  weakness  of 
the  Dutch  mercantile  marine  as  the  principal  cause  why  the 
Dutch  were  not  in  a  position  to  compete  with  Americans  in 
the  direct  trade.  But  this  weakness  of  the  nation's  mer- 

!)   Ibid.,  VI.,  378-379.     October  25,  1826. 


152  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

cantile  marine  was  a  source  of  strength  to  the  Dutch  gov- 
ernment in  the  controversy  regarding  discriminating  duties ; 
for  it  induced  the  American  government  to  act  with  modera- 
tion and  to  refrain  from  retaliatory  measures.  President 
Adams,  in  referring  to  the  matter  in  his  second  annual  mes- 
sage, in  December,  1826,1)  stated  that  although  retaliation  on 
our  part  might  be  "just  and  necessary,"  he  thought  it  "more 
consistent  with  the  spirit  of  our  institutions  to  refer  the  sub- 
ject again  to  the  paramount  authority  of  Congress,  to  decide 
what  measure  the  emergency  may  require,"  than  abruptly 
to  carry  into  effect  the  3rd  section  of  the  act  of  1824,  which 
authorized  him  to  suspend  the  privileges  granted  under  the 
act  against  any  country  which  did  not  fully  reciprocate. 

Meanwhile  Hughes  had  arrived  at  his  post  and  the  result 
of  his  first  interview  with  Verstolk  was  such  as  to  convince 
him  that  the  Dutch  government  had  no  intention  "of  making 
any  change  whatever  in  the  10%  allowance  to  their  own 
traders;  or  in  their  system  as  it  now  exists."  "It  now  re- 
mains for  us  to  decide,"  he  says,  "what  we  are  to  gain  or  lose 
by  passing  acts  at  home  altering  the  actual  footing  of  the 
trade  with  this  country."  2>  A  little  later3 >  he  states  emphat- 
ically that  "any  legislation  on  our  part  will  not  be  met  by  an 
abrogation  of  the  10%  bounty  ....  but  will  be  met  by 
some  countervailing  measure  on 'the  part  of  this  country." 
Verstolk,  he  reports,  "was  astonished  that  so  unimportant  a 
matter  should  be  so  strongly  dwelt  on,"  and  he  quotes  him  as 
saying,  "If  you  do  anything  to  change  the  footing  of  the 
trade,  what  will  be  the  consequence  ?  Why,  instead  of  10  or 
12  of  our  ships  going  to  your  ports,  there  may  go  only  5  or  6, 
so  the  influence  of  such  a  change  may  affect  5  or  6  vessels 
and  no  more!  Moreover,  this  domestic  rule  of  ours  is  not 
meant  for  the  United  States,  our  direct  trade  with  you  is  so 
trifling  that  it  would  not  be  worth  while  to  persist  in  it ;  but 
consistency  requires  of  us  not  to  alter  it  as  respects  you :  it 
is  essential  to  our  navigation,  in  our  intercourse  with  other 
nations,  especially  England ;  and  a  change  towards  you  might, 
and  would,  produce  the  most  serious  inconvenience  in  our 
relations  and  obligations  towards  other  powers." 


*)  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II. ,  918. 

2)  Despatches,    Netherlands,    VIII.      Hughes    to    Clay,    Janu- 
ary 21,  1837  (private). 

3)  Ibid,  VIII.    April  15,  1827. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  153 

Hughes  reports  further  that  the  Dutch  merchants  with 
whom  he  had  spoken  "will  not  patiently  talk  of  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  10%.  Some  of  them  have  said,  'Why,  the  duties 
upon  your  produce  are  merely  nominal  ....  and  look  at 
our  ports,  look,  for  example,  at  Antwerp.  There  are  forests 
of  American  masts.  We  are  almost  driven  off  the  seas  by 
you'."  Hughes  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  delicacy  of 
this  "ticklish  question/'  all  the  more  so,  because  of  "the  uni- 
versal eagerness  and  malicious  watchfulness  with  which  the 
European  commercial  world  has  seemed  to  anticipate  .... 
some  break  up,  some  commercial  quarrel,  some  misunder- 
standing between  the  two  nations  !"  This  feeling  had  shown 
itself  in  numerous  ways;  there  was  a  general  expectation 
"that  some  serious  rupture  was  about  to  trammel  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Netherlands." 

All  his  despatches  are  similar  in  tone.  The  Dutch  gov- 
ernment maintained  that  it  could  not  and  would  not  change 
its  system,  to  suit  the  wishes  of  the  United  States,  and  defied 
the  United  States  to  retaliate.  "Any  alteration  made  by 
you,"  said  Verstolk  on  one  occasion,1)  "will  act  upon  only 
12  or  14  of  our  ships,  whereas  retaliation  by  us  would  act 
upon  200  to  300  of  yours."  The  Dutch  government  was  de- 
lighted to  see  our  numerous  ships,  and  hoped  the  number 
would  go  on  increasing,  "but  the  very  actual  numbers  proves 
they  are  pretty  well  satisfied  with  our  treatment  of  them ;  we 
know  very  well  what  trade  means ;  if  they  were  not  satisfied, 
they  would  not  come,  for  they  certainly  don't  come  here  for 
our  amusement  and  advantage."  On  another  occasion  he 
declared  that  they  would  rather  have  none  of  their  ships  go 
to  the  United  States,  than  to  deprive  them  of  the  10%  draw- 
back and  thus  to  change  their  entire  system.2) 

The  representations  of  Hughes  merely  served  to  embitter 
the  Dutch  government,  and  in  September,  1827,  Verstolk  ad- 
vised the  king,  in  a  secret  communication,  to  break  off  the 
discussion  unless  the  American  government  should  desist 
from  its  extreme  demand.3 >  The  Dutch  minister  at  Wash- 
ington was  instructed  to  refrain  from  alluding  to  the  matter, 
and  if  the  American  government  should  again  bring  it  up, 
he  was  to  defer  a  definite  reply,  in  the  hope  that  the  whole 


!)  Ibid.,  VIII.    Hughes  to  Clay,  June  12,  1827  (private). 

2)  Ibid.,  VIII.    Hughes  to  Clay,  October  15,  1827. 

3)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amer.  Legatie,  Registre  9-1.     Sept.  28. 


154  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

question  might  be  settled  at  some  future  date  by  means  of  a 
commercial  treaty.1*  And  Hughes,  realizing  that  nothing 
was  to  be  gained  by  further  discussion,  declared  that  we  must 
now  decide  "whether  we  will  be  satisfied  with  our  present 
undeniable  advantages,"  or  run  the  risk  of  losing  them  "by 
an  effort  to  make  them  better."  2) 


The  Dutch  government  had  never  maintained  that  our 
demand  was  wholly  unjustifiable  and  that  we  were  not  in 
strict  justice  entitled  to  what  we  asked  for.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  was  admitted  that  "in  the  abstract  and  on  paper" 
we  might  have  some  ground  for  remonstrance,3 *  and  from 
this  admission  it  follows  that  the  Dutch  government  knew 
itself  to  be,  at  least  theoretically,  in  the  wrong.  All  that  the 
American  government  conceded,  therefore,  when  it  tempor- 
arily abandoned  the  discussion  at  the  close  of  1827,  without 
having  gained  its  point,  was  that  the  matter  was  not  of  suf- 
ficient practical  importance  to  us  to  deserve  being  pressed 
unduly.  For,  though  the  profits  of  the  American  trader 
would  have  been  increased  considerably,  had  the  10%  draw- 
back been  granted  to  Americans  as  well  as  to  the  Dutch,  it 
could  not  be  denied  that  the  policy  of  the  Dutch  government 
had  resulted  in  no  direct  loss,  and  that  it  had  not  materially 
decreased  the  number  of  American  vessels  trading  at  Dutch 
ports. 

But  if  the  number  of  American  vessels  entering  Dutch 
ports  showed  no  decrease,  and  even  exceeded  the  number  of 
Dutch  vessels  annually  engaged  in  the  direct  trade  between 
the  two  countries  in  the  proportion  of  100  to  10,  this  was  not 
because  of  the  tariff  law  of  1822,  but  in  spite  of  it  and  con- 
trary to  its  real  intention.  For,  the  avowed  object  of  the 
10th  article  of  this  law  was  to  encourage  national  ship-build- 
ing, and  thus  to  encourage  the  importation  of  foreign  goods 
in  Dutch  vessels,  instead  of  in  foreign  vessels.  The  Dutch 
mercantile  marine  was  still  comparatively  small,  so  that  a 
government  premium  or  bounty  was  deemed  necessary  to 

*)    Ibid.,  Registre  9-1.     Verstolk  to  Huygens,  October  31,  1827. 

2)  Despatches,   Netherlands,  VIII.     Hughes   to   Clay,    Novem- 
ber 28,  1827. 

3)  Ibid.,  VIIL,  Hughes  to  Clay,  October  15,  1827. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  155 

stimulate  its  growth.  The  reason  why  only  10  or  12  Dutch 
vessels  per  year  could  be  "coaxed"  into  the  American  trade, 
as  Verstolk  expressed  it,  was  because  no  greater  number  was 
available.  It  was  because  they  lacked  vessels  of  their  own 
and  because  Americans  had  vessels  to  spare,  that  the  Dutch 
were  compelled  to  import  American  goods  in  American  ves- 
sels, and  for  this  same  reason  they  also  made  use  of  Ameri- 
can vessels  to  carry  their  own  merchandise  to  the  United 
States. 

But  instead  of  frankly  and  openly  acknowledging  this 
fact,  the  Dutch  government  actually  assumed  the  role  of  the 
aggrieved  party,  when  it  pointed  to  our  high  tariff  as  the 
reason  why  so  few  Dutch  vessels  traded  at  our  ports.  This 
explanation — or  rather  accusation — might  have  had  some 
weight,  if  Dutch  goods  had  been  subject  to  a  higher  tariff 
when  imported  in  Dutch  vessels  than  when  imported  in 
American  vessels.  But,  as  the  Dutch  government  well  knew, 
the  act  of  1824  had  established  perfect  equality  in  this  re- 
spect. If  it  were  at  all  true,  therefore,that  Dutch  vessels  were 
frightened  off  by  reason  of  our  high  tariff,  we  should  at 
least  expect  to  find  the  same  cause  operating  with  like  effect 
upon  American  vessels.  For,  why  should  Dutch  shippers 
have  given  any  preference  to  American  vessels,  when  it  cost 
them  no  more  to  import  their  goods  in  Dutch  vessels  ?  Yet 
it  was  an  actual  fact  that  nine  out  of  every  ten  vessels  carry- 
ing Dutch  goods  to  the  United  States  were  American. 
Clearly  enough,  the  small  percentage  of  Dutch  vessels  em- 
ployed for  this  purpose  was  due  to  some  other  factor  than 
our  tariff. 

It  should  be  noted  also  that  the  tariff  question  and  the 
question  of  discriminating  duties  were  not  one  and  the  same. 
Strictly  speaking,  each  was  a  separate  issue,  but  the  Dutch 
government  apparently  confused  the  two. 

Although  there  was  no  connection  between  our  tariff 
policy  and  the  small  number  of  Dutch  ships  arriving  at  our 
ports,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  profits  of  Dutch  merchants 
and  manufacturers  were  greatly  lessened  by  reason  of  the 
high  duties  imposed  upon  certain  kinds  of  merchandise  com- 
ing from  the  Netherlands.  Ever  since  1816  complaints  had 
been  heard  against  our  policy  of  high  protection,  and  these 
complaints  multiplied  after  the  passage  of  the  tariff  act  of 


156  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

May  19,  1828.1*  This  act  increased  the  duty  on  gin  from 
42  to  57  cents  per  gallon,  which  was  equivalent  to  an  ad 
valorem  duty  of  over  100%.  A  duty  of  nine  cents  per  square 
yard  was  levied  on  sail-cloth  or  Holland  duck,  and  this  was 
to  be  raised  a  half  cent  per  year  until  it  reached  twelve  and 
a  half  cents.  There  was  also  a  progressive  increase  of  $5.00 
per  .ton  on  flax,  until  the  duty  should  reach  the  exceedingly 
high  figure  of  $60.00  per  ton.  The  duties  on  white-lead, 
linseed  oil,  etc.,  were  proportionately  high. 

A  month  or  two  after  the  passage  of  this  act,  the  Cham- 
ber of  Commerce  of  Schiedam  and  the  gin  manufacturers 
of  Delfshaven  petitioned  for  government  aid  in  securing  a 
reduction  of  the  duty  on  gin.  The  Amsterdam  Chamber  of 
Commerce  believed  it  would  be  feasible  to  apply  for  a  reduc- 
tion of  the  duties  in  general,  and  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the 
tariff  had  met  with  "strenuous  opposition  in  the  United 
States  itself."  These  petitions  were  forwarded  to  Huy- 
gens,2) who  made  them  the  basis  of  a  series  of  complaints 
against  our  tariff  policy  in  general,  and  particularly  against 
the  prohibitive  duty  on  gin.3)  But  his  protests  remained  un- 
heeded, and  as  a  result  the  discontent  in  Holland  increased 
from  year  to  year.  In  one  of  his  notes  Huygens  sought  to 
impress  upon  the  American  government  "that  the  situation 
of  the  Diplomatic  and  Commercial  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Netherlands  has  taken  a  delicate  and 
critical  turn,  and  deserves  a  particular  attention  for  avoid- 
ing a  rupture  of  the  naturally  amicable  relations"  between 
them.  Their  quarrels,  he  said,  were  "like  those  arising  be- 
tween two  lovers,  with  the  difference  that  they  do  not  offer 
such  easy  means  of  reconciliation."  *) 


In  addition  to  our  dispute  with  the  Netherlands  in  regard 
to  discriminating  duties  and  to  their  complaints  against  our 
tariff — neither  of  which  were  of  such  a  nature  as  to  cause 


*)   U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  IV.,  271. 

2)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amerik.  Legatie,  Registre  9-1.     Ver- 
stolk  to  Huygens,  August  7,  1828,  with  the  inclosures  mentioned  in 
the  text. 

3)  Notes  from  the  Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  I.,  Huygens  to 
Clay,  November  28,  1829;  to  Van  Buren,  May  15,  December  11  and 
14,  1829,  and  May  22,  1830. 

4>    Ibid.,  I.,  May  15,  1829. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  15? 

the  official  relations  to  become  delicate  and  critical — there 
were  just  at  this  time  two  other  matters  which  did  not  help 
to  improve  the  good  understanding  between  the  two 
countries. 

One  of  these  arose  out  of  the  award  made  by  the  King  of 
the  Netherlands  in  the  controversy  between  England  and  the 
United  States  regarding  the  Northeastern  boundary.  This 
controversy,  which  had  been  outstanding  since  1783,  had 
been  referred  to  King  William  for  arbitration  in  1828. 
Hughes  notes  that  "many  of  the  first  personages  of  this 
kingdom"  had  shown  their  satisfaction  "at  this  proclaimed 
proof  of  the  confidence  reposed  by  the  United  States  in  the 
wisdom,  judgment  and  honour  of  their  monarch."  ^  And 
the  King  himself,  in  notifying  Hughes  of  his  acceptance,  had 
remarked,  "I  hope  you  will  believe  that  I  am  sensible  of  the 
extreme  delicacy  of  the  points  and  feelings  in  such  a  contro- 
versy, and  alarmed  by  the  almost  impossibility,  let  the  deci- 
sion of  the  arbiter  be  what  it  may,  of  satisfying  both  parties, 
....  But  I  shall  be  guided  by  the  best  lights  that  may  be 
obtained,  and  I  hope  I  may  add,  by  a  spirit  of  the  purest  and 
most  inflexible  impartiality,  as  to  the  two  parties  who  have 
done  me  the  honour  to  select  me  as  umpire  in  their  differ- 
ences; ....  an  honour  which,  you  may  assure  the  Presi- 
dent, I  know  how  to  feel  and  to  appreciate."  2) 

At  the  same  time  the  Jackson  administration  decided  to 
recall  Hughes,  and  to  replace  him  by  an  Envoy  Extraordi- 
nary and  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  This  in  itself  was  a 
matter  of  gratification  to  the  government  of  the  Nether- 
lands, which  had  maintained  a  representative  of  ministerial 
rank  at  Washington  since  1825,  whereas  the  United  States 
had  appointed  no  minister  to  the  Netherlands  since  the  recall 
of  Eustis  in  1818.  But,  to  use  the  words  of  Secretary  Van 
Buren,  "there  existed  a  high  necessity  in  the  judgment  of  the 
President  that  the  local  feelings  and  interests  involved  in  the 
controversy  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
....  should  be  consulted  in  making  the  selection.  Mr. 
Preble,  therefore,  who  belongs  to  the  State  of  Maine,  the 
state  of  this  Union  most  deeply  interested  in  the  decision  of 
that  important  concern,  was  selected  for  this  mission. "3) 

!)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  VIII.    Hughes  to  Clay,  Jan.  8,  1829. 

2)  Ibid.,  VIII.    Hughes  to  Clay,  Jan.  21. 

3)  Instructions,  Europe,  XII.,  200-201.     Van  Buren  to  Hughes, 
May  29,  1829. 


158  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

The  appointment  of  Preble  was  unwise  for  the  very  rea- 
son that  he  was  "a  neighbor  to  the  debateable  land."  "It  is 
regarded,"  says  Hughes,  "as  winking  at  cunning  and  trick ; 
in  a  word,  like  sending  a  party  to  plead  his  own  cause."  *) 
And  Huygens  (not  to  be  confused  with  Hughes)  wrote  to 
Van  Buren  that  the  nomination  of  a  minister  "for  discussing 
and  treating  of  the  boundary  question  was  far  from  satis- 
fying the  Netherlands."  2)  Under  the  circumstances  Preble 
was  occasionally  made  to  feel  that  he  was  persona  non  grata, 
and  it  must  have  been  an  embarrassing  moment  for  him 
when,  upon  his  presentation  at  court,  the  Prince  of  Orange 
asked  him  point-blank  whether  he  was  not  largely  interested 
as  a  proprietor  in  the  lands  in  controversy. 3) 

The  award  of  the  king  was  made  known  on  January  10, 
1831,  and  two  days  later  Preble  sent  in  a  protest  against  the 
award,  on  the  ground  that  the  king  had  acted  contrary  to  his 
instructions.4)  This  protest  seems  to  have  been  interpreted  as 
an  attack  on  the  king's  integrity,  and  therefore,  naturally 
enough,  aroused  "angry  feelings,"  which  were  not  improved 
when  the  United  States  Senate  officially  rejected  the  award. 
Thus  the  position  of  arbiter,  which  the  king  had  assumed 
with  evident  pleasure  and  pride,  became  in  the  end  a  source 
of  bitterness  to  him  and  a  cause  of  estrangement  between  the 
two  countries.  As  late  as  December,  1831,  Baron  Verstolk, 
who  is  characterized  as  being  "in  general  the  most  frigid  and 
reserved  of  all  diplomats,"  grew  warm  in  complaining  of  the 
spirit  of  enmity  against  Holland  displayed  in  American 
newspapers.5) 

Furthermore,  the  political  situation  in  the  Netherlands 
was  another  factor  which  contributed  to  the  disfavor  with 
which  Americans  and  things  American  were  looked  upon. 
In  August,  1830,  a  revolutionary  movement  broke  out  in  the 
Southern  provinces,  which  ultimately  resulted  in  the  inde- 
pence  of  Belgium.  The  attitude  of  the  Dutch  people  toward 
American  institutions  and  political  ideals  was  to  some  extent 


!)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  VIII.    Hughes  to  Van  Buren,  Sept. 
25,  1829. 

2)  Notes  from  the  Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  I.    Huygens  to 
Van  Buren,  May  15,  1829. 

3)  Despatches,    Netherlands,    IX.,    Preble    to    Van    Buren,    Jan. 
30,  1830. 

*)   Ibid.,  IX.,  enclosed  in  his  despatch  of  January  16,  1831. 
5>   Ibid.,  IX.  Davezac  to  Van  Buren,  December  30,  1831. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  159 

determined  by  the  stand  which  they  took  on  this  domestic 
question.  This  is  brought  out  in  one  of  the  despatches  of 
Preble,1*  written  about  a  month  after  the  revolution  in  Bel- 
gium had  begun.  "Our  form  of  government  and  social  con- 
ditions are  the  theme  of  perpetual  eulogium  from  the  Lib- 
erals. They  are  the  living  example  and  model  to  which  the 
opposition  are  forever  appealing."  He  then  contrasts  the 
attitude  of  the  Liberals  with  that  of  the  Conservative  party, 
and  quotes  "a  very  intelligent  Dutchman  of  the  old  school 
gentry"  as  saying,  "You  have  no  conception  how  they  hate 
your  government  and  people ;  they  regard  you  as  the  school 
of  liberalism  and  the  source  of  all  the  revolutionary  move- 
ments in  Europe ;  for,  in  your  happy  condition,  you  are  con- 
tinually preaching  in  silence,  but  with  powerful  effect,  doc- 
trines and  principles  the  most  odious  and  alarming  to  them." 

We  may  also  note  here,  as  an  indication  of  the  manner 
in  which  our  government  and  people  were  regarded  in  Hol- 
land, what  Van  Hogendorp  confided  to  his  journal  on  April 
26,  1832.2> 

"Our  representative  in  the  United  States  [Huygens]  has 
returned  home  on  leave,  and  has  paid  me  a  visit.  He  seemed 
very  prejudiced  against  the  Americans  and  presented  several 
objections  against  them. 

"His  first  objection  was,  that  the  national  debt  would  be 
paid  off  in  a  year,  from  which  he  predicted  great  disasters. 

"His  second  objection  was,  that,  in  consequence,  taxes 
would  be  reduced  by  at  least  a  half. 

"His  third  objection  was,  that  the  population  was  in- 
creasing alarmingly,  and  that  as  a  result  the  Western  States 
would  in  time  obtain  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

"His  fourth  objection  was,  that  so  many  Europeans  came 
to  settle  there,  and  that  during  the  previous  year  the  number 
was  60,000. 

His  fifth  objection  was,  that  there  was  an  extraordinary 
circulation  of  money,  so  that  everything  could  be  undertaken 
on  credit,  and  that  Americans  would  trade  all  other  nations 
to  death. 

"His  sixth  objection  was,  that  the  government  encour- 

*)  Ibid.,  IX.,  Preble  to  Van  Buren,  September  14.  1830  (con- 
fidential). 

2)  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften  van  G.  K.  Van  Hogendorp, 
VII.,  257. 


.60  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

aged  this  [commercial]  activity  by  levying  no  export  duties, 
and  by  granting  eighteen  months*  credit  on  import  duties. 

"I  was  careful,  indeed,  not  to  express  any  doubts,  but 
when  he  was  gone  I  asked  myself  whether  the  man  had  lost 
his  common  sense.  Upon  reflection,  I  concluded  that  he  de- 
sires to  play  to  the  gallery,  in  order  to  gain  favor  and  to  fur- 
ther his  own  interests.  He  possibly  knows  from  old  that  it 
is  fashionable  in  Holland,  and  especially  at  this  capital,  to 
scoff  at  Americans.  More  than  once  he  could  not  hide  his 
surprise  that  I  did  not  scoff  with  him. 

"It  is  a  characteristic  trait  of  these  times  that  Americans 
are  criticized  in  this  fashion.  Their  prosperity  is  a  source 
of  lively  criticism  by  the  government  of  every  country  in 
Europe." 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  161 


CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  CONCLUSION  OF  A  COMMERCIAL  TREATY. 


So  long  as  the  question  submitted  to  the  arbitration  of 
King  William  remained  undecided,  the  American  govern- 
ment considered  it  inexpedient  to  open  up  a  discussion  on 
the  general  interests  of  the  two  countries.1*  Shortly  after 
the  king's  decision  was  announced  Preble  returned  home. 

When  his  successor,  Auguste  Davezac  of  Louisiana, 
made  known  our  desire  for  a  modification  of  the  treaty  of 
1782,  he  was  surprised  to  find  that  the  Dutch  government 
showed  a  willingness  to  begin  negotiations  at  once.  The 
king  even  expressed  the  belief  that  the  negotiations  would 
this  time  be  more  successful,  for,  since  the  failure  of  the 
former  attempt,  he  said,  circumstances  had  greatly  changed. 
Davezac,  much  pleased  to  find  the  Dutch  government  in  so 
favorable  a  mood,  requested  that  full  powers  should  imme- 
diately be  sent  him  to  conclude  a  treaty. 2* 

On  May  18,  1832,  Edward  Livingston,  then  acting  as 
Secretary  of  State,  sent  Davezac  a  project  of  a  treaty,  con- 
sisting of  ten  articles.3 >  The  President's  objects,  Livingston 
explained,  were  threefold.  First,  "To  introduce  stipula- 
tions, which,  by  means  of  a  perfect  reciprocity  of  advan- 
tages, would  secure  to  us  an  intercourse  not  only  with  the 
European,  but  the  American  and  Asiatic  possessions  of  that 
country."  Second,  "To  give  an  extension  to  the  principles 
on  which  the  rights  of  the  neutrals  are  secured/'  Third,  "To 
consecrate  by  treaty  stipulations  the  duties  which  civilized 
nations  owe  to  each  other  in  time  of  war." 

!)  Instructions,  Europe,  XIII. ,  67,  80.  Van  Buren  to  Preble, 
Nov.  2,  1829;  Jan.  4,  1830. 

2)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  X.    Davezac  to  Livingston,  Decem- 
ber 30,  1831. 

3)  Instructions,  Europe,  XIIL,  293-300. 


162  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

The  terms  which  the  President  proposed  in  order  to  ac- 
complish these  objects  were  in  brief  as  follows.  Neither 
party  was  to  grant  any  particular  favor  to  other  nations  in 
respect  to  commerce  and  navigation,  ''which  shall  not  imme- 
diately become  common  to  the  other  party."  Citizens  of 
either  country  might  freely  reside  in  the  other  country,  and 
were  to  be  entitled  to  the  same  rights  and  privileges  in  re- 
gard to  commerce  and  navigation  as  those  which  native  citi- 
zens enjoyed.  This  provision  was  intended  to  establish 
equality  in  regard  to  lighthouses,  salvage,  pilotage,  quaran- 
tine and  harbor  dues.  The  only  exception  was  that  each 
country  reserved  the  coasting  trade  to  its  own  citizens.  Fur- 
thermore,— and  this  was  the  most  important  departure  from 
the  existing  practice — any  merchandise,  irrespective  of  its 
origin,  which  could  be  imported  into  either  country  in  its 
own  vessels,  could  also  be  imported  in  vessels  of  the  other 
country,  subject  to  the  same  duties  as  to  tonnage  and  cargo; 
and  any  merchandise  which  could  be  exported  or  reexported 
from  either  country  in  its  own  vessels,  could  also  be  exported 
in  vessels  of  the  other  country. 

With  reference  to  the  question  of  neutral  rights,  the 
American  government  proposed  that  article  eleven  of  the 
former  treaty,  which  declared  "that  free  vessels  shall  secure 
the  effects  with  which  they  shall  be  loaded,"  or,  in  other 
words,  that  free  ships  make  free  goods,  should  apply  only  to 
nations  which  recognized  the  principle;  but  if  either  of  the 
two  parties  should  be  at  war  with  a  third,  and  the  other 
party  should  be  neutral,  "the  flag  of  the  nentral  shall  cover 
the  property  of  enemies  whose  government  acknowl- 
edged this  principle,  and  no  others."  When,  as  in  the  above 
stipulation,  the  neutral  flag  of  either  party  should  protect 
the  property  of  the  enemies  of  the  other  party,  "the  neutral 
property  found  on  board  of  vessels  of  such  enemies  shall  be 
held  and  considered  as  enemy's  property,  and  as  such  shall 
be  liable  to  detention  and  confiscation;"  but  "if  the  flag  of 
the  neutral  does  not  protect  enemies'  property,  in  that  case 
the  goods  of  the  neutral,  embarked  in  such  enemies'  ships, 
shall  be  free." 

In  the  instructions  accompanying  this  project,  Livingston 
made  it  clear  that  unless  a  perfect  reciprocity  of  commercial 
advantages  could  be  secured,  we  had  no  great  desire  to  de- 
part from  the  existing  arrangement.  "Now  there  can  never 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  163 

be  a  perfect  reciprocity,"  he  said,  "which  excludes  the  most 
important  dominions  of  one  of  the  parties  from  its  opera- 
tion." Should  the  Dutch-  government  repeat  the  same  argu- 
ment which  had  been  advanced  during  the  previous  negotia- 
tions, that  in  extending  the  principle  of  reciprocity  to  their 
colonies  they  were  giving  us  an  advantage  for  which  they  re- 
ceived no  equivalent,  Davezac  was  to  point  to  our  long  coast- 
line, extending  from  the  Sabine  to  the  St.  Croix,  to  our 
numerous  harbors,  and  to  the  great  variety  Of  our  produc- 
tions. Since  the  Netherlands  is  now  reduced  to  a  popula- 
tion of  a  little  over  two  million,  "there  would  be  no  reci- 
procity whatever  in  a  treaty  that  should  give  -to  such  a  state 
a  perfect  equality  of  trade  with  another  of  six  times  the 
population,  twenty  times  the  extent,  and  whose  productions 
are  infinitely  varied — more  especially  when  that  small  state 
is  essentially  navigating  and  commercial,  has  ships  and  capi- 
tal to  avail  itself  of  all  the  advantages  which  an  equal  trade 
with  our  extensive,  populous  and  productive  country  will 
afford,  while,  if  the  colonies  were  excluded,  we  should  have 
nothing  in  return  but  the  limited  advantages  which  its  con- 
tracted territory  and  small  amount  of  population  has  to  offer 
us.  The  extension  of  these  reciprocal  advantages  to  the 
trade  with  the  colonies  would  in  some  measure  balance  this 
inequality." 

With  reference  to  the  status  of  Louisiana  he  was  told  to 
say,  "Had  the  conditions  of  the  cession  been  that  Louisiana 
should  remain  in  its  colonial  state,  then  it  is  acknowledged 
that  the  reciprocity  would  have  been  preserved,  and  the  trade 
to  Louisiana  would  be  a  good  equivalent  for  the  trade  to  the 
Dutch  colonies.  But  Louisiana  is  there — whether  governed 
as  a  colony  or  a  component  part  of  our  territory  is  imma- 
terial ....  Of  what  importance  to  a  foreign  nation  is  it 
how  a  country  is  governed,  provided  no  interruption  is  of- 
fered to  the  commercial  rights  secured  by  treaty  ?"  Besides, 
in  1817  we  had  only  Louisiana,  now  we  could  throw  Florida 
into  the  scale  also,  and  both  had  greatly  increased  in  value 
since  1817. 

What  the  United  States  desired,  Livingston  repeated, 
was  to  secure  unrestricted  trade  with  the  Dutch  colonies. 
This  would  be  a  great  advantage  to  the  Dutch  themselves, 
"in  the  wars  which,  as  a  continental  power,  they  must  expect 
to  be  engaged  in,  while  we  would  probably  be  neutral,  when, 


164  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

with  our  ships,  we  should  keep  up  intercourse  between  the 
mother  country  and  its  colonies  ....  To  this  they  may 
answer  that  they  can  secure  the  advantage  by  temporary 
suspension  of  their  restrictive  laws,  of  which  we  would  be 
glad  to  avail  ourselves.  A  conclusive  reply,  however,  is  that 
the  British  doctrine,  that  neutrals  shall  not  in  time  of  war 
be  permitted  to  carry  on  a  trade  to  which  they  were  not  en- 
titled in  time  of  peace,  will  probably,  in  all  such  cases,  be 
enforced  by  that  and  other  nations  whose  interest  it  may  be 
to  assert  the  principle,  and  that  therefore  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  secure  it  by  treaty."  Should  the  Dutch  government 
be  entirely  averse  to  making  this  arrangement,  Davezac  was 
to  propose  this  modification:  "We  shall  not  participate  in 
the  direct  trade  between  the  European  and  the  colonial  pos- 
sessions of  Holland,  leaving  everything  else  as  hereinbefore 
proposed." 

Meanwhile  the  political  situation  of  the  Netherlands  was 
not  favorable  for  the  opening  of  treaty  negotiations.  The 
Dutch  government  was  just  then  at  odds  with  the  five  great 
powers  of  Europe,  whose  terms  regarding  the  separation  of 
Belgium  the  king  stubbornly  refused  to  accept.  In  October, 
1832,  England  and  France,  the  two  powers  principally  con- 
cerned, began  to  put  pressure  to  bear  by  declaring  a  block- 
ade of  Dutch  ports. 

Davezac  saw  in  this  situation  a  possibility  of  securing 
for  Americans  the  privilege  of  carrying  on  the  direct  trade 
between  the  Dutch  colonies  and  the  mother  country.  A 
prominent  merchant  of  Amsterdam  had  written  him,  he  re- 
ports in  December  of  this  year,1)  that  representations  had 
been  made  to  the  government,  to  show  the  necessity  of  ad- 
mitting Americans  to  the  colonies.  "This  is  but  the  begin- 
ning of  an  expression  of  public  feeling  which  will  soon  burst 
out  loudly  from  Rotterdam,  Den  H  elder  and  every  other  sea- 
port in  the  Netherlands.  It  has  already  had  an  effect  on  the 
Cabinet,"  and  would  soon,  he  believed,  "surmount  the  repug- 
nance" of  the  minister  of  finance,  "a  man  saturated  by  all 
the  ideas  of  the  17th  century."  In  later  despatches  he  noted 
that  our  own  vessels  were  in  demand  for  the  trade  to  Java 
and  Sumatra,  and  he  believed  the  demand  would  continue  so 
long  as  the  cause  continued. 2) 


*)  Despatches,  Netherlands,  X.,  Davezac  to  Livingston,  Decem- 
ber 7,  1832  (confidential). 

2)  Ibid.,  X.,  February  26  and  March  22,  1833. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  165 

On  April  2,  1833,  about  a  month  before  the  king  yielded 
to  the  demands  of  the  Powers,  Davezac  at  length  submitted 
the  project  of  the  treaty  which  had  been  forwarded  to  him 
the  year  before.1)  His  note  was  referred  for  careful  con- 
sideration and  report  to  the  Departments  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Finance  and  Colonies,  and  on  the  16th  of  April  these  De- 
partments brought  out  an  adverse  report.2)  The  proposal 
to  extend  reciprocity  to  the  colonial  trade  was  considered 
utterly  impracticable.  At  present,  it  was  stated,  all  foreign 
flags  are  subject  to  higher  duties  than  the  Dutch;  to  grant 
any  special  privilege  to  Americans,  who  are  already  "our 
formidable  competitors  in  the  Indies,"  will  invariably  result 
in  the  ruin  of  our  own  trade  with  our  colonies. 

It  was  also  considered  inadvisable  to  accept  our  pro- 
posals regarding  neutral  rights.  If  England  and  the  United 
States,  they  argue,  should  again  become  involved  in  war,  the 
flag  of  the  Netherlands  will  not  protect  English  property, 
for  England  does  not  recognize  the  principle  of  free  ships, 
free  goods.  But  suppose  England  should  accept  this  prin- 
ciple, the  Dutch  would  thereby  be  placed  in  an  even  more 
difficult  position.  For,  in  that  case,  Dutch  vessels  could  not 
be  employed  in  English  service,  and,  worse  still,  Dutch  goods 
found  on  board  of  English  vessels  would  be  subject  to  con- 
fiscation. They  suspect  the  United  States  of  having  sinister 
motives,  in  submitting  its  proposals  at  a  time  when  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Netherlands  and  England  were  seriously 
strained.  These  proposals,  instead  of  evincing  a  desire  to 
regulate  the  political  and  commercial  relations  on  a  favor- 
able footing,  "have  no  other  intention  than  that  of  utilizing 
the  critical  situation  in  which  the  Netherlands  was  so  unex- 
pectedly placed,  for  the  purpose  of  entirely  destroying  its 
trade  and  its  colonial  system,"  of  increasing  the  difficulties 
between  Great  Britain  and  Holland,  and  of  preventing  the 
restoration  of  friendship  with  Great  Britain  as  long  as  pos- 
sible. Their  joint  advice,  therefore,  was  that  "from  a  polit- 
ical as  well  as  from  a  commercial  point  of  view,"  the  pro- 
posals of  the  American  government  should  be  rejected. 

On  May  1  Verstolk  informed  Davezac  that  Holland  could 
not  grant  the  advantages  which  the  United  States  sought  to 
acquire  in  the  colonial  trade,  for  these  advantages  were  "at 


*)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Amer.  Legatie,  Registre  10. 
2)  Ibid.,  Registre  10. 


166  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

variance  with  the  whole  colonial  system  of  the  Netherlands." 
Furthermore,  perfect  reciprocity,  he  said,  "presupposes  a 
certain  similarity  between  the  tariffs  of  the  two  countries, 
which  does  not  exist,  since  that  of  the  United  States  consid- 
erably exceeds  that  of  the  Netherlands."  a)  Davezac  seems 
to  have  considered  this  reply  as  final,  and  the  negotiations 
were  abruptly  broken  off. 


Nearly  twenty  years  had  now  elapsed  since  trade  rela- 
tions had  been  resumed,  yet  neither  country  was  satisfied 
with  the  policy  of  trade  and  navigation  which  the  other  was 
pursuing.  Up  to  this  time  an  agreement  had  been  reached  on 
only  one  of  the  questions  of  a  commercial  nature  which  had 
called  for  settlement  in  1815,  and  even  this  agreement  was 
of  a  tentative  character  and  of  uncertain  duration. 

The  United  States  maintained,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the 
reciprocity  established  in  1818,  though  confined  in  its  opera- 
tion to  the  direct  trade,  was  as  perfect  on  our  part  as  we 
could  make  it,  but  that  the  Dutch  government  had  violated 
the  spirit  and  principle  of  this  agreement  by  its  tariff  act 
of  1822.  This  act  had  now  been  in  operation  more  than  a 
decade  and  during  all  these  years  goods  imported  in  Ameri- 
can vessels  had  been  subject  to  an  additional  import  duty  of 
10%.  Yet  the  American  government  showed  no  signs  of 
an  intention  to  retaliate,  and  since  1827  had  even  ceased  to 
complain  of  this  policy. 

Two  and  a  half  years  after  the  failure  of  the  second  at- 
tempt at  treaty  renewal, — which  brings  us  to  the  close  of 
1835, — circumstances  occasioned  a  revival  of  this  old  dis- 
pute. These  circumstances  are  clearly  set  forth  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage  from  President  Jackson's  seventh  annual 
message.  "Coinciding  with  the  opinion  of  my  predecessor 
that  Holland  is  not,  under  the  regulations  of  her  present  sys- 
tem, entitled  to  have  her  vessels  and  cargoes  received  into  the 
United  States  on  the  footing  of  American  vessels  and  car- 
goes as  regards  duties  of  tonnage  and  impost,  a  respect  for 
his  reference  of  it  to  the  Legislature  has  alone  prevented  me 


Tbid.,  Registre  10. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  167 

from  acting  on  the  subject.  I  should  still  have  waited  with- 
out comment  for  the  action  of  Congress,  but  recently  a  claim 
has  been  made  by  Belgian  subjects  for  admission  into  our 
ports  for  their  vessels  and  cargoes  on  the  same  footing  as 
American,  with  the  allegation  that  we  could  not  dispute  that 
our  vessels  received  in  their  ports  the  identical  treatment 
shown  to  them  in  the  ports  of  Holland,  upon  whose  vessels 
no  discrimination  is  made  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States. 
Giving  the  same  privileges,  the  Belgians  expected  the  same 
benefits, — benefits  that  were  enjoyed,  in  fact,  when  Belgium 
and  Holland  were  united  under  one  government.  Satisfied 
with  the  justice  of  their  pretension  to  be  placed  on  the  same 
footing  with  Holland,  I  could  not,  nevertheless,  without  dis- 
regard to  the  principle  of  our  laws,  admit  their  claim  to  be 
treated  as  Americans,  and  at  the  same  time  a  respect  for 
Congress,  to  whom  the  subject  has  long  since  been  referred, 
has  prevented  me  from  producing  a  just  equality  by  tak- 
ing from  the  vessels  of  Holland  privileges  conditionally 
granted  by  acts  of  Congress,  although  the  condition  upon 
which  the  grant  was  made  has,  in  my  judgment,  failed  since 
1822.  I  recommend,  therefore,  a  review  of  the  act  of  1824, 
and  such  a  modification  of  it  as  will  produce  an  equality  on 
such  terms  as  Congress  shall  think  best  comports  with  the 
settled  policy  and  the  obligations  of  justice  to  two  friendly 
powers." 

Two  weeks  earlier,  Secretary  John  Forsyth  had  informed 
the  Dutch  charge,  Martini,  that  the  President  was  person- 
ally in  favor  of  raising  the  duties  on  Dutch  vessels,  and  that 
he  would  advise  Congress  to  adopt  this  course. *>  Martini, 
in  the  hope  that  the  President  might  be  induced  not  to  refer 
to  the  matter  "in  his  usual  sharp  tone/'  held  an  interview 
with  Van  Buren,  who  gave  him  no  encouragement.  He  also 
talked  the  matter  over  with  Mr.  Dickens,  chief  clerk  of  the 
State  Department,  who  suggested  that  the  best  way  out  of 
the  difficulty  would  be  a  treaty  agreement.  A  few  days  be- 
fore the  message  appeared,  Forsyth  gave  him  the  comfort- 
ing assurance  that  the  President's  language  would  be  very 
moderate.  Congress,  Forsyth  thought,  would  probably  show 
no  haste  in  taking  action,  and  meanwhile  the  Dutch  might 
see  fit  to  establish  perfect  reciprocity,  by  returning  the  addi- 

*)  R.  A.,  Buitenl.  Zaken,  Am.  Legatie,  Registre  12,  Litt.  B, 
No.  26.  Martini  to  Verstolk,  November  25,  1835. 


168  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

tional  import  duty  of  10%  which  Americans  had  been  pay- 
ing for  the  last  thirteen  years.1* 

In  Holland  the  President's  message  was  viewed  with 
i  alarm,  and  Verstolk  early  in  January  called  for  advice  from 
various  other  Departments  of  the  government.  The  head  of 
the  Department  of  National  Industry  reported  on  Janu- 
ary 2 1.2*  According  to  all  the  latest  indications,  he  said,  the 
United  States  would  soon  lay  a  discriminating  duty  on 
Dutch  vessels,  unless  Holland  should  grant  to  Americans 
a  drawback  of  10%  of  the  import  duties.  An  increase  of  the 
duties  in  the  United  States  would  result  in  great  injury  to 
the  Dutch,  who  had  of  late  invested  considerable  capital  in 
American  trade.  The  number  of  American  ships  engaged 
in  the  direct  trade  was  on  the  decrease,  while  the  number  of 
Dutch  ships  was  on  the  increase,  so  that  competition  was 
more  nearly  equal  than  in  former  years.  In  1834  no  less 
than  17  Dutch  vessels  had  arrived  from  the  United  States; 
in  1835  there  were  29.  During  the  same  years  the  number 
of  Dutch  vessels  bound  for  the  United  States  was  respect- 
ively 12  and  22,  while  a  considerable  precentage  of  Ameri- 
can vessels  had  sailed  from  Holland  in  ballast.3 > 

It  also  deserved  consideration,  he  said,  that  by  the 
American  tariff  act  of  March,  1833,  all  duties  in  excess  of 
20%  ad  valorem  would  be  gradually  reduced,  so  that  after 
1842  the  maximum  duty  would  be  20%.  This  maximum 
duty  was  still  comparatively  high,  but  nevertheless  the  re- 
duction was  "a  substantial  improvement,"  and  would  lead 
to  a  further  increase  in  the  Dutch  trade  with  the  United 
States.  His  advice,  therefore,  was,  that  Dutch  vessels 
should  be  made  to  pay  the  additional  10%  import  duty  now 
exacted  from  Americans,  or  that  Americans  should  be 
granted  the  10%  drawback  now  enjoyed  by  the  Dutch.  The 
latter  course,  he  thought,  would  be  preferable,  but  to  pre- 
vent difficulties  with  other  powers,  the  United  States  would 

!)   Ibid.,  Martini  to  Verstolk,  December  4,  1835. 

2)  Ibid.,  Rapport  van  den  Administrates  van  Nationale  Nijver- 
heid  aan  den  Min.  van  Buitenl.  Zaken.     Signed;     Netscher. 

3)  19  out  of  74  in  1834,  10  out  of  57  in  1835.    Davezac  also  notes 
that  "while  Dutch  vessels  rapidly  find  freight  in  our  ports,"  American 
vessels  in  Holland  had  difficulty  in  finding  a  return  cargo.    This  was 
due  to  the  protection  given  by  Holland  to  her  own  navigation.     In 


[an.  1837  he  writes,  "the  advantage  given  to  Dutch  navigation, 
las  worked  a  practical  injury  to  American  trade." 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  169 

have  to  make  some  concession,  by  lowering  the  duties  on  cer- 
tain goods  of  Dutch  origin. 

This  report  was  then  sent  to  the  Ministers  of  Finance 
and  Colonies,  who  gave  it  their  entire  approbation.1)  The 
Minister  of  finance  suggested  that  it  might  be  best  to  em- 
body this  arrangement  in  treaty  form. 

The  Secretary  of  foreign  affairs  made  this  report  the 
basis  of  his  instructions  to  Martini  on  May  24,  1836.2)  Mar- 
tini was  authorized  to  make  known  that  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment was  inclined  to  grant  a  restitution  of  10%  of  the 
duties  on  goods  imported  in  American  vessels,  on  condition 
that  the  United  States  should  grant  a  permanent  reduction 
of  duties,  in  favor  of  the  Netherlands,  on  gin,  cheese,  lin- 
seed-oil, glassware,  wheat  and  oats.  Unless  the  United 
States  should  make  a  concession  of  this  kind,  he  said,  Hol- 
land's treaty  obligations  toward  other  powers  would  be 
compromised. 

About  nine  months  later,  in  February,  1837,  Congress  at 
length  undertook  to  carry  out  the  recommendation  which 
President  Jackson  had  made  in  his  message  of  December, 
1835.  On  February  13  the  Senate  began  a  consideration  of 
a  bill,  which  had  been  passed  by  the  House,  for  placing  Bel- 
gian vessels  and  cargoes  on  the  same  footing  as  those  of  Hol- 
land, in  ports  of  the  United  States.  Buchanan,  as  chair- 
man of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  explained3* 
that  Holland  had  thus  far  refused  to  live  up  to  the  terms  of 
the  Act  of  1824,  by  granting  a  drawback  to  its  own  vessels. 
"We  might,"  he  said,  "according  to  the  principle  of  this  act 
have  done  the  same,  as  a  countervailing  measure,  in  favor  of 
our  own  navigation;  but  as,  notwithstanding  the  duty  of 
10%,  our  own  navigation  continued  to  enjoy  almost  the 
whole  of  the  trade  between  Holland  and  the  United  States," 
it  had  not  been  deemed  worth  while  to  deprive  the  Dutch  of 
the  privileges  they  were  enjoying.  The  only  object  of  the 
present  bill  was  to  place  Belgian  vessels  on  an  equality  with 
the  Dutch.  But  a  provision  was  inserted  authorizing  the 
President  to  suspend  the  act  of  1824  against  either  Belgian 
or  Dutch  vessels,  when  in  his  opinion  circumstances  should 
render  it  expedient. 


!)  R.   A.,   Buitenl.   Zaken,  Am.  Legatie,   Registre   12,   Litt.   B, 
No.  26.    Feb.  6  and  11. 

2)  Ibid.,  Registre  10.     Cypher  despatch. 

3)  Congressional  Debates,  XIII.,  Part  I,  806. 


170  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Clay  demanded  to  know1)  "whether  information  had  been 
obtained  as  to  the  present  proportion  between  Dutch  and 
American  navigation  employed  in  the  trade  with  Holland, 
as  in  1835  it  appeared  that  the  Dutch  were  rather  gaining  on 
us  "  Buchanan  replied  that  he  would  supply  the  Senate  with 
this  information,  which  he  did  on  the  following  day.  The  fig- 
ures he  submitted  showed  that  in  1834  the  American  tonnage 
engaged  in  the  trade  with  Holland  was  17,000,  in  1835  it 
had  decreased  to  15,000,  and  in  1836  to  8,500.  During  the 
same  years  the  Dutch  tonnage  employed  in  this  trade  had 
increased  from  1,651  to  5,401.  Buchanan  did  not  profess 
to  know  whether  the  rapid  increase  in  Dutch  tonnage  was 
due  to  their  discriminating  duty  on  American  vessels,  but  if 
so,  he  thought  the  President  should  promptly  suspend  the  act 
of  1824  against  Dutch  vessels  and  cargoes.  Clay  expressed 
the  same  opinion.  When  we  see  a  regular  increase  in  Dutch 
tonnage  and  a  regular  decrease  in  American,  there  is  no 
doubt,  he  said,  "that  both  results  proceeded  from  a  common 
cause."  And  this  cause,  he  thought,  was  the  discrimination 
against  American  vessels  in  Holland. 2)  The  amendment  in- 
troduced by  Buchanan  met  with  the  approval  of  the  House, 
and  in  this  form  the  bill  was  passed  on  the  second  of 
March.3) 


For  our  purpose  the  significance  of  Jackson's  message  of 
1835  and  of  the  act  of  March,  1837,  which  grew  out  of  it,  lie 
herein  that  they  led  to  a  revival  of  the  treaty  discussions, 
which  this  time  were  to  be  crowned  with  success.  While 
the  bill  was  still  pending  Martini  had  held  an  interview  with 
Forsyth,  and  had  seized  the  occasion  to  make  known  the  con- 
tents of  his  instructions  of  May,  1836.  Forsyth  replied  that 
the  United  States  would  be  pleased  to  see  the  old  dispute 
about  discriminating  duties  removed  by  a  convention,  but 
that  the  administration  could  not,  without  an  authorization 
from  Congress,  grant  a  reduction  of  the  duties  on  Dutch 
products.  Another  interview  in  March,  after  the  passage 
of  the  act  referred  to  above,  led  to  the  same  result  and  con- 
vinced  Martini  that  a  concession  such  as  his  instructions 

!)  Ibid.,  February  13,  1837. 
2)  Ibid.,  February  15,  1837. 
8)  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  V.,  152. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  171 

called  for  could  not  be  obtained  from  the  American 
government.1^ 

At  a  conference  held  in  June,  Martini  asked  whether 
Forsyth  could  suggest  no  other  basis  of  agreement.  Forsyth 
replied  by  referring  to  the  original  proposal  which  the  United 
States  had  submitted  in  1817.  He  proposed,  namely,  that 
Dutch  vessels,  whether  engaged  in  the  direct  or  indirect 
trade,  and  irrespective  of  the  origin  of  their  cargoes,  should 
be  admitted  to  American  ports  on  the  same  footing  as  our 
own. 

Martini's  despatch  of  June  25,  setting  forth  the  nature  of 
the  proposal,2)  was  referred  to  the  Minister  of  finance  for 
consideration, — which  seems  to  have  been  a  customary  mode 
of  procedure  under  the  government  of  King  William — and 
in  due  time  became  the  basis  of  a  new  set  of  instructions. 
On  December  15,  1837,  Verstolk  informed  Martini  that  For- 
syth's  proposal  had  been  rejected,  for  if  the  United  States 
made  so  liberal  a  concession  in  favor  of  Dutch  ships,  they 
would  undoubtedly  expect  the  Dutch  government  to  make  a 
similar  concession  in  favor  of  American  ships.  And  as  Dutch 
ships  would  seldom  have  occasion  to  bring  goods  to  the 
United  States  from  a  foreign  market,  the  government  was  not 
prepared  to  adopt  the  principle  of  perfect  reciprocity.  The 
king  was,  however,  willing  to  conclude  a  treaty,  if  the 
American  government  would  guarantee  that  goods  imported 
into  American  ports  in  Dutch  vessels,  should  be  entitled  to 
a  reduction  of  10%  of  the  import  duties,  irrespective  of 
whether  these  goods  were  carried  directly  from  Holland  or 
from  some  foreign  port.  In  addition  to  this  he  proposed  an 
agreement  by  which  vessels  of  either  country,  when  engaged 
in  the  direct  trade,  should  be  subject  to  no  higher  tonnage 
duty  than  was  imposed  on  national  vessels,  and  that  this 
same  principal  should  also  apply  to  vessels  engaged  in  the 
indirect  trade,  when  arriving  in  ballast.  This  agreement  was 
to  hold  good  only  for  the  European  dominions  of  the  Neth- 
erlands, not  for  the  Dutch  colonies.3) 

Early  in  February,  1838,  Martini  submitted  these  pro- 
posals to  Forsyth,  and  a  few  days  later  he  was  informed  that 


!)    R.   A.,   Buitenl.   Zaken,  Am.  Legatie,   Registre   12,   Litt.   B, 
No.  26.     Martini  to  Verstolk,  February  20  and  March  8,  1837. 
2)  Ibid.,  Registre  12,  Litt.  B,  No.  26. 
s)   Ibid.,  Registre  12,  Litt.  B,  No.  26. 


172  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

the  President  had  accepted  them.1*  On  April  21  Verstolk 
forwarded  the  concept  of  a  treaty,  consisting  of  six 
articles.2*  This  concept  reached  Martini  early  in  June,  and 
on  the  6th  of  that  month  he  informed  Forsyth  that  he  had 
received  full  powers  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  a  treaty, 
on  the  bases  proposed  in  February  last.3)  Formal  negotia- 
tions were  at  once  begun,  and,  after  much  wrangling  over 
the  exact  wording  of  certain  articles,  the  treaty  was  ready 
for  signature  on  January  19,  1839.  Ratifications  were  ex- 
changed on  May  23. 

Article  one  of  this  treaty  of  January  19,  1839,4>  estab- 
lished perfect  reciprocity  as  regards  import  duties  on  goods, 
of  whatever  origin,  carried  directly  from  a  port  of  the 
United  States  to  a  port  in  the  Netherlands,  and  vice  versa. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  indicated  that  Holland  had  at 
length  accepted  the  viewpoint  of  the  United  States  in  the 
long-standing  dispute  regarding  drawbacks.  It  was  express- 
ly declared :  "The  bounties,  drawbacks,  or  other  favours  of 
this  nature,  which  may  be  granted  in  the  States  of  either  of 
the  contracting  parties,  on  goods  imported  or  exported  in 
national  vessels,  shall  also  in  like  manner  be  granted  on 
goods  directly  exported  or  imported  in  vessels  of  the  other 
country  ....  it  being  understood  that,  in  the  latter  as  in 
the  preceding  case,  the  goods  shall  have  been  loaded  in  the 
ports  from  which  such  vessels  have  been  cleared."  By 
article  two  each  country  agreed  to  place  the  vessels  of 
the  other  on  an  equality  with  its  own  in  regard  to 
"duties  of  tonnage,  harbour  dues,  light-houses,  sal- 
vage, pilotage,  quarantine,  or  port  charges  of  any  kind  or 
denomination."  The  next  three  articles  guaranteed  protec- 
tion and  assistance  of  the  consuls  of  either  country  in  the 
performance  of  their  official  duties ;  defined  what  was  meant 
by  "National"  vessels ;  and  provided  for  mutual  aid  to  each 
other's  vessels  in  time  of  shipwreck  or  distress.  Article  six 
stipulated  that  the  treaty  was  to  be  in  force  during  the  next 
ten  years,  after  which  it  was  to  terminate  automatically 
twelve  months  after  either  party  had  notified  the  other  of  its 
intention  to  discontinue  it. 


!)  Ibid ,  Martini  to  Verstolk,  February  11,  1838. 

2)  Ibid. 

3)  Notes  from  the  Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  II. 

4)  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  VIII.,  524-527. 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  173 


CHAPTER  X. 


CONCLUSION. 


Our  relations  with  Holland  during  the  years  1803  to  1840 
may  be  divided  into  two  periods.  The  first  period  lies  be- 
tween the  middle  of  1803,  when  the  warfare  between  Eng- 
land and  France  was  resumed,  and  the  close  of  1813,  when 
the  French  domination  of  Holland  ceased. 

The  nature  of  the  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Holland  during  these  years  was  determined  by  the 
nature  of  the  relations  between  Holland  and  France.  Diplo- 
matic relations  were  suspended  entirely,  not  because  of  a 
rupture  of  the  traditional  friendship,  but  because  the  foreign 
policy  of  Holland  was  dictated  by  France.  Trade  relations 
were  determined  by  the  fact  that  Holland,  as  the  unwilling 
ally  of  Napoleon,  was  compelled  to  adopt  the  Continental 
System. 

The  year  1803  saw  the  inception  of  the  Continental 
System  in  Holland;  the  year  1813  saw  its  final  overthrow. 
Until  the  close  of  1807  the  operation  of  this  System  tended 
to  increase  rather  than  to  diminish  the  volume  of  our  trade 
with  Holland.  These  were  years  of  unusual  prosperity  to 
the  American  trader,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  subject 
to  many  petty  inconveniences,  and  to  occasional  losses  re- 
sulting from  the  detention  of  his  vessel. 

With  the  renewal  of  hostilities,  in  1803,  the  maritime 
trade  of  Holland  temporarily  ceased.  Her  ships  were  either 
unemployed,  or  were  engaged  in  internal  commerce,  or  in 
the  more  hazardous  practice  of  smuggling.  From  this  state 
of  things  Yankee  captains  and  sailors  profited.  Our  neutral 
status  entitled  us  to  import  into  Holland  the  products  of  the 
United  States,  of  the  Dutch  colonies,  and  of  all  other  coun- 
tries. British  goods  alone  were  barred.  As  a  result,  the 
carrying  trade  of  Holland  was  largely  in  the  hands  of 
Americans. 


174  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

Our  commercial  prosperity  was  also  due  in  part  to 
our  participation  in  the  contraband  trade,  and  to  the  gen- 
eral atmosphere  of  corruption  which  characterized  the 
period.  Fraudulent  importations  of  enemy  goods  and 
fraudulent  exportations  of  Dutch  goods  to  the  enemy  were 
matters  of  daily  occurrence.  The  falsification  of  certificates 
of  origin,  and  of  the  ship's  papers  in  general,  became  a  fine 
art  which  flourished  liberally,  and  Dutch,  French  and  British 
officials  lent  their  assistance  in  furthering  the  practice.  The 
Dutch  exclusion  laws  proved  to  be  entirely  inadequate  to 
deal  with  the  problem  of  fraudulent  trade  under  a  neutral 
flag.  The  legislation  of  1803-W  made  no  provision  at  all 
for  penalizing  a  neutral  who  perpetrated  fraud.  The  more 
stringent  law  of  May,  1805,  for  the  first  time  gave  a  compre- 
hensive definition  of  the  term  British  goods,  and  laid  down 
four  distinct  penalties  for  their  introduction  by  neutrals 
—penalties  ranging  from  the  payment  of  a  fine  of  1,000 
florins  to  the  confiscation  of  the  vessel  and  its  entire  cargo. 
But  there  is  no  evidence  that  a  single  American  vessel  or 
American-owned  cargo  were  thus  confiscated,  nor  that  any 
of  the  fines  were  ever  exacted  from  an  American  captain. 
The  law  was  enforced  only  during  a  few  months ;  it  became 
a  dead  letter  the  moment  Louis  was  made  king.  Even  the 
Berlin  decree  was  not  enforced  against  neutrals  until  nine 
months  after  its  promulgation. 

After  September,  1807,  when  the  Continental  System 
came  to  be  enforced  more  vigorously,  also  against  neutrals, 
our  commercial  relations  with  Holland  took  a  decided  change 
for  the  worse.  By  Louis'  orders  of  August  28  and  Septem- 
ber 16,  1807,  the  Berlin  decree  was  made  operative  in  Hol- 
land. The  offense  of  introducing  British  goods  and  of 
touching  at  an  English  port  was  made  punishable  by  the  con- 
fiscation of  the  vessel  and  of  the  entire  cargo.  This  regula- 
tion remained  a  part  of  the  commercial  code  of  Holland 
until  the  end  of  the  period. 

Some  of  the  provisions  of  the  Berlin  decree  were 
strengthened  by  the  Milan  decree,  which  was  put  into  effect 
in  Holland  by  Louis'  order  of  January  23,  1808,  proclaiming 
an  embargo  on  all  shipping.  At  the  same  time  the  embargo 
in  the  United  States  prevented  our  vessels  from  leaving 
American  ports.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find  that 
the  volume  of  our  trade  with  Holland  fell  off  tremendously 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  175 

during  1808.  But  the  surprising  fact  is  that,  in  spite  of  trade 
restrictions,  American  vessels  were  still  admitted  to  Dutch 
ports,  and  continued  to  supply  Dutch  markets  with  consid- 
erable quantities  of  foreign  and  British  goods.  A  secret 
order  of  February  11,  permitted  the  importation  of  salt. 
This  was  repealed  on  May  19,  but  again  made  effective 
on  August  1.  Throughout  the  year,  by  special  order  of 
Louis,  it  was  made  possible  for  Americans,  who  were  then 
the  only  neutrals,  to  import  tea.  Many  an  American  vessel 
also  took  chances  on  importing  other  cargoes  besides  salt 
and  tea,  and  almost  invariably  found  a  welcome.  There  is 
no  instance  on  record  of  the  confiscation  of  an  American 
vessel  in  Holland  in  1808,  though  many  of  them  were  clearly 
violating  the  law  of  the  land.  Moreover,  vast  quantities 
of  forbidden  goods  were  smuggled  into  Holland,  and  to  this 
practice  American  vessels  also  lent  themselves.  Though  our 
trade  with  Holland  was  diminished  in  volume,  it  was  not 
entirely  at  a  standstill. 

The  legislation  during  the  first  seven  months  of  1809 
was  somewhat  more  favorable  to  the  American  trader,  but 
trade  was  still  hazardous  and  the  market  uncertain.  The 
decree  of  March  31  permitted  the  importation  of  salt  and 
tea,  and  of  such  American  products  as  tobacco,  whale-oil, 
hides,  and  potash.  The  decree  of  June  30,  added  six  articles 
to  the  list  of  imports,  but  this  concession  was  revoked  on 
July  29,  and  the  decree  of  March  31,  again  became  operative. 
Throughout  the  year,  however,  it  was  still  possible,  and 
profitable,  for  Americans  to  import  goods  into  Holland,  as 
well  as  to  carry  out  a  variety  of  goods  from  Holland.  But 
again,  as  in  1808,  and  as  a  result  of  the  bewildering  rapidity 
with  which  decree  followed  decree,  many  a  cargo  consisted 
in  part  of  forbidden  goods,  the  introduction  of  which  should 
have  subjected  the  American  captain  to  the  confiscation  of 
his  vessel.  Yet  no  such  confiscations  occurred,  and  the  for- 
bidden cargoes — which  should  also  have  been  confiscated — 
were  merely  stored  in  royal  warehouses  with  the  intention 
of  returning  them  to  the  owners  at  the  return  of  peace. 
Moreover,  this  year  offered  unusual  opportunities  for  smug- 
gling, and  thousands  upon  thousands  of  pounds  of  British 
and  colonial  produce,  carried  over  by  American  vessels,  ulti- 
mately found  their  way  into  Holland,  either  along  maritime 
routes  or  across  the  land  frontier,  and  were  there  sold  by 


176  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

speculators  at  fabulous  prices.  In  spite  of  numerous  re- 
strictions, trade  was  even  more  flourishing  in  1809  than  in 
1808,  though  the  total  volume  was  still  far  less  than  in  any 
of  the  prosperous  years  preceding  1808. 

The  year  1810  put  an  end  to  the  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
Dutch  markets  would  still  be  available  for  the  American 
trader.  Louis'  decree  of  February  1  excluded  "every  Ameri- 
can vessel  whatsoever,"  and  this  decree  was  enforced  to  the 
letter.  The  treaty  of  March  16  compelled  Holland  to  deliver 
to  France  all  merchandise  which  had  been  brought  in  by 
Americans  since  January  1,  1809,  and  the  annexation  of 
Holland  to  France,  in  July,  put  an  end  to  our  trade  with  Hol- 
land during  the  remainder  of  the  Napoleonic  period.  The 
Stars  and  Stripes,  emblem  of  our  commercial  prosperity,  still 
crossed  the  seas  in  every  direction,  but  were  no  longer  to  be 
seen  in  Dutch  ports. 

The  losses  sustained  by  American  merchants  during  the 
second  part  of  this  period,  i.e.  from  September,  1807,  to  the 
end  of  1813,  were  negative  rather  than  positive  in  character. 
They  resulted  from  the  closure  of  Dutch  ports  and  from 
the  uncertain  state  of  the  Dutch  markets.  During  these 
years  many  an  American  mercantile  firm,  which  had  been 
wont  to  maintain  business  connections  with  Holland,  per- 
manently deflected  its  trade  to  other  markets.  The  only  posi- 
tive losses  sustained  resulted  from  the  execution  of  the  treaty 
of  March,  1810,  and  from  the  confiscation  of  American  ves- 
sels seized  by  French  privateers.  But  these  losses  were  re- 
markably small  in  comparison  with  the  losses  sustained  by 
Americans  in  other  European  countries. 

The  second  period  of  our  relations  with  Holland  begins 
with  the  effort  of  the  Dutch  government  to  re-open  diplo- 
matic intercourse,  in  December,  1813,  and  ends  with  the 
conclusion  of  the  commercial  treaty  of  1839.  On  September 
24,  1814,  the  American  government  recognized  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Netherlands,  by  officially  receiving  Changuion 
as  minister  to  the  United  States,  and  in  July,  1815,  Eustis 
assumed  his  functions  as  minister  to  the  Netherlands,  a  post 
which  had  been  vacant  since  1801.  Between  that  date  and 
the  end  of  1839  no  important  questions  of  a  strictly  diplo- 
matic nature  arose.  The  official  relations  during  these  years 
were  on  the  whole  friendly,  except  for  the  ill-feeling  in 
1830-'31,  aroused  by  our  rejection  of  King  William's  award 


Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations  177 

in  the  Maine  boundary  controversy,  and  by  the  opposition  in 
Holland  to  our  high  tariff  of  1828. 

Except  for  a  few  months  in  1830-'31,  while  the  Belgians 
were  engaged  in  establishing  their  independence,  the  com- 
mercial intercourse  between  the  two  countries  during  this 
second  period  was  not  disturbed  by  war.  Our  relations  with 
Holland  during  these  peaceful  years  were  determined,  in 
part,  by  the  nature  of  the  events  during  the  first  period. 
The  decade  of  warfare  which  preceded  left  its  stamp  on 
succeeding  years.  The  spoliation  claims  which  were  unsuc- 
cessfully prosecuted  against  Holland  from  1815  to  1820,  were 
a  direct  aftermath  of  the  Napoleonic  era.  Moreover,  the 
merchant  marine  of  Holland  had  suffered  tremendous  losses 
as  a  result  of  the  Napoleonic  System,  and  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  second  period  the  Dutch  were  not  in  a  position 
to  compete  with  Americans  in  the  direct  trade  between  the 
two  countries.  Not  only  were  the  bulk  of  American  goods 
carried  over  to  Holland  in  American  ships,  but  the  Dutch 
were  compelled  to  make  use  of  American  bottoms  in  export- 
ing their  own  productions  to  the  United  States.  The  bal- 
ance of  trade,  therefore,  during  the  greater  part  of  this 
period  was  overwhelmingly  in  our  favor.  This  state  of 
things  naturally  aroused  the  jealousy  of  the  Dutch,  and  their 
commercial  jealousy  was  one  of  the  factors  which  retarded 
the  adoption  of  a  commercial  treaty. 

The  governments  of  both  countries  during  this  second 
period  were  in  favor  of  trade  reciprocity.  King  William, 
whose  personal  characteristics  and  mental  habits  largely  de- 
termined the  legislative  output  and  national  policy  of  Hol- 
land, had  decreed  on  May  17,  1815,  that  import  and  tonnage 
duties  on  goods  and  vessels  from  the  United  States  should 
be  the  same  as  for  vessels  engaged  in  the  European  trade. 
After  January  1,  1817,  our  vessels  were  to  pay  the  same  ton- 
nage duties  as  Dutch  vessels.  The  United  States  had  mean- 
while done  nothing  to  reciprocate  these  favors.  But  in  1817 
an  attempt  was  made  to  regulate  commercial  relations  by 
treaty,  so  as  to  make  them  conform  with  our  reciprocity  act 
of  March,  1815.  This  attempt  failed,  partly  because  the 
weakness  of  the  Dutch  merchant  marine  made  it  impolitic 
for  Holland  to  extend  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  so  as  to 
make  it  apply  to  import  and  tonnage  duties  on  vessels  en- 


178  Thirty-Seven  Years  of  Holland- American  Relations 

gaged  in  indirect  trade,  partly  because  of  the  antiquated 
colonial  policy  of  the  Dutch  government. 

In  spite  of  the  failure  of  the  treaty  negotiations,  the 
Dutch  regulations  of  1815  and  1817  remained  in  force,  and 
by  act  of  April  20,  1818,  which  was  renewed  on  January  7, 
1824,  Congress  reciprocated  the  favors  which  the  Dutch 
government  had  extended  to  our  commerce.  By  these  acts, 
which  remained  in  force  until  1839,  we  abolished  our  dis- 
criminating tonnage  duties  on  all  Dutch  vessels  visiting  our 
ports,  and  our  discriminating  import  duties  on  Dutch  vessels 
coming  directly  from  the  Netherlands.  Holland,  however, 
by  its  law  of  August  26,  1822,  violated  the  spirit  of  our  reci- 
procity agreement  by  granting  a  drawback  of  10%  on  goods 
imported  in  Dutch  vessels.  This  regulation  occasioned  a 
dispute  which  lasted  until  1839.  By  that  time  the  merchant 
marine  of  Holland  had  grown  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
Dutch  were  in  a  position  to  compete  on  more  equal  terms 
with  Americans  in  the  direct  trade.  As  a  result  the  Dutch 
government  was  ready  to  extend  the  principle  of  reciprocity 
in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  American  government. 
This  was  accomplished  by  the  treaty  of  1839,  which  estab- 
lished a  reciprocity  of  import  duties  on  goods  carried  di- 
rectly from  country  to  country,  irrespective  of  whether  such 
goods  were  of  native  origin.  In  regard  to  tonnage  duties 
this  treaty  was  less  favorable  to  the  Dutch  than  our  legis- 
lation of  1818  and  1824,  which  was  due  to  the  belief  that 
Dutch  vessels  would  seldom  have  occasion  to  carry  a  cargo 
from  a  foreign  port  to  an  American  port.  Moreover,  it 
failed  to  make  any  provision  for  the  trade  of  Americans  with 
the  Dutch  colonies.  This  matter,  therefore,  as  well  as  the 
extension  of  the  principles  of  perfect  reciprocity  to  tonnage 
and  import  duties,  remained  to  be  determined  by  future 
regulations. 


Bibliography  179 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


A.     MANUSCRIPT  SOURCES. 

I.  In  the  State  Department,  Washington: — 

1.  Instructions  to  American  Ministers  in  Europe,  vols.   II. 
to  XII.,  years  1815  tot  1832. 

2.  Instructions  to  American  Ministers  to  the  Netherlands, 
vol.  I. 

3.  Despatches  from  American  Ministers  to  the  Netherlands, 
vols.  V.  to  XII.,  years  1815  to  1840. 

4.  Notes  from  the  Secretary  of  State  to  Foreign  Legations, 
vols.  II.  to  V.,  years  1815  to  1840. 

5.  Notes  to  the. Legation  of  the  Netherlands,  vol.  I. 

6.  Notes  from   the  Legation   of   the   Netherlands,  vols.   I 
and  II. 

After  January,  1833,  the  Instructions  to  our  minis- 
ters at  The  Hague  are  separately  bound.  After  June, 
1834,  this  plan  was  followed  for  the  Notes  from  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  to  the  Dutch  Legation.  For  the  Notes 
from  the  Dutch  Legation  and  for  the  Despatches  of  our 
ministers  at  The  Hague  this  plan  was  followed  from  the 
beginning.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence for  these  years  has  been  published  in  the 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations. 

7.  Despatches,  France,  vol.  XI.     The  few  despatches  from 
this  volume  which  served  my  purpose  were  loaned  to  me 
by  Dr.  Melvin. 

8.  Consular  Despatches,  Amsterdam,  vols.  II.  and  III. 

9.  Consular  Letters,  Rotterdam,  vol.  I. 

10.     Consular  Letters,  Antwerp,  vols.  I.  and  II. 

Of  particular  value  are  the  reports  of  consul-general 
Bourne  at  Amsterdam,  1803 — 1813.  They  furnish  much 
information  on  the  effect  of  the  Dutch  exclusion  laws  on 
American  trade.  Except  for  the  usual  trade  statistics, 
the  consular  letters  after  1813  yielded  little  of  importance. 

II.  In  the  Manuscript  Division,  Library  of  Congress: — 

1.  The  Sylvanus  Bourne  Papers.  Contain  duplicates  of 
Bourne's  official  communications  to  the  Dutch  govern- 
ment; also  much  additional  material — letters  to  mer- 


180  Bibliography 

chants,  captains,  other  consuls,  etc in  all  more  than 

4,000   documents,   of  which   about   500  are   in   Bourne's 
hand. 

2.  The  William  Taylor  Papers.     Wm.  Taylor  and  Sons  of 
Baltimore,  carried  on  an  extensive  trade  with  Holland 
prior  to  1814.    The  reports  of  their  Amsterdam  agent  on 
the  movement  of  vessels,   state  of  the  market,  market 
prices,   etc.,   constitute   an   excellent   supplement   to   the 
Bourne  Papers.     Neither  of  these  collections  has  been 
catalogued. 

3.  Logbook   of  the  Merchant  Ship   "Lexington",  Timothy 
Gardner,   Master;   New  York  to  Bremen   and  Amster- 
dam, 1807-'08. 

j 

III.  In  the  British  Archives:— 

1.  British  Foreign  Office,  ff ,  |^.  Documents  relating 
to  the  re-opening  of  diplomatic  relations.     Collected  by 
Dr.  Lingelbach. 

2.  Privy   Council  Registers,  vols.   67-70.     Loaned   by  Dr. 
Melvin. 

IV.  In  the  Rijks-Archief  at  The  Hague:— 

The  Dutch  archives  contain  unusually  rich  and  exten- 
sive collections  for  the  years  1803 — 1813.  My  classifica- 
tion of  sources  follows  the  arrangement  adopted  in  the 
hand-books  and  catalogues  provided  for  this  purpose.  I 
have  indicated  only  those  volumes  which  have  been  of 
use  in  this  study. 

1.  R.  A.,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken: 

a.  Amerika,  vols.  358  and  359;  Vol.  358,  containing  the 
consular  correspondence,  yielded  almost  nothing;  in 
359  are  to  be  found  a  number  of  Bourne's  communi- 
cations with  the  Dutch  government. 

b.  Frankrijk,  vols.  216  and  218.    A  portion  of  the  diplo- 
matic correspondence  between  France  and   Holland 
has  been  published  by  Colenbrander.    These  volumes 
contain  hitherto  unpublished  material  on  the  efforts 
of  the  Directory  to  secure  Napoleon's  consent  for  the 
exportation  of  cheese  to  the  United  States. 

2.  R.  A.',  Staatsbewind: 

In  this  group  are  the  minutes  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
Directory,  the  Legislative  Body,  and  the  Zeeraad  or 
Marine  Council.  The  latter  body  had  charge  of  petitions, 
etc.,  on  matters  relating  to  trade  and  navigation.  Its  de- 


Bibliography  181 

cisions  were  then,  as  a  rule,  discussed  by  the  Directory  or 
Legislative  Body,  or  by  both. 

a.  Minute ele   Notulen  van   het  Staatsbewind,  vols.  84, 
90,  100,  103,  105,  109,  133. 

b.  Minuteele  Notulen  van  het  Wetgevend  Lichaam  der 
Bataafsche  Republiek,  vols.  13,  14,  15. 

c.  Registers  van  de  Besluiten  der  Zeeraad,  vols,  1,  2, 
and  3. 

3.  R.  A.,  Staats  Secretarie : 

Under  this  head  are  grouped  the  collections  relating  to 
the  reign  of  king  Louis.  I  have  used  only  the  royal  de- 
cisions and  decrees,  and  the  volumes  containing  the 
secret  royal  decrees  and  other  documents  requiring 
secrecy ;  which  together  comprise  some  300  volumes. 
The  secret  decrees  constitute  one  of  the  most  valuable 
sources  for  a  study  of  Louis'  commercial  policy,  and  af- 
ford abundant  proof  that  Napoleon's  incessant  criticisms 
of  his  brother  were  not  without  foundation. 

a.  Origineele  Koninklijke  Decreten  en  Besluiten,  vols. 
89,  90,  100,  115,  118,  131,  132,  157. 

b.  Secrete  Koninklijke  Decreten  en  Stukken,  vols.  359, 
360. 

4.  R.  A.,  Collectie  Goldberg,  vols.  190  and  208. 

This  is  one  of  the  many  private  collections  in  which 
the  Dutch  archives  for  this  period  are  particularly  rich. 
Goldberg  held  office  under  the  Directory  and  under 
Louis.  He  evidently  possessed  a  hobby  for  trade  statis- 
tics, and  the  long  lists  of  imports  and  exports  which  he 
patiently  worked  out  constitute  the  only  valuable  source 
of  information  I  have  been  able  to  obtain  on  this  phase 
of  the  subject.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  consular  re- 
ports prior  to  1815  do  not  afford  the  slightest  clue  to  the 
volume  of  our  carrying  trade  with  Holland.  Because  of 
the  evident  care  which  Goldberg  exercised  to  obtain  ac- 
curate statistics,  I  have  had  no  hesitation  in  accepting 
his  figures,  even  though  they  occasionally  differ  from 
those  of  Pitkin. 

5.  R.  A.,  Buitenlandsche  Zaken,  Amerikaansche  Legatie: 

At  the  time  when  I  used  the  diplomatic  and  consular 
correspondence  for  the  years  1814  to  1829,  this  material 
had  just  been  transferred  from  the  Foreign  Office  to  the 
the  Rijks-Archief,  and  was  as  yet  uncatalogued.  The 
documents  in  the  Foreign  Office  for  the  years  1829  to 
1840,  to  which  I  had  access,  also  showed  no  evidence  of 
classification.  Therefore  the  classification  of  Dutch 


182  Bibliography 

sources  for  1814 — 1840,  which  is  here  given,  is  largely 
arbitrary. 

a.  Registre  1.    Despatches  of  Changuion,  Ten  Gate  and 
and  Quabeck,  1815  to  1820. 

b.  Registre  2.    Notes  to  the  Seer,  of  State,  1816  to  1831. 

c.  Registre  3.    This  packet  contains  the  correspondence 
relating  to  spoliation  claims,  and  to  the  treaty  nego- 
tiations of  1817. 

d.  Registre  4.  1 

I  Consular  Correspondence,  1815  to  1820. 

e.  Registre  5.  J 

f.  Registre  6.    Despatches,  1825  to  1827. 

g.  Registre  7.     Despatches,  1828  to  1836. 

h.  Registre  9.  Numbers  A  to  E  contain  the  Notes  of 
Huygens,  1825  to  1830;  in  F  to  L  are  found  in- 
structions to  Huygens  and  miscellaneous  material. 

i.    Registre  10.     Despatches  of  Martini. 

j.    Registre  11.    Notes  and  despatches  of  Martini. 

k.  Registre  12.  This  packet,  labelled  Retroacta,  Litt.  B, 
no.  26,  contains  most  of  the  material  bearing  on  the 
treaty  negotiations,  1836—1839. 

R     PRINTED  SOURCES. 

1.  Colenbrander,  Dr.  H.  T.,  Gedenkstukken  der  Algemeene 
Geschiedenis    van    Nederland,    1795-1840,    (Den    Haag, 
Mart.   Nyhoff,   1908-1912.) 

Deel  IV.,  eerste  stuk,  pp.  LXXVIII  +  344 ;  tweede  stuk, 

pp.  345-787. 

Deel  V.,  eerste  stuk,  pp.  LXI+388 ;  tweede  stuk,  pp.  389- 

847. 

Deel  VI.,  eerste  stuk,  pp.  XL.  -f-754 ;  tweede  stuk,  pp.  LVI. 

-j-  757-1586;  derde  stuk,  pp.  CCXXXVII  -f  1591-2017. 
This  is  a  collection  of  sources  relating  to  Dutch  history 
from  1795  tot  1840,  the  publication  of  which  is  financed 
by  the  Dutch  government.  These  three  volumes,  com- 
prising over  4,000  pages,  contain  a  mass  of  hitherto  inac- 
cessible material,  collected  from  public  and  private  ar- 
chives in  the  Netherlands  and  other  countries.  Volume 
IV.,  deals  with  the  period  of  the  Directory,  1801 — 1806; 
vol.  V.  covers  the  reign  of  Louis ;  vol.  VI.,  in  three  parts, 
comprises  material  on  the  incorporation  of  Holland,  and 
the  overthrow  of  French  rule  in  1813. 

2.  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  ler.,  vols.  VIII.  to  XX.  An 
indispensible  source  for  a  study  of  Napoleon's  dealings 
with  Holland.     I  did  not  consult  the  Correspondance  af- 
ter July,  1810,  for  Colenbrander,  in  vol.  VI.,  has  re-pub- 


Bibliography  183 

lished  from  this  collection,  and  also  from  the  collections 
of  Lecestre  and  Brotonne,  all  of  Napoleon's  writings  re- 
lating to  Holland.  Mary  Loyd's  New  Letters  of  Napo- 
leon I.  contains  an  occasional  letter  not  found  in  any  of 
the  above  collections. 

3.  Rocquain,  Felix,  Napoleon  ler  et  le  Rois  Louis,  d'  apr&s 
les    documents    conserves    aux    archives   nationales,    pp. 
CXXVIII+337.     (Paris,  1875).     Rocquain  has  here  col- 
lected   all    the    correspondence    between    Napoleon    and 
Louis.    Napoleon's  letters  may  also  be  found  in  the  Cor- 
respondence, but  Louis'  letters  are  not  accessible  else- 
where in  printed  form. 

4.  Duboscq,  Andr£,  Louis  Bonaparte  en  Hollande,  d'  aprfcs 
ses  lettres,  1806-1810.  pp.  401.     (Paris,  1911).     Here  are 
to  be  found  a  number  of  Louis'  communications  with 
Dutch  officials.    A  few  of  these  have  not  been  reprinted 
by  Colenbrander. 

5.  Louis   Bonaparte,  Documents  Historiques  et  Reflexion 
sur  le  Gouvernment  de  la  Hollande,  III  vols.    (Paris, 
1820).     In  these  Memoirs  Louis  sought  to  justify  many 
of  his  acts  of  his  reign.     Napoleon  received  a  copy  of 
them  at  St.  Helena  just  before  his  death,  but  his  com- 
ment was  by  no  means  favorable.    They  contain  a  num- 
ber of  documents  which  have  proved  useful. 

6.  Roell,  J.  Willem,  Verslag  van  het  Verblijf  des  Konings 
te  Parijs,  in  1809  en  1810,  pp.  409.     (Amsterdam,  1837). 
Roell,  Dutch  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  accompanied 
Louis  on  his  trip  to  Paris  in  1809.     This  Report  is  the 
best  inside  information  as  to  many  of  the  occurrences 
during   Louis'    stay   at    Paris.     The   lengthy   appendices 
(pp.  197-409)   contain  valuable  source  material. 

7.  De  Clercq,  M.,  Recueil  des  Traites  de  la  France,  vol.  II. 

8.  Le  Moniteur  Universel,  1803  to  1810.    The  Moniteur,  be- 
ing the  official  organ  of  the  French  government,  contains 
a  number  of  Napoleon's  decrees,  and  also  yielded  various 
items  of  interest  on  commercial  matters. 

9.  Poulson's  American  Daily  Advertiser,  1803-1810. 

10.  The  Aurora,  1803  to  1810.     Both  of  these  dailies  were 
published  at  Philadelphia,  which  was  then  our  leading 
port.    I  consulted  them  chiefly  for  the  shipping  news. 

11.  Annual  Register,  1807,  1809. 

12.  Hogendorp,  F.  de  B.,  Brieven  en  Gedenkschriften  van 
Gijsbert  Karel  van  Hogendorp.    VII.  vols.     (The  Hague, 


184  Bibliography 

1866-1903).  Van  Hogendorp  temporarily  acted  as  Seer, 
of  Foreign  Affairs  in  1813-'14,  and  his  letters  and  me- 
moirs shed  some  light  on  the  re-opening  of  relations  with 
the  United  States  in  1814. 

13.  Pitkin,  Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  and  Manufac- 
tures of  the  United  States.     (1835  edition.) 

14.  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  vols.  II.,  III.,  IV.,  VIII. 

15.  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vols.  III.,  V., 
VI.    Volume  III.  contains  a  part  of  Armstrong's  corre- 
spondence with  Champagny  in  1810.    In  vol.  V.  is  to  be 
found  the  correspondence  relating  to  spoliation  claims, 
while  vol.  VI.  contains  a  part  of  the  material  relating  to 
discriminating  duties. 

16.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vols. 
I.  and  II. 

C.     SECONDARY  WORKS. 

1.  Colenbrander,  H.  T.,  De  Betaafsche  Republiek,  pp.  286. 
(The  Hague,  1908.) 

2.  Vreede,  G.  W.,  Inleiding  tot  eene  Geschiedenis  der  Ne- 
derlandsche  Diplomatie.     (Utrecht,  1865.) 

3.  Wichers,  L.,  De  Regeering  van  Koning  Lodewijk  Napo- 
leon, 1806-1816.     pp.  401.     (Utrecht,  1865.) 

Both  of  the  above  contain  some  original  material  in  the 
appendices. 

4.  Wiipperman,  Generaal,  Nederland  Voor  Honderd  Jaren, 
1795-1813.     pp.  538.     (Utrecht,  1913-)   .  This  is  the  best 
secondary  account  for  the  entire  period  of  French  domi- 
nation, and  promises  to  be  the  standard  work  on  the 
subject. 


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